Part 13

Nothing can be more certain, than that his services were supereminently beneficial; and, that the period was not yet arrived for their being duly acknowledged.

Though not a word appears, in the official returns of the wounded at the siege of Calvi, to intimate the fact; though not a single syllable of regret is expressed, in the dispatches of either commander in chief; it was at this very siege, that the hero had the misfortune to be entirely deprived of the sight of his right eye. The calamitous accident was occasioned by a shot from one of the enemy's batteries striking the ground near the battery which he commanded; and driving, with prodigious violence, some minute particles of sand, or small gravel, into that tender organ.

Even this shocking event, with all it's attendant anguish, was incapable of forcing him from his post. With a ribbon tied over his inflamed eye, he persisted in directing the batteries, till the last fortress of Corsica had submitted to his sovereign's arms.

Surely, if the total loss of sight in one eye, which himself is said never to have considered as a wound, did not entitle his name to be placed in the list of wounded officers, which seems somewhat doubtful, the gallantry of remaining at his post would never have escaped Lord Hood, as it seems to have done the Honourable Lieutenant General Stuart, had he been present on the occasion.

On the 8th of August, two days before the capitulation was signed, Lord Hood, who had received the thanks of both houses of parliament, for his very gallant conduct in the expedition against Corsica, voted on Friday, the 20th of June 1794; when, also, the like thanks were voted to all the officers, sailors, and soldiers, engaged in that expedition; sent a letter to Captain Nelson, dated on board the Victory, off Calvi, in which he inclosed the above resolutions: observing that, having received his majesty's commands, to communicate to the respective officers, seamen, marines, and soldiers, who had been employed in the different operations which had been successfully carried on against the enemy in Corsica, a resolution of the two houses of parliament; he desires that he will make known, to all in the Agamemnon, and such other officers and seamen as are with him, and were employed at Bastia, the sense that is entertained of their spirited and meritorious conduct.

This, too, which is merely an official letter, has been magnified, by those who clearly know nothing about the matter, into an additional honour conferred on Captain Nelson, and said to have been highly flattering to his feelings.

How his feelings were in reality affected at this period, the reader will presently have an opportunity of knowing from much better authority.

In the mean time, Lord Hood sent duplicates of his former dispatches to the Admiralty, dated on board the Victory, off Calvi, August 9, 1794. He herewith transmits a continuation of Captain Nelson's Journal, from the 28th of July, to the 8th of August: also, the copy of a letter which he had received from Captain Nelson, highly creditable to Lieutenant Harrison, a transport agent; as well as to Mr. William Harrington, master of the Willington, and the transports men; who were all anxiously eager to serve on shore, or on board his majesty's ships, mentions having taken possession of the Melpomene and Mignonne frigates: the former, one of the finest ever built in France, carrying forty guns; the other, only thirty-two. Captain Cunningham, charged with these dispatches, who had been three months cruizing off Calvi, with infinite diligence, and perseverance, under many difficulties, is recommended as an officer of great merit, and highly deserving any favour that can be shewn him.

Without wishing to detract from the merits of Captain Cunningham, it may certainly be contended that he had not, during the time mentioned, surpassed Captain Nelson, who receives no such decided praise, nor any positive recommendation whatever.

These observations are drawn from the face of the public dispatches, compared with a knowledge of the services and character of Captain Nelson, as they were at that time manifesting themselves to all who knew him.

His conspicuous merits, it should seem, were growing too conspicuous; the power of his rising splendour, it might begin to be feared, would too powerfully eclipse that which was getting into the wane; and, therefore, though praise could not be entirely denied, it was by no means to be lavishly bestowed. This is ever the cold and cautious sentiment of mean and mercenary minds: it sometimes creeps into the bosoms of even the liberal and the brave. In the former, it begets a fixed principle of action; from the latter, it is generally soon expelled by a little dispassionate reflection. It is like the last struggle of age, contending against a conviction of the superior vigour of youth: which, by a good parent, is often unwillingly relinquished, in even corporeal considerations; scarcely ever, willingly, in those of intellect.

Without meaning to hazard any particular application of these ideas, there is good reason to think that he began now to be an object of considerable attraction. His power, though still abundantly too confined for his ability, had been in some degree extended; and his services were, in consequence, so numerous and great, that he well merited recommendation to an enlarged sphere of action.

That he thought himself slighted, is beyond a possibility of doubt: smarting with the total loss of sight in one eye, and almost exhausted by fatigue, he felt conscious of deserving applause more ardent than any which he had yet obtained. He was, probably, not pleased to find that his journal of the siege of Calvi did not appear, as perhaps it ought to have done, in the Gazette; nor even the letter in commendation of his voluntary coadjutors, which he had sent to Lord Hood. His lordship, however, it is but just to remark, could by no means be considered as accountable for these omissions, as he certainly transmitted both these documents to government.

What were his sensations, at this juncture, it would be difficult exactly to ascertain; but his consolation is known, and it was worthy of his exalted mind--"They have not done me justice," said he, writing to his eldest sister, Mrs. Bolton, "in the affair of Calvi; but, never mind, I'll have a Gazette of my own."

On another occasion, soon after, he remarked that he had then been more than a hundred days actually engaged, at sea and on shore, against the enemy, since the commencement of the war; that he had the comfort to be ever applauded by the commander in chief, but never to be rewarded: and, what he considered as more mortifying than all the rest, for services in which he was slightly wounded, others had been extravagantly praised, who were very snug in bed all the time, far distant from the scene of action.

In October 1794, Lord Hood returned to England; when the command of the Mediterranean fleet devolved on the present Lord Hotham, with whom Captain Nelson continued to serve with equally distinguished ability wherever opportunities occurred.

At the latter end of December, and beginning of January 1795, they were cruizing off Toulon for about three weeks: during fifteen days of which, in such a series of bad weather as he had scarcely ever experienced, they were almost constantly under storm stay-sails. They saw, while on this cruise, three French frigates; and had no doubt that, as one of them was a crippled ship, the Agamemnon, which sailed better than any ship in the fleet, and was the nearest to them by a couple of leagues, might have taken one or two of them. A line of battle ship, however, never chasing on such occasions, and the admiral's anxiety to keep the fleet together preventing him from making the signal for the frigates to chase them till too late in the day, they unfortunately effected their escape.

On the 10th of January, they arrived, from this unsuccessful cruise, in the Gulph of St. Fiorenzo; where, a few days after, in a very heavy sea, the Berwick, of seventy-four guns, Captain Smith, which was preparing to join the fleet, not having the rigging set up, lost all it's masts, and was rendered a complete wreck. The superiority of the Toulon fleet, at that time, rendered this a very serious misfortune, and it led to one which proved still greater.

The French, in fact, had sixteen ships of the line, besides the Sans Culotte of a hundred and twenty guns, with twelve frigates and five corvettes, then in the harbour; and thirty Marseilles ships were also fitting out as transports, generally supposed to be intended for the conveyance of troops on an expedition against our newly-acquired kingdom of Corsica.

Admiral Hotham, in the mean time, was desirous of getting again to sea, for the purpose of covering the convoy and expected reinforcements from England; and this he was obliged to effect without waiting longer for the Berwick. He had, in truth, at this period, much to contend with. His fleet was only half manned; Italy was calling him to her defence; and Corsica perpetually demanding the reinforcements and convoy hourly expected.

The French, well aware how inadequate, in numbers and in strength, Admiral Hotham must necessarily be for the accomplishment of all these objects in the face of such superior force, came out with positive orders to seek and to destroy the British Mediterranean fleet. This being effected, which their presumption left them no doubt would soon happen, their troops were to be landed, and the kingdom of Corsica retaken.

On the 8th of March, Admiral Hotham being in Leghorn Road, received an express from Genoa, that the French fleet, consisting of fifteen sail of the line and three frigates, was seen on the 6th instant off the Isle of Marguerite. This intelligence corresponding with a signal made from the Moselle, then in the offing, for a fleet in the north-west quarter, he immediately caused the squadron to be unmoored; and, at day-break the following morning, put to sea, in pursuit of the enemy.

The Moselle having brought intelligence that the fleet seen was steering to the southward, Admiral Hotham shaped his course for Corsica, lest their destination should be against that island; dispatching the Tarleton brig to St. Fiorenzo, with orders for the Berwick to join him off Cape Corse. He had, however, the misfortune to learn, by the return of the brig, the same night, that the Berwick had, two days before, been captured by the enemy's fleet.

Though the French ships were seen daily by the advanced frigates, the two squadrons did not get sight of each other till the 12th, when the enemy was discovered to windward.

Next morning, observing them still in that direction, without any apparent intention of coming down, the signal was made for a general chace. The weather being squally, and blowing very fresh, the Ca-Ira of eighty guns, formerly the Couronne, was discovered to be without it's topmasts; which afforded Captain Freemantle, of the Inconstant frigate, who was far advanced in the chace, an opportunity of shewing a good proof of British enterprise, by attacking, raking, and harassing that ship, till the coming up of Captain Nelson, in the Agamemnon, by whom it was soon so completely cut up, as to be incapable of getting away: his brave fellows, all the time, who appear to have been miraculously preserved, working the ship about the enemy's stern and quarters, with as much exactness as if going into Spithead. Though the Ca-Ira had thirteen hundred men on board, and Captain Nelson only three hundred at quarters, including himself--for this is his own account and mode of reckoning--he had, after an action of two hours, in which a hundred and ten of the enemy were killed and wounded, not one of his Agamemnons slain, and no more than seven wounded. The Sans Culotte, however, of a hundred and twenty guns, at length coming up, and the British heavy ships being still distant, Admiral Hotham called him off; making the signal for the squadron to form on the larboard line of bearing, in which order they remained during the night.

In the morning of the 14th, the Ca-Ira was discovered in tow of the Censeur of seventy-four guns, so far separated from their own squadron as to afford a probable chance of cutting them off. The opportunity was not lost; and, all sail being made to effect that purpose, the enemy were reduced to the alternative of abandoning those ships, or coming to battle. Our advanced ships were so closely supported in their attack on the Ca-Ira and Censeur, that they were effectually cut off from any assistance; and the conflict ended by the enemy's yielding them up: satisfied, after all their boasts, by firing on the British line, as they passed with a light air of wind, and evidently happy that our van ships had suffered too much for the squadron to follow them with any prospect of success.

The grand object of their vaunted armament, however, was completely frustrated by this encounter. It could not, Captain Nelson observed, be denominated a battle, as the enemy would not afford any opportunity of closing with them; if they had, from the zeal and gallantry endeavoured to be shewn by each individual captain, there was not the smallest doubt that a glorious victory would have ensued.

The French ships had been all fitted with forges; and fired, continually, from some of their guns, hot shot and shells. The diabolical practice of having furnaces in their cockpits, however, was found too dangerous to be long persisted in.