Part 45

Ts‘ao Kung says: 吏强欲進卒弱輒陷 “The officers are energetic and want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse.” Note that 弱 is to be taken literally of physical weakness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch‘üan makes 陷 equivalent to 敗, and Tu Mu explains it as 陷沒於死地 “stumbling into a death-trap.”

17. 大吏怒而不服遇敵懟而自戰將不知其能曰崩

When the higher officers

大吏, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are the 小將 “generals of inferior rank.” But Li Ch‘üan, Ch‘ên Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as simply convertible with 將 or 大將.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is ruin.

Ts‘ao Kung makes 大將, understood, the subject of 怒, which seems rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi’s note is: 謂將怒不以理且不知裨佐之才激致 其兇懟如山之崩壞也 “This means, the general is angry without just cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head.” He takes 能, therefore, in the sense of 才; but I think that Ch‘ên Hao is right in his paraphrase 不顧能否 “they don’t care if it be possible or no.” My interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch‘ên and Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the Tso Chuan, 宣公, XII. 3, showing how the great battle of 邲 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost for the 晉 Chin State through the contumacy of 先縠 Hsien Hu and the resentful spite of 魏錡 Wei I and 趙旃 Chao Chan. Chang Yü also alludes to the mutinous conduct of 欒黶 Luan Yen [ibid. 襄公, XIV. 3].

18. 將弱不嚴教道不明吏卒無常陳兵縱橫曰亂

When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: 上無疑令，則衆不二聽，動無疑事，則衆不二志 “If the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.” General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: “The secret of getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.” Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much what Wei Liao Tzŭ (loc. cit.) goes on to say: 未有不信其心而能得其 力者也. Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: 用兵之害猶豫最大三軍之災生於狐疑 “the most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

吏卒皆不拘常度 “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine” [Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter disorganisation.

19. 將不能料敵以少合衆以弱擊强兵無選鋒曰北

When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a rout.

Chang Yü paraphrases the latter part of the sentence 不選驍勇之士使爲 先鋒兵必敗北也, and continues: 凡戰必用精銳爲前鋒者一則壯吾志一則挫敵威也 “Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the enemy.” Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar (“De Bello Gallico,” V. 28, 44 et al.). There seems little to distinguish 北 from 走 in § 15, except that 北 is a more forcible word.

20. 凡此六者敗之道也將之至任不可不察也

These are six ways of courting defeat,

Ch‘ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) 不量寡衆 “neglect to estimate the enemy’s strength;” (2) 本乏刑德 “want of authority;” (3) 失於訓練 “defective training;” (4) 非理興怒 “unjustifiable anger;” (5) 法令不行 “non-observance of discipline;” (6) 不擇驍果 “failure to use picked men.”

which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

See supra, § 13.

21. 夫地形者兵之助也料敵制勝計險阨遠近上將之道也

The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

Chia Lin’s text has the reading 易 for 助. Ch‘ên Hao says: 天時不如 地利 “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those connected with ground.”

but a power of estimating the adversary,

The insertion of a “but” is necessary to show the connection of thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely wholly on natural advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,

制勝 is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,