The Science and Philosophy of the Organism

Part I.--the Individual Organism With Regard to Form and Metabolism

*A.* ELEMENTARY MORPHOGENESIS--

Evolutio and Epigenesis in the old Sense 25 The Cell 27 The Egg: its Maturation and Fertilisation 31 The First Developmental Processes of Echinus 33 Comparative Embryology 44 The First Steps of Analytical Morphogenesis 45 The Limits of Pure Description in Science 50

*B.* EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL MORPHOGENESIS--

1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE PHYSIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT. “EVOLUTIO” AND “EPIGENESIS” 52

The Theory of Weismann 52 Experimental Morphology 56 The Work of Wilhelm Roux 58 The Experiments on the Egg of the Sea-urchin 59 On the Intimate Structure of the Protoplasm of the Germ 65 On some Specificities of Organisation in Certain Germs 70 General Results of the First Period of “Entwickelungsmechanik” 71 Some New Results concerning Restitutions 74

2. ANALYTICAL THEORY OF MORPHOGENESIS 76

α. THE DISTRIBUTION OF MORPHOGENIC POTENCIES 76

Prospective Value and Prospective Potency 76 The Potencies of the Blastomeres 79 The Potencies of Elementary Organs in General 80 Explicit and Implicit Potencies: Primary and Secondary Potencies 83 The Morphogenetic Function of Maturation in the Light of Recent Discoveries 85 The Intimate Structure of Protoplasm: Further Remarks 88 The Neutrality of the Concept of “Potency” 89

β. THE “MEANS” OF MORPHOGENESIS 89

β′. The Internal Elementary Means of Morphogenesis 90

Some Remarks on the Importance of Surface Tension in Morphogenesis 91 On Growth 93 On Cell-division 94

β″. The External Means of Morphogenesis 95

The Discoveries of Herbst 96

γ. THE FORMATIVE CAUSES OR STIMULI 99

The Definition of Cause 99 Some Instances of Formative and Directive Stimuli 102

δ. THE MORPHOGENETIC HARMONIES 107

ε. ON RESTITUTIONS 110

A few Remarks on Secondary Potencies and on Secondary Morphogenetic Regulations in General 110 The Stimuli of Restitutions 113

3. THE PROBLEM OF MORPHOGENETIC LOCALISATION: THE THEORY OF THE HARMONIOUS-EQUIPOTENTIAL SYSTEM--FIRST PROOF OF THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE 118

The General Problem 118 The Morphogenetic “System” 119 The “Harmonious-equipotential System” 122 Instances of “Harmonious-equipotential Systems” 126 The Problem of the Factor *E* 132 No Explanation offered by “Means” or “Formative Stimuli” 132 No Explanation offered by a Chemical Theory of Morphogenesis 134 No Machine Possible Inside the Harmonious Systems 138 The Autonomy of Morphogenesis proved 142 “Entelechy” 143 Some General Remarks on Vitalism 145 The Logic of our First Proof of Vitalism 146

4. ON CERTAIN OTHER FEATURES OF MORPHOGENESIS ADVOCATING ITS AUTONOMY 150

Harmonious-equipotential Systems formed by Wandering Cells 151 On Certain Combined Types of Morphogenetic Systems 153 The “Morphaesthesia” of Noll 157 Restitutions of the Second Order 158 On the “Equifinality” of Restitutions 159 Remarks on “Retro-Differentiation” 163

*C.* ADAPTATION--

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON REGULATIONS IN GENERAL 165

1. MORPHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION 168

The Limits of the Concept of Adaptation 168 Adaptations to Functional Changes from Without 172 True Functional Adaptation 176 Theoretical Conclusions 179

2. PHYSIOLOGICAL ADAPTATION 184

Specific Adaptedness *not* “Adaptation” 186 Primary and Secondary Adaptations in Physiology 188 On Certain Pre-requisites of Adaptations in General 189 On Certain Groups of Primary Physiological Adaptations 190

General Remarks on Irritability 190 The Regulation of Heat Production 193 Primary Regulations in the Transport of Materials and Certain Phenomena of Osmotic Pressure 194 Chromatic Regulations in Algae 197 Metabolic Regulations 198

Immunity the only Type of a Secondary Physiological Adaptation 204 No General Positive Result from this Chapter 209 A few Remarks on the Limits of Regulability 212

*D.* INHERITANCE. SECOND PROOF OF THE AUTONOMY OF LIFE--

The Material Continuity in Inheritance 214 On Certain Theories which Seek to Compare Inheritance to Memory 216 The Complex-Equipotential System and its Rôle in Inheritance 219 The Second Proof of Life-Autonomy. Entelechy at the Bottom of Inheritance 224 The Significance of the Material Continuity in Inheritance 227 The Experimental Facts about Inheritance 228 The Rôle of the Nucleus in Inheritance 233 Variation and Mutation 237

*CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FIRST MAIN PART OF THESE LECTURES* 240

Part Ii.--Systematics and History

*A.* THE PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMATICS--

Rational Systematics 243 Biological Systematics 246

*B.* THE THEORY OF DESCENT--

1. GENERALITIES 250

The Covert Presumption of all Theories of Descent 253 The Small Value of Pure Phylogeny 255 History and Systematics 257

2. THE PRINCIPLES OF DARWINISM 260

Natural Selection 261 Fluctuating Variation the Alleged Cause of Organic Diversity 264 Darwinism Fails all along the Line 269

3. THE PRINCIPLES OF LAMARCKISM 271

Adaptation as the Starting-Point 272 The Active Storing of Contingent Variations as a Hypothetic Principle 273 Criticism of the “Inheritance of Acquired Characters” assumed by Lamarckism 275 Other Principles Wanted 281 Criticism of the Hypothesis of Storing and Handing Down Contingent Variations 282

4. THE REAL RESULTS AND THE UNSOLVED PROBLEMS OF TRANSFORMISM 290

5. THE LOGICAL VALUE OF THE ORGANIC FORM ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENT TRANSFORMISTIC THEORIES 293

The Organic Form and Entelechy 294

*C.* THE LOGIC OF HISTORY 297

1. THE POSSIBLE ASPECTS OF HISTORY 299

2. PHYLOGENETIC POSSIBILITIES 304

3. THE HISTORY OF MANKIND 306

Cumulations in Human History 308 Human History not an “Evolution” 311 The Problem of the “Single” as such 315

*CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SYSTEMATICS AND HISTORY IN GENERAL* 322

THE PROGRAMME

ON LORD GIFFORD’S CONCEPTION OF “SCIENCE”

This is the first time that a biologist has occupied this place; the first time that a biologist is to try to carry out the intentions of the noble and high-minded man to whom this lectureship owes its foundation.

On such an occasion it seems to be not undesirable to inquire what Lord Gifford’s own opinions about natural science may have been, what place in the whole scheme of human knowledge he may have attributed to those branches of it which have become almost the centre of men’s intellectual interest.

And, indeed, on studying Lord Gifford’s bequest with the object of finding in it some reference to the natural sciences, one easily notes that he has assigned to them a very high place compared with the other sciences, at least in one respect: with regard to their methods.

There is a highly interesting passage in his will which leaves no doubt about our question. After having formally declared the foundation of this lectureship “for Promoting, Advancing, Teaching and Diffusing the study of Natural Theology in the widest sense of that term,” and after having arranged about the special features of the lectures, he continues: “I wish the lecturers to treat their subject as a strictly natural science, the greatest of all possible sciences, indeed, in one sense, the only science, that of Infinite Being.... I wish it considered just as astronomy or chemistry is.”

Of course, it is not possible to understand these words of Lord Gifford’s will in a quite literal sense. If, provisionally, we call “natural theology” the ultimate conclusions which may be drawn from a study of nature in connection with all other results of human sciences, there cannot be any doubt that these conclusions will be of a rather different character from the results obtained in, say, the special field of scientific chemistry. But, nevertheless, there are, I think, two points of contact between the wider and the narrower field of knowledge, and both of them relate to method. Lord Gifford’s own phrase, “Infinite Being,” shows us one of these meeting-points. In opposition to history of any form, natural sciences aim at discovering such truths as are independent of special time and of special space, such truths as are “ideas” in the sense of Plato; and such eternal results, indeed, always stand in close relation to the ultimate results of human knowledge in general. But besides that there is still another feature which may be common both to “natural theology” and to the special natural sciences, and which is most fully developed in the latter: freedom from prepossessions. This, at least, is an ideal of all natural sciences; I may say it is *the* ideal of them. That it was this feature which Lord Gifford had in view in his comparison becomes clear when we read in his will that the lectures on natural theology are to be delivered “without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation.”

So we might say that both in their logical and their moral methods, natural sciences are to be the prototype of “Natural Theology” in Lord Gifford’s sense.

NATURAL SCIENCES AND “NATURAL THEOLOGY”

But now let us study in a more systematic manner the possible relations of the natural sciences to natural theology as a science.

How is it possible for a natural scientist to contribute to the science of the highest and ultimate subject of human knowledge?

Almost all natural sciences have a sort of naïveté in their own spheres; they all stand on the ground of what has been called a naïve realism, as long as they are, so to say, at home. That in no way prejudices their own progress, but it seems to stand in the way of establishing contact with any higher form of human knowledge than themselves. One may be a first-rate organic chemist even when looking upon the atoms as small billiard balls, and one may make brilliant discoveries about the behaviour of animals even when regarding them in the most anthropomorphic manner--granted that one is a good observer; but it can hardly be admitted that our chemist would do much to advance the theory of matter, or our biologist to solve the problem of the relations between body and mind.

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