Part 148

Socr. But do you think that any one else in his senses or even mad would venture to say seriously to himself, being himself persuaded, that an ox must needs be a horse, or two one?

Theæ. Not I, by Jupiter.

Socr. If, therefore, to speak to one’s-self is to form judgments, no one, who speaks and forms judgments of both objects, and touches upon both with his soul, would say and judge that one is another. You must therefore give up what you said about the other. For I assert this, that no one thinks that the ugly is beautiful, or any thing else of the kind.

Theæ. I give it up then, Socrates, and it appears to me as you say.

Socr. It is impossible, then, for one who forms judgments about both, to think that the one is the other.

Theæ. It seems so.

116. Socr. He, however, who judges one thing only, but the other in no respect, will never judge that the one is the other.

Theæ. You say truly: for he would be compelled to touch upon that also of which he does not judge.

Socr. It is not possible then for a person who judges either both or one of the two, to judge that one is the other: so that if any one should define false judgment to be the judgment of one thing instead of another, he would say nothing to the purpose; for neither in this way, nor in those before mentioned, does it appear that false judgment pertains to us.

Theæ. It seems not.

Socr. However, Theætetus, if this should appear not to be so, we shall be compelled to admit many absurdities.

Theæ. What are they?

Socr. I will not tell you, until I have endeavoured to consider the matter in every point of view; for I should be ashamed for both of us, if, while we are in the difficulty we are, we should be compelled to admit what I now say. But if we discover the object of our search and become free, then we will speak of others, as subject to this, being ourselves placed beyond the reach of ridicule: but if we shall continue still involved in difficulties, we must humble ourselves, I imagine, and give ourselves up to discussion, like those who are sea-sick, to be trampled on and treated as it pleases. Hear, then, how I still find a way out of our enquiry.

117. Theæ. Only speak.

Socr. I shall deny that we made a correct admission, when we admitted that it is impossible for a person to judge that what he knows is what he does not know and be thus deceived; but in some respect it is possible.

Theæ. Do you mean that which I suspected at the time when we said this, might be the case, that sometimes I knowing Socrates, and seeing another person at a distance whom I do not know, have thought it was Socrates, whom I do know? For what you mention happens in a case of this kind.

Socr. Are we not, then, driven from that position, because it made us, while we know, not know the things that we do know?

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Let us not, then, make our assumption in this way but as follows; and perhaps it will in some respect succeed for us, and perhaps it will oppose us. For we are in a condition in which it is necessary to examine out whole argument in every point of view. Consider, therefore, whether I say any thing to the purpose. Is it possible for a person who did not know something before, afterwards to learn it?

Theæ. It is indeed.

Socr. And can he not also learn another thing after another?

118. Theæ. Why not?

Socr. Suppose, then, I beg, for the sake of argument, that we have in our souls a waxen tablet, in one larger, in another smaller, in one of purer wax, in another of impurer, in some of harder, and in others again of softer, but in some of a moderate quality.

Theæ. I do suppose it.

Socr. Let us say, then, that this is a gift of Mnemosyne the mother of the Muses; and that, whatever we wish to remember of things that we have seen, or heard, or have ourselves thought of, we impress in this, by placing it under our perceptions and thoughts, as if we were taking off the impressions from rings: and that whatever is imprinted, this we remember and know, as long as its image remains; but when it is effaced, or can be no longer imprinted, we forget and do not know it.

Theæ. Be it so.

Socr. When, therefore, a person knows these things and considers any of the things that he sees or hears, consider whether in this way he can judge falsely?

Theæ. In what way?