Socr. See then whether it is possible thus to possess science without having it: just as if any one having caught some wild birds, as doves or any others, and having constructed a dove-cote at home, should feed them; we should probably say that in some respects he always has them, because he possesses them: should we not?
Theæ. Yes.
Socr. But in another respect we should say that he has none of them, but that he has acquired a power over them, since he has brought them under his control, in an enclosure of his own, so as to take and have them when he pleases, by catching whichever he wishes, and again of letting them go: and this he is at liberty to do as often as he thinks fit.
Theæ. Such is the case.
131. Socr. Again, therefore, as in a former part of our discussion we constructed I know not what kind of waxen figment in the soul, so now let us make in each soul a kind of aviary of all sorts of birds, some being in flocks, apart from others, and others few together, and others alone, flying amongst all the rest wherever it may chance.
Theæ. Suppose it to be made: but what next?
Socr. While we are children, we must say, that this receptacle is empty, and instead of birds we must understand sciences; whatever science, then, one has become possessed of and shut up in this enclosure, one must say that he has learnt or discovered the thing of which this is the science, and that this is to know.
Theæ. Be it so.
Socr. Again, therefore, when any one wishes to catch any one of these sciences, and, when he has taken it, to have it, and again to let it go, consider what words he requires, whether the same as before, when he possessed them, or different ones. But from what follows you will more clearly understand what I mean. Do you call arithmetic an art?
Theæ. Yes.
132. Socr. Suppose this to be a catching of the sciences of every even and odd number.
Theæ. I do suppose it.
Socr. By this art, then, I think, he has the sciences of numbers under his control, and, if he pleases, transfers them to others.
Theæ. Yes.
Socr. And we say that he who transfers them teaches, and that he who receives them learns, but that having them, by possessing them in that aviary, he knows them.
Theæ. Certainly.
Socr. Attend now to what follows. Does not he who is a perfect arithmetician know all numbers? for the sciences of all numbers are in his soul.
Theæ. How not?
Socr. Does not then such a person sometimes calculate either something within himself, or something else that is external, that is capable of being calculated.
Theæ. Undoubtedly.
Socr. But to calculate we shall say is nothing else than to examine what is the quantity of any number.
Theæ. Just so.
Socr. What therefore he knows, he appears to examine, as if he did not know, though we admitted that he knows all number. You surely hear such questions as these.
Theæ. I do.
133. Socr. We, therefore, carrying on our comparison with the possession and catching of doves, will say that this catching is of two kinds, one before possessing for the sake of possessing, the other when one has already obtained possession, for the purpose of taking and having in the hands what was already possessed. So with respect to the things of which a person has already acquired the science by learning, and which he knew, he may learn these same things again, and recover and retain the science of each, which he formerly possessed, but had not ready in his mind.
Theæ. True.
Socr. On this account, I just now asked, what words it is proper to use in speaking of these things, when an arithmetician sets about calculating, or a grammarian reading any thing. Shall we say that knowing such a subject he again applies himself to learn from himself what he knows?
Theæ. This would be absurd, Socrates.
The Works of Plato (vol. 1 of 6) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.