Part 220

TUESDAY, April 12.

Removal of Federal Judges upon Address from Congress.

Mr. ADAMS stated that he, together with his colleague, were instructed by the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, to use their best endeavors to procure such an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as will empower the President of the United States to remove from office any of the judges of the courts of the United States, upon an address to him made for that purpose, by a majority of the House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senate, in Congress assembled.

On motion, by Mr. ADAMS,

Ordered, That the instructions be referred to the committee appointed the 25th of January last, on the subject of amendments to the constitution, to consider and report thereon.

Amendment of the Constitution--President by lot from among the Senators.

Mr. HILLHOUSE.--The situation of the United States at the time of the meeting of the Convention for forming the constitution, I well remember, and it will be recollected by every member of this Senate, to have been such as to excite the anxious solicitude of every considerate man in our country. External pressure being removed, the recommendations of Congress had ceased to have effect on the States. We were a nation without credit and without resources; or rather without the means of drawing them forth. Local policy began to operate in a manner that tended to excite jealousy and discontent among the States; and there was reason to fear that we were exposed, and at no remote period, to all the calamities of civil war. Under these circumstances, the present constitution was promulgated, and was eagerly seized on by the great body of the people, as the palladium of our liberties, and the bond of our Union. I was of the number of those who approved it, though some parts of it appeared to me mere theories in the science of Government, which I hoped in the experiment would prove salutary; but my expectations were not sanguine.

Before I proceed with my explanatory remarks, I must take the liberty of stating, that in using the terms monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy, I do not use them as the cant words of party; I use them in their fair, genuine sense. The terms Federalist and Republican, I do not use by way of commendation or reproach; but merely by way of description, as the first names of individuals, to distinguish them from others of the same family name.

Federalists and Republicans never divided upon the elementary principles of government. There are very few Americans who are not in principle attached to a free republican government; though they may differ on minor points, and about the best mode of organizing it. Persons attached to monarchy or aristocracy are few indeed; they are but as the dust in the balance. No one in his sober senses can believe it practicable, or politic if practicable, to introduce either. If ever introduced, which God forbid, it must be done at the point of the bayonet.

It is well known that the denominations of the parties, called Federalists and Republicans, were applied, the former to those who supported, the latter to those who opposed the two first Administrations formed under the Federal Constitution. Those who opposed those Administrations, wishing to obtain the governing power, and disliking the name of Anti-Federalists, given to the first opposers of the constitution, assumed the more popular name of Republicans. It cannot be expected that a politician, when he has made himself up for a political ball or masquerade, will exhibit his true character. Many of the most florid speeches are made more with an eye to the people, than to the body to which they are addressed. To find the true character of man, you must look to his homespun, everyday dress; if you do this, will you not find a full proportion of good Republicans, as they are called, who exhibit no more of that virtue called humility than their neighbors, and who manifest no greater regard for equal rights? The supposed differences are more imaginary than real. Names may, and sometimes do, deceive ignorant, uninformed individuals; but these names now scarcely do that.

Some of the important features of our constitution were borrowed from a model which did not very well suit our condition: I mean the Constitution and Government of England, a mixed monarchy, in which monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, are so combined as to form a check on each other. One important and indispensable requisite of such a Government is, that the two first branches should be hereditary, and that the Monarch should be the fountain of honor and source of power. In the United States, the people are the source of all power.

Placing in the hands of the Chief Magistrate, who depends on a popular election, prerogatives and powers in many respects equal, in some, exceeding in practice those exercised by the King of Great Britain, is one of the errors of the constitution. This error can be corrected only in one of two ways; either the office must be stripped of those high prerogatives and powers, and the term of holding the office shortened, or some other mode devised, than a popular election, for appointing a President: otherwise, our country must perpetually groan under the scourge of party rage and violence, and be continually exposed to that worst of all calamities, civil war.

I am aware I have engaged in a difficult undertaking. I have to oppose deep-rooted prejudices and long-established opinions, which will be abandoned with reluctance. I have to contradict favorite theories, long ago adopted, and still strenuously maintained. It is therefore to be expected that arguments which go to destroy the former, or contradict the latter, will be admitted with caution, and listened to with a reluctant ear. Some of the amendments, when first presented to my mind, made but a slight impression, and I was disposed to pass them by as impracticable or ineffectual; but experience and mature reflection have satisfied me both of their correctness and importance.

I am aware that the amendments will not be approved by many individuals in this nation, under an apprehension of their tending to lower the tone and energy of the Government. They will be denounced by all office hunters, demagogues, and men of inordinate ambition, more anxious for their own elevation to office than for the public good. All artful men, who rely more on their dexterity and skill in intrigue, than upon honest merit, to secure an election, will raise their voices and cry aloud against them. They will describe them as utopian and visionary; as departing from the elective principle; and as lowering the dignity and character of the Government. But the great body of the people, who compose that portion of the community which can have no views or interests incompatible with the general welfare, which can have no other wish or desire than to see the nation prosper, and which the feelings of nature would stimulate to do what would advance the prosperity and happiness of future generations, will, I flatter myself, lend a listening ear, and grant me a candid and patient hearing. I must also be permitted to indulge the hope, that, in this honorable body, the amendments will not be hastily rejected; nor until they shall have undergone an attentive and critical examination.

A prominent feature of the amendments is, to shorten the term of service of the President, Senators, and Representatives; observation and experience having convinced me, that in an elective Government, long terms of office and high compensations do not tend to make independent public servants, while they produce an anxious solicitude in the incumbents to keep their places; and render seekers of office more eager to obtain them, and more regardless of the means.

My first amendment goes to reduce the term of service of the members of the House of Representatives to one year.

No inconvenience can arise from this arrangement; because there is a constitutional provision that Congress shall assemble once in every year. That body, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, ought to exhibit a fair representation of their sentiments and will; and, coming fresh from the people to the Congress of each year, will, it may be presumed, fairly express such sentiments and will. And if, in an interval from one session of Congress to another, there be a real change of public sentiment, why should not that change be expressed? Will an attempt in their Representatives to resist it, tend to tranquillize the public mind? or will it not, like persecution in religion, tend to make proselytes to their sentiments?

Constitutions, except so far as they are necessary to organize the several departments of Government, and bring the public functionaries into a situation to deliberate and act; and, in the General Government, to draw the line of demarcation between that and the State governments, to prevent interference and collision, are of little avail; and present but feeble barriers against the public will. Whenever a measure is understood and believed to be necessary to promote the general welfare, the people will not fail to effect it. If they cannot, by construction, get round the constitution, they will, by an amendment, go directly to their object. Of the truth of this, experience has furnished ample proof. The danger is, that by attempting to extend constitutional restrictions too far, unnatural and mischievous exertions of power may be produced.

By the second amendment, the term of service of the Senators is to be reduced to three years; one-third to be chosen each year.

The Senate, I am aware, may be surprised, and perhaps feel some displeasure, that one of their own body should propose an amendment, which, in the estimation of some, may tend to lessen their dignity, and destroy their independence. Did I believe this, I should be the last to offer it. If the Senate will hear me patiently, I think I can show that it will produce no such effect.

Senators represent the rights and interests of States in respect to their sovereignty. In them, therefore, the States ought to feel a confidence. And this confidence will rather be increased than lessened by shortening the term of service to three years. Shall I be told that the Legislatures of the States are not to be relied on for their stability and patriotism? that it would be unsafe, every third year, to trust them with the appointment of their Senators? No, surely. The several States are the pillars on which the Constitution of the United States rests, and must rest. If these pillars are not sound, if they are composed of feeble, frail materials, then must the General Government moulder into ruin. This, however, is not my belief. I have confidence in the State Governments. I am for keeping them in their full vigor and strength. For if any disaster befalls the General Government, the States, having within their respective spheres all the power of independent Governments, will be the arks of safety to which the citizens can flee for protection from anarchy, and the horrid evils which follow its train. I have therefore uniformly been opposed to measures which had the remotest tendency to their consolidation.

When I shall have stated the next amendment, it will be found that my plan, instead of lessening the dignity and importance of Senators, will magnify their office, and make it the object of desire and laudable ambition to the best characters and greatest talents of our country; for, from the Senate I propose that the President of the United States shall always be taken; and in a manner that will exclude all cabal and undue influence in obtaining that high office--a mode in which the man of modest merit shall have an equal chance of success with the most daring and artful intriguer.

The third amendment provides for the appointment of a President. He is to be taken by lot from the Senate, and is to hold his office for one year.

This mode promises many advantages, and only two objections against it present themselves to my mind; one, that it is a departure from the elective principle; the other, that it will not always ensure the best talents. I should not have proposed this mode, if any other could have been devised, which would not convulse the whole body politic, set wide open the door to intrigue and cabal, and bring upon the nation incalculable evils; evils already felt, and growing more and more serious. Upon mature examination, those objections appear less formidable than at first view.

When Senators shall be chosen with an eye to this provision, every State will be anxious to make such a selection of persons as will not disgrace it in the eventual elevation of one of them to the Presidential chair. Every State Legislature would, in the choice of the Senator, consider itself as nominating a candidate for the Presidency. The effect of this arrangement would be, in reality, that, instead of the States appointing Electors to choose a President, the Legislatures themselves would become the Electors; with this advantage, that the nomination would be made when not under the influence of a Presidential electioneering fever. In the regular course of appointing Senators, only one nomination would be made at one time in each State; and in most cases, three years would elapse before he could be designated for the Presidency. The great caution in the selection of Senators, with a reference to that high office, would produce another excellent effect: it would ensure the continuance, in that body, of men of the most respectable talents and character--an object of the highest importance to the general welfare. In the mode directed by the constitution for choosing a President by the House of Representatives, there is almost as great a departure as in what I propose, from the pure elective principle; which requires perfect freedom of choice among all who are eligible; and that the ballot of each qualified voter shall have equal weight in making such choice. Whereas, by the constitution, the House are confined to three candidates, and must vote by States; so that a State having twenty-two members, has but one; and, consequently, no more weight than a State having only a single member. And those States whose members shall be equally divided, will have no vote. These circumstances considered, the present constitutional mode of choosing a President by the House of Representatives, when tested by the pure elective principle, may be deemed, as to the mode of choosing, and the object of the choice, as exceptionable as the appointment by lot; while it remains liable to all the evils of a contested election, from which the appointment by lot is wholly free.

In answer to the second objection, it may be fairly presumed that the Senate will always be composed of men possessed at least of decent talents. And such men, with honest views, long experience, and the aid of the Heads of Departments and other officers, would be able to do the public business correctly. It is not necessary, it is not desirable, that the President should command the armies in person; and all our foreign relations may be managed through the agency of able Ministers, whose appointments are to be approved both by the Senate and House of Representatives. The several Executives, ever since the adoption of the constitution, have been in the habit of calling to their aid a Cabinet Council, composed of the Heads of Departments; who ought to consist, as they probably will, of men of talents, integrity, and experience; and who, upon the plan proposed, being likely to continue long in office, will thereby give stability and system to the measures of Government.

If the appointment by lot will not always insure a President of the first rate talents, neither will the present mode of electing; for when party spirit runs high, and parties are nearly balanced, candidates will be set up, not for their talents, but because they are popular and can command votes. And there may be a possibility of having a President for four years, distinguished neither for talents nor integrity. A President appointed by lot will possess the advantage, and in practice it will be found a very great advantage, of coming into office free from party influence; which, under the present mode of electing, is seldom if ever to be expected; and it is to be feared that it will be too powerful to suffer even an honest man to do right.

Appointing a President by lot from the Senate, will give every State an equal and fair chance of participating in the dignity of that high office; will prevent the possibility of bargaining among the large States to the total exclusion of the middling and small States; and will thus remove one ground of State jealousy, which must inevitably grow out of our present mode. As it regards the sovereignty of the respective States, the appointment by lot is in exact conformity to the principles of the constitution; for in the event of an election of a President by the House of Representatives, each State has an equal vote, conformably with its equal rights as sovereign and independent; so that, in respect to peace and union, this mode of appointing a President would produce effects of great and lasting importance.