Philosophical Studies

Part 1

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

G. E. MOORE, Litt.D.

Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews), F.B.A.

Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge Author of "Principia Ethica"

LONDON

ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL LTD

BROADWAY HOUSE: 68-74 CARTER LANE, E.C.4

1922

CONTENTS

I. THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM II. THE NATURE AND REALITY OF OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION III. WILLIAM JAMES' "PRAGMATISM" IV. HUME'S PHILOSOPHY V. THE STATUS OF SENSE-DATA VI. THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY VII. SOME JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION VIII. THE CONCEPTION OF INTRINSIC VALUE IX. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL RELATIONS X. THE NATURE OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously published, originally appeared as follows:--

I. "The Refutation of Idealism" in Mind, N.S. Vol. xii, 1903.

II. "The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1905-6.

III. "Professor James' 'Pragmatism'" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1907-8.

IV. "Hume's Philosophy" in The New Quarterly, November, 1909.

V. "The Status of Sense-Data" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1913-14.

VI. "The Conception of Reality" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-18.

VII. "Some Judgments of Perception" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1918-19.

IX. "External and Internal Relations" in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919-20.

PREFACE

All the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones (VIII and X), have been previously published; and of those which have been previously published all, except that on "External and Internal Relations" (IX), are here re-printed without change. They were written at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the order in which they were written, except that VIII on "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," which was written earlier than VI and VII, has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject.

All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers; but I hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I have done so, have done my best to explain in ordinary language exactly what I mean by them. The tone of X is somewhat different from that of the rest, because it was written as a lecture for the Leicester Philosophical Society, with regard to which I was informed that I must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience. It accordingly bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended.

An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree; and I feel that some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old ones; and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth saying in a form which, however defective it may be, I doubt my own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether this excuse applies is that of the first paper--"The Refutation of Idealism." This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether I ought to have included it. But in this case I have another excuse: namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy; and I was told that, for some readers at all events, it would be a convenience that it should be re-printed along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference.

I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, in which changes have been made, is IX on "External and Internal Relations." In this case the changes are not due to any change in my views, but to the fact that, in that part of the paper in which symbols are used, I tried, when it was first published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, to use the symbols adopted by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, and used them also without giving an explanation of their meaning which would be sufficient for readers not acquainted with that work. The symbols in question are symbols which it is difficult for printers to reproduce; and I have, therefore, thought it better, on this occasion, to use another set of symbols, which seem to me to be adequate for the limited purpose I had in view. I have tried to give an explanation of their meaning, which will enable anyone to understand them; and I have taken the opportunity of rewriting some of the parts of the paper in which they occur in a way which will, I hope, make some points clearer than they originally were.

I have to thank the Committee of the Aristotelian Society for permission to reprint the large number of papers (viz., II, III, V, VI, VII and IX), which originally appeared in the Proceedings of that Society; and the Editor of the New Quarterly for permission to reprint the article on Hume's Philosophy (IV), which appeared in that Journal in November, 1909.

G. E. MOORE.

CAMBRIDGE,

January, 1922.

Part 2

Philosophical Studies

THE REFUTATION OF IDEALISM

Modern Idealism, if it asserts any general conclusion about the universe at all, asserts that it is spiritual. There are two points about this assertion to which I wish to call attention. These points are that, whatever be its exact meaning, it is certainly meant to assert (1) that the universe is very different indeed from what it seems, and (2) that it has quite a large number of properties which it does not seem to have. Chairs and tables and mountains seem to be very different from us; but, when the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is certainly meant to assert that they are far more like us than we think. The idealist means to assert that they are in some sense neither lifeless nor unconscious, as they certainly seem to be; and I do not think his language is so grossly deceptive, but that we may assume him to believe that they really are very different indeed from what they seem. And secondly when he declares that they are spiritual, he means to include in that term quite a large number of different properties. When the whole universe is declared to be spiritual, it is meant not only that it is in some sense conscious, but that it has what we recognise in ourselves as the higher forms of consciousness. That it is intelligent; that it is purposeful; that it is not mechanical; all these different things are commonly asserted of it. In general, it may be said, this phrase 'reality is spiritual' excites and expresses the belief that the whole universe possesses all the qualities the possession of which is held to make us so superior to things which seem to be inanimate: at least, if it does not possess exactly those which we possess, it possesses not one only, but several others, which, by the same ethical standard, would be judged equal to or better than our own. When we say it is spiritual we mean to say that it has quite a number of excellent qualities, different from any which we commonly attribute either to stars or planets or to cups and saucers.

Now why I mention these two points is that when engaged in the intricacies of philosophic discussion, we are apt to overlook the vastness of the difference between this idealistic view and the ordinary view of the world, and to overlook the number of different propositions which the idealist must prove. It is, I think, owing to the vastness of this difference and owing to the number of different excellences which Idealists attribute to the universe, that it seems such an interesting and important question whether Idealism be true or not. But, when we begin to argue about it, I think we are apt to forget what a vast number of arguments this interesting question must involve: we are apt to assume, that if one or two points be made on either side, the whole case is won. I say this lest it should be thought that any of the arguments which will be advanced in this paper would be sufficient to disprove, or any refutation of them sufficient to prove, the truly interesting and important proposition that reality is spiritual. For my own part I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not suppose that anything I shall say has the smallest tendency to prove that reality is not spiritual: I do not believe it possible to refute a single one of the many important propositions contained in the assertion that it is so. Reality may be spiritual, for all I know; and I devoutly hope it is. But I take 'Idealism' to be a wide term and to include not only this interesting conclusion but a number of arguments which are supposed to be, if not sufficient, at least necessary, to prove it. Indeed I take it that modern Idealists are chiefly distinguished by certain arguments which they have in common. That reality is spiritual has, I believe, been the tenet of many theologians; and yet, for believing that alone, they should hardly be called Idealists. There are besides, I believe, many persons, not improperly called Idealists, who hold certain characteristic propositions, without venturing to think them quite sufficient to prove so grand a conclusion. It is, therefore, only with Idealistic arguments that I am concerned; and if any Idealist holds that no argument is necessary to prove that reality is spiritual, I shall certainly not have refuted him. I shall, however, attack at least one argument, which, to the best of my belief, is considered necessary to their position by all Idealists. And I wish to point out a certain advantage which this procedure gives me--an advantage which justifies the assertion that, if my arguments are sound, they will have refuted Idealism. If I can refute a single proposition which is a necessary and essential step in all Idealistic arguments, then, no matter how good the rest of these arguments may be, I shall have proved that Idealists have no reason whatever for their conclusion.

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