Part 209

Mr. MURRAY said, the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) yesterday, observed that he was not a little surprised that those who a few days since had appeared so alarmed at the phantom of war, should on this question appear so willing to meet it. He would remark that those gentlemen were alarmed at a shadow which appeared followed by the substance of war, and were unwilling to do any thing that might lead to a war that did not yet exist. But we were now at war with Algiers, and had no choice. They had been at war with the United States ever since the end of the Revolutionary war. The Spaniards and Portuguese kept them within the Mediterranean. Gentlemen who are averse to the report, hold up two substitute measures: one, which was suggested, and has been argued by the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) is, that we ought to grant a sum to Portugal for her protection of our trade. The other is, that commercial regulations will accomplish our protection. He liked neither. The last, if permanent, will withdraw all temptation from Great Britain to interpose her good offices. The first is worse; it is subsidizing Portugal at the expense of our own people, and that too without security. Gentlemen would make it the interest of Portugal to make such breaches of truce as would occasionally withdraw protection, and oblige us to subsidize her higher. It would create a disgraceful dependence on a foreign power, and weaken the spirit of our marine; whereas, if you fit out frigates, you employ your money in nourishing the roots of your own industry; you encourage your own ship-building, lumber, and victualling business. He believed, that however true might be the suspicion of British interference in Indian affairs, and he feared it was too true, he did not believe the evidence as to Algerine interference strong enough to induce an argument against the report, under a supposition that as Great Britain had effected the truce, so she would aid Algiers against us. He thought so, because it was not now as much her interest as it was in times of peace. In times of peace, had she let loose the Algerines, her own navigation would have been enabled to carry for us, but now it would be molested by the French. He did not believe nations, more than persons, would do wrong purely out of evil designs, devoid of interest; the greatest villain would not. At present, their ships are liable to attack from the French, and he had it from good authority, that so far were the British from having advantaged themselves if they had been so base, that scarcely a British ship had appeared since in our ports. The ship frigates would be able to blockade the Gut of Gibraltar; the Algerines did not sail in fleets; they wanted plunder, not glory; when they discovered they had to get the first by hard fighting, they would listen to peace, accompanied by money. Spain, it was true, had purchased a peace, but there was an hereditary inveteracy against Spain, and a facility of attacking her shores which we need not fear; so it was her interest to buy a peace when war could bring her nothing but a glory that almost disgraced her armies; as to jealousy of power in the Executive, he hoped to see a proper equipoise in the powers of this Government; but, when proper occasions occurred, he hoped Congress would never refuse the adequate means to enable the Executive to discharge its constitutional duties.

Mr. GOODHUE observed, that the committee had carefully looked over the statement of the marine force of Algiers for several years back, and had no reason to doubt that the six vessels would be equal to the purpose intended. There was no ground to suppose Algiers would have more force at present than she had during her war with Portugal. He had no doubt that the Algerines were let loose on the American commerce to prevent supplies going to France, and while the war lasts, we shall not be able to buy a peace. It is said, that the truce was but for a year, and in six months it will expire. He did not wish to depend on that, when the evil is so great. And why depend on Portugal? She is more under the influence of Britain than any other nation in Europe. When Britain has been at the trouble of stipulating a peace for Portugal, will she suffer that nation to assist us? Certainly not. Or is it wise to stand by and depend upon such a resource?

Mr. MADISON said, that gentlemen thought so differently on this subject, and advanced arguments against his side of the question of such a different nature, that it was difficult or impossible to give them an answer. He then proceeded to quote the speech of Mr. GOODHUE; when that gentleman rose to explain. Mr. M. then proceeded to notice the speeches of Mr. FITZSIMONS and Mr. S. SMITH. Both of these gentlemen were up more than once to explain, as having been misquoted. In a speech of considerable length, he was not suffered long to proceed without interruptions of explanations. This produced a scene of altercation. One circumstance, however, was mentioned by Mr. FITZSIMONS that deserves particular notice. From April to December next, he said, the insurance on American ships from England and the rest of Europe, will not be less than twenty-five per cent. of their value on account of the Algerines.

The House now adjourned, without taking any question.

TUESDAY, March 4.

Estimate of Appropriations.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury of the sums necessary to be appropriated for the service of the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four; and after some time spent therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said report under consideration, and come to a resolution thereupon; which he delivered in at the Clerk's table, where the same was twice read, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

Resolved, That, for the support of the Military Establishment of the United States, for the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-four, there be appropriated a sum of money, not exceeding one million four hundred and fifty-seven thousand nine hundred and thirty-six dollars and one cent; that is to say:

For the pay of the Legion of the United States, $303,684 00 For subsistence, 312,567 75 For forage, 31,632 00 For clothing, 112,000 00 For equipments for the cavalry, 7,314 05 For horses for the cavalry, 16,000 00 For bounty, 5,000 00 For the Hospital Department, 20,000 00 For the Ordnance Department, 6,715 32 For repairs and articles directed to be made and purchased by the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 202,783 34 For defensive protection of the frontiers, 130,000 00 For the Indian Department, 50,000 00 For the Quartermaster's Department, 150,000 00 For contingencies of the War Department, 30,000 00 And for Invalid Pensions, 80,239 55 ------------ $1,457,936 01

Ordered, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said resolution; and that Mr. BOUDINOT, Mr. TRUMBULL, and Mr. GILLESPIE, do prepare and bring in the same.

THURSDAY, March 6.

Slave Trade.

The House went into Committee of the Whole on the bill to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the ports of the United States, Mr. BOUDINOT in the chair.

The two first sections of the bill were agreed to, with one alteration moved by Mr. TRUMBULL, which was to give the District Court as well as the Circuit Courts cognizance of the offence.

The third section which relates to the penalty &c., it was moved should be struck out. This motion was negatived. It was then moved to insert the word foreign before "ship or vessel;" which was agreed to.

The committee proceeded through the bill, which was reported to the House with sundry amendments; these were agreed to by the House, and the bill ordered to be engrossed for a third reading.

MONDAY, March 10.

Algerine War.

NAVAL ARMAMENT.

Mr. GILES observed, that, from the sense of the House several times manifested on this subject, there remained no doubt but that the bill would pass. In that event, he most earnestly hoped that the success of the measure would, at least, equal the expectations of its advocates. Indeed, he hoped that their expectations would be disappointed and exceeded; for it did not seem to him that even they were very positive as to its full competency to the end proposed. He even wished that every ship could be furnished with the cap of Fortunatus and the shield of Hercules; for he was persuaded that, in the present state of things, some magical influence would be found essential to enable them to effect their undertaking. He observed, that, at present, the wisdom or folly of the proposed measure was mere matter of opinion; that the passage of the bill will furnish futurity with a complete experiment of its true character.

He intended to offer his reasons against the passage of the bill, not with a hope of making proselytes, but as a testimony of the real motives which influenced his opposition. With this view, he should only mention some of the general impressions produced on his mind by this subject, without fatiguing the House with minute exemplifications of them.

The subject had presented itself to him in two points of view--1st, as affording a protection to our commerce against the Algerine depredations; 2d, as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment.

He could not help premising that, in the course of discussion, the advocates of the bill had censured its opponents with a want of disposition for the protection of commerce, whilst they claimed a monopoly of all good intention towards this object. He did not mean to derogate from the good intention of the favorers of the bill, but he believed its opponents possessed as pure a zeal for the protection and due encouragement of commerce as its advocates. It is not a question whether commerce is, or is not, to be protected; but whether the plan proposed be the most effectual and the least exceptionable that can be devised for that purpose? The difference of opinion does not consist in the end to be produced, but in the means proposed to effect the end.

The first objection he should make to the bill would be, the obvious inadequacy of the means contemplated to effect the end proposed by them. The object proposed is an effectual resistance, not only to the whole present naval force of Algiers, but to their whole naval ability. The bill contains, in itself, essentially a declaration of war. Our calculations, therefore, should be extended to the utmost limit of the naval ability of the hostile nation. The means to be employed consist of four frigates of forty-four guns each, and two ships of thirty-six guns each. To decide with propriety upon the objection, this force should be compared with the naval ability of Algiers. He did not mean to go into a minute history of Algiers. He should only observe, in general, that it was a populous country; that it had furnished at one time one hundred thousand fighting men; that its power at this day was as great as at any preceding period; that they were a warlike people, accustomed to naval enterprises and desperate in naval engagements; that, for some time past, they had been subsidized for peace by almost every European nation. He could not help concluding, from these circumstances, that the naval ability of the nation either was or might, without any uncommon exertions, he rendered superior to four forty-four gun frigates and two thirty-six gun ships, the force contemplated by the bill; and, if the conclusions were just, the bill is unwise.

Mr. G. proceeded to consider the bill as the foundation of a permanent naval establishment. He said there was a clause in the bill authorizing the PRESIDENT to suspend all proceedings in the equipment of the armament, in case of a peace with Algiers, which gave him some consolation; but it did not altogether relieve his apprehensions from this operation of the measure, because he knew that a permanent naval establishment was a favorite policy with some gentlemen, and because the argument had been urged in favor of the present bill.

He observed that a permanent naval establishment could be recommended to the United States but from one or both of the following considerations: either upon the principle of entering into a competition for naval power with the Powers of Europe; or as affording security to the collection of our own revenue.

He thought the question of a permanent naval establishment was one of the most important which could be presented to the consideration of the House, and that the most serious consequences were necessarily connected with it. In the first place, he viewed the establishment of a navy as a complete dereliction of the policy of discharging the principal of the public debt. History does not afford an instance of a nation which continued to increase their navy and decrease their debt at the same time. It is an operation exceeding the ability of any nation. The naval competition of the Powers in Europe has produced oppression to their subjects and ruin to themselves. The ruin of the French Monarchy, he believed, might be ascribed very much to that cause. A navy is the most expensive of all means of defence, and the tyranny of governments consists in the expensiveness of their machinery. The expensiveness of the French Monarchy is the true cause of its destruction. The navy of France furnished the principal item of that expense. The navy produced expense, the expense exceeded the revenue, new contributions became necessary, the people saw the tyranny, and destroyed the tyrant. The same effect, by the same policy, will probably be produced in great Great Britain. The Government is not yet destroyed, but the people are oppressed, liberty is banished. The extensiveness of the Government is the true ground of the oppression of the people. The King, the Nobility, the Priesthood, the Army, and, above all, the Navy.

All this machinery lessens the number of the productive and increases the number of unproductive hands of the nation in Great Britain. The operation has been extended so far that the poor rates alone probably afforded a greater tax per capita than the whole taxes paid in the United States. He was astonished with these fatal examples before our eyes, that there should be any gentlemen who would wish to enter into this fashionable system of politics. He said the United States had already progressed full far enough into this system; for, exclusively of the ordinary expense of the Civil List, a debt had been funded upon principles of duration. An army had been raised, at an immense expense, and now there was a proposition for a navy. He observed that, for several years past, the appropriations for the support of the Military Establishment had exceeded a million of dollars per annum--from one million to one million and a half annually. He believed that, if the expense had been foreseen, there would have been more active efforts to have avoided it. It was a policy, at this day, very generally condemned; yet we are now to exhibit a counterpart of this policy upon the ocean, with this aggravation--that it will commence with greater certain expense, and with a more uncertain object. The system of governing by debts he conceived the most refined system of tyranny. It seems to have been a contrivance devised by politicians to succeed the old system of feudal tenures. Both systems were tyrannical, but the objects of their tyranny were different. The system of feuds operated upon the person of the individual--the system of debts operates upon the pockets of the individual. In the feudal system, the tenant often received some indulgence and lenity from the martial generosity which generally characterized the lord. The lord was gratified with the acknowledgment of the tenant that he was a slave, and the rendition of a peppercorn as an evidence of it. The product of the tenant's labor was left for his own support. The system of debts affords no such indulgences. Its true policy is to devise objects of expense, and to draw the greatest possible sum from the people in the least visible mode. It boasts not of economizing in calls upon the people for contributions. It boasts not of economizing in the objects of expenditure. It consults the obedience, and not the happiness of the people. There is no device which facilitates the system of expense and debts so much as a navy. And he declared, from that consideration, he should value his liberty at a lower price than he now did, if the policy of a permanent Naval Establishment should obtain in the United States.