Part 12

All this day, the 1st of December, he observes, he has been in sight of the French squadron; which, he hears, has been joined by a frigate from Calvi. He misses, however, the frigate which had received most of his fire; and adds, that there are not wanting those who declare that they beheld it sink.

With these frigates, on the coast of Corsica, Captain Nelson may be said to have commenced his career as commander of a squadron; and such was his activity, skill, and bravery, that they were perpetually engaged against the enemy. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to trace every single transaction which occurred during the time which he held this command. His services were, occasionally, exerted at land as well as sea; and such was his dexterity in getting out guns, erecting batteries, and assisting the reduction of fortresses, that much of our success in gaining possession of that island was generally ascribed to his ability.

On the 10th of February 1794, the tower and garrison of Mortella surrendered; and the strong redoubt and batteries of the Convention were taken by storm on the 17th, after a severe cannonading of two days. The enemy abandoned, that same night, the tower of Forneli, and two considerable sea-batteries dependent on it.

On the 19th, they retreated from St. Fiorenzo to Bastia; having previously sunk one of their frigates, and burnt another in the gulph: and the town, forts, and port of St. Fiorenzo, were taken possession of, the same day, by his majesty's land and sea forces. The frigate which had been sunk was afterwards weighed, and taken into our service under the name of the St. Fiorenzo.

At the siege of Bastia, whither the enemy were followed, and which commenced the beginning of April, Captain Nelson bore a most conspicuous share; exerting himself with a vigour, alacrity, and judgment, which obtained universal admiration. It has been said, and re-echoed, that ample testimony was, on this occasion, given to his skill and unremitting exertions; but, it may safely be asserted, he never thought so.

Lord Hood, it is true, makes respectful mention of his services; it would be extremely wonderful if he did not, when it is considered that he was the principal naval officer actively employed there, and yet served, with the most indefatigable perseverance, nearly two months on land. What follows, however, is all that appears in his lordship's dispatches relative to Captain Nelson, which few will think too much--"Captain Nelson, of his majesty's ship Agamemnon, who had the command and direction of the seamen, in landing the guns, mortars, and stores, and Captain Hunt, who commanded at the batteries, very ably assisted by Captain Buller and Captain Serecold, and the Lieutenants Gore, Hotham, Stiles, Andrews, and Brisbane, have an equal claim to, my gratitude; as the seamen, under their management, worked the guns with great judgment and alacrity. Never was a higher spirit, or greater perseverance exhibited; and I am happy to say, that no other contention was at any time known, than who should be most forward and indefatigable for promoting his majesty's service; for, although the difficulties they had to struggle with were many and various, the perfect harmony and good humour that universally prevailed throughout the siege overcame them all."

This, certainly, is no singular praise of Captain Nelson; who, it is well known, greatly signalized himself on the occasion.

In the very next paragraph of the same Gazette, Lord Hood says--"I cannot but express, in the strongest terms, the meritorious conduct of Captain Duncan and Lieutenant Alexander Duncan, of the Royal Artillery, and Lieutenant De Butts, of the Royal Engineers: but my obligation is particularly great to Captain Duncan, as more zeal, ability, and judgment, was never shewn by any officer than were displayed by him; and I take the liberty of mentioning him as an officer highly entitled to his majesty's notice."

Such superior praise and recommendation of a military officer, however deserving, by the naval commander in chief, could not be very pleasing to Captain Nelson; who felt conscious of having merited at least equal attention, by ably performing more than could be in any way considered as his actual duty.

The slight sketch modestly given of this affair, by himself, in a letter to Captain Locker, will afford some idea of it's importance. It is dated, at Bastia, May 30, 1794, on board the Agamemnon: and states, that he has just got on board, after eight weeks service on shore; where, he trusts, he has acquitted himself in a manner his friends will be pleased with. The more he saw of this place, the more he was astonished at it's being given up: but, the truth was, that the different parties were afraid to trust each other; the surrender could be justified on no other ground.

The frigates formerly mentioned had now, most of them, fallen into his hands; for he mentions that he has then on board the Agamemnon two captains, twenty-four other officers, and three hundred seamen, of the ships he fell in with the preceding October. The officers abused the crews; the people, their officers: all joined against their commodore, for not coming down to the British ships after they were crippled. Not that Captain Nelson had any idea they could have taken his ships; but, he admitted that they certainly behaved shamefully ill. The Fortunee was burned, the Minerve and Le Fleche taken: the Melpomene got to Calvi; and would, he trusted, fall into his hands.

He adds, that they are now taking on board shot, powder, &c. for Calvi; which, though very strongly situated, he thinks will soon fall. Agamemnon is then to go to Gibraltar, for something like a refitment, having been without the slightest repair, in hull or rigging, sixteen months. He describes Bastia as most pleasantly situated; containing fourteen thousand inhabitants, and being capable of holding twenty thousand. A few hours, he says, will carr parties to Italy: and observes that, if the Corsicans knew their own interest, they would be happy with us; but, that they cannot bear dependance.

This opinion of Captain Nelson's, respecting the disposition of the Corsicans, is a fresh proof of his acute discernment, and was abundantly confirmed by the event.

It having been agreed, by the two commanders in chief, Lord Hood and Lieutenant-General the Honourable Charles Stuart, that the utmost dispatch was necessary, in order to enable the troops selected for the siege of Calvi to begin their operations before the commencement of the unhealthy season, every effort was used to forward the necessary preparations; and so effectual were the exertions of the different departments, that the regiments embarked at Bastia in the course of a very few days. Captain Nelson, accordingly, who had been detached on the 9th of June, by Lord Hood, from the fleet off Mortella Bay, to take the charge of these embarkations, in his lordship's absence, agreed that they should proceed to Port Agra, where a landing was effected on the 19th of the same month; and, on that very day, the army encamped, in a strong position, on the Serra del Cappucine, a ridge of mountains three miles distant from the town of Calvi.

From many of the out-posts, and particularly from those which the friendly Corsicans were ordered to occupy, it was distinctly discoverable that the town of Calvi was strong in point of situation, well fortified, and amply supplied with heavy artillery. The exterior defences, on which the enemy had bestowed a considerable labour, consisted in the bomb-proof Stone Star Fort Mozello, mounting ten pieces of ordnance, with a battery of six guns on it's right, flanked by a small entrenchment. In the rear of this line, which covered the town to the westward, was placed, on a rocky hill to the east, a battery of three guns. Considerably advanced on the plain to the south-west, the Fort Mollinochesco, on a steep rock, commanded the communication between Calvi and the province of Balagori; supported by two frigates, moored in the bay, for the purpose of raking the intermediate country. The principal difficulties, however, in approaching the enemy's works, did not so much arise from the strength of the defences, as from the height of the mountains and rugged rocky surface of the country it was necessary to penetrate; and so considerable were these obstacles, against the usual mode of attack, that it was judged expedient to adopt rapid and forward movements, instead of regular approaches.

In conformity to this plan of proceeding, the seamen and soldiers were laboriously employed in making roads; dragging guns to the tops of the mountains; and collecting military stores, for the purpose of erecting two mortar and four separate gun batteries, on the same night. One of these was intended against the Mollinochesco; the second, to be constructed on rocks, to cover the principal one, of six guns; which, by a sudden march, and the exertions of the whole army, was to be erected within seven hundred and fifty yards of the Mozello.

Owing to some mistake, the proposed battery against the Mollinochesco was built and opened two days earlier than the time appointed. Observing, however, that though this fort was considerably damaged, it seemed evidently the intention of the enemy to repair rather than evacuate it, on the evening of the 6th of July, the Royal Irish regiment was ordered to move towards their left, exposing the men to the fire of their artillery. At sun set, and during the greatest part of the night, this diversion was seconded by a feigned attack of the Corsicans: which so effectually deceived the enemy, that they withdrew a considerable piquet from the spot where the principal battery was to be constructed, in order to support the Mollinochesco; and, directing the whole of their fire to that point, enabled the troops to complete their work.

This important position established, the enemy was compelled to evacuate the Mollinochesco, and to withdraw the shipping under the protection of the town.

A heavy firing immediately commenced on both sides; which continued, with little intermission, till the 18th of that month: when, observing that their batteries were considerably damaged, and a breach appearing practicable on the west side of the Mozello, a disposition was made for a general attack on the outworks, under cover of two batteries ordered to be erected that night; which would, from their position, in the event of a check, appear the principal object of the movement.

By the greatest exertions, this battery was completely constructed, without discovery, within three hundred yards of the Mozello, an hour before day-break: a signal gun was then fired from it, for the troops to advance. Covered, in their approach, by two field pieces, they proceeded, with a cool and steady confidence, and unloaded arms, towards the enemy; forced their way through a smart fire of musquetry; and, regardless of live shells thrown into the trench, or the additional defence of pikes, stormed the Mozello: while the Royal Irish regiment, with two pieces of cannon, equally regardless of opposition, carried the enemy's battery on the left, and forced their trenches, without firing a shot.

The possession of these very important posts, which the troops maintained under the heaviest fire of shells, shot, and grape, induced an offer to consider such terms as the garrison of Calvi might incline to propose.

An unfavourable answer, however, being returned, the navy and army once more united their efforts; and, in nine days, completed batteries of thirteen guns, four mortars, and three howitzers, within six hundred yards of the town. These opened with so well directed a fire, that the enemy were unable to remain at their guns; and, in eighteen hours, sent proposals, which terminated in a capitulation, and the expulsion of the French from Corsica, on the 10th of August, after a siege of fifty-one days.

The above account of the reduction of Calvi is extracted from the dispatches of the military commander in chief, and affords a very good idea of the siege.

Lord Hood, who arrived off Calvi on the 27th of June, where he continued during the siege, in his dispatches to the Admiralty, writes--"The Journal I here transmit from Captain Nelson, who had the command of the seamen, will shew the daily occurrences of the siege; and whose zeal and exertion I cannot sufficiently express--or, of that of Captain Hallowell--who took it by turns to command in the advanced battery, twenty-four hours at a time: and, I flatter myself, they, as well as the other officers and seamen, will have full justice done them by the general; it is, therefore, unnecessary for me to say more on the subject."

What Lieutenant General Stuart did say, respecting Captain Nelson's wonderful exertions and consummate skill, on this occasion, however, instead of doing him fuller justice, was sufficiently moderate, and very concise--"The assistance and co-operation of Captain Nelson, the activity of Captain Hallowell, and the exertions of the navy, have greatly contributed to the success of these movements."

Can any person of the smallest discernment, for a moment suppose, that a mind like that of the heroic Nelson, could feel satisfied by such indiscriminate and cold approbation as is here expressed? The slightest glance even of his own modest Journal of the siege, must have convinced every one, had it been given, as he might expect, to the public, of the prodigious fatigue and perseverance, at least, which this great man underwent, if it had not demonstrated the astonishing skill and bravery which he is so well known to have there most eminently displayed.

An intelligent Corsican, now in England, Mr. Casalonga, perfectly remembers the general estimation in which Captain Nelson was held throughout the island, for the various prodigies of valour performed there during the year 1794; particularly, at the siege of the tower of Mortella, and the towns of Bastia and Calvi. Respecting this last place, he observes, an official report was sent to the municipality of Ajaccio, where himself was a member, that during the siege, which was very obstinate and dangerous, the place being deemed impregnable, Captain Nelson ran to every direction; and, in spite of a tremendous fire kept up by the enemy, he erected his battery in such a position as to throw shot on the besieged; who, perceiving their works destroyed, and public and private buildings demolished, were soon panic struck, and sued for capitulation.

Thus, while Captain Nelson was only considered, at home, as making one among the many brave officers employed in this service, his distinguished merits were so attractive in the eyes of foreigners, on the spot, that they ascribed nearly the whole success to his transcendent abilities.