Part 3

Practical and theoretic life--Insufficiency of descriptive distinctions --Insufficiency of the psychological method in philosophy--Necessity of the philosophical method--Constatation and deduction--Theories which deny the practical form of the spirit--The practical as an unconscious fact: critique--Nature and practical activity--Reduction of the practical form to the theoretical: critique--The practical as thought in action--Recognition of its autonomy.

NEGATION OF THE SPIRITUAL FORM OF FEELING 21

The practical and the so-called third spiritual form: feeling--Various meanings of the word: feeling, a psychological class--Feeling as a state of the spirit--Function of the concept of feeling in the History of philosophy: the indeterminate--Feeling as forerunner of the æsthetic form--In Historic: preannouncement of the intuitive element--In philosophical Logic: pre-announcement of the pure concept--Analogous function in the Philosophy of the practical--Negation of feeling--Deductive exclusion of it.

III

RELATION OF THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY WITH THE THEORETICAL 33

Precedence of the theoretical over the practical--The unity of the spirit and the co-presence of the practical--Critique of pragmatism--Critique of psychological objections--Nature of theoretic precedence over the practical: historical knowledge--Its continual mutability--No other theoretic precedent--Critique of practical concepts and judgments--Posteriority of judgments to the practical act--Posteriority of practical concepts--Origin of intellectualistic and sentimentalistic doctrines--The concepts of end and means--Critique of the end as plan or fixed design--Volition and the unknown--Critique of the concept of practical sciences and of a practical Philosophy.

INSEPARABILITY OF ACTION FROM ITS REAL BASE AND PRACTICAL NATURE OF THE THEORETIC ERROR 53

Coincidence of intention and volition--Volition in the abstract and in the concrete: critique--Volition thought and real volition: critique--Critique of volition with unknown or ill-known base --Illusions in the instances adduced--Impossibility of volition with erroneous theoretical base--Forms of the theoretic error and problem as to its nature--Distinction between ignorance and error: practical origin of latter--Confirmations and proofs--Justification of the practical repression of error--Empirical distinctions of errors and the philosophic distinction.

IDENTITY OF VOLITION AND ACTION AND DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLITION AND EVENT 73

Volition and action: intuition and expression--Spirit and nature--Inexistence of volitions without action and inversely--Illusions as to the distinctions between these terms--Distinction between action and succession or event--Volition and event--Successful and unsuccessful actions: critique--Acting and foreseeing: critique--Confirmation of the inderivability of the value of action from success--Explanation of facts that seem to be at variance.

THE PRACTICAL JUDGMENT, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL 86

Practical taste and judgment--Practical judgment as historical judgment--Its Logic--Importance of the practical judgment--Difference between practical judgment and judgment of event--Progress in action and progress in Reality--Precedence of the Philosophy of the practical over the practical judgment--Confirmation of the philosophic incapacity of the psychological method.

VII

PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION, RULES AND CASUISTIC 103

Justification of the psychological method and of empirical and descriptive disciplines--Practical Description and its literature --Extension of practical description--Normative knowledge or rules: their nature--Utility of rules--The literature of rules and its apparent decadence--Relation between the arts (collections of rules) and philosophic doctrines--Casuistic: its nature and utility--Jurisprudence as casuistic.

VIII

CRITIQUE OF THE INVASIONS OF PHILOSOPHY INTO PRACTICAL DESCRIPTION AND INTO ITS DERIVATIVES 121

First form: tendency to generalize--Historical elements that persist in the generalizations--Second form: literary union of philosophy and empiria--Third form: attempt to put them in close connection--Science of the practical, and Metaphysic: various meanings--Injurious consequences of the invasions--1st, Dissolution of empirical concepts--Examples: war and peace, property and communism, and the like--Other examples--Misunderstandings on the part of the philosophers--Historical significance of such questions--2nd, False deduction of the empirical from the philosophic--Affirmations as to the contingent changed into philosophemes--Reasons for the rebellion against rules--Limits between philosophy and empiria.

HISTORICAL NOTES 144

I. Distinction between history of the practical principle and history of liberation from the transcendental--II. Distinction of the practical from the theoretical--III. Minglings of the Philosophy of the practical with Description--Vain attempts at a definition of empirical concepts--Attempts at deduction--IV. Various questions--Practical nature of error--Practical taste--V. Doctrines of feeling--The Wolfians--Jacobi and Schleiermacher--Kant--Hegel--Opponents of the doctrine of the three faculties. Krug--Brentano.

SECOND SECTION

THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY IN ITS DIALECTIC

NECESSITY AND FREEDOM IN THE VOLITIONAL ACT 173

The problem of freedom--Freedom of willing and freedom of action: critique of such distinction--The volitional act, both necessary and free--Comparison with the æsthetic activity--Critique of determinism and arbitrarism--General form of this antithesis: materialism and mysticism--Materialistic sophisms of determinism--Mysticism of doctrine of free will--Doctrine of necessity-liberty and idealism--Doctrine of double causality; of dualism and agnosticism--Its character of transaction and transition.

FREEDOM AND ITS OPPOSITE. GOOD AND EVIL 192

Freedom of action as reality of action--Inconceivability of the absolute absence of action--Non-freedom as antithesis and contrariety--Nothingness and arbitrariness of non-liberty--Good as freedom and reality, and evil as its opposite--Critique of abstract monism and of dualism of values--Objections to the irreality of evil--Evil in synthesis and out of synthesis--Affirmative judgments of evil as negative judgments--Confirmations of the doctrine--The poles of feeling (pleasure and pain); and their identity with the practical opposites--Doctrine relating to pleasure and happiness: critique--Empirical concepts relating to good and evil--To have to be, ideal, inhibitive, imperative power--Evil, remorse, etc.; good, satisfaction, etc.--Their incapacity for serving as practical principles--Their character.

III

THE VOLITIONAL ACT AND THE PASSIONS 215