Part 6

It is to be remembered that the enemy can, less easily than the British, afford losses, especially of arms. Commanders, without being prodigal of their men's lives, need not, therefore, be afraid of incurring casualties, especially when there is likelihood that the enemy will suffer loss to at least an equal extent. If the tribesmen's losses are heavy, those of the British troops will probably be considerably less. Close fighting is all to the advantage of trained soldiers.

As has been stated, the clansmen will rarely commit themselves to battle in conditions favourable to the British, unless they can be outwitted or surprised. Night operations may, therefore, frequently be necessary, having special regard to the fact that, from their hill tops, the enemy will overlook all manoeuvres. As the natives are not often abroad in the early morning, surprise, at dawn, will not present unusual difficulties.

The enveloping form of tactics, when the enemy is attacked both in front and flank, is as effective in tribal as in other warfare. But, owing to the topographical advantages enjoyed by the tribesmen, it will be necessary to hold them closely in frontal attack, and so distract their attention from outflanking movements. This may be possible, for they fight with confidence when behind cover. Mere frontal attack is likely to be at once costly and ineffective; hence, if neither envelopment, nor night operations, are practicable, resort may be had to such stratagems as a feigned retirement, or bait of transport animals, to tempt the Pathans from their hills.

Though the possibility of tribal counter-attack, by shock, must not be lost sight of, the British advantage in training and armament should enable a central general reserve to be dispensed with, the object being to so dispose the troops as to insure envelopment.

Good information and staff work, and a sound system of inter-communication, will, moreover, if all ranks are imbued with the spirit of mutual support, go far to insure success.

Commanders, especially of small forces, should remember that hesitation will be quickly observed by the enemy, but a bold front, and ready stratagem, will soon cause him to lose heart.

When a post or isolated detachment requires assistance, aid can often be most rapidly and effectively given by application of such indirect pressure as will tend to divert the enemy's attention.

In minor tactics, whilst taking every advantage of the cover afforded by features of ground, troops must beware of seeking shelter in hollows or nullahs, places which will, assuredly, have been marked by the enemy's riflemen, so that their occupation will rarely escape punishment.

In attack, infantry units, whilst securing their flanks, should advance up salients, taking care to afford one another mutual fire assistance. Supports and local reserves should be pushed as near to the firing line as the shape of the ground will permit; but, at times, reserves may be able to effectively support the troops in front by covering fire, from suitable positions, behind, or on the flanks of, the line of advance.

Fire should be reserved until units have closed on the enemy, the object being to prevent the early evacuation of a position, after having caused a few casualties at long range.

As the enemy's fire, though likely to be accurate, will probably lack volume, resort need not be had to widely extended formations.

To gain ground, and when assaulting, the procedure outlined in the training manuals requires no modification.

Artillery should be handled with discretion, and should be on its guard against the tendency to open fire whenever a target is seen. Its aim should be not to evict, but to hold the enemy to his sangars, and to inflict loss when he retreats.

The steep forward slopes of hills will enable fire to be continued until the infantry has closed on the tribesmen, but oblique, rather than frontal fire should be employed.

It is, of course, important to insure close inter-communication between infantry and artillery.

In tribal, as in other warfare, unless the enemy is completely enveloped, efficient pursuit is necessary to set the seal on victory. Pursuit can, at first, probably be best undertaken by the enveloping wings, artillery co-operating to head the enemy off in the required direction, whilst the cavalry press forward.

A portion of the artillery should, therefore, move with the outflanking wings, keeping as near as possible to the firing line.

Pathans, familiar with the country, and confident that they have everything to gain, and but little to lose by such tactics, favour the harassing of troops as they withdraw from heights, or along valleys. Though it may be taken as a maxim that there will be no pursuit if the enemy has, in any recent fighting, been adequately punished, the conditions may have been such that casualties could not be inflicted.

In these circumstances, the clansmen must surely not be permitted to embarrass the British movements, and must be convinced that pursuit is both dangerous and unprofitable.

Mere counter-attack, when the enemy is not surprised, is likely to lead to no advantage, but a few skilfully laid ambushes will soon discourage his zeal for pursuit. Should he, however, persist in following up the troops, counter-attack should at once be made, and the retirement discontinued. The enemy, it is to be remembered, will, as a rule, offer the greatest opportunity of inflicting loss when he follows up a retirement, and, in such operations, the aim must be rather to cause than to avoid casualties.

All withdrawals should be pre-arranged and systematic, flanks being securely held, and the principle of mutual support observed. But formalism must be avoided, and procedure must never be permitted to become so stereotyped that the enemy will be able to confidently anticipate the movements of the troops.

Men must beware of entering nullahs, or depressions of any kind, until the further edge has been secured; and, when on a hill top, the provision of such cover as will conceal the head-dress is of importance.

Transport animals should be clear of the fighting troops before retirement is begun.

If the object is to slip away from the enemy, the retirement should be made at a time when movement is not expected.

When a valley is to be swept in course of punitive operations, an adequate force should be left to secure the entrance, if the column is to leave by this route.

Troops, as has already been suggested, should, in respect of ammunition, food, and warm coats, be independent of transport animals, and it should be understood that units are always to be prepared to remain for the night away from camp. The men should be trained to economise water, which is often scarce across the border.

Ammunition and rifles being the main objects of tribal ambition, special care should be taken to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.

Against the North West Frontier clans, the offensive, as usual, is normally the best defensive, but it may sometimes happen that small British forces are temporarily obliged to act on the defensive.