Part 3

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM

Identity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and thinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle term and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical judgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse of it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure concepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.

III

CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC

Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial justification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three logical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory of the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical character--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of Logistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic.

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION

Reaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the representations--The individual judgment; and its difference from the judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and intellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception or perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical judgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact and of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of knowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive of this error--Individual syllogisms.

THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE

The copula: its verbal and logical significance--Questions relating to propositions without a subject. Verbalism--Confusion between different forms of judgments in the question of existentiality--Determination and subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of individual judgments--Necessity of the existential character in these judgments---The absolutely and the relatively inexistent--The character of existence as predicate--Critique of existentiality as position and faith--Absurd consequences of those doctrines--The predicate of existence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment--The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept.

INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION

Individual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and critique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical individual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process of empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as classification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative illusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility of direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration (mensuration, etc.)--Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called conversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and their abstractness.

THIRD SECTION

IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL A PRIORI SYNTHESIS

IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

Result of preceding enquiry: the judgment of definition and the individual judgment--Distinction between the two: truth of reason and truth of fact, necessary and contingent, etc.; formal and material--Absurdities arising from these distinctions: the individual judgment as ultra-logical; or, duality of logical forms--Difficulty of abandoning the distinction--The hypothesis of reciprocal implication, and so of the identity of the two forms--Objection; the lack of representative and historical element in the definitive--The historical element in the definitions taken in their concreteness--The definition as answer to a question and solution of a problem--Individual and historical conditionally of every question and problem--Definition as also historical judgment--Unity of truth of reason and truth of fact--Considerations in confirmation of this--Critique of the false distinction between formal and material truths--Platonic men and Aristotelian men--Theory of application of the concepts, true for abstract concepts and false for true concepts.

THE A PRIORI LOGICAL SYNTHESIS

The identity of the judgment of definition and of the individual judgment, as synthesis a priori--Objections to the synthesis a priori, deriving from abstractionists and empiricists--False interpretation of the synthesis a priori--Synthesis a priori in general and logical synthesis a priori--Non-logical synthesis a priori--The synthesis a priori, as synthesis, not of opposites, but of distincts--The category in the judgment. Difference between category and innate idea--The synthesis a priori, the destruction of transcendency, and the objectivity of knowing--Power of the synthesis a priori remained unknown to its discoverer.

III

LOGIC AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE CATEGORIES

The demand for a complete table of the categories--This demand extraneous to Logic--Logical categories and real categories--Uniqueness of the logical category: the concept. The other categories, no longer logical, but real. Systems of categories--The Hegelian system of the categories, and other posterior systems--The logical order of the predicates or categories--Illusion as to the logical reality of this order--The necessity of an order of the predicates not founded upon Logic in particular, but upon the whole of Philosophy--False distinction of Philosophy into two spheres--Metaphysic and Philosophy, rational Philosophy and real Philosophy, etc., derived from the confusion between Logic and Doctrine of the categories--Philosophy and pure Logic, etc.; overcoming of the dualism.

SECOND PART

PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY AND THE NATURAL AND MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES

THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DIVISIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

Summary of the results relating to the forms of knowledge--Non-existence of technical forms, and of composed forms--Identity of forms of knowledge and of knowing. Objections to them--Empirical distinctions and their limits--Enumeration and determination of the forms of knowing reality, corresponding to the forms of knowledge--Critique of the idea of a special Logic as doctrine of the forms of knowing the external world and of a special Logic as doctrine of the methods--Nature of our treatment of the forms of knowledge.

PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy as pure concept; and the various definitions of philosophy--Those which negate philosophy--Those which define it as science of supreme principle, of final causes, etc.; contemplation of death, etc.; as elaboration of the concepts, as criticism, as science of norms; as doctrine of the categories--Exclusion of material definitions from philosophy--Idealism of every philosophy--Systematic character of philosophy--Philosophic significance and literary significance of the system--Advantages and disadvantages of the literary form of the system--Genesis of the systematic prejudice, and rebellion against it--Sacred and philosophic numbers; meaning of their demand--Impossibility of dividing philosophy into general and particular--Disadvantages of the conception of a general philosophy, distinct from particular philosophies.

III

HISTORY