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Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, From 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16) · United States. Congress — chapter 221 of 283 · ~1,457 words · public domain

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As the President is to be taken from the Senate, and, if worthy of the Senatorial office, must have experience, and be well informed of the affairs of the nation--and can also avail himself of the information and talents of every member of the Government--there can be no solid objection to reducing his term of service to one year. The President will always enter on his office at the close of the session of Congress; and during the recess have time to make himself more fully acquainted with the state of the nation, so as to present a proper view of it to the next Congress, as well as to conduct successfully the public business at the end of his term. No serious embarrassment or inconvenience, in conducting the public business, has been felt from the change of a President or the Head of a Department. There are and always must be subordinate officers around the Government, well acquainted with the routine of business; which will and must proceed in its usual course. If any example were necessary to show that no injury would arise to the nation from an annual appointment of a President, I might instance the ancient Republic of Rome--where, in the days of her greatest virtue, prosperity, and glory, her chief magistrates, or consuls, were chosen every year. But, being taken from the Senate, a body conversant with the management of their public affairs, as is our Senate, no evil accrued to the public.

The office of President is the only one in our Government clothed with such powers as might endanger liberty; and I am not without apprehension that, at some future period, they may be exerted to overthrow the liberties of our country. The change from four to ten years is small; the next step would be from ten years to life, and then to the nomination of a successor; from which the transition to an hereditary monarchy would almost follow of course. The exigencies of the country, the public safety, and the means of defence against foreign invasion, may place in the hands of an ambitious, daring President, an army, of which he would be the legitimate commander, and with which he might enforce his claim. This may not happen in my day; it probably will not; but I have children whom I love, and whom I expect to leave behind me, to share in the destinies of our common country. I cannot therefore feel indifferent to what may befall them and generations yet unborn.

I do not desire in the smallest degree to lessen the President’s power to do good; I only wish to place such salutary checks upon his power, as to prevent his doing harm. His power of nominating and appointing to office, and removing from office, will still be continued; with only the additional check of requiring the consent of the House of Representatives, in one case, and of the Senate and House in the other. All his other powers will remain the same as at present, and there will be but little danger of an abuse of those powers, if the term of Presidential office be reduced to one year, and the appointment be by lot: which will render it impossible to bring the high prerogatives of this office to aid in procuring it. An artful intriguer cannot then point to the various lucrative offices in the gift of the President, for the purpose of stimulating exertion in favor of his election: than which a more powerful engine could not have been devised.

Of the impropriety and impolicy of the present mode of electing a President, can there be stronger proof, can there be a more convincing evidence, than is now exhibiting in the United States? In whatever direction we turn our eyes, we behold the people arranging themselves under the banners of different candidates, for the purpose of commencing the electioneering campaign for the next President and Vice President. All the passions and feelings of the human heart are brought into the most active operation. The electioneering spirit finds its way to every fireside; pervades our domestic circles; and threatens to destroy the enjoyment of social harmony. The seeds of discord will be sown in families, among friends, and throughout the whole community. In saying this, I do not mean any thing to the disadvantage of either of the candidates. They may have no agency in the business; they may be the involuntary objects of such competition, without the power of directing or controlling the storm. The fault is in the mode of election; in setting the people to choose a King. In fact, a popular election, and the exercise of such powers and prerogatives as are by the constitution vested in the President, are incompatible. The evil is increasing, and will increase, until it shall terminate in civil war and despotism. The people, suffering under the scourge of party feuds and factions, and finding no refuge under the State, any more than in the General Government, from party persecution and oppression, may become impatient, and submit to the first tyrant who can protect them against the thousand tyrants.

I have dwelt so long on this amendment, because of the novelty, in this country, of appointing a Chief Magistrate by lot. The facility of appointing by lot was obvious; but it seemed necessary to exhibit, and to demonstrate the many and highly important advantages which will arise from this mode of appointing a President of the United States. The principal of these I will now present in one short view:

1st. It will make the Senate more respectable.

2d. It is prompt and certain.

3d. It will avoid the evils of a disputed election, now unprovided for in the constitution.

4th. It will exclude intrigue and cabal.

5th. It gives talent and modest merit an equal chance.

6th. It is economical.

7th. It gives to the people a President of the United States, and not the chief of a party.

8th. It removes temptation to use power otherwise than for public good.

9th. It will annihilate a general party pervading the whole United States.

10th. It will remove a direct, powerful, and dangerous influence of the General Government on the individual States.

11th. It will prevent the influence of a Presidential election on our domestic concerns and foreign relations. And,

12th. It will secure the United States against the usurpation of power, and every attempt, through fear, interest, or corruption, to sacrifice their interest, honor, or independence; for one year is too short a time in which to contrive and execute any extensive and dangerous plan of unprincipled ambition; and the same person cannot be President during two successive terms.

Reducing the Presidential term of service to one year, will remove the necessity of attaching to the office the splendor of a palace. The simplicity of ancient Republics would better suit the nature of our Government. The instances of persons called from the plough to command armies, or to preside over the public councils, show that in a Republic pomp and splendor are not necessary to real dignity. Cincinnatus, who was content with the scanty support derived from tilling, with his own hands, his four-acre farm, has been as celebrated in history as the most splendid monarchs. By these remarks I would not be understood to object against giving adequate salaries to all public functionaries. In the case of subordinate officers, it may be left to Legislative discretion. But the President having such great power and extensive influence, his compensation ought to have a constitutional limit, and not exceed fifteen thousand dollars.

FRIDAY, April 15.

Death of the Representative, Jacob Crowninshield.

A message from the House of Representatives notified the Senate of the death of JACOB CROWNINSHIELD, Esq., late a member of that House, and that his funeral will take place to-morrow morning, at 10 o’clock.

On motion, by Mr. GILMAN,

Resolved, That the Senate will attend the funeral of Mr. CROWNINSHIELD to-morrow morning at 10 o’clock.

SATURDAY, April 16.

The Senate adjourned to twelve o’clock, and attended the funeral of the honorable JACOB CROWNINSHIELD. After which they returned to their Chamber, and the VICE PRESIDENT having retired for the remainder of the session, the Senate proceeded by ballot to the choice of a PRESIDENT pro tempore, as the constitution provides; and the honorable SAMUEL SMITH was elected.

Ordered, That the Secretary wait on the President of the United States, and acquaint him that the Senate have, in the absence of the Vice President, elected the honorable SAMUEL SMITH their President pro tempore; and that the Secretary make a like communication to the House of Representatives.

WEDNESDAY, April 20.

Bank of the United States.

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