Part 13

For this reason a peaceable interference on the part of the League before the war broke out, would make the most warlike amongst the powers consider.

But the fact that no State could stir up a war without meeting a crushing superior force would lead to a constant and lasting state of peace, and disarmament.

De Molinari thinks his plan would be advanced by forming an association in the countries named, which should work for an agreement between them in the above-named direction.

The proposition will never of itself lead to any practical result. But it is at least useful in having pointed out the growing interest which neutral powers have in maintaining peace unmolested. This interest shows itself already in general politics in the zealous pains with which, on the outbreak of war, all powers not implicated unite to "localize" war, that is, to limit it to as few partisans, and to as, small an area, as possible. The peace interests of neutral States become year by year more powerful factors in politics.

Here we must bear in mind that more States are continually passing over into the condition of unconsciously forming "a neutral league." They are approaching the goal which they have long been striving after by arms and by diplomacy. "They are," to quote Bismarck, "satisfied and do not strive for more." Such States are Germany and Italy, which have achieved their unity, and Hungary, which has gained its freedom.

Nevertheless all great causes of war are not thereby eradicated from Europe.

In the forenamed article by the Russian jurist, Kamarowski, light is thrown upon this circumstance with scientific clearness.

He says respecting Germany, that this country has essentially realized its national unity, and thereby reached a justifiable object; but at the same time has been guilty of two serious violations of the principles of international right.

"It carried on the war against France with an inflexible and altogether unnecessary severity, and it tore from that State Elsass-Lothringen."

The attempt is certainly made to justify this by the fact that both these provinces formerly belonged to Germany, and that it was an absolute necessity for Germany to acquire a military guarantee against a fresh attack on the part of France.

Kamarowski shows both these grounds to be untenable. If nations should continually look back to the past, and strive to renew the old conditions, they never could found a more durable or righteous state of things in the present.

What ought to be decisive is, that in these unhappy provinces the sympathy of the great part of the population is completely on the side of France.

The possession of Strasburg and Metz has not only failed to give Germany the anticipated security; it has, on the other hand, compelled the Germans to live since 1871 in perpetual unrest; to keep on foot an immense army, and to expend their last resources in building fortresses. Besides, this possession cripples German activity in both internal and external political questions. The situation of France is equally unenviable; constantly kept in suspense, and with the feeling of having been unjustly treated, and longing for revenge. Is it possible, with this deadly hatred between two of Europe's most civilized states, to think of a lasting peace?

And what can the Governments of these nations do with respect to this evil, unless they set themselves to eradicate it?

Kamarowski proposes three different solutions of the question of Elsass-Lothringen. A European congress might arrange the destiny of these provinces, by dividing them, for example, so that Elsass should remain united to Germany, and Lothringen to France; or by forming them into two or more cantons united to Switzerland; or lastly, by letting them become an independent State with a self-chosen mode of government, but with the sine quâ non that they shall be neutralized, and placed under the guarantee of combined Europe.

It would be almost immaterial to Europe which of these three expedients were chosen; therefore the choice might be left to the inhabitants of Elsass-Lothringen themselves; and the opportunity might be given them of expressing themselves by a plebiscite, uncontrolled by any influence from either the French or German side.

This naturally affects Danish South Jutland in an equal degree, which Germany wrenched from Denmark by a gross breach of international law. That the writer does not adduce this instance may be simply because he does not regard it as involving any danger of war.

Kamarowski finds this to be much more pronounced with regard to the EASTERN QUESTION.

This is more threatening than that of Elsass-Lothringen. Ever since the close of the last century the Turkish Empire has, on account of its internal condition, been doomed to fall to pieces, and its final dissolution is only a question of time. It is difficult to say what is to be done with the remains.

The only reasonable and righteous settlement is to allow the Christian peoples who were in the past subjected by the Turks, and who compose the great majority of the population in European Turkey, to form independent States. Manifold causes have hitherto prevented the organization of the political life of these nations, shorn of political maturity in consequence of protracted thraldom, mutual jealousy, and influences of the great powers, who under all manner of excuses have played their own game at the cost of these people, pretending to protect them, while they sought to make them into their subjects. Russia has doubtless, even if unintentionally, in the greatest degree helped to set these nations free, and to produce the present position by which Servia and Roumania have been changed, from being subject to Turkey, into independent States; and Bulgaria, instead of being a Turkish province, has now a less subject position as regards Turkey. "It is," says the writer, "not altogether without reason that the Russians accuse their Southern Sclav brethren of ingratitude"; but he admits that Russia ought partly to blame herself. She has, for instance, at times shown a decided inclination to force her forms of thought and policy upon them, and to get the whole of their inner national life placed under her authority. This action of Russia is blameworthy, both because it violates the independence which belongs of right to every State, and because it is foolishly opposed to Russia's own well-known interests. By such a policy she can only betray her Sclav mission, create more than one new Poland for herself, and artificially shift her political power from north to south, thereby weakening her national strength.

Kamarowski further describes the selfish schemes of England and Austria in the Balkan peninsula.

These plans are even more distasteful to the Christian population than Russia's, because it stands in the closest relation to that country both as to race and a common religion. England and Austria seek to entice this people by the prospect of freer institutions and greater economic well-being but they can only drag them into their net at the cost of their national and moral independence. And the jealousy between these powers, Russia on the one hand and Austria and England on the other, each wanting to get the advantage, or to possess itself of the remains of the dying realm, is a standing menace to the peace of Europe. This danger would disappear if people could be satisfied to let these nations belong to themselves.

Now that Austria has carried out the injunction laid upon her by the Berlin Congress--for the present to undertake the management and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina--she ought to withdraw from these provinces, whose population should be allowed to decide their own fate by universal suffrage, whether this would result in the union of Bosnia with Servia, and of Herzegovina with Montenegro, or whether the situation should be arranged in some other way. All that Austria has any ground for requiring is, the free navigation of the Danube and the straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), and therewith her true interests in this region would be abundantly satisfied.

The Christian States which, alongside of Turkey, have spread over the Balkan peninsula, are Greece, Roumania, Servia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. The last named still stands in subjection to Turkey, but has the same right to full independence as the neighbour States. It is evidently their vocation to divide amongst themselves the remains of Turkey in Europe, for their population in an overwhelming proportion consists of Southern Sclavs and Greeks. But unhappily they seem to have little conception of this their task, because they live in a constant state of jealousy and bickering. These States are all only just in the embryo. They have not yet by a long way attained their natural boundaries. A large number of Greeks and Bulgarians are still under the direct government of Turkey. It would be labour lost to attempt to guess how many small States will form themselves out of the ruins of Turkey, or what political form they will take. The author remarks that it would be best for them to arrange themselves into one or more confederations with self-government for each single State composing this alliance.

Europe, in harmony with international justice, should see to it: (1) that the peoples of the Balkan peninsula should not become the prey of any foreign power; (2) that they should not be allowed to trespass upon each other's domains; (3) that their development should as far as possible proceed in a peaceful and law-abiding way; (4) that they should divide the inheritance of Turkey in a thoroughly just manner, so that the political boundaries should be marked out in harmony with the wishes and interests of the inhabitants; (5) that they themselves do not invade the domains of other States, and that they recognise all the maxims of international justice.

A European congress, co-operating in such an arrangement of the conditions of the Balkan peninsula, would contribute in no small degree to remove the causes of war in Europe, and would do effective work in the cause of freedom and civilization. Greece would acquire all the islands of the Archipelago, together with Candia and Cyprus. Macedonia would, according to the conditions of its nationalities, be divided between Greece and Bulgaria. The natural boundary of the latter would be the Danube on the one side and the Archipelago on the other. Constantinople would remain the capital of a Bulgarian kingdom, or of a Southern Sclav federation; or again, a free city with a small independent territory. The fortifications on both sides the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be destroyed, and both these straits be thrown open to the navigation of all nations.

After being obliterated from the list of European nations, Turkey would peacefully continue its existence in Asia.

But not even so are all the causes of war removed from our continent. Many are to be found in the RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND ENGLAND especially two, says Kamarowski.