The Essays of Adam Smith

PART I.. Of the Propriety of Actions.

OF THE PROPRIETY OF ACTIONS. PAGE SEC. I. Of the Sense of Propriety . . . . 9

CH. I. Of Sympathy . . . . . . 9-13 CH. II. Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy . . 13-16 CH. III., IV. Of the manner in which we judge of the Propriety or Impropriety of the Affections of other Men, by their Concord or Dissonance with our own . . . . . . . 16-23 CH. V. Of the amiable and respectable Virtues . 23-26

SEC. II. Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety . . 26

CH. I. Of the Passions which take their Origin from the Body . . . . . . . 26-30 CH. II. Of those Passions which take their Origin from a particular Turn or Habit of the Imagination . . . . . . 30-32 CH. III. Of the unsocial Passions . . . 32-37 CH. IV. Of the social Passions . . . . 37-39 CH. V. Of the selfish Passions . . . . 39-41

SEC. III. Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one State than in the other . . . . . . 42

CH. I. That though our Sympathy with Sorrow is generally a more lively Sensation than our Sympathy with Joy, it commonly falls much more short of the Violence of what is naturally felt by the Person principally concerned . . 42-47 CH. II. Of the Origin of Ambition, and of the Distinction of Ranks . . . . 47-56 CH. III. Of the Corruption of our Moral Sentiments, which is occasioned by this Disposition to admire the Rich and the Great, and to despise or neglect Persons of poor and mean Condition . . 56-60

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PART II.

OF MERIT AND DEMERIT; OR, OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT.

SEC. I. Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit--Introduction 61

CH. I. That whatever appears to be the proper Object of Gratitude, appears to deserve Reward; and that, in the same Manner, whatever appears to be the proper Object of Resentment, appears to deserve Punishment . . . . . . 61-63 {6} CH. II. Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment . . . . . . 63-65 CH. III. That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who confers the Benefit, there is little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who suffers it . . . . . . 65-67 CH. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing Chapters . 67-68 CH. V. The Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit 68-70

SEC. II. Of Justice and Beneficence

CH. I. Comparison of those two Virtues . . 70-75 CH. II. Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the Consciousness of Merit . . . . 75-78 CH. III. Of the Utility of this Constitution of Nature 78-84

SEC. III. Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions--Introduction . . . . 84-85

CH. I. Of the Causes of this Influence of Fortune . 85-88 CH. II. Of the Extent of this Influence of Fortune 88-95 CH. III. Of the final Cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments . . . . . . 96-99

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PART III.

OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR OWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY.

CH. I. Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation . . . . . 99-102 CH. II. Of the Love of Praise, and of that of Praise-worthiness; and of the Dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness. . . . 102-118 CH. III. Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience . . . . . . 118-137 CH. IV. Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules . . . 137-142 CH. V. Of the Influence and Authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity . . 142-150 CH. VI. In what Cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole Principle of our Conduct; and in what Cases it ought to concur with other Motives . 150-158

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PART IV.. Of the Effect of Utility Upon the Sentiment of Approbation.

OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION.

CH. I. Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon all the Productions of Art, and of the extensive Influence of this Species of Beauty . . . . . . 158-165 CH. II. Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the Perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles of Approbation . . . . 165-171 {7}

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PART V.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM AND FASHION UPON THE SENTIMENTS OF MORAL APPROBATION AND DISAPPROBATION.

CH. I. Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our Notions of Beauty and Deformity . . 171-176 CH. II. Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments . . . . . 176-187

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PART VI.. Of the Character of Virtue.--Introduction, 187.

OF THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE.--INTRODUCTION, 187.

SEC. I. Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it affects his own Happiness; or of Prudence . 187-192

SEC. II. Of the Character of the Individual, so far as it can affect the Happiness of other People--Introduction . . . . 192-193

CH. I. Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by Nature to our Care and Attention 193-201 CH. II. Of the Order in which Societies are by Nature recommended to our Beneficence . . 201-208 CH. III. Of universal Benevolence . . . 208-210

SEC. III. Of Self-command . . . . 210-233

Conclusion of the Sixth Part . . . . 233-236

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PART VII.. Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.

OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

SEC. I. Of the Questions which ought to be examined in a Theory of Moral Sentiments . . . 236-237

SEC. II. Of the different Accounts which have been given of the Nature of Virtue--Introduction . 237

CH. I. Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety . . . . . 237-260 CH. II. Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence . . . . . 260-265 CH. III. Of those Systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence . . . . . 265-271 CH. IV. Of licentious Systems . . . 271-278

SEC. III. Of the different Systems which have been formed concerning the Principle of Approbation--Introduction . . . 279

CH. I. Of those Systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love . . . 279-281 CH. II. Of those Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation . . . 282-284 CH. III. Of those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation . . . 285-290

SEC. IV. Of the Manner in which different Authors have treated of the practical Rules of Morality 290-304 {8}

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CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE FORMATION OF LANGUAGES. 305-325

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ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS.

THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY 325-326

SEC. I. Of the Effects of Unexpectedness, or of Surprise . . . . . 326-329 SEC. II. Of Wonder, or the Effects of Novelty . 329-337 SEC. III. Of the Origin of Philosophy . . 338-342 SEC. IV. The History of Astronomy . . . 342-384

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THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES, ILLUSTRATED BY THE HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT PHYSICS . . . . . 385-395

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THE PRINCIPLES WHICH LEAD AND DIRECT PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRIES, ILLUSTRATED BY THE HISTORY OF ANCIENT LOGICS AND METAPHYSICS . . . . 395-405

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OF THE NATURE OF THAT IMITATION WHICH TAKES PLACE IN WHAT ARE CALLED THE IMITATIVE ARTS . . . 405

Part I., 405-415. Part Ii., 415-432. Part Iii . 432-434

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OF THE AFFINITY BETWEEN MUSIC, DANCING, AND POETRY 435-438

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OF THE EXTERNAL SENSES . . . . 438-439

Of the Sense of Touching, 439-444. Of the Sense of Tasting, 444-445. Of the Sense of Smelling, 445. Of the Sense of Hearing, 445-450. Of the Sense of Seeing . . . . . . 450-468

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OF THE AFFINITY BETWEEN CERTAIN ENGLISH AND ITALIAN VERSES . . . . . . 468-473

THE

THEORY

MORAL SENTIMENTS

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Part I.--Of the Propriety of Action.

SEC. I.--OF THE SENSE OF PROPRIETY.

CHAP. I.--Of Sympathy.

HOW selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

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