Part 211

Mr. MERCER next spoke. He owned the measures proposed appeared to him great and momentous, and, had he any powers of declamation, he should think it improper to give loose to them on a question of this kind. We should weigh well our interest, examine carefully the situation in which we stand, and determine calmly where we shall place our next step. The proposition is, to arrest, not to confiscate, the debts due to British subjects. From his recollection of the positions established by the best jurisprudence writers, no doubt remained in his mind that we have a clear right to secure to ourselves reparation in that way, and, in our predicament, confiscation even would be warranted, and by a point as firmly established as any principle which has the general practice of nations for a basis.

One of the latest writers on national law (Binkershoek) is of opinion that debts are property, as well as any thing else, and sees no reason why they should not, as well as other kinds of property, be seized to secure indemnity for injuries. This is the opinion of Wolfius, of Vattel, Grotius, and of his commentators. He could go on with a long list of authorities, and refer to actual treaties to show that it has been the practice of nations. Having established the right, he proceeded to consider the expediency of the propositions. Gentlemen, he hoped, did not wish that we should make a solemn declaration of war before we acted. This is no longer the custom among nations. It would be a pompous display of candor which no longer exists. Have any nations in the present European war, premised their operations by a declaration? No; their first step was to do all the injury in their power to their enemies. Then, we having taken what steps will best tend to our security, and give us the best hold of our enemy, let us not, however, lose sight of a settlement by negotiation. Let us show mankind that peace is our first wish. When we are thus prepared, let us step forward to an amicable negotiation. Let us call on the Executive to send forward some proper person to the Court of Great Britain, to assure them that we have a high sense of the injury done us; that we have it in our power to resent it, but wish to see the difference settled by receiving an indemnification. We shall thus make it their interest as well as duty to allow it. This he conceived to be the line of conduct we should adopt if we wished to preserve the Western Hemisphere from the scourges that desolate the Old World. By some such measure as that proposed, we should make their motives for peace more weighty, and we should give assurances of our amicable disposition, by showing that all we wish is a just compensation.

In a matter of this kind he was sensible of the danger of precipitation. The best mode of arresting the property proposed should be calmly weighed. He believed that something like the proposition made by Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, before the House resolved itself into a committee--a stop to all transfers of British property--would be proper as a preliminary step.

He concluded with some observations on the respect which nations, however weak, will command from their superiors in strength, by showing that they will not suffer imposition, by joining heart and hand in defence of their rights. This spirit, he was sure, animates Americans, and now their power is better able to keep pace with that spirit than when we humbled that nation. At that time we were in our infancy--an infancy by no means thriving under the trammels of the mother country--and, when they turned us adrift, and began their hostile spoliations, they carried with them all our means of defence; but now, thank Providence, we have spirit and power to defend ourselves. If the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. SMITH) would modify his proposition, and make the term thirty days, it should have his assent in preference to that now before the committee.

Mr. SMITH (of South Carolina) said, that the proposition he had read before the House went into committee was in the nature of an embargo on debts, securing them from transfer until the necessity of sequestering them more plainly appeared. The proposition did not then appear to meet the wishes of the House. When the committee should rise he would again bring it forward. The question now before the committee is, whether they will agree to a sequestration of British debts. He wished this object had not been coupled with the indemnification to our own citizens, because it is fairer to decide each question upon its own merits. That part of the resolutions which contemplates an indemnification may give a weight to the first part which it might not intrinsically deserve.

He made some observations on the propriety of cool deliberation on the present important subject. The passions should be banished, and calm reason more than ever courted. It requires all the wisdom of the Legislative body now to combine our national honor with our national safety. He had doubts on the propriety of the resolutions proposed, but acknowledged that the arguments used in their favor had great weight in his mind. If the situation of this country be compared with that of other commercial nations, the propriety of something like the present resolutions would appear more evident. When other commercial nations wish to quarrel with us, their navies enable them to seize our vessels, and we cannot retaliate in the same way. Then we must fly to such means of retaliation as are in our power. If they take our property of one description, and we cannot lay our hands upon the same kind, we must take any of theirs within our reach. This reasoning has, no doubt, great force; but the sacredness with which the modern usages of nations has shielded debts is a great bar to our proceeding in the present case. Contracts between individuals are now considered as out of the reach of governments, and it is the modern usage not to meddle with them. In the beginning of our late war, debts were not confiscated. The State of South Carolina, though certainly not wanting provocation, while confiscating all other property, left debts untouched, under the idea that private contracts are sacred. But this, in a case of war, and urgent necessity, might be overlooked; but if we are not in a state of war, perhaps meddling with private contracts might provoke it. Credit is certainly important to this country. We should consider how far the operation of the resolutions proposed would give a shock to it. Besides, they might have a tendency to involve us in future wars. We shall yet long be under the necessity of receiving certain supplies from Europe, and shall have debtors among us for those supplies. These debtors may at any time, when the burden weighs heavy, think of easing it by fomenting dissensions with the foreign creditor nation, in expectation that a confiscation of the debts may be an effect. It is true that, in such a case, they will not be exonerated. But it cannot be supposed that the government to whom the debts would be transferred could prosecute the recovery of them with as much ardor as an individual.

The gentleman last up had relied on the authority of ancient and foreign jurists. Some among this class of writers warrant putting prisoners to death--a principle which modern custom has put a stop to. They also, it is true, warrant the confiscation of debts; but Burlamaqui says this is not the practice of modern nations. None, or very few trifling examples can be cited, he believed, of a departure from this principle, in modern times, among nations where commerce is cherished. This country depends on commerce, and credit is one of the means by which it flourishes; we should, then, not endeavor to weaken it. If we are once over the barrier, by trifling extensions of the principle we may be carried to immoderate lengths, indeed. Some persons who are in favor of sequestering private debts, speak with horror of touching the public funds. For his part, he did not see much difference between confiscating private and public debts. The object is the injury of an enemy, and to retaliate for injuries. Again: if we go to war with Great Britain, it is probable we shall be involved with her allies, then will it be said, that we shall confiscate what the Dutch lent us at a time of distress or since the peace. The Dutch have bought largely in our funds. The same principle will lead us to lay our hands upon that property. It will be difficult to draw a line, if we admit the principle.

Under these impressions, if called upon to give his vote, he should now feel much embarrassment. It had been said that the adoption of the present resolutions would be a means of obliging Great Britain to do us justice; that it would strike a terror among the subjects of that country, and make them clamorous for peace. It might, he feared, have a very different effect exasperate them, and unite the people with the Government against us. Some further forbearance on our part may separate them. It will convince the people of Great Britain that we really wish for peace, and then, if war is the issue, the impression will be severely felt by that Government. We shall render the Administration very unpopular, and hasten its dismission for one more friendly to this country. He was of opinion this crisis was fast approaching.

He concluded by again adverting to his propositions for preventing the transfer of British debts, which he hoped would be considered as a sufficient provision in the present exigency, and would give time to deliberate on further measures, and to watch the course of events in Europe, which, he believed, would have great influence upon the conduct of Great Britain towards us, and probably bring forward the change in the Administration of Great Britain.

The committee now rose and reported progress.

FRIDAY, March 28.

Sequestration of British Debts.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union, and took up Mr. DAYTON's resolutions for the sequestration of debts due to British subjects.

Mr. GILES commenced his remarks by observing, that he had intended to have given a silent vote upon this question before the committee, and probably should not have altered that intention, if it had not been from the solicitous requests expressed yesterday by several gentlemen in the opposition, that the favorers of the proposed measure should furnish the committee with the reasons upon which it was founded. Although it appeared to him to be rather unreasonable that some gentlemen should be expected, not only to possess reasons for their own opinions, but to furnish reasons for others; and, although he did not conceive that the favorers of the measure were under any obligation to disclose the reasons inducing it, provided they thought proper to hazard its fate upon a silent vote, yet he was willing to indulge the gentlemen with presenting to them the general course of reflection which the subject had produced in his mind, and which had strongly suggested its propriety. He had, however, a more powerful inducement to disclosing his opinion, since the subject has become matter of discussion and its propriety doubted.

The measure is deemed a bold one, and pregnant with the most serious consequences; in all such cases, he was desirous that his responsibility to the United States in general, and to his immediate constituents in particular, would at all times be tested by the real motives which should influence his conduct.

Several gentlemen in the opposition had earnestly admonished the committee against the indulgence of their passions upon this subject, and recommended the exercise of cool and deliberate reasoning. He should not pretend to say how far such an admonition was necessary, or justified by the temper of the committee, but he believed it applied as strongly to the gentlemen who suggested the caution, as to those to whom it was addressed; and he hoped, in the course of the future discussion, the gentlemen would show an example in themselves of the precepts they had prescribed to others.

As to himself, Mr. G. declared that, impressed with the awfulness of the present crisis, he had never reflected upon a subject with more coolness; and, if he understood his own situation, his mind was never in a state more susceptible of conviction.

The proposed measure is expected to eventuate in a final explanation of the relative state of things between the United States and Great Britain. It will probably result, therefore, in an open hostility, with the usual appeal to arms, or in a peace, with all the rights of neutrality attached to it. For this purpose, the resolution proposes a sequestration of the debts due to the subjects of Great Britain, to be held as a pledge for the indemnification of the losses sustained by American citizens under the orders of the British King, in contravention of the laws of nations, and violation of every rule of morality and justice. In the course of debate, this subject seems to have resolved itself into two questions. First, as it respects the right of one nation to sequester the property of the individuals of another in any possible case. Second, the policy of exercising this right at this time, under the existing circumstances of the United States.

He presumed that a state of things might exist between two nations in which reprisal would not only become the right but the duty to the nation sustaining the wrong. This happens where one nation, without cause, forcibly seizes upon the effects of another, or of its citizens, and withholds them without restitution or compensation, and when the nation, whose effects shall be so seized and detained, shall possess no other means of indemnification. The right of reprisal in the injured nation, in such a case, grows out of its injury sustained, and its inability to redress itself in any other way.

The duty of the injured nation to make reprisals, is founded on self-preservation; and in case of the losses of its citizens, upon the promise of the protection of property sacredly made by the nation to its individual members.

This he believed to be the doctrine of the laws of morality and reason, and he knew it to be the doctrine of the laws of nations, which were, in fact, nothing more than the laws of morality and reason systematized and reduced to writing.

Believing this principle to be a just one, he would apply it to the existing state of things between the United States and Great Britain. Almost as soon as Great Britain had taken part in the iniquitous war against France, the Executive of the United States manifested their regard for peace, by proclaiming their existing state of neutrality, and recommending to their citizens, not only the observance of neutrality, but of impartial neutrality--although the partiality of the American people for the cause of France was well known--although, at that moment, their affections for the French nation were addressed by the most honorable and powerful considerations that ever existed between two nations. The peculiar similarity between the existing French cause and that which had just given birth to American liberty and independence; the material agency which the French nation had exerted in bringing about that event; and the existing principles of Government here, the product of the Revolution, which are the great object of attack by the combination against France.

A pure and laudable regard for peace, and a detestation of war, however, had overcome all these sensations, and produced a neutrality, which he believed, on the part of the United States, had been rigidly observed; at least, he was sure, that such was the intention of Government. In this state of things, Great Britain commenced an attack upon this state of neutrality, which it was certainly her interest to preserve, and which she ought to have deemed a favor to obtain. Great Britain continued to keep possession of posts upon the acknowledged territory of the United States, to carry on a contraband trade with our savage enemy. She, shortly after our proclaimed neutrality, proceeded to interrupt our lawful trade with our allies. She seized, condemned, and sanctioned the complete transfer of the property of American citizens to her own subjects; and, as if there could be no limits to her iniquity and resentment, she has contrived to open upon our Eastern frontiers a barbarous enemy to aid in making depredations upon our commerce.

These acts constitute injuries which amount to war, and they are infinitely aggravated, both by the perfidy which attended the execution of some of them, and the total want of provocation for the commission of any of them.

If, then, Great Britain shall have committed acts towards the United States which furnish just cause of war, the United States possess the right, consistently with the laws of nations, to exercise any act towards Great Britain which would be justifiable in a state of war. The United States having received the injuries, are authorized to select such measures and means as they may deem the most expedient for self-preservation and indemnification. Reprisal is within their power. All other means of redress are without their power. In such a state of things, reprisal is a right--reprisal is a duty. An objection, more plausible than solid, has been made to this course of reasoning, that the individuals who will be the immediate objects of the reprisal, have not been the immediate agents of the aggression. The laws of nations state, that the property of individuals is as much a subject of reprisal as the property of the aggressing nation; but, as the nation is the immediate agent in the wrong, the individual who sustains an injury thereby, becomes entitled to recompense from his nation. The nation which commits the wrong, by this process, will ultimately sustain the loss. Hence, in the present case, the innocent and unsuspecting victims of the United States, have received losses from the lawless aggressions of Great Britain, and the question is, whether they shall finally sustain those losses, without any clear claim of indemnification upon the Government of the United States? or, whether the losses shall be transferred to British subjects, who will thereby possess the clearest claim for recompense from the British Government? He thought the laws of God, the laws of morality, the laws of reason, the laws of nations, would all pronounce that the British Government which had done the wrong, should afford the recompense.

Mr. G. said, that if the losses were to be ultimately borne by the individual subjects of Great Britain, the remedy would seem to be a harsh one; but, even in that case, the only alternatives left to the United States would be to say whether their own citizens, to whom they have promised protection, should finally sustain the losses, or the British subjects, to whom they have promised no protection. But the situation of the individuals who may be the subjects of reprisal, is greatly meliorated, by the consideration of their just claim to recompense from their own Government, which he had no doubt but they would ultimately obtain, if they were put into a situation to demand it; but if they should ultimately be denied justice, it would be a consolation to reflect, that it was the injustice of their own Government, not of the United States.

He observed, that a reprisal in the way proposed, stood upon the same ground as the invasion of the property in every other case did, and was justified upon the same principle, to wit, self-preservation. He presumed, if there existed an acknowledged state of war, letters of marque and reprisal, commissions to privateers, &c., would be deemed justifiable and expedient, and that no discrimination would be made between the property of individuals and the property of the nation; yet the invasion of the rights of property in that case would be as palpable as in the case of the reprisal proposed, with this aggravation; that, in that case, the individual sustaining the loss would not be entitled to ultimate recompense from the Government--in the case proposed, he would be entitled to recompense. He observed, that the British nation had not discovered this delicate discrimination between national and individual property, in their late instructions given to their privateers and ships of war, although they had sustained no wrong; and he thought their conduct an example in point for the United States, who had received the injury and committed none.

A gentleman (Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina) yesterday attempted to make a distinction between vessels at sea and other property; although he acknowledged that, at the first blush, he could discern no distinction in principle.