Part 147

Socr. It is impossible, therefore, to judge that which is not, either with respect to real objects or abstract essences.

Theæ. It appears not.

Socr. To form false judgments, therefore, is different from judging things that do not exist.

Theæ. It seems to be different.

Socr. Neither then in this way nor in the way we considered a little before, is false judgment formed in us.

Theæ. On no account.

113. Socr. Do we then give that name to what takes place as follows.

Theæ. How?

Socr. We say that a mistaken judgment is a false judgment, when any one says that any real object is another real object, changing one for the other in his thoughts. For thus he always judges that which exists, but one thing instead of another, and erring in that which he was considering, he may be justly said to form a false judgment.

Theæ. You now appear to me to have spoken most correctly: for, when any one forms a judgment that a thing is ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly forms a false judgment.

Socr. It is evident, Theætetus, that you esteem me lightly and have no fear of me.

Theæ. How so?

Socr. I do not seem to you, I imagine, likely to lay hold of your “truly false,” by asking whether it is possible for swift to take place slowly or light heavily, or any other contrary, not according to its own nature, but according to the nature of its contrary, contrariwise to itself. This, however, I dismiss, that your confidence may not be in vain. But are you satisfied, as you say, that to form false judgments is to form mistaken judgments?

Theæ. I am.

114. Socr. It is possible, then, according to your opinion, for one thing to be comprehended in the mind as another, and not as it is.

Theæ. It is possible.

Socr. When, therefore, any one’s mind does this, is it not necessary that it should think about both objects, or one of them?

Theæ. Quite necessary.

Socr. Either together or in turns?

Theæ. Very well.

Socr. But by thinking do you mean the same that I do?

Theæ. What do you mean by it?

Socr. The discourse which the soul holds with itself about the objects that it considers. I explain this to you as a person who does not know what he says. For the soul, when it thinks, appears to me to do nothing else than discourse with itself, asking itself questions and answering them, affirming and denying; but when it has decided, whether it has come to its decision more slowly or more rapidly, and now asserts and does not doubt, this we call judgment. So that to form a judgment I call to speak, and judgment a sentence spoken, not indeed to another person nor with the voice but in silence to itself. But what do you call it?

Theæ. The same.

Socr. When any one, therefore, forms a judgment that one thing is another, he says to himself, as it seems, that one thing is another.

115. Theæ. How not?

Socr. Recollect, then, whether you have ever said to yourself, that the beautiful is certainly ugly, or the unjust, just, or even, chief of all, consider whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself, that one thing is certainly another, or, quite contrariwise, whether you have ever ventured even in sleep to say to yourself, that undoubtedly odd is even, or any thing else of the kind.

Theæ. You say truly.