Part 33

Japanese. [Entering on another part of the terms agreed on.] We will not confine Americans, or prevent them from walking around; but we should like to place a limit to the distance they may walk.

Perry. I am prepared to settle that matter now, but they must not be confined to any particular house or street. Suppose we make the distance they may walk, the same distance that a man can go and come in a day. Or, if you choose, the number of lis or ris may be agreed upon.

Japanese. We are willing that they shall walk as far as they can go and come in a day.

Perry. There is no probability that sailors would wish to go on shore more than once from curiosity; besides, they will have their daily duties to attend to on board ship and will not be able to go on shore.

Japanese. We do not wish any women to come and remain at Simoda.

Perry. The probability is that few women will go there, and they only the wives of the officers of the ships.

Japanese. When you come back from Matsumai we should like you to settle the distance that Americans are to walk. It is difficult for us to settle the distance.

Perry. Say the distance of seven Japanese miles in any direction from the centre of the city of Simoda.

Japanese. Very well. A few miles will make no difference. You are requested not to leave agents until after you have experienced that it is necessary.

Perry. I am willing to defer the appointment of a consul or an agent one year or eighteen months from the date of the signing the treaty; and then, if my Government think it necessary, it will send one.

In fact, not an article of the treaty was made without the most serious deliberation by the Japanese. In answer to a question from Captain Adams, in the very first stages of the negotiation, they replied: "The Japanese are unlike the Chinese; they are adverse to change; and when they make a compact of any kind they intend that it shall endure for a thousand years. For this reason it will be best to deliberate and examine well the facilities for trade and the suitableness of the port before any one is determined on." Probably nothing but the exercise of the most perfect truthfulness and patience would ever have succeeded in making a treaty with them at all; and from the language of one of their communications, it is obvious that, with characteristic caution, they meant that their present action should be but a beginning of intercourse, which might or might not be afterward made more extensive, according to the results of what they deemed the experiment.

This, it must be remembered, was the first formal treaty they ever made on the subject of foreign trade, at least since the expulsion of the Portuguese, and they evidently meant to proceed cautiously by single steps.

There is observable throughout the negotiations the predominating influence of the national prejudice against the permanent introduction of foreigners among them. The word "reside" is but once used in the whole treaty, and that in the article relative to consuls. The details of conferences, already given, show how anxiously they sought to avoid having consuls at all. Indeed, Commodore Perry says, "I could only induce the commissioners to agree to this article, by endeavoring to convince them that it would save the Japanese Government much trouble if an American agent were to reside at one or both of the ports opened by the treaty, to whom complaints might be made of any malpractice of the United States citizens who might visit the Japanese dominions." They wanted no permanent foreign residents among them, official or unofficial. This was shown most unequivocally in the remark already recorded in one of the conferences--"We do not wish any women to come and remain at Simoda."

Simoda was one of the ports open for trade with us; they knew that our people had wives and daughters, and that a man's family were ordinarily resident with him in his permanent abode, and that if the head of the family lived in Simoda as a Japanese would live, there would certainly be women who would "come and remain at Simoda." But more than this. It will be remembered that the Commodore had submitted to them our treaty with China, and they had held it under consideration for a week, at the end of which time they said: "As to opening a trade, such as is now carried on by China with your country, we certainly cannot yet bring it about. The Chinese have long had intercourse with Western nations, while we have had dealings at Nagasaki with only the people of Holland and China." Now what was "such a trade" as we carried on with China? The Japanese read in our treaty that five ports were open to us, that permission was given "to the citizens of the United States to frequent" them; and further, "to reside with their families and trade there." This they deliberately declined assenting to when they refused to make a treaty similar to that with China. They surely would not afterward knowingly insert it in any treaty they might make with us.

The only permanent residence to which they gave assent, and that most reluctantly, was the residence of a consul. Temporary residence was allowed to our shipwrecked citizens, as well as to those who went to Simoda or Hakodate on commercial business. They are allowed to land, to walk where they please within certain limits, to enter shops and temples without restriction, to purchase in the shops, and have the articles sent to the proper public office duly marked, where they will pay for them, to resort to public-houses or inns that are to be built for their refreshment "when on shore" at Simoda and Hakodate; and until built, a temple, at each place, is assigned "as a resting-place for persons in their walks." They may accept invitations to partake of the hospitality of any of the Japanese; but they are not permitted to enter "military establishments or private houses without leave." Without leave, our citizens cannot enter them within the territories of any nation with which we have a treaty. In short, the whole treaty shows that the purpose of the Japanese was to make the experiment of intercourse with us before they made it as extensive or as intimate as it was between us and the Chinese. It was all they could do at the time, and much, very much, was obtained on the part of our negotiator in procuring a concession even to this extent.

But, as he knew that our success would be but the forerunner of that of other powers, and as he believed that new relations of trade once commenced, not only with ourselves, but with England, France, Holland, and Russia, could not fail, in the progress of events, to break up the old restrictive policy, effectually and forever, and open Japan to the world; and must also lead gradually to liberal commercial treaties, he wisely, in the ninth article, secured to the United States and their citizens, without "consultation or delay," all privileges and advantages which Japan might hereafter "grant to any other nation or nations." And the Commodore's comments on this article conclusively show that he, at least, did not suppose he had made a "commercial treaty":

"Article IX. This is a most important article, as there can be little doubt that, on hearing of the success of this mission, the English, French, and Russians will follow our example; and it may be reasonable to suppose that each will gain some additional advantage, until a commercial treaty is accomplished. Article IX will give to Americans, without further consultation, all these advantages."

All other powers were forced to be content in obtaining just what we, as pioneers, obtained. Their treaties were like ours. That of Russia was copied from ours, with no change but that of the substitution of the port of Nagasaki for Napha in Riu Kiu. We respectfully submit, therefore, that all, and indeed more than all, under the circumstances, that could have been reasonably expected has been accomplished.

(1855) THE CAPTURE OF SEBASTOPOL, Sir Edward B. Hamely and Sir Evelyn Wood

This is the most famous event of the Crimean War, in which Russian power was pitted against the allied forces of Turkey, France, Great Britain, and Sardinia. The war grew out of rival demands concerning a protectorate in Turkey. In 1852 Napoleon III asked for the restoration of the protectorate of the Holy Places in the Ottoman Empire to the Latin Church. Supported by Russia, the Greek Church had virtually supplanted the Latin Church in Turkish dominions, and Russia now put forward a demand for a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Turkey had no interest in the religious questions at issue, and she pursued a wavering course between the disputing powers, fearing to offend either of them. Russia at last began openly to threaten Turkey, and, finding vacillation and diplomacy no longer availing for a postponement of the conflict, the Sultan declared war, October 4, 1853.

In the early engagements of the war the Turks gained some successes over Russian troops, but the first important event was the destruction of a part of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, November 30, 1853. This, being regarded by England as an act of treachery on the part of Russia, brought Great Britain into the conflict. The Russians occupied the Danubian principalities, and the Battle of the Alma, in which the allies first confronted Russia, was won by the former, with greatly superior numbers, September 20, 1854.

The siege of Sebastopol began in October, and during its progress important battles occurred--that of Balaklava, that of Inkerman, November 5th, in which the Russians were defeated by the English and the French; that of Tchernaya, August 16, 1855, a victory for the Russians; and the storming of the Malakoff, described below. The capture of Sebastopol was followed by the taking of Kars by the Russians, November 28, 1855, and the war ended. In accordance with the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, Russia abandoned her claim to a protectorate over Christians in Turkey, and the Sultan agreed to grant them more favorable terms.

Sir Edward Bruce Hamley and Sir Henry Evelyn Wood, British generals who served in the Crimean War, give us the best accounts of the siege and capture of Sebastopol, in which they were active participants. The siege had continued through many weeks without decisive developments, when on June 18, 1855, the French made a strong but unsuccessful assault on the Malakoff, which, like the Redan, formed one of the main defences. The following narratives describe the British assault on the Redan and the final storming of the Malakoff by the French.

SIR EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY

Seeing how desperate was the condition of the fortress, Prince Gortschakoff had resolved, after the Battle of the Tchernaya, to abandon Sebastopol. In letters to the Minister of War, of August 18 and 24, 1855, he expressed this intention, saying there was not a man in the army who would not call it folly to continue the defence longer. With a view to conducting a retreat he pressed forward rapidly the construction of the bridge across the harbor, which was to have a roadway of sixteen feet and to bear heavy vehicles. He also conferred with Todleben on other measures to protect the withdrawal, and accordingly barricades were built across the streets and formed into armed and defensible works which were intended, as a last resort, to hold in check the assailants. Preparations were also made for blowing up the principal forts and magazines.

Another great cannonade had begun on August 17th. The French lines had now approached so close to the place that new additions to them were immediately destroyed or rendered untenable by the fire from the Malakoff and Little Redan; and the shower of small shells, easily cast into the trenches from the ramparts, and called by the French "bouquets," greatly increased their losses. For the silencing of the artillery, which thus hindered the French sappers, the allied batteries opened in full force against the part of the enemy's lines from the Redan to the great harbor. But the town front was not included, and the English batteries suffered greatly from want of support by the works on their left.

On August 20th Gortschakoff entered the fortress, and went round the lines of defence, upon which the fire of the allies was just then at its height. What he saw might well confirm him in his resolution to retreat. There was no longer either a city or a suburb to defend, for both were heaps of rubbish and cinders. The parapets of the works, dried in the heats of summer and split in huge fragments by the shot, were crumbling into the ditches. The interior space was honeycombed with holes made by the shells. Gabions and sandbags could not be procured to repair the embrasures, which remained in ruins. Many of the dismounted guns could no longer be replaced, not because there were not plenty in the arsenals, but because to mount them by night, under the deadly fire of the mortars, entailed such frightful sacrifices of men.

The defenders of the works were packed in caves under the parapets; the gunners lay dead in heaps on the batteries; the wounded could not be removed by day, because the communications with the rear were now searched throughout by the fire of the allies, and so lay where they fell, in torment in the sun beside the more fortunate slain. On landing, the Prince had passed the hospitals, full to overflowing, and the ambulances with the wounded crowding what had been the squares. There was nothing to relieve the horrible monotony of destruction and devastation except the bridge, which promised retreat from this misery, and which was approaching completion.