Part 5

This arrangement does not appear advantageous. The troops detailed for the relief of the picquets will probably have to move out in darkness, and over an unknown area, and though, if the enemy advances during the relief, he will be opposed in double strength, should his attack be delivered later, units who do not know the ground will be placed in positions they will not be able to defend to the best advantage. Besides, the men composing the rear-guard, whose functions are in any case sufficiently arduous, will be involved in additional and unnecessary fatigue.

The withdrawal of picquets may be carried out on the following principles:--

When a picquet commander sees, or receives reports that the rear-guard is approaching, he should send the bulk of his picquet to a position, previously reconnoitred, on the lower slope of the hill, and in the direction of the line of march of the column, whence the retirement of the remainder can be covered by fire.

Whilst on the hill, and especially as the time for withdrawal approaches, the men of a picquet should be careful not to show themselves, in order that the enemy may not, by counting heads, be able to divine that retirement has been begun. Similarly, the men left on the hill to the last, should, above everything, avoid exposure.

When the picquet commander sees the rear-guard commander, who will usually be with the last troops, and whose presence will be shown by a flag, is opposite his post, he should give the signal for the evacuation of the hill top, on which the men should creep back, and as soon as they are below the sky line, run down the hill to a position beyond that of their covering party. The withdrawal should then be continued according to the accepted principles, until the whole picquet has reached the valley, when its leader should report to the rear-guard commander, receiving orders whether the picquet is to proceed to the main column, or to join the rear-guard.

The rear guard commander should have previously called in the road sentry post marking the locality held by the picquet, and the map furnished by the advanced guard will have been of assistance in identifying its position.

It is contended that the withdrawal of a picquet rests, except in special circumstances, entirely with the picquet leader. He is the man on the spot, and can best judge when the retirement should commence.

The rear-guard commander should rarely attempt to regulate the actions of the picquets, of whose situation he cannot have adequate knowledge, but should exercise general supervision, ready to afford assistance if required.

At times picquets may be able to support one another's movements, but, as a rule, a picquet will be too fully occupied with its own affairs to be able to render assistance to its neighbours.

The above outline of a withdrawal presupposes that hostile pressure is not unduly severe.

If the enemy venture to close with the rear-guard and picquets, it is submitted that an immediate counter-attack should be delivered, the main body being halted.

To lose so golden an opportunity of inflicting loss on a volatile foe seems on the one hand unwise, whilst, on the other, it is surely both undignified and demoralising to permit savages to hunt British regulars into camp.

The delivery of a counter-attack is accompanied by some risk, and its success will depend on the aptitude of the rear-guard commander for stratagem, for, if loss is to be inflicted, the enemy must, as a rule, be trapped.

Simple ruses which suggest themselves are, either to attempt to attract the tribesmen into the low ground by a bait of ammunition or transport animals, the cavalry, guns, and part of rear-guard, infantry being previously concealed in positions from which they can take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, and the retirement of picquets stopped, as soon as the attack is delivered. Or, two or more picquets, which have been previously reinforced by troops moving along concealed lines of advance to the hill tops, may feign retirement, and attack the tribesmen as they follow over the crest line.

If stratagem fails, the column should halt and drive off the enemy, a proceeding which should be repeated until he is taught that to follow up British troops is neither profitable nor advantageous.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE.

Success in war depends in some degree on adaptation of tactics to local conditions, and it is therefore clear that, to attain rapid success against the inhabitants of the North Western Frontier, a knowledge of their tactics is required, and that, whilst the British aims are pursued with unswerving determination, their probable movements must be met and defeated.

The tribesmen, like most savages, are only really formidable when one is running away from them. They fight well in positions strongly fortified, and with flanks secure, but, being without the discipline or cohesion to meet envelopment, are much influenced by pressure against their flanks.

Pathans are fearful of artillery, and do not, as a rule, seriously resist a determined advance, preferring the easier and less dangerous enterprise of harassing the retirements which they believe are an inevitable corollary to forward movements; or of attacking isolated detachments, whose operations they have observed from their hill-tops.

They are suspicious of ambuscades, except when excited in pursuit, and are not prone to accept battle unless surprised.

Like other people, they shoot well when not themselves under effective fire, and, when shooting into a valley, where the strike of the bullet can be observed, their fire is accurate. On the other hand, owing to their relatively defective armament, and to lack of ammunition, tribal fire as a rule lacks volume.

The tribesmen skirmish well, and move quickly over their hills, but rarely, except when engaging a small force, or by night, attack in mass. On the other hand, they often crowd their defensive positions with men.

They are said to dislike being overlooked by their opponents, and therefore do not care to attack up hill, but will, at times, try to rush a detachment, with the object of capturing rifles and ammunition.

The fact that a proportion of the men possess only inferior fire-arms, renders possible resort to shock tactics, especially when roused to a pitch of fanaticism.

Pathans are partial to night operations, probably because they believe that there is little fear of interference after dark. Their enterprises are usually on a small scale, but night attacks in force, are possible. Their inadequate clothing, and the cold of the early morning, however, usually forces them to seek shelter as the night wears on.

From the above description it will be seen that British troops, so long as they observe the ordinary principles of war, have nothing to fear from the tribesmen. But it is to be remembered that, unless stratagem is intended, the offensive is the general rule in tribal warfare, for the enemy construes a defensive attitude as a sign of fear, and becomes correspondingly elated.

The composition of forces despatched on reconnaissance and minor punitive expeditions requires careful consideration. Columns composed of men drawn from many different infantry units are inherently weak, so that, in all operations, complete units, so far as they are required, should be employed, cavalry being added when local conditions are favourable. Artillery will generally be necessary, as well as a proportion of technical troops, but the strength of columns should, within limits of safety, be low, in order to insure mobility, and to encourage resistance. The military value of the enemy must not, however, be underestimated.

The main object of all operations is to quickly attain a decisive success. To this end the tribesmen must be induced to stand and fight with the purpose of inflicting casualties on them.