Part 2

Nor, in truth, did its criticism of Science favour what is known as a philosophy "detesting facts": indeed, the chief preoccupation of that criticism was meticulous respect of facts, which was neither observed nor observable in empirical and abstract constructions and in the analogous mythologies of naturalism. The character of this Logic might equally be described as affirmation of the concrete universal and affirmation of the concrete individual, as proof of the Aristotelian Scientia est de universalibus and proof of Campanula's Scientia est de singularibus. In this manner those empty generalizations and fictitious riches which are removed from philosophy in the course of treatment, there appear more than amply, infinitely compensated for by the restitution to it of its own riches, of the whole of history, both that known as human and that known as history of nature. Henceforward it can live there as in its own dominion, or rather its own body, which is co-extensive with and indivisible from it. The separation there effected by philosophy from science is not separation from what is true knowledge in science, that is from the historical and real elements of science. It is only separation from the schematic form in which those elements are compressed, mutilated and altered. Thus it may also be described as a reconnection of it with what of living, concrete and progressive exists in those sciences. If the destruction of anything be aimed at in it, that can clearly be nothing but abstract and anti-historical philosophy. This Logic must thus be looked upon as a liquidation of philosophy rather than of science, if abstract science be posited as true philosophy.

That point is dwelt upon in the polemic against the idea of a general philosophy which should stand above particular philosophies, or the methodological problems of historical thought. The distinction of general philosophy from particular philosophies (which are true generality in their particularity) seems to me to be the gnoseological residue of the old dualism and of the old transcendency; a not innocuous residue, for it always tends to the view that the thoughts of men upon particular things are of an inferior, common and vulgar nature, and that the thought of totality or unity is alone superior and alone completely satisfying. The idea of a general philosophy prepares in this way consciously or otherwise for the restoration of Metaphysic, with its pretension of rethinking the already thought by means of a particular thought of its own. This, when it is not altogether religious revelation, becomes the caprice of the individual philosopher. The many examples offered by post-Kantian philosophy are proof of this. Here Metaphysic raged so furiously and to such deleterious effect as to involve guiltless philosophy in its guilt. The latent danger always remains, even if this restoration of Metaphysic does not take place, for if it never becomes effective because it is carefully watched and restrained, the other draw-back persists, namely, that that general philosophy, or super-philosophy or super-intelligence desired, while it does not succeed in making clear particular problems, which alone have relation to concrete life, nevertheless in a measure discredits them, by judging them to be of slight importance and by surrounding them with a sort of mystical irony.

To annul the idea of a "general" philosophy is at the same time to annul the "static" concept of the philosophic system, replacing it with the dynamic concept of simple historical "systemizations" of groups of problems, of which particular problems and their solutions are what remain, not their aggregate and external arrangement. This latter satisfies the needs of the times and of authors and passes away with them, or is preserved and admired solely for æsthetic reasons when it possesses them. But those who retain some superstitious reverence for "General Philosophy" or "Metaphysic" have still a superstitious reverence for what are known as static systems. In so doing they behave in a rational manner, for they cannot altogether free themselves from the claims of a definitive philosophy which is to solve once and for all the so-called "enigma of the world" (imaginary because there are infinite enigmas which appear and are solved in turn, but there is not the Enigma), and is to provide the "true system" or "basis" of the true system. Nevertheless I hope that good fortune will attend the doctrine of the concept here set out, not only because it seems to me to afford the satisfaction proper to every statement of truth, namely, to accord with the reality of things, but also (if I may so express myself) because it carries with it certain immediate and tangible advantages. Above all, it relieves the student of philosophy of the terrible responsibility--which I should never wish to assume--of supplying the Truth, the unique eternal Truth, and of supplying it in competition with all the greatest philosophers who have appeared in the course of centuries. Further, it removes from him together both the hope of the definitive system and the anxious fear of the mortal doom which will one day strike the very system that he has so lovingly constructed, as it has struck those of his predecessors. At the same time it sets him out of reach of the smiling non-philosophers who foresee with accuracy and are almost able to calculate the date of that not distant death. Finally, it frees him from the annoyance of the "school" and of the "scholars"; "school" and "scholars" in the sense of the old metaphysicians are no longer even conceivable, when the idea of "systems" having-their "own principles" has been abolished. All dynamic systems or provisory systemizations of ever new problems have the same principle, namely, Thought, perennis philosophia. There has not been and never will be anything to add to this. And although the many propositions and solutions of problems strive among themselves to attain harmony, yet to each, if it be truly thought, is promised eternal life, which gives and receives vigour from the life of each of the others. This is just the opposite of what takes place with static systems which collapse, one upon the other, only certain portions of good work surviving them in the shape of happy treatment of special problems which are to be found mingled with the metaphysic of every true philosopher. And although there is no longer a field left over to these scholars who merely faithfully echo the master, like adepts of a religion, there is yet a wide field always open to the other type of scholar, men who pay serious attention and assimilate what is of use to them in the thought of others, but then proceed to state and to solve new problems of their own. Finally, the life of philosophy as conceived and portrayed in this Logic, resembles the life of poetry in this: that it does not become effective save in passing from different to different, from one original thinker to another, as poetry passes from poet to poet, and imitators and schools of poetry, although they certainly belong to the world, yet do not belong to the world of poetry.

B. C.

September 1916.

CONTENTS

FIRST PART

THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE A PRIORI LOGICAL SYNTHESIS

FIRST SECTION

THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT

Thought and sensation--Thought and language--Intuition and language as presuppositions--Scepsis as to the concept--Its three forms--Æstheticism--Mysticism--Empiricism--Redactio ad absurdum of the three forms--Affirmation of the concept.

THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

Concept and conceptual fictions--The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative--Conceptual fictions as representative without universality, or universals void of representations--Criticism of the doctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts--Posteriority of fictional concepts to true and proper concepts--Proper character of conceptual fictions--The practical end and mnemonic utility--Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with concepts--Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts.

III

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT

Expressivity--Universality--Concreteness--The concrete-universal and the formation of the pseudoconcepts--Empirical and abstract pseudoconcepts--The other characteristics of the pure concept--The origin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the concept--Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and the impossibility of demonstrating it--Prejudice concerning the nature of the demonstration--Prejudice relating to the representability of the concept--Protests of philosophers against this prejudice--Reason of their perpetual reappearance.

DISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT

Disputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism and nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract concepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical disputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept of the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and causes--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical nature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual intuition--Uniqueness of thought.

CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND

THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION

The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the concept--The series in abstract concepts.

OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts --Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle of sufficient reason.

SECOND SECTION

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT

Relation of the logical with the æsthetic form--The concept as expression--Æsthetic and æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of thought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction of subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and existence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the definition as fixed verbal formula.