Part 208

Resolved, That a sum not exceeding ---- dollars be appropriated for the support of such of the inhabitants of St. Domingo, resident within the United States, as shall be found in want of such support.

That a regular account of the moneys so expended be kept; and that the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES be requested to obtain a credit therefor, in the accounts between the French Republic and the United States.

Ordered, That a committee be appointed to bring in a bill in conformity with the foregoing resolution, and providing for the due application of the moneys aforesaid; and that Mr. AMES, Mr. TRACY, and Mr. DENT, be the said committee.

THURSDAY, February 6.

War with Algiers.

The resolution being read for building four ships of 44 guns and two ships of 20 guns--

Mr. MADISON rose to inquire whether there was in the public stores of the United States, a sufficient quantity of cedar and live oak for building the proposed six vessels? He was answered that there was not. Mr. M. then observed, that it was evident this fleet could not be ready for effective service in the course of the present year. He imagined that there was another resolution, precedent as to the time of voting it, which ought to be before the committee. The resolution to which he alluded, was that assigning a sum of money to buy a cessation of hostilities from the Regency of Algiers. He was of opinion that the project of fitting out an armed squadron was liable to many solid objections. There were two points of light in which this subject might be surveyed. The first of these was, whether the Algerines acted from their own impulse in this matter? In that case, they were known to be in the habit of selling a peace; and, if they are willing to do so, he fancied that it might be purchased for less money than the armament would cost. On the other hand, if they do not act from their own impulse, but upon the instigation of Britain, we may depend upon it that they cannot be bought. Britain will keep them hostile. There is infinitely more danger of a British war from the fitting out of ships than from the resolution on the report of the Secretary of State. The distance which the ships would have to sail is not less than three thousand miles, and their number is too small for a decisive advantage. The combined powers would embrace the equipment of these ships as an excellent opportunity to pick a quarrel with the United States. Mr. M. expressed his doubts with regard to the propriety of this measure, because the expense would be immense, and there was no certainty of reaping any benefit from it.

Mr. CLARK was anxious to state his doubts on this subject, that gentlemen, who, by their habits of life, had met with opportunities of better information than he possessed, might correct him where he was wrong. In the first place, the ships would be too small in point of number to be of any kind of importance, amidst the numerous navies of Europe. The distance from any friendly port, where, in case of accidents, they might repair, was likewise very great. It was to be expected that, when they fell in with British ships of war, that the latter would endeavor to search them for prohibited cargoes, and for seamen, because they were in the practice of impressing their own countrymen wherever they could find them. This would produce a quarrel. There was a scheme which occurred to him, and which he judged would be less expensive and more effectual. This was, to hire the Portuguese to cruise against the Algerines. He understood that the Court of Lisbon desired to keep her ships of war in actual service. The British have been in the habit of building frigates for the service of the Algerines, and, as he was informed, mariners, at a distance upon sea could distinguish in what country vessels were built by their construction. Hence it would be difficult for the captain of an American frigate to ascertain at sea a British ship of war from an Algerine. He had an objection to the establishment of a fleet, because, when once it had been commenced, there would be no end of it. We must then have a Secretary of the Navy, and a swarm of other people in office, at a monstrous expense. If we build six ships this year, we should next year find it necessary to build six more, and so on. The combined powers would find a much better pretence for a war by this armament than from the resolutions on the Report of the Secretary. Mr. C. closed his speech, which was heard with great attention, by observing that he rose principally to submit his opinions on this question as hints for those who were better qualified to form a judgment on the subject than himself.

Mr. BALDWIN expressed his doubts as to every part of this subject. He had not been able to gain any information that was satisfactory. To block up the Mediterranean was, he believed, impracticable. Bribery alone could purchase security from the Algerines. Spain and Britain had always found this method the cheapest. He had much confidence in the gentleman who had been employed to go as an Envoy to Algiers from this country. He was a thorough man. Mr. B. had yet formed no decided opinion, and could wish to suspend his judgment till he learned the issue of the present application to the Dey. If bribery would not do, he should certainly vote for equipping a fleet.

Mr. NICHOLAS feared that we were not a match for the Algerines. A small number of sailors were sufficient to navigate one of their ships, and they had a militia to man them who were innumerable. He had not been able to form an exact opinion, but he was afraid that we were not a match for them by sea.

Mr. S. SMITH rose chiefly to answer the interrogatories proposed by Mr. CLARK, as to what harbors in Europe American ships could retire to for shelter? In an early part of his life, Mr. S. said that he had been in that part of the world, and could assure the House that there was no want of proper harbors to refit or obtain provisions in. The first he mentioned was Toulon; Marseilles, likewise, had a most excellent harbor, and there was no doubt that our vessels would be received there in the most friendly way, as the Algerines had lately declared war against the Republic of France. Spain had, likewise, several excellent ports--Malaga, Cadiz, Barcelona, and Ferrol. In all these the American squadron would be heartily welcome, and meet with all kinds of naval stores in the greatest abundance. Lisbon, also, was a fine harbor, and Oporto would be proper for the same purpose. So that, in case of accident, the armament had nothing to fear from wanting a place of retreat. He had no doubt that our vessels and our sailors would both be much superior to those of the Algerines. Their ships were old and crazy, and were presents made them by the powers with whom they are not at war. The American bottoms must be better; and our fleet will most likely have its station between Oran and Malaga, and, stretching across between those two ports, block up the mouth of the Straits. He adverted to the mistake of Mr. BALDWIN, who had said that Spain never attempted to block up the Straits; the proper answer to which was, that Spain had an extensive coast, not less than four or five hundred miles, within the Mediterranean; so that she was quite differently situated, with regard to them, from America. Mr. S. mentioned, as a consolatory circumstance, that our profit was twice as great at present, in commerce, as it was before the war, in spite of all the spoliations committed by Britain, and by Spain; and, if the war continues, the profits will continue to multiply twice as fast as they would otherwise do. As an evidence of this fact, he mentioned the high price of wheat at present in this market, and asked whether any gentleman had heard of a price so high at this season of the year before? A gentleman (Mr. NICHOLAS) had spoken of an Algerine militia. Why, sir, (said Mr. S.,) I shall set down against them the American militia, and so that account is settled. He estimated that the whole American exports and imports, in round numbers, was twenty millions of dollars each; and that the extra insurance on account of the Algerines, from one end of the year to the other, would not be less than five per cent. to the whole, which was altogether two millions of dollars. From this Mr. S. inferred that it must be the very worst kind of economy to hazard an expense of two millions of dollars of insurance, for the sake of saving the charges of this armament. He did not see it improbable that the Algerines might very soon be on our coast, under the command of British or American renegadoes. It was nothing uncommon, among seamen, for two captains to be in the greatest friendship to-day, and plundering each other's vessels to-morrow. As an example of what Americans, in particular, are capable of doing, he repeated the history of a Mr. Cooper, of Virginia, who, some years ago, fitted out a ship for the express purpose of cruising against American vessels bound from or to the East Indies. He sent a person into the harbor of Algiers to solicit a commission from the Dey, and this envoy had very near been taken prisoner, as the Dey wanted to have made a slave of him. Mr. S. said that Mr. Cooper was known to be a man of courage, of perseverance, and as possessing that species of intellectual resources which qualify an adventurer for bold undertakings. He inferred, from this anecdote, that, if Mr. Cooper, a man of respectable birth and connections, could form such a scheme, what was not to be feared from the common set of seamen? He could not tell where the danger might end; nor did he know whether Philadelphia itself would be in safety. They might speak of their forts as much as they pleased; he knew their force, and did not much value it. The British had gone past them, and what was to hinder the Algerines, or such a man as Mr. Cooper, from getting past them? Were he on the coast of an enemy, he should not have the least scruple of engaging to run a ship by such forts, when there was in view so great a prospect as the plunder of Philadelphia. He strongly pressed the necessity of sending out the proposed fleet as quickly as possible.

Mr. AMES attacked the mover of the resolutions on the Report of the Secretary (Mr. MADISON) for not displaying in the affair of the Algerines some part of the spirit which he had exerted on the other occasion. He thought it shameful to buy a peace, and that there could be no security, if we did. He recommended an armament. Portugal had shown herself friendly; and, referring to what Mr. CLARK had stated, he was of opinion she would give our ships shelter in her ports. He thought that six stout frigates at the mouth of the Straits would do the business. He went at considerable length into Mr. MADISON's resolutions, and condemned, upon various grounds, the arguments and conduct of the gentlemen who supported them. Yesterday, we were told that Britain durst not quarrel with America, and to-day she is represented as ready to do it. Our commerce is on the point of being annihilated, and, unless an armament is fitted out, we may very soon expect the Algerines on the coast of America.

Mr. GILES, in reply, said that Mr. AMES drew inconsistent pictures. One day he represented the American commerce at the summit of prosperity; the next, it was reduced to nothing. In defence of the commercial regulations, he reminded the House that Britain, and not Algiers, was the real object of alarm, and the real source of hostility. It was, therefore, proper to provide remedies against both of these illustrious confederates. Algiers was but the instrument, Britain was the cause. The reliance of Britain upon this instrument plainly showed that she was not equal to a war and a commercial contest. She had, therefore, turned loose the Algerines upon us--a fact which is pretty generally acknowledged on both sides of the House. It is, therefore, in the power of Britain to prevent the progress of these pirates. The commercial restrictions will reduce Britain to difficulty, and she will then, for the sake of friendship with America, be glad to put a stop to the Algerine ravages. Until some measure of this kind has been adopted, Britain, as she has raised up Algiers, will keep her up. The cheapest mode of getting peace will certainly be by embracing the commercial regulations. Mr. G. was averse to the proposal of a fleet. He agreed very much with the gentleman from New Jersey, (Mr. CLARK,) that it would be a better expedient to hire the fleet of Portugal. He considered the establishment of a maritime force as having a direct tendency to war; whereas, the commercial restrictions had the same tendency to peace. The sending of American armed ships into the midst of the fleets of Europe would certainly produce a quarrel. It had been well remarked, (by Mr. CLARK,) that, if an attempt was made to search our ships of war, like our merchantmen, it would infallibly produce a public affront, and consequent hostilities.

Mr. MADISON, in reply to some remarks which had fallen from Mr. SMITH, respecting the present high price of wheat in the American market, said, that he had been informed of a place where wheat sold for four shillings and sixpence per bushel only, where the dollar passes for six shillings. Mr. M. supposed that Britain could render very essential service to the Algerines, without embarking in a war. She has not embarked in a war to the north-west of the Ohio, but she has done the same thing, in substance, by supplying the Indians with arms, ammunition, and, perhaps, with subsistence. He did not assert that Britain directed the plan of the Indian expeditions, for he had no explicit evidence that they actually did so. In the same way that they gave underhand assistance to the Indians, they would give it to the Algerines, rather than hazard an open war.

The committee now rose, without coming to the question.

FRIDAY, February 7.

JOHN PAGE, from Virginia, appeared, produced his credentials, and took his seat in the House.

Algerine War.

THE NAVAL FORCE.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union. The Chairman read the resolution before the House for equipping a Naval force.

Mr. MADISON thought this expedient unlikely to answer the purpose, and liable to many objections. Before the American squadron can be equipped, the truce between Algiers and Portugal must expire. When that expiration shall take place, she either will not renew the truce at all, or she will stipulate that the United States shall be comprehended in it. He would save the money intended for the fleet, and hire the Portuguese ships of war with it, as soon as the truce ends. He wished that the committee might reject the present motion, and when they did so, he would move a resolution, a copy of which he read to the committee. It was in substance:

"That the sum of ---- dollars be provided to be employed in such a manner as should be found most effectual for obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers; and failing of this, that the sum should be applied to the end of obtaining protection from some of the European Powers."

Mr. M. considered the armament at present proposed, as quite too small to answer any efficient purpose.

A member here observed, that it would be hazardous to rely on Portugal; because, though the truce might expire in about six months, it would possibly be renewed at the end of that time, or converted into a peace.

Mr. FITZSIMONS wished that gentlemen would pay some attention to attested facts, before they so abruptly declare that the six ships proposed by the committee to be built and put into commission, were incompetent to the end for which they were designed. The committee had bestowed considerable time in deliberating upon the best information which could be obtained, before they specified the force requisite to be employed, and they had been satisfied, that what was now proposed would be equal to the end. Here Mr. F. read a different statement of the ships of war in the service of the Regency of Algiers, at different times. One of these shows that in the year 1789, there were nine xebecs, from thirty-six to ten guns, and one ship of forty guns upon the stocks; but that several of the xebecs were laid up or unfit for service. A second estimate of the Algerine maritime force, had been transmitted by Mr. Humphries. He specified four frigates, two xebecs, and one brig. By advices still more recent, the fleet consisted of one vessel of forty-four guns, one of thirty-six, one of twenty-eight, three xebecs, and a brig. Mr. F. observed, that gentlemen had objected to the sending out an American fleet; that they could not always keep together. He reminded them, that from November to March or April, the corsairs of Barbary never go out to sea. There were two months during that time, when they were restrained by their religion from piratical excursions. The committee had been told, that the Portuguese are ready to assist us. There is ground to expect this assistance, but not to depend upon it. Two American frigates, along with the Portuguese vessels, would be fully equal to the task of curbing the Algerines. As to militia, he could not see of what consequence they could be in a naval contest. With regard to expense, he stated a very important fact. The United States import, annually, two millions of bushels of salt from these countries, which the Algerines will cut off from our commerce. The rise on that article must then be at least one dollar per bushel; which is a tax of two millions of dollars at once, or three times the expense of the armament. Probably, however, the loss may extend to four millions of dollars on this single article of salt, in one year only; a sum which would keep up the fleet a long time. We have been trying to buy a peace, but without success; and if we are not able to enforce it, the price of buying it must be so much the higher. As soon as Portugal is left to herself, she will certainly protect us, because it is much for her interest to do so. At present, she cannot, perhaps, from the influence of the combined powers. Mr. F., therefore, recommended an armament in the mean time.

Mr. SMILIE objected to this measure, because it was unequal to the task. Britain would assist the Algerines underhandedly, as she did an enemy in another quarter, and would continue to do so. He did not think she was shameless enough to own it, but she would do it.

Mr. NICHOLAS went on the same ground. He said that Britain had not been content with striking up a truce for Portugal, that the Algerines might be let loose on American commerce, but her Minister at the Court of Lisbon had endeavored to prevent our vessels from obtaining a Portuguese convoy. Not content with insuring a loss to America, she had striven to make that loss immediate. As to the duration of the truce, it could not last long, for the Queen of Portugal had, in fact, broken it already. She had declared that the trade to that country should pass unmolested; to which condition it was not likely that the Algerines would consent. The Portuguese nobility had clamored at the acceptance of a truce. So that, on the whole, it could hardly last long. A naval force was a very expensive affair. The greater part of the immense debt of England had been lavished on her navy. He was against building a navy.

Mr. SWIFT had been always sensible that the situation of this country was not fit for war. We have a very heavy debt; but still it is better to bear debts than depredations. A gentleman of extensive information (Mr. S. SMITH, in yesterday's debate) had stated the rise of insurance as much less than the armament would cost. Britain had always more dependence on her navy, than on the immense sums that she pays to these barbarians. Mr. S. had no doubt that the proposed fleet would have its intended effect. He despaired of either buying a truce or buying an ally. As to the militia of Algiers, they could not be brought into action against frigates. He considered the charge of hiring the Algerines, as an unfounded accusation on the honor of Britain. He could not bring himself to believe that she was capable of a conduct so exceedingly disgraceful. He had no direct evidence to convince. It might be objected to this armament, that it would augment the national debt, and throw too much influence into the hands of the Executive Government. But the same objection might be started against every armament whatever.