Part 128

Theæ. He does indeed say so.

Socr. It is probable however that a wise man does not trifle; let us, therefore, follow him. Does it not sometimes happen that when the same wind blows, one of us is cold, and another not, and one slightly, but another exceedingly?

Theæ. Assuredly.

Socr. Whether, then, shall we say, that the wind at that time is in itself cold or not cold? or shall we believe Protagoras, that it is cold to him that is cold, but not to him that is not?

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Does it not, then, appear so to both of them?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But to appear is the same as to be perceived?

Theæ. It is.

Socr. Appearance then and perception are the same in things hot, and every thing of that kind; for such as every one perceives things to be, such also they seem to be to every one.

Theæ. It seems so.

Socr. Perception, therefore, has always reference to that which really is, and is free from falsehood, as being science.

Theæ. It appears so.

25. Socr. By the graces, then, was not Protagoras a very wise man, and did he express himself thus enigmatically to us, the general rabble, but speak the truth to his disciples in secret?

Theæ. What mean you by this, Socrates?

Socr. I will tell you, and that no mean account; he asserts, that no one thing exists of itself, nor can you correctly designate any thing by any quality, but if you call it great, it will appear small, and if heavy, light, and so with every thing else; as if nothing was one thing, or any thing, or possessed of any quality: but as if all things which we say exist, become so from impulse, motion, and admixture with each other, thereby designating them incorrectly; for nothing ever is, but is always becoming. And in this all the wise men in succession, except Parmenides, agreed, namely, Protagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles, and of the poets, those who rank highest in each kind of poetry, in comedy Epicharmus, and in tragedy Homer; for in saying that “Oceanus is father of the gods, and Tethys mother,” he asserts that all things are produced by flux and motion. Does he not seem to say so?

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Footnote 148:

Iliad, xiv. 201.

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Theæ. To me he does.

26. Socr. Who then can contend with such an army, with Homer for its leader, and not be ridiculous?

Theæ. It is not easy, Socrates.

Socr. It is not, indeed, Theætetus. For this is a strong proof in favour of their argument, that motion gives the appearance of existence and of generation, but repose of non-existence and decay; for heat and fire, which engenders and supports other things, is itself engendered by impulse and friction, but this is motion. Are not these the origin of fire?

Theæ. Surely they are.

Socr. And moreover the race of animals springs from the same causes.

Theæ. How not?

Socr. But what? Does not the habit of the body perish by rest and inaction, but is it not for the most part preserved by exercise and motion?