Part 10

2. With respect to the Sound and the Little Belt, that in time of war, ships belonging to any belligerent power shall be forbidden to show themselves in these seas; which, on the other hand, shall be always open for merchant craft, even those belonging to belligerent powers, as well as for war-ships belonging to neutrals.

3. With respect to the Great Belt, that this strait shall always be open for merchant and war-ships of every flag, including belligerents, whether singly or in fleets; but that these ships shall be entirely forbidden to undertake any inimical action on the coasts of the above-named strait, or in its seas, within a distance exceeding the maximum range of its artillery before sailing in or sailing out, or indeed any attack, seizure, privateering, blockade, embargo, etc., or any other warlike action whatever.

The meeting expressed its desire to see an international congress arrange and conclude a treaty which should be open for all European nations to enter into and sign, which should establish on the above-named basis, under the guarantee of the signatory powers, the neutrality of the northern States, together with the creation of a really solid tribunal of arbitration, which, as the highest court of appeal, should solve all difficulties that might arise with respect to the said treaty.

That the neutralization of the Suez Canal, so long looked upon as a pious wish, may in the near future lead to the inviolability of Egypt, will doubtless be suggested. When this is accomplished, the good understanding between France and England will be further strengthened, and a foundation thereby laid for an extended co-operation in the service of the peace of the world, in the young Congo State, with its twenty millions of inhabitants and a territory equal to half Europe; a realm founded without costing a drop of blood, from its first commencement sanctioned and declared a neutral community by the European powers unanimously, which will some day be looked upon as one of the fairest pages in the history of the human race.

FOOTNOTES:

--Since practical abstaining from war is the natural assumption of neutrality, a neutral State is bound not to assist any belligerent power in warlike purposes.

--A neutral State may not supply a belligerent power with weapons or other war material.

--If private persons furnish belligerent powers with war material as articles of commerce, they assuredly run the risk of confiscation by the contending parties of such articles, as contraband of war; but the neutral State is not to be regarded as having violated its neutrality by tolerating trade in contraband of war.

--Permission freely to purchase food even upon account of a belligerent power is not regarded as a serious concession towards that State, provided that the permission is general, applying alike to both parties.

--A neutral State may not permit the war-ships of a belligerent power to run into its ports or (with any other object than to procure provisions, water, coal, etc.) to traverse its sounds, rivers and canals.

--Belligerent powers are bound fully to respect the right of peace of the neutral States, and to abstain from any invasion of their territories.

--Where a violation of neutral territory has taken place from ignorance of the boundary and not from evil intent, the neutral State shall immediately claim redress, compensation, and the adoption of measures necessary to prevent a similar mistake in future.]

Since the European States have settled into their present grouping, the material preponderance of the great powers over the smaller countries has more and more diminished the possibility of these defending their external liberty and independence by military power only.

There are States whose whole male population cannot equal or barely exceed the number, which a great power can command for its fully equipped army.

In olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight against a greater and more powerful neighbour. In consequence of the weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly developed art of war, it was then possible.

Now this condition is changed. As a rule we find that the military strength of a State is in direct proportion to its population and material wealth.

The consequence is that the smaller States have virtually ceased to be belligerent powers. Such examples as Germany's proceeding against Denmark in 1864, and England's against Egypt in 1882, or in general, when the stronger State only needs to consider how large a portion of its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be considered as wars, but as military executions.

As to our own country (Sweden), it certainly has, together with Norway, an advantage in its situation above other small powers. But it concerns us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time. This is not to be done by turning Sweden into a military State, because even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against our powerful neighbours.

In proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy.

In our day, not only are great and well-disciplined hosts required for carrying on war, but great material riches are equally indispensable. The relation between a nation of four or five millions, and one of forty or fifty millions, is like that between the dwarfs and the giants.

It is easily understood that patriotic feelings may bewilder the judgment, and that our nation, with its brilliant war memories, can only with difficulty perceive this simple truth, and with reluctance accommodate itself to the changed condition which modern times have created.

Let us, however, realize that we are standing at the parting of the ways; that we have before us the alternative, on the one hand, of a barren and ruinous militarism; on the other, the seeking of our defence in a neutrality guaranteed by the united powers; making it possible for us to get our defence adjusted, without any very great difficulty, and settled upon a footing so satisfactory.

The first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land, excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and wealthier nations. The second would put us into a position to confine our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds.

The clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice.

It will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us. There are two opinions about that. But in one thing we may all unite, namely, that a settled neutrality for Sweden is a thing to be aimed at. Here almost every interest of the fatherland converges.

But if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign powers.

Accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us, we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome.

This is my conviction.