Part 151

Socr. What then? do you suppose that any one has ever proposed to consider within himself of five and seven, I do not mean seven and five men, or any thing else of the kind, but the numbers five and seven themselves, which we said were in his soul like impressions in wax, and that it is impossible to judge falsely respecting them,—has any man at any time considered these very things, speaking to himself and asking how many they are, and answered, one that he supposes they are eleven, and another that they are twelve, or do all men say and suppose that they are twelve?

128. Theæ. No, by Jupiter, but many suppose that they are eleven. And if a person considers about a greater number, he is still more mistaken; for I suppose that you rather speak about every number.

Socr. You suppose rightly, but consider whether any thing else ever happens than this, that he supposes that the number twelve impressed in his soul is eleven?

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Does it not then come back to our former statements? For he who is in this condition supposes that what he knows is something else that he also knows, which we said was impossible, and from which very circumstance we demonstrated that there is no such thing as false judgment, in order that the same person might not be compelled to know and not to know the same thing at the same time.

Theæ. Most true.

Socr. Therefore we must show that false judgment is something else than an interchange of mind with perception. For, if this were so, we could never be deceived in the thoughts themselves: but now there is either no such thing as false judgment, or it is possible for a person not to know what he knows: and which of these two do you choose?

Theæ. You offer me a difficult choice, Socrates.

Socr. Our argument however appears as if it would not allow both these to take place: though (for we must venture on every thing), what if we should determine to lay aside all shame?

Theæ. How?

Socr. By taking upon ourselves to declare what it is to know.

Theæ. But why would this be shameless?

129. Socr. You do not seem to consider that the whole of our discussion from the beginning has been an investigation respecting science, as if we did not know what it is.

Theæ. I do consider it.

Socr. Does it not, then, appear to be a shameless thing, to explain what it is to know, when we are ignorant of what science is? But, Theætetus, our conversation has been all along full of defects. For we have over and over again used the expressions, We know, and We do not know, We have a scientific knowledge, and We have not a scientific knowledge, as if we both of us understood something about it, whereas we are still ignorant of what science is. But if you please, we will still at the present moment use the terms, to be ignorant, and to understand, as if we could properly use them, though we are destitute of science.

Theæ. But how will you converse, Socrates, if you abstain from the use of these expressions?

Socr. Not at all, while I am what I am. If however I were contentious, or if a person of that kind were now present, he would say that I must abstain from them, and would strongly object to what I say. But as we are poor creatures, do you wish I should venture to say what it is to know? For it appears to me that it would be worth while to do so.

Theæ. Venture then, by Jupiter; for you will be readily pardoned for not abstaining from these expressions.

130. Socr. Have you heard, then, what they now say it is to know?

Theæ. Perhaps so; but at present I do not remember.

Socr. They say, I believe, that it is to have science.

Theæ. True.

Socr. Let us, then, change it a little, and say that it is to possess science.

Theæ. But in what will you say this differs from that?

Socr. Perhaps in nothing: but whether it seems to differ or not, listen and examine with me.

Theæ. I will, if I am able.

Socr. To possess, therefore, does not appear to me to be the same as to have: for instance, if any one having bought a garment, and having it in his power, should not wear it, we should not say that he has it, but that he possesses it.

Theæ. And very properly.