CHAPTER XXXIII.

HIRING OF FOREIGNERS AND EMPLOYMENT AND TREATMENT OF INDIANS IN THE AMERICAN WAR.

No two acts of the British Government in connection with the American war were more deprecated on both sides of the Atlantic than the employment of foreign troops and Indians against the colonists; they were among the alleged and most exciting causes of the Declaration of Independence; they weakened British influence throughout the colonies; they roused thousands to arms who would have otherwise remained peacefully at home. In England they were denounced by the highest personages both in and out of Parliament, and by the public at large.

These Hessian mercenaries, though much lauded at first, and dreaded by the colonists, proved to be inferior to the British soldiers, were not reliable, deserted in large numbers, and plundered everywhere, without regard to Loyalists or Disloyalists, and strengthened the American resistance far more than they strengthened the British army.

But if the hiring of foreign troops at an enormous expense was disgraceful and impolitic, the employment of Indians against the colonists was still more impolitic and unnatural an outrage upon civilization and humanity; and what is still even more to be lamented is that this enlistment of savages in the warfare of one branch of the British family against another was sanctioned if not instigated by the King himself.

During the war between France and England, which commenced in 1755, both parties sought the alliance and support of the Indians, and employed them in the savage work of border warfare. The French succeeded in securing the greater number of the Indians, and used them with dreadful effect, murdering and scalping thousands of the British colonists along the inland frontiers of the several colonies. At the termination of the war by the Treaty of Paris, in 1763, and the extinction of French power in America, the French authorities commended the Indians to cultivate the friendship of England, whose great superiority and success in the war tended to turn the Indian affections and interest in favour of the British. Dr. Ramsay observes: "The dispute between Great Britain and her colonies began to grow serious, and the friendship of the Indians became a matter of consequence to both parties. Stretching for fifteen hundred miles along the whole north-western frontier of the colonies, they were to them desirable friends and formidable enemies. As terror was one of the engines by which Great Britain intended to enforce the submission of the colonies, nothing could be more conducive to the excitement of this passion than the co-operation of the Indians. Policy, not cruelty, led to the adoption of this expedient, but it was of that over refined species which counteracts itself. In the competition for the friendship of the Indians, the British had advantages far superior to any possessed by the colonists. The expulsion of the French from Canada--an event which had taken place only thirteen years before--was still fresh in the memory of many of the savages, and had inspired them with high ideas of the martial superiority of the British troops. The first steps taken by Congress to oppose Great Britain put it out of their power to gratify the Indians. Such was the effect of the non-importation agreement of 1774. While Great Britain had access to the principal Indian tribes through Canada on the north, and Florida on the south, and was abundantly able to supply their many wants, the colonists had debarred themselves from importing the articles which were necessary for the Indian trade."

The employment of the Indians in this civil war was in every respect disadvantageous to England. It was disapproved and denounced throughout England and Europe, as unnatural and inhuman; it was disapproved by the English commanders and even Loyalists in America, and inflamed the colonists to the highest degree. Wherever the Indians were employed, they were a source of weakness to the English army, while their ravages and cruelties disgusted the Loyalists and brought disgrace upon the English arms and cause. Sir Guy Carleton forbade their crossing from Canada into the colonies, and was afterwards accused in England for disobedience in not employing them; and General Burgoyne gave the strictest orders against their murdering and plundering. His defeat near Saratoga was largely owing to the conduct of the Indians in his army.

American historians dilate with much eloquence and justice upon the employment of Indians against the colonists, and narrate, with every possible circumstance of aggravation, every act of depredation and cruelty on the part of the Indians against the white inhabitants that espoused the cause of Congress; but they omit to state in like manner that Congress itself endeavoured to enlist the Indians in its quarrel with the mother country; that General Washington recommended their employment against the English, and that the very idea of engaging the Indians in this civil war originated with the first promoters of the revolution in Massachusetts. Nor do American historians state frankly and fairly that for every aggression and outrage committed by the Indians, the American soldiers, even under the express order of Congress, retaliated with a tenfold vengeance--not in the manner of civilized warfare, but after the manner and destruction of the savages themselves. The American writers had also great advantages in representing everything in regard to the proceedings of the revolutionists in the brightest light, and everything connected with the Loyalists and the English in the darkest colours, as they had the reports, letters, and all other papers relating to these subjects in their own exclusive possession, and published only such and so much of them as answered their purpose; even the internal proceedings of Congress were secret, and only became known after the close of the war. And many of the most important historical facts relating to the war have been brought to light in the biographies and correspondence of the men who figured in the revolution; and many letters and papers of great historical value in throwing light upon the events and conduct of parties during that period have only been published during the present century, and some of them for the first time during the present generation. This is true in regard to much that relates to the employment and proceedings of the Indians, as well as in regard to those of the Loyalists and various events of the American revolution. According to American historians, the idea of employing the Indians in the civil war was the wicked conception of British malignity, and everywhere reprobated in America; while the idea was actually first conceived and embodied in a resolution by the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. At Cambridge a new Provincial Congress had assembled, with the popular feeling in their favour, and with several thousands of militia or minute men under their command. But the most determined of all their measures was to enlist a company of Stockbridge Indians residing in their province. Further still, they directed a secret letter--and a secret it has been kept for more than fifty years--to a missionary much esteemed by the Indians in the western parts of New York, entreating "that you will use your influence with them to join us in the defence of our rights,"--in other words, to assail and scalp the British soldiers. It is worthy of remark, that the Massachusetts delegates, the framers of this letter, were among those who expressed the highest astonishment and indignation when, at a later period, a similar policy was adopted on the British side.

"Under date of the 27th of July, 1776, General Washington wrote to Congress," says Mr. Allen, "expressing respectful anxiety that the Stockbridge Indians shall be employed, and remarks that they were dissatisfied at not being included in the late order for enlisting their people, and had inquired the cause of General Putman.

"The reasons he assigns for recommending their employment are such as have influenced, and probably determined, the Americans from that time to the termination of the last war (1812-1815) with Great Britain--that is, the impossibility of keeping them neutral; the fear of their joining the enemy; while the customs of savage warfare are so repulsive to all the feelings of humanity and pride of the soldier, that it would seem no palliation could be received for the crime of having sanctioned them by example. Indians are active and serviceable when properly employed. They are the best defence against Indians. Acquainted from their birth with wiles and stratagems, they can trace the enemy, and tell its numbers, its footsteps, when the eye of the white man cannot discover a trace; and the moving of grass or rushes, which would be unregarded by a regular soldier, as the natural effect of winds, leads the Indian to be prepared for an ambush. The certainty that Indians can be restrained when it is wished, reconciles the opposite contradictions which are so often seen between the complaints made by the Americans that the enemy employed savages, at the very moment that they also employed them."

It is thus clear that both parties courted the co-operation of the Indians, and employed them to the utmost of their power; and therefore one party has no just ground of reproach against or advantage over the other party for the inhuman policy of enlisting the Indians in their cause, though the British had larger means and greater facilities in securing this savage co-operation.

It has been alleged, and no doubt truly, that the American commanders restrained the cruel and plundering propensities of the Indians, and the English commanders did the same; but neither the English nor the Americans were always able to control their Indian allies on or after the day of battle. American writers have, however, charged the outrages of the Indians in the English army, and scouting parties, to the sanction of the British generals, and the prompting of the British Loyalists, and some English writers have reiterated the charge. The employment of the Indians at all was against the judgment of both General Burgoyne and Sir Guy Carleton, and only submitted to in obedience to the King's authority. As early as the 11th of July, 1776, Burgoyne (while pursuing his enterprise from Montreal to Albany) complains as follows of the conduct of the Indians to the Secretary of State: "Confidentially to your Lordship, I may acknowledge that in several instances I have found the Indians little more than a name. If, under the management of their conductors, they are indulged for interested reasons in all the caprices and humours of spoiled children like them, they grow more unreasonable and importunate upon every new favour. Were they left to themselves, enormities too horrid to think of would ensue; guilty and innocent, women and infants, would be a common prey."

While the Indians were an incumbrance to Burgoyne's army during his whole campaign, and forsook him in the eventful hour when he most needed them, their barbarities contributed greatly to swell the revolutionary army, and to alienate great numbers of Loyalists, weakening Burgoyne's army in the very country where he expected most support from the inhabitants, and giving the American general, Gates, a great preponderance of strength over him--the army of Burgoyne being reduced to 3,500 men fit for actual service, while that of Gates was increased to upwards of 16,000 fit for actual service.

But if the British exceeded the Americans in gaining the greater part of the Indians to their cause, and the corresponding disgrace and disadvantage of their accompanying the army, the Americans far outdid the English and the Indians themselves in the work of desolation and destruction. Dr. Ramsay remarks:

"The undisturbed tranquillity which took place in South Carolina and the adjacent States after the British had failed in their designs against them in the spring and summer of 1776, gave an opportunity of carrying war into the Indian country. This was done, not so much to punish what was past, as to prevent all future co-operation between the Indians and British in that quarter. Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia sent about the same time a considerable force, which traversed the Indian settlements, burned their towns, and destroyed their fields of corn. Above 500 of the Cherokees were obliged, from want of provisions, to take refuge in Florida, and were fed at the expense of the British Government."

It is to be observed that this was not an invasion of the white settlements by the Indians, but an invasion of the Indian settlements by the whites; it was a "carrying war into the Indian country;" it was not provoked by the Indians, but "was done to prevent all future co-operation between the Indians and British in that quarter." Yet this war of invasion, this war of precaution, was also a war more destructive to the Indians than any which they, even under the French, had inflicted on the white colonists; for not an Indian cornfield was left undestroyed, nor an Indian habitation unconsumed.

FOOTNOTES:

"The colonies were particularly exasperated at the introduction of foreign troops into this quarrel. They looked upon this measure as an unanswerable proof that all regard for their character as Englishmen was fled, and that Great Britain viewed them as strangers, whom, if she could not conquer and enslave, she was determined to destroy. This persuasion excited their most violent indignation; they considered themselves as abandoned to plunder and massacre, and that Britain was unfeelingly bent on their ruin, by whatsoever means she could compass it.

"While the colonists represented this measure in so sanguinary a light, it was depicted at home in the same colour by their partisans. It was even reprobated by many individuals who were not averse to the other parts of the Ministerial plan, but who could not bring themselves to approve of the interference of foreign mercenaries in our domestic feuds.

"It was not only throughout the public at large this measure occasioned so much discontent; after having in Parliament undergone the keenest censure of the Opposition, it fell under the displeasure of a considerable number of those who sided with the Minister and were generally used to support the measures of Government; but on this occasion they loudly dissented from them. Several quitted the House without voting; others, who voted in his favour, obliged him previously to give them an assurance that he would remove all their doubts and scruples, and satisfy them clearly on this subject." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xviii., pp. 76, 77.)]

"They had, it was said, been told before their departure from Germany that they were to be put in possession of the lands of those whom they conquered, and they were full of this expectation at their arrival. But upon discovering their mistake, they resolved, however, to make themselves amends by appropriating whatever they could lay their hands upon. * * The conduct of the Hessians was extremely offensive to the British commanders, but they were too powerful a body to restrain by compulsion, as they composed almost one-half of the army. Notwithstanding the prudence and steadiness with which General Howe conducted himself upon this emergency, it was not possible to restrain their excesses, nor even prevent them from spreading among the English troops in a degree to which they would not have certainly been carried had they not such examples for a plea.

"The depredations of the Hessians grew at last, it was said, so enormous, that the spoils they were loaded with became an absolute incumbrance to them, and a frequent impediment to the discharge of their military duties.

"The desolation of the Jerseys was one of the consequences of this spirit of rapine. The Americans who adhered to Britain attributed to it the subsequent decline of the British cause in these and other parts. As the devastation was extended indiscriminately to friend and foe, it equally exasperated both parties; it confirmed the enmity of the one, and raised up a new enemy in the other; and it injured the British interest in all the colonies." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chaps. xvii. and xxii., pp. 53, 54-268, 269.)

Dr. Andrews adds, in another place, that--

"The resentment occasioned by the depredations that had been carried on in the Jerseys had left few, if any, friends to Britain in that province. The dread of seeing those plunderers return, who had spared neither friend nor foe, rendered all parties averse to the cause in which they were employed. To this it was owing that their motions were observed with such extreme vigilance, that they stood little or no chance of succeeding in any of their enterprises. So many had suffered through them, that there was no deficiency of spies to give instant information of whatever they were suspected to have in view; and as much mischief was done them by such as acted secretly from motives of private revenge, as by those who took an open part against them in the field." (Dr. Andrews' History of the American War, etc., Vol. II., Chap, xxiii., pp. 301, 302.)]

"It was unfortunate for the colonies that since the peace of Paris, 1763, the transactions with the Indians had been mostly carried on by superintendents appointed and paid by the King of Great Britain. These being under obligations to the Crown, and expectants of further favours from it, generally used their influence with the Indians in behalf of the mother country and against the colonies. * * The Americans were not unmindful of the savages on their frontier. They appointed commissioners to explain to them the grounds of their dispute, and to cultivate their friendship by treaties and presents. They first sought to persuade the Indians to join them against Great Britain, but having failed in that, they endeavoured to persuade the Indians that the quarrel was by no means relative to them, and that therefore they should take part with neither side.

"For the greater convenience of managing the intercourse between the colonies and the Indians, the latter were divided into three departments--the northern, southern, and middle--and commissioners were appointed for each. Congress also resolved to import and distribute among them a suitable assortment of goods, to the amount of £40,000 sterling, on account of the United States; but this was not executed." (Dr. Ramsay's History of the United States, Vol. II., Chap. xix., p. 321.)]

"For instance, the aid of the Indians had been willingly accepted by the colonists in the Canadian expedition since September, 1775; the general question of their employment had been considered by Washington in conference with a Committee of Congress and delegates of New England Governments in October of the same year; and the main objection which Washington and other officers urged against it, as shown by a letter of his to General Schuyler, January 27, 1776, and the answer from the latter, was that of expense. He had, nevertheless (April 19, 1776), advised Congress 'to engage them on our side,' as 'they must, and no doubt soon will, take an active part either for or against us;' and the Congress itself had, on June 3rd--not a month before the Declaration of Independence was actually accepted--passed a resolution to raise 2,000 Indians for the Canadian service, which, shortly afterwards, was extended by another (referred to in a letter of Washington's of June 20), authorizing General Washington to employ such Indians as he should take into the service in any place where he might think that they would be most useful, and to offer them bounties, not indeed for scalps, but for every officer and soldier of the King's troops whom they might capture in the Indian country or on the frontiers of the colonies. When all this had been done, it needed the forgetfulness and the blind hypocrisy of passion to denounce the King to the world for having 'endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages;' yet the American people have never had the self-respect to erase this charge from a document generally printed in the fore-front of their Constitution and Laws, and with which every schoolboy is sedulously made familiar.

"Perhaps, indeed, it would have been otherwise had not the charge been one which circumstances appeared to confirm. For, in fact, owing to causes already indicated, the Americans never could make friends of the Indians in the contest, and consequently the 'merciless savages' continue in history to figure on the side of the British. Who could wonder at it? At the date of the Declaration of Independence, the Indian child had only just reached man's estate, who in the year of his birth might have escaped being a victim to the bounty of £20, held out for the scalp of every Indian woman and child, by Massachusetts, in 1775, whilst one of £40 had been offered for that of his father, raised in 1776 to £300. It did not require the retentive memory of the redskin to make him look with suspicion on solicitations of friendship from men who might have been parties to such schemes of extermination to his race." (The Ludlow's History of the War of Independence, 1777-1783, Chap. v., pp. 124-126.)

"But Jefferson's violent pamphlet should, in fact, be looked upon less as a Declaration of Independence than as a Declaration of War--less as an assertion of right than as a cry of defiance uttered in the hour of grave peril, and in the face of a formidable foe."--Ib., p. 126.]

"In those days (1779), far unlike our own, the Congress resembled a Committee or a Junta, much rather than a chamber of debate. The speeches, it is said, were all in the style of private conversation. There were never more than forty members present, often no more than twenty. These small numbers, however, by no means ensured harmony, nor precluded violent and unseemly quarrels, rumours of which were not slow in passing the Atlantic. 'For God's sake,' thus wrote La Fayette from France, 'for God's sake, prevent the Congress from disputing loudly together. Nothing so much hurts the interest and reputation of America.' Thus the object of concealment, unless, perhaps, for private purposes, was most imperfectly attained, although, in name at least, the deliberations of Congress at this time were secret. Historically, even the Journal which they kept gives little light as to their true proceedings. An American gentleman, who has studied that document with care, laments that it is 'painfully meagre, the object being apparently to record as little as possible.'" (Lord Mahon's History of England, Vol. VII., Chap. lviii., pp. 420, 421; quoting as his authority, "Letter of La Fayette to Washington, June 12, 1779," and "Life of President Reed," by Mr. Wm. Reed, Vol. II., p. 18.)]

"Lord Suffolk, in his speech (in reply to Lord Chatham), undertook to defend the employment of the savages. 'The Congress,' he said, 'endeavoured to bring the Indians over to their side, and if we had not employed them they would most certainly have acted against us.' This statement, which at the time was doubted or denied, has been, it must be owned, in no small degree borne out by documents that have subsequently come to light. Even several months later, we find Congress in treaty to engage several parties of Indians in their service." (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lvi., p. 305.)

"See Washington's Writings, Vol. V., p. 273, and Appendix to Vol. III., p. 494. 'Divesting them,' says Washington, 'of the savage customs exercised in their wars against each other, I think they may be made of excellent use as scouts and light troops, mixed with our own parties.' But what more did the English ever design or desire?" (Lord Mahon's History, etc., Vol. VII., Chap. lvi., p. 305.)]

"It is due to Burgoyne to state, that from the first he had made most strenuous exertions, both by word and deed, to prevent any such enormities. The testimony, for example, of his aide-de-camp, Lord Petersham, when examined before the House of Commons, is clear and precise upon that point. (See Burgoyne's Narrative and Collection of Documents, pp. 65, 66, second edition.) But in spite of all restraints, the cruel temper and lawless habits of these savages would sometimes burst forth--sometimes not more fatally to their enemies than to their friends. The tragical fate of Miss MacRea raised one loud cry of indignation on both sides of the Atlantic. This lady, in the bloom of youth and beauty, the daughter of an American Loyalist, was betrothed to an officer in the British provincial troops. Anxious for her security, the officer engaged some Indians to escort her from her home and convey her to the British camp, where the marriage would be solemnized. As a further precaution, he promised to reward the person who should bring her safe to him with a barrel of rum. But this very precaution, as it seemed to be, was the cause of the disaster which ensued. Two of the Indians who took charge of her began a quarrel on the way, as to which of them should first present her to the bridegroom. Each was eager for the rum; each resolute that his companion should not receive it in his place. At last one of them in sudden fury raised his tomahawk, struck Miss MacRea upon the head, and laid her a corpse at his feet. General Burgoyne at this news displayed his utmost resentment and concern. He compelled the Indians to deliver up the murderer, and designed to put him to death. He was only induced to spare his life upon the Indians agreeing to terms which the General thought would be more effectual than any execution, in deterring them from similar barbarities. Deterred, indeed, they were. But when they found themselves precluded from their expected delights of plundering and scalping, they began to desert and go home. Of nearly five hundred who at the outset had joined Burgoyne, less than threescore at last remained beneath his banner."--Ib., pp. 259-261.

At the first general encampment of Burgoyne's army on the western side of Lake Champlain, he met a deputation of the Indians in alliance with Great Britain, and made an animated speech to them. "He exhorted them to behave with courage and fidelity to their friends, and to avoid all barbarity towards their enemies. He entreated them to be particularly careful in distinguishing between the adherents and foes to the British nation. He earnestly requested that they would put none to death but such as actually opposed them with arms in their hands, and to spare old men, women, children, and prisoners; to scalp only such as they had killed in action, and to treat compassionately the wounded and dying. He promised them a reward for every prisoner they brought in, but assured them he would look narrowly into every demand for scalps." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap, xxviii., p. 383.)]

"Several instances of this nature happened about this time, which contributed powerfully to alienate the minds of many from the cause in which they served. One was recorded, in particular, that equally struck both parties with horror. A young lady, the daughter of Mr. MacRea, a zealous royalist, being on her way to the British army, where she was to be married to an officer, unhappily fell into the hands of the Indians, who, without regarding her youth and beauty, murdered her with many circumstances of barbarity.

"Scenes of this nature served to render the royal party extremely odious. However the Americans might be conscious that the Indians were as offensive, and as much abhorred by their enemies as by themselves, still they could not forgive them the acceptance of such auxiliaries as must necessarily disgrace the best cause.

"The resentment occasioned by the conduct of the Indians, and no less the dread of being exposed to their fury, helped considerably to bring recruits from every quarter to the American army. It was considered as the only place of refuge and security at present. The inhabitants of the tracts contiguous to the British army took up arms against it almost universally. The preservation of their families was now become an object of immediate concern. As the country was populous, they flocked in multitudes to the American general's camp; and he soon found himself at the head of an army which, though composed of militia and undisciplined men, was animated with that spirit of indignation and revenge which so often supplies all military deficiencies." (Dr. Andrews' History of the Late War, Vol. II., Chap. xxviii., pp. 393, 394.)]