Part 212

Mr. G. said, that every species of property stood on the same principle--the promise made by the Government to afford protection to all property--the same rights are attached to every species of property, and the Government is bound to afford an equal security to all. A sentence read yesterday, by a gentleman, (Mr. S. SMITH), from a writer upon the laws of nations, clearly shows the right of a nation to make reprisal upon all the effects of individuals of an aggressing nation indiscriminately, except stock in the public funds; which has been exempted, under the idea of its being a pledge in the hands of Government; the withholding of which would be a breach of public faith. He believed that the practice and policy of some nations might have given rise to this distinction, but he doubted whether the practice had been uniform and universal, and he was clear that there was no rational distinction in principle. The idea that the public funds are a pledge in the hands of Government, and ought not, therefore, to be touched, is equally applicable to every other species of property. In the case of contracts between individuals, the Government guarantees the performance upon the refusal of one party to pay, or comply. In the case of lands or personal chattels, the Government guarantees the exclusive enjoyment to the proprietor; it would be equally a violation of faith for the Government to deny its obligation in the one case as in the other, and nothing could justify an invasion of the rights of property, in any case, but self-preservation--the first of all rights, and the highest of all duties.

He positively denied that any pre-eminence was due to one species of property over another. He said, however, that this discussion was not immediately necessary, as the resolution under consideration did not embrace the stock in the funds of the United States.

Mr. G. observed, that it had been said, and repeated in the committee, that the proposed measure was war. He denied that the measure in itself was war, or that it furnished a just cause of war. He believed, however, that it was problematical whether it would eventuate in peace or war; indeed, he remarked, that the crisis of affairs is already such, that, whether the measure be adopted or not, he viewed war as a probable event, peace as a possible event; but the point he contended for was, that if the aggressions towards the United States be sufficient to justify reprisal, the exercise of the right does not furnish a just cause of war. The exercise of a right by one nation can never involve the absurd consequence of giving another nation the right to exercise a wrong. He said, that gentlemen on one side of this question seemed to act upon an imaginary, instead of the real, state of things. He was not, therefore, astonished at hearing the committee cautioned against the violation of neutrality. He did not conceive that the present state of things between the United States and Great Britain would justify the use of the term neutrality. Neutrality is a term used to signify the relation in which two nations stand towards each other. Neutrality, therefore, requires parties--either party may destroy the relation between the parties. It therefore appeared absurd to him to say that Great Britain was in a state of depredation and war towards the United States, and the United States in a state of neutrality towards Great Britain. It has been said, that the United States have not abandoned their neutrality; this is true, but it is no evidence that neutrality exists. Great Britain has abandoned it for them.

He said, however, that this was disregarding the substance and entering into a mere cavil about names. It was not material, in his opinion, what name ought to be given to the existing relation of things between the United States and Great Britain--whether it was called a state of peace, a state of war, a state of neutrality, a state of reprisal, a state of retortion, or a state of very uncivil conduct on the part of Great Britain. Nor did he conceive it material to ascertain whether there was any intermediate stage between a state of peace and a state of war, or in which state the depredations of Great Britain should technically be classed; but one thing was certain and material--that the United States had sustained substantial wrongs, which required a substantial remedy. Gentlemen who have regarded names and disregarded substances have also been extremely alarmed at the idea of a discrimination of conduct by the United States towards foreign nations. A gentleman (Mr. BOUDINOT) observed yesterday, that the United States had sustained injuries from France and Spain as well as Great Britain, and asked why there should be any discrimination in their favor? Mr. G. said he was extremely hurt that the conduct of France should be so unnecessarily and inopportunely arraigned in that House. He submitted it to the gentleman to say, if the United States should be compelled to enter into the war, which was at this moment not an improbable event, why then it would be wise to irritate the only nation in the world who could afford them any substantial assistance! He said that this conduct was the less justifiable, from the recollection that the conduct of France was the result of necessity, and there was every reason to conclude that the conduct of that nation would be explained in a satisfactory manner. But a consideration mentioned by a gentleman, (Mr. SMITH, of Maryland,) yesterday, was a conclusive answer--the United States owe to France a pecuniary obligation, as well as one of a more sacred nature. This is at all times sufficient for their indemnification. With respect to Spain, if the gentleman would show the injury sustained, and point out a fund for indemnification, Mr. G. declared he would not hesitate a moment to apply it to that object.

But will the gentleman conclude, that because one nation has injured us, in a degree against which we have no redress, that therefore we shall not indemnify ourselves from a nation which has injured us in the extreme, and against which we have the most ample redress?

He believed the gentleman's coolness, his wisdom, and his deliberation, could not possibly lead him to such a result. With respect to discrimination in the conduct of the United States towards foreign nations, it necessarily grew out of the character of the conduct of other nations towards the United States. Some gentlemen appeared to him to have carried their ideas upon this subject to the most fanciful absurdities. To keep France out of the comparison, let this indiscriminate conduct, so much applauded, be applied to Great Britain and Holland. Great Britain destroys our trade, plunders our property, and, to her injuries, adds insult and contempt. Holland, engaged in the same cause, fosters our trade, and respects us as a nation. Under these circumstances, do gentlemen contend that an indiscriminate conduct is due to Great Britain and to Holland? Or do they mean to carry this delicate indiscriminate conduct so far as to refuse to themselves all redress from one nation, because they would wish to deal out the same conduct to all others, whether they had offended or not? He said, that discrimination was stamped in the front of the conduct of foreign nations towards us, and to make an indiscriminate return would be the worst and most unjust of all discriminations. He hoped gentlemen would pardon him, but he could not help thinking that they had carried their ideas upon this subject to the most fanciful absurdities. A gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) yesterday remarked, that of late the condition of war had been much ameliorated as it regards the rights of property, and he thought the amelioration ought to be extended rather than abridged. Mr. G. declared, that he heartily joined him in his wishes that the condition of war would ere long be ameliorated, both as it regards property and persons. He hoped that mankind would soon learn more wisdom than to butcher each other for the amusement or security of the privileged orders of the world. From that source he believed all wars arose, and until the cause was banished from the earth, he feared the fatal effects resulting from it would continue to exist. He declared, that he should view the banishment of the privileged orders from the world as the surest harbinger of the approach of the millennium. But this is not the happy period of the world; for, although the United States are free from this pest of the human species in their internal organization, yet the evils they at this moment experience arise from their external intercourse with that part of the world which is less fortunate. The attack made on the United States at this moment, is an attack upon property. If there should be a war between the United States and Great Britain, it will be a war of property. Unless there should be a species of madness in the nation not to be calculated upon, they cannot think of invasion and subjugation. It is known that the United States cannot make an attack upon Great Britain, and territory and conquest with them are no objects. Hence the war will be confined to depredations upon property. This is the most dishonorable species of warfare, and therefore the more to be regretted. There is this obvious distinction, however, between the United States and Great Britain. With Great Britain, at least with the privileged orders, it is matter of choice; with the United States, it is matter of compulsion. The United States despise this mode of warfare; they covet not the property of any nation upon earth, but self-preservation demands it. They are under the strong hand of a powerful nation, despising their rights, and regardless of justice. In this state of things, there is but little hope of strengthening the sacred ties of property; for, in the example of Great Britain, her late conduct can furnish no consolation for these theoretic speculations; and however the United States might be inclined to practise upon them, yet the British depredations will forbid them--for submission will be an invitation to new acts of aggression. He most ardently wished the state of things were otherwise; but, exposed to these inconveniences, the most effectual means ought to be adopted for their resistance.

Mr. G. proceeded to observe, that having shown the right of reprisal to be conformable to the laws of nations, and clearly justified by the existing relation of things between the United States and Great Britain, he would now submit a few remarks upon the policy of exercising the right at this time. Under the existing circumstances of the United States, he thought the policy of the measure was recommended by the clearest and most obvious principles. The relation of things between the United States and Great Britain is such as to demand a final and unequivocal explanation, whether the proposed measure be adopted or not. In all parts of this committee, in all parts of the United States, a definitive explanation is called for. The present state of things between the two nations cannot long exist.

It is to be hoped that, the tone of language to be used by the United States will be adjusted to the nature of the injuries they have sustained. Acquiescence and submission are no longer recommended. Hence, matters are already reduced to extremities, and all the irritations already exist which can grow out of an extreme state of things. The proposed measure can add nothing to these irritations. The question, therefore, appears to be reduced to this--whether, in demanding an explanation and attempting negotiation, we shall use all the means in our power to compel a favorable issue? or whether we shall tamely supplicate for justice, and suffer the most effectual means of compulsion to elude our grasp? He did not mean here to recapitulate the conduct of Great Britain towards us; he hoped it was sufficiently impressed upon the mind of every gentleman in the committee; but, after the recent experience of her conduct, it would be madness, it would be folly, to address our complaints to her justice or moderation. He thought it would be wise to lay hold of every thing in our power, and hold it as a pledge for her good behavior. This measure would put us in the best possible situation for negotiation. It would authorize an appeal to her interest, which she could not resist. He begged the committee to reflect upon the argument which had been used here, to prevent a late measure which had been adopted, and which had been renewed upon the present resolution, that a great value in property, belonging to the citizens of the United States, was in the power of the British, and that any counteracting measures would place it in extreme hazard. This seemed to him to have been the most prevailing argument which had been urged, and for some time was irresistible. If, then, the argument shall have been applied with so much force here, with how much more force will it be applied in Great Britain, when they find that the property of the individuals of that nation is placed in jeopardy here, and that it greatly exceeds in value the whole of the property which they have infamously detained and condemned? Besides, if, in the event of a war, it should be a war of property, as is every where contemplated. Great Britain will find that the war will be commenced upon very unequal terms. Viewing this measure, therefore, as to its probable tendency to peace or war, he thought the probability greatly in favor of its producing peace. When Great Britain shall find that she is entering into a contest upon unequal terms, when she shall find that it may terminate in a permanent loss of the advantages of her commerce with the United States, when she shall see before her a precipice, into which if she should once enter she never can return, she would pause before she acted, she would take time to count the probable loss and gain, and peace would be the infallible consequence of such deliberate calculations. This measure will convince Great Britain that the United States possess a knowledge of their rights, a confidence in their ability, and a determination in their disposition to assert and support them.

A gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) observed yesterday, that a pacific system would probably attach the people of Great Britain to the United States, and detach them from their own Government. The gentleman ought to recollect, that a pusillanimous conduct will not. It is with nations as it is with individuals--to be respected by others, they should respect themselves. The same gentleman remarked, that a change of Ministry might be expected, and advised waiting for the event. The idea is as undignified as it is chimerical.

Mr. G. said, he knew nothing of the change of the Ministry--the principle was unknown here. The people here were their own governors. It was immaterial to them who the Minister was. Even in the country where the people were less fortunate, where Ministers govern, a change of Ministers never produced any solid advantage to the nation. It was merely an expedient of the moment, to smother a popular clamor. But, even proceeding upon the gentleman's hypothesis, which Mr. G. thought wholly inadmissible, he submitted to the gentleman to determine, whether a positive submission by foreigners to the avaricious regulations of a Minister, be the most likely mean to render him unpopular at home? On the other hand, whether it was not the most effectual mean of preserving his popularity, and of keeping him in office? He presumed the people at home would never complain of injuries abroad, if those who sustained them refused to complain. It is but by resistance, and throwing the burden upon the people of England, that they can be brought to complain. But, in cases of such extremities as the present, all appeals to the people of England are futile and degrading. Our only resource should be in our own exertions. They would be abundantly sufficient, if we could be brought to believe it.

Mr. G. remarked, that the people of Ireland had lately afforded an instructing lesson upon this point. They had arms in their hands for the purpose of asserting their rights; under the idea of acquiescence and submission they had surrendered them to the Government; perhaps, under the expectation of a change of Ministry. Did this act of submission render them more respectable in the eyes of the people of England? Did it encourage the hopes of those who wished the establishment of Government upon the principle of equal rights? Did it not rivet the chains upon the people of England? Did it render the people of Ireland more respectable in the eyes of the people of the United States? To these questions it was unnecessary to give an answer. The people of Ireland reaped the usual merits of submission--imposition and insult.

There was another consideration strongly in favor of the policy of the proposed measure. Applications have been already made from different parts of the United States by the immediate sufferers from the British depreciations, for an indemnification of their losses. These applications will, probably, be increased, repeated, and continued; the agricultural and other interests of the United States will, probably, never consent to equalize this burden. The claims of the sufferers upon the Government will gain additional weight, unless this fund should be offered to them for their indemnification. This is the obvious, the natural and the rightful fund for their indemnification; and he thought it was, at least, the duty of the Government to hold it as a pledge for their security. If this measure should not now be adopted, the refusal will lay a foundation for further parties in the United States, which may ultimately have a serious effect upon the Government.

An objection, of a very delicate and influential nature, has been made to the proposed measure, which required some consideration--that it would affect the character and credit of the Government. He had viewed this objection with the most deliberate attention, and felt the whole force of its imposing delicacy; but was at length perfectly satisfied that it was unfounded. This objection relates rather to the right than the policy of the United States to adopt the measure. If the United States possesses the right of reprisal upon an honest and sound interpretation of the laws of nations; if the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States be sufficient to justify the excess of the right, he believed the policy of exercising the right could never tarnish the American character, nor lessen the credit of American citizens hereafter. The world of nations, as well as individuals, will easily see, that it was a measure of compulsion, not of choice; that, although the United States believed, they regretted the necessity; that they were not the authors of the original wrongs; that they had borne them with patience, had used their endeavors to prevent the commission of them; and that, when these wrongs were committed and repeated, the United States possessed no other means of redress.

Under these circumstances, in the exercise of a substantial right, he did not believe there could flow any consequential wrong.

The motive would be looked at, and it would furnish a complete exoneration from blame, whilst the original aggressors would become justly responsible for all the consequences.

Mr. G. said, he could not sit down without making some remarks upon the fruits of the conduct heretofore observed by the United States. The most pacific system has heretofore marked the character of the Government. All America looked upon the late proclamation of neutrality as a competent guarantee for peace. He had no doubt but that it was dictated by the purest regard for peace. But what have been the fruits of it? He did not mean to condemn the conduct of the Executive. Perhaps it was suggested by the then existing state of things. He only intended to show, that it had not met with the return it merited, and which was reasonably expected from it.

It has not produced peace. A regard for peace has been construed into a fear of war. A resistance of the feelings of the people for the cause of France has been a palatable food for British arrogance and presumption. Submission to aggression has invited new aggressions; appeals for justice have been deemed testimonies of debility, till at length the United States, after having been stripped of their citizens and property, are upon the eve of a war, because they have not exerted their rights at an earlier period. If this conduct should have been heretofore wise and pacific, experience has taught us that it is no longer so; nothing can be expected from the justice, the honor, or the moderation of a court which has proved itself equally a stranger to them all; but, before such a tribunal, acquiescence will beget injuries, injuries will beget insults, and insults will beget contempt, degradation, and war.

Mr. SWIFT remarked that, on the first view of the subject, he had been inclined to favor the proposition, not having attended minutely to the distinction made by the laws of nations respecting the property of an enemy liable to reprisal; but on a full investigation of the subject, and mature deliberation, he was convinced that the proposition under consideration would be a direct and manifest violation of the laws of nations; he was, therefore, clearly and decidedly opposed to its adoption. Gentlemen have said much respecting the insults and the injuries which we have received from the British nation; but Mr. S. conceived it to be unnecessary that gentlemen should describe their insults and injuries in the highest colors to inflame our passions, and to animate our resentment. He believed that every gentleman in the committee deeply felt the indignity which had been offered to their country, and was convinced that Great Britain had been guilty of a violation of the laws of nations; but, under such circumstances, it was our duty to conduct with coolness, candor, and moderation. He thought that the heat and passion which had been manifested in the course of the debate were inconsistent with that dignity and propriety which ought to mark the deliberations of the Legislature.

Mr. S. observed, that the conduct of the British Court in regard to their concealing in such a singular manner the Order of the 6th of November, and the equivocal terms in which it was expressed, was greatly to their dishonor. But he thought that the words legal adjudication, would fairly admit of a construction that no American vessel that should be taken pursuant to that order, could be liable to be condemned, unless warranted by the laws of nations. There was reason to apprehend that such was the intention of the British Cabinet; and that the Courts of Admiralty in the West Indies, in their condemnations, had exceeded their jurisdiction, and contradicted the design of the Court of London. Recent intelligence confirmed the idea. No information of these illegal transactions had yet been communicated to them. It was possible that when that court were made acquainted with the injuries we had sustained that they would award restitution or compensation. Mr. S. remarked that, by the laws of nations, no nation had a right to make reprisal for any injury till all other means of obtaining justice had failed; that it was our duty in the first place to represent to the Court of Great Britain the spoliations that had been made on our commerce by the illegal condemnation of our vessels; that, till we had done this, the laws of nations would not warrant us to make reprisals on the goods and effects of the British nation. That there was a possibility of obtaining a satisfactory explanation of their conduct and reparation for the injuries we had suffered. It was, therefore, a proper subject of negotiation. But, he said, if that nation will not do us justice, then we are authorized to make reprisals.

Mr. S. then observed that, when we had taken such steps as would authorize reprisal, we should be precluded by the laws of nations from adopting the proposition under consideration. He said that a gentleman from Maryland (Mr. MERCER) had yesterday asserted that Burlamaqui was the only authority among the writers on the laws of nations against the measure; and that the opinion of Vattel was in favor of it. Another gentleman from Maryland (Mr. SMITH) had read a passage from Vattel, which he considered as an authority in point, to justify the seizing of private debts; but not debts due from the public. But if these gentlemen had thoroughly examined Vattel, they would have found, instead of his being an authority in their favor, he had in the most direct terms maintained a contrary opinion. He then read a passage from Vattel, that showed that the effects of an enemy in a country at the time of a declaration of war cannot be seized, but that the owner is entitled to a reasonable time to remove them; and another passage, which expressly declared that, by the usage and custom of modern nations, public and private debts are not the subject of reprisal. Mr. S. conceived that these rules were founded in the highest wisdom; that all debts were contracted under a sanction of public faith, and an understanding that a war should not render them liable to seizure or confiscation; that a moral obligation existed between the contracting parties for the payment of the debts; and that no government could ever have a right to violate a moral obligation. That, therefore, by the law of nations in all instances where property comes into the possession of a nation by a confidence reposed in their honor and faith, as in case of public or private debts, such property can never be the subject of reprisal, because this would be to authorize a breach of public faith; but reprisals are always to be made on property in possession of the nation who has done the injury, and which may be taken without any violation of those principles, which ought to be held sacred in time of war.

Mr. S. remarked, that it had been suggested that the British nation had been guilty of a violation of the laws of nations in their treatment of us; and that, therefore, we were not bound to govern ourselves by that law in our conduct towards them. This argument, however plausible, he said, would not bear the test of examination; that all reprisals were justified only on the principle that the nation on whom reprisal is made has been guilty of a previous violation of the laws of nations. When a nation disregards that general law by which the conduct of all independent communities towards each other is to be regulated, the same law points out the mode of redress. If there has been no violation of that law, there can be no reprisal. If there has been a violation, then the reprisal must be pursuant to the law, for it is the highest absurdity to say, that because there has been an infraction of a law which authorizes a certain mode of redress, that we may pursue a different mode of redress in violation of the law which gives us the right. This would be at once to renounce the whole system of the laws of nations, and throw mankind back into a state of savage barbarity and ferocity.

Mr. S. then adverted to the policy of the measure. He said, upon a fair calculation, it would be found that the adoption of the proposition would be productive of far greater injury to this country than the amount of the losses sustained by our citizens in consequence of the spoliations committed upon our commerce. It is evident that this country, even admitting that a war should take place, would wish to renew their commercial connection with Great Britain. But if, in contempt of the law of nations, we seize on private debts, we shall for ever forfeit all credit; no trust can be reposed in our citizens, and no faith in our Government. No foreign merchants will ever deal on credit with our citizens, from a well-guarded apprehension that, in case of a war between the countries, the sacred nature of private contracts will not protect them against the hand of a Government which has exhibited the example of a deliberate violation of the laws of nations. When we consider the immense advantages that can be derived from private credit and national honor, it will be easy to imagine the infinite mischief that must result from a disregard of those principles.

Mr. S. objected to the measure on the ground that he considered it to be a declaration of war; and he did not think that the circumstances required or justified our taking that step. He said that notwithstanding the unwarrantable proceedings of the British nation; yet, no act had been done by the British Court that clearly indicated an intention to make war directly upon us, or that could be considered as direct and intentional war, though we might consider many of their acts as just causes of making war on our part.

The revocation of the Order of the 6th of November, the new instructions of the 8th of January, and the explanation given to the merchants of London, clearly evidenced that a war might be avoided with that nation. While there was the remotest possibility of preserving our peace we ought not to do an act which might endanger a war. While then the conduct of the British Cabinet would admit of an explanation, while there was a prospect that we might obtain by negotiation restitution of the property of our citizens or compensation for the losses they had sustained, we ought to pursue that mode; but if we proceeded to make reprisals by adopting an illegal measure, it must certainly be deemed a declaration of war.

The omission of the regular means of obtaining satisfaction by negotiation, and an unwarrantable mode of reprisal, would certainly be just causes of war. If we must be driven into a war, it would be of the highest advantage to us to conduct it in such a manner as to convince the people of Great Britain that we sincerely wished to avoid it, and that the unjust and illegal proceedings of their own court have been the sole cause of the war. In such a case we have reason to think, that so great is the interest of that nation in preserving our commercial connection, that a powerful party will be formed in our favor to oppose the injustice of the Government. The sentiments of the people will be against the war, and the court will find it extremely difficult to maintain it under such circumstances.

But if, without demanding an explanation, we proceed to adopt rash, violent, and unwarrantable measures, the spirit of the nation will rise against us, and the people will join the court in prosecuting a war which will be then deemed just and necessary.

Mr. S. then observed that we ought to take into consideration the present situation of Europe; that the late successes of the French nation had materially changed the political prospect. It was possible that these successes had been the cause which had produced an alteration in the views of the British Court. If events had happened which had rendered the disposition of that nation less unfriendly and hostile, we ought to take advantage of that circumstance, and not do any thing to check the progress of that favorable disposition. He most sincerely hoped that these successes would convince the combined powers of the impossibility to conquer France, and produce a general pacification.

While such were the prospects, he ardently wished that a measure repugnant to the principles of common honesty and common justice might be rejected; and he hoped that no gentleman in the committee would vote in favor of a proposition which would fix an indelible stigma on our national character.