Theæ. Certainly.
18. Socr. But they say that Diana is the cause of this, because being herself a virgin she has the charge of child-births. Now to barren women she has not given the power of becoming midwives, because human nature is too weak to undertake an art in things of which it has had no experience, but she has imposed that office on those who from their age are incapable of bearing children, doing honour to the resemblance of herself.
Theæ. That is reasonable.
Socr. And is not this also reasonable and necessary, that who are pregnant and who are not should be better known by midwives than by others?
Theæ. Certainly.
Socr. Moreover, midwives by applying drugs and using enchantments, are able both to excite and, if they please, to alleviate the pangs, and to deliver those that bring forth with difficulty, and if the child appears to be abortive, they produce a miscarriage.
Theæ. It is so.
Socr. Have you not also heard this of them, that they are most skilful match-makers, as being perfectly competent to distinguish what kind of woman ought to be united to what kind of man, in order to produce the finest children?
Theæ. I did not altogether know that.
19. Socr. Be assured, then, that they pride themselves more in this than in cutting the navel-string. For consider; do you think it belongs to the same or a different art to cultivate and gather in the fruits of the earth, and again to know in what soil what plant or seed ought to be sown?
Theæ. No, but to the same art.
Socr. But with respect to women, my friend, do you think that there is one art of that kind, and another of gathering in the fruit?
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Footnote 147:
That is, of choosing the soil.
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Theæ. It is not reasonable to suppose so.
Socr. It is not. But by reason of the illegitimate and ill-assorted unions of men and women, to which the name of pandering has been given, midwives out of regard to their own dignity avoid match-making also, fearing lest by this they should incur the other imputation, since it doubtless belongs to real midwives only to make marriages properly.
Theæ. It appears so.
Socr. Such then is the office of midwives, but less important than my task. For it does not happen to women, sometimes to bring forth images, and sometimes realities, which cannot be easily discriminated; for, if it did happen, it would be the greatest and noblest work for midwives to distinguish that which is true and that which is not; do you not think so?
Theæ. I do.
20. Socr. But in my art of midwifery all other things are the same as in theirs; but it differs in this, that it delivers men and not women, and that it attends to their souls bringing forth and not their bodies. But the most important thing in my art is, that it is able to test in every possible way whether the mind of a young man is bringing forth an image and a cheat, or what is genuine and true: for the case is the same with me as with midwives; I am barren of wisdom, and as to what many have reproached me with, that I question others, but give no answer myself on any subject, because I have no wisdom, they reproach me truly. But the cause of this is as follows: the deity compels me to act the part of a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth myself. I am not, therefore, myself at all wise, and I have no such discovery as is the offspring of my own mind; but those who associate with me at first appear, some of them, exceedingly ignorant, but all, as our intimacy continues, to whom the deity grants that privilege, make a wonderful proficiency, as is evident both to themselves and others; and this is clear, that they make this proficiency without ever learning any thing from me, but from their own resources finding and becoming possessed of many beautiful things; of the midwife’s office, however, the deity and I are the cause. 21. But it is evident from this: many, from not knowing this, and deeming themselves to be the cause, but despising me, either of themselves or through the persuasion of others, have left me sooner than was proper, and after they have left me have miscarried for the future, in consequence of their depraved associations, and badly nurturing what they have been delivered of through me, they have destroyed it, setting a higher value on cheats and images than on that which is true, they have at last appeared to be ignorant both to themselves and others. One of these was Aristides son of Lysimachus, and many others, with some of whom, when they again come to me, begging to renew their intercourse with me, and doing every thing in their power to obtain it, the demon that attends me prevents me from associating, but with others it allows me, and these again make considerable proficiency. And they that associate with me are in this respect affected in the same way as women who bring forth; they suffer pangs, and are filled with anxieties, to a far greater degree than the women are. But their pangs my art is able both to excite and appease. And these are affected in this way. 22. But sometimes, Theætetus, there are some who do not appear to me to be at all pregnant, and I, knowing that they do not need my assistance, very kindly sue others for them, and with the aid of the deity, conjecture well enough, from associating with whom they will derive benefit. Of these I have handed many over to Prodicus, and many to other wise and divine men. I have dwelt long on this, my excellent friend, for this reason, because I suspect, as you also think yourself, that you are in pain from being pregnant with something inwardly. Deal with me, then, as son of a midwife, and as myself skilled in midwifery, and endeavour to answer the questions I put to you to the best of your ability. And if, on examining any thing that you say, I shall consider it to be an image and not true, and should thereupon remove it and throw it away, do not be angry with me, like women who are delivered for the first time are for their children: for many, my admirable friend, have ere this been so affected towards me as to be actually ready to bite me, when I take away any trifle from them, and they do not think that I do this with a good design, in that they are very far from knowing that no deity designs ill to men, and that neither do I do any thing of this kind through ill-will, but because it is by no means allowable for me to give way to falsehood and conceal the truth. 23. Again, therefore, from the beginning, Theætetus, endeavour to tell me what science is; but never say that you are unable to do so; for if God wills and you strive manfully you will be able.
Theæ. Indeed, Socrates, when you are thus urgent, it would be disgraceful for one not to endeavour to the utmost of one’s power to say what one is able. He, then, that knows any thing appears to me to perceive what he knows, and, as it now seems, science is nothing else than perception.
Socr. Well and nobly said, my boy; for it is right thus to declare one’s opinion. But come, let us consider this together, whether it is solid or empty. Science, you say, is perception?
Theæ. Yes.
Socr. You appear, indeed, to have given no mean definition of science, but that which Protagoras has given; but he said the same thing in a different manner. For he says that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that exist, and of the non-existence of those that do not exist. You have doubtless read this?
Theæ. I have read it, and that often.
24. Socr. Does he not say pretty much, that such as every thing appears to me, such it is to me, and as it appears to you, such it is to you, but you and I are men?
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