Part 146

Instead of this, our army consisted of only about twelve hundred men, and of these not above four or five hundred were regular troops; besides, had even this force been sufficient, if employed in season, the delays that had taken place in the execution of the plan would alone have been sufficient to defeat the intended purpose. During the winter, the law was passed for raising the additional troops for carrying on the war with greater vigor. The whole summer was spent in the business, and the few men that we did enlist were not raised till late in the fall. Collected at length at the head of the Ohio, they fruitlessly loitered away their time, till they finally erected a monument to our eternal disgrace and infamy.

Whatever troops are to be employed, ought to be raised with diligence and despatch, if we wish to avoid a similar miscarriage in our next attempt. The army ought not to enter the Indian country till their whole force is complete. Difficulties, however, and delay, equal to those of last year, may be expected in enlisting the men; and we shall have the officers in pay a considerable time without any soldiers. Perhaps the former pay of the troops was too low, and proper effective men were unwilling to accept of it; if so, let it be raised, let the men be well clothed and fed, and they will more readily engage in the service. Probably, also, the term of three years was an objection with many, who would otherwise have joined our standard. If enlisted only for six months, the ranks will be sooner filled; and this ought to have considerable weight with those who advocate the augmentation of the military establishment, as they cannot but know that, if we set about enlisting the number of men contemplated in the bill, and in the manner there prescribed, they cannot be raised time enough to render any service in the next campaign.

The information contained in the report on the table was not, it was said, to be implicitly relied on. That report was made by a man who had not personally visited the frontier. Others, who had been on the spot, were of opinion that, if two thousand levies had been raised last year, they would have been sufficient, not only for the defence of the frontier, but even for any offensive operations that might have been thought necessary. Such troops, collected in the vicinity, are more competent to the undertaking than the troops now in contemplation. No complaint had been made of their conduct. Whenever they were tried, they behaved as well as the regulars, and, in the action under General St. Clair, they gave equal proofs of their valor.

It was further urged, that the frontier militia are not only equal, but infinitely superior to any regular troops whatever, for the defence of the borders, and that they are, in fact, the only force that can be effectually employed in expeditions against the hostile Indians, whose mode of fighting is familiar to them, and does not strike them with that degree of terror with which it inspires those men who enlist on the regular establishment. These latter being collected in the heart of populous cities, where the face of an Indian is seldom seen, hardly know whether the Indian and his horse are not the same animal. And when they approach the enemy, at the very first shout, even before he is in view, they are terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever been taught to reflect on with horror, and, being incapable of resistance, they commit their safety to flight. To prove the superiority of the militia, gentlemen need only contrast the despatch and success of the expedition conducted by General Scott, with the delays, disgrace, and mortification, which attended that under General St. Clair, and consider the difference of the expense on those two occasions.

The expense of such an army as the bill contemplates is an object well worthy of serious consideration, especially at the present moment, when there is scarcely a dollar in the Treasury. Gentlemen would also do well to advert to the progress of this business, and consider where they were likely to stop, if they went on at the present rate. At first, only a single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about $100,000; a second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense to about $300,000; and now a standing force of 5,168 men is contemplated, at an annual expense of above a million and a quarter of dollars. Can this be justified in the present state of our finances, when it is well known that the Secretary of the Treasury, having been requested by the members from a particular State to build a light-house on a part of their coast, declined the undertaking, and alleged the want of funds as the reason?

Our resources, however, might be made to answer for the support of such a force as that which was intended for the service of the preceding year, and there would be little complaint or dissatisfaction among the people. Very few murmurings were heard against the former establishment; but such a one as is now contemplated will be thought extravagant, will breed discontent among the citizens of the United States, and perhaps afford our neighbors in Canada an opportunity to take advantage of our divided situation, and involve us in a war more dangerous than the former which separated us from Great Britain.

Apprehensions, it is said, are entertained that the object contemplated in raising these additional troops is not so much to punish and coerce the Indians, as to have a standing regular force equal to what the British have on this continent. This is said to amount to about six thousand men, including those in Canada. But it is to be remarked, that the British nation has not above one thousand men within the limits of the United States; and yet, with this handful of troops, they not only keep the Indians in awe, but even, in opposition to the wishes of the United States, retain possession of those posts which should have been ceded to us pursuant to the terms of the treaty. Why, then, is it necessary, for the purpose of establishing posts and garrisoning them, to increase the standing force to so large a number as that contemplated in the clause under consideration? During our late arduous struggle for liberty, when we had to cope with the most powerful nation under heaven, the commander-in-chief had never at any one time above ten thousand men under his own immediate command; and if, with so small a force, we were able to effect so glorious a revolution, there can be no necessity of going such lengths at present, for the sake of establishing a military character. It is strange policy, indeed, to raise five or six thousand men to oppose a handful of Indian banditti, whose utmost amount does not, from the documents on the table, appear to exceed twelve hundred.

We are preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one, except those who are in the secrets of the Cabinet, knows for what reason the war has been thus carried on for three years. But what funds are to defray the increased expense of maintaining such a force as is now contemplated? The excise is both unpopular and unproductive. The impost duties have been raised as high as is consistent with prudence. To increase them, would be but to open a door for smuggling, and thus diminish their productiveness. And if those sources of revenue fail--if our finances be thus exhausted in unnecessary wars--we shall be unable to satisfy, the public creditors, unless recourse be had to new taxes, the consequence of which may, with just reason, be deplored; whereas, if we but keep our expenses within bounds--if we nurse our finances--we shall be respectable among the nations of the earth, nor will any nation dare to insult us, or be able to do it with impunity.

During the course of these observations, an honorable gentleman asked, whether this was a day set apart for rhetorical flourishes, as the galleries were open, and he saw the short-hand writers stationed at their different posts?

At an early stage of the debate, an honorable gentleman had suggested, that, instead of passing a law for raising at all events the additional regiments, which, for his part, he did not think necessary, the House, if they finally determined the present establishment to be insufficient, would perhaps do better to appropriate a certain sum of money, to enable the Executive to call in such additional aid as circumstances may require.

To this it was objected, that it is the duty of the Representatives of the people, in all appropriations of the public money, to make them for certain specific purposes. To act otherwise on the present occasion would be setting a precedent that might, in its consequences, prove highly injurious; for, although the greatest confidence may safely be reposed in the virtue and integrity of him who now fills the Presidential chair, it is impossible to foresee what use may hereafter be made of the precedent by his successors, or how far it may be carried.

Against the motion for striking out, and in favor of the proposed augmentation of the military establishment, it was urged: That, as to the justice of the war carried on against the Indian tribes, that was a question which could not admit of a doubt in the mind of any man who would allow that self-preservation and indispensable necessity are sufficient causes to justify a nation in taking up arms. If the present war be not in every respect justifiable, then there never was, nor ever will be, a just war. It was originally undertaken, and since carried on, not for the sake of conquest, but to defend our fellow-citizens, our friends, our dearest connections, who are daily exposed, in the frontier settlements, to all the rage of savage barbarity, to which they, with their wives and children, must soon fall victims, unless we speedily fly to their assistance; and, although there are some people who utterly deny the justice of any war whatever, this doctrine, however fine in theory, will hardly ever obtain in practice; for, is it to be imagined, that any set of men are of such a passive disposition as calmly to look on whilst their friends and relations are butchered before their eyes, and to refuse giving them every assistance in their power?

The murders and depredations which have for years past been repeatedly committed by the savages, loudly call for redress. From various documents of unquestionable authority, now in the hands of the Secretary of War, signed and attested by the Executive and Legislature of Kentucky, by the District Judge, and the Captains of the militia, it appears, that, from the year 1783 to 1790, there have been, of the inhabitants of that District, or of emigrants on their way thither, no less than fifteen hundred persons either massacred by the savages, or dragged into captivity, two thousand horses taken away, and other property plundered or destroyed to the amount of fifty thousand dollars. And there is good reason to suppose that on the other frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania the number of persons murdered or taken prisoners during the above-mentioned period would furnish a list of one thousand or fifteen hundred more.

The white people, it is true, have sometimes committed depredations on the Indians; but the instances have been rare (the honorable gentleman who spoke did not recollect above one or two) of their making unjust attacks upon the savages; nor did they, on those occasions, commence hostilities against them till exasperated by the strongest provocations that could possibly stimulate the human heart. This circumstance may be justly allowed as some palliation of the offence. Even in these instances, however, a few individuals only were concerned; and, when the affair came to the knowledge of the State, ample reparation was made to the injured party. The General Government, too, had shown an equal disposition to do justice to the Indian tribes. Witness the affair of the Cherokees; for, as soon as Congress had heard their complaints of an encroachment made on them by some of the people from the frontier of the Carolinas, immediate orders were issued for obliging the intruders to evacuate the Indian territory.

But, notwithstanding the disposition that prevails, as well in the Legislatures of those States whose frontiers are most exposed, as in the General Government, to cultivate peace and amity with the neighboring Indians, that desirable object is become utterly unattainable in the present posture of affairs. The frontier Indians have killed a number of whites; the whites, in their turn, have made retaliation. Both parties are in the highest degree exasperated against each other, and likely to continue so, in spite of every endeavor that can be made to effect a reconciliation. With minds thus irritated, it is vain to hope for peace, as long as they continue in each other's neighborhood. It is therefore necessary to form a strong barrier, to keep them asunder, unless, indeed, the advocates for a cessation of hostilities would oblige the frontier settlers to abandon their lands. But by what new-invented rule of right should the inhabitants of Kentucky, and the other frontier settlers, be laid under a greater obligation than any other citizens of the United States to relinquish a property legally acquired by their purchase? Were it even proposed to pacify the savages, by purchasing the lands anew, such a measure would answer no other purpose than that of procuring a temporary peace, which would soon again be interrupted by a war that would reproduce the necessity of again having recourse to the same expedient. We should have to purchase the lands again and again, without end. By thus squandering the public money, year after year, we should swell the national debt to an amount that we cannot possibly foresee. Better at once to make a vigorous effort, to act in a manner becoming the national dignity, and to maintain our ground by war, since we cannot obtain a durable or an honorable peace.

Attempts have, at various times, been made to effect treaties of peace with the Indian tribes with whom we are now at war; and, although these efforts have constantly proved ineffectual, they yet show, that neither the United States nor the State of Virginia were backward on their part to adopt conciliatory measures, and to do away that animosity which had commenced on the part of the savages at an early period of the late war with Great Britain, and had continued to break out at intervals ever since. In the years, 1783, '84, '85, '87, '88, and '90, offers of peace were made to them. On the last-mentioned occasion, when a treaty was proposed at the Miami village, the Indians at first refused to treat. They next required thirty days to deliberate; and, in the interim, the inhabitants of Kentucky were expressly prohibited by the President of the United States from carrying on any offensive operations against them; yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the whites, no less than one hundred and twenty persons were killed or captured by the savages, and several prisoners roasted alive, during that short period, at the expiration of which, the Indians refused to give any answer at all.

On another occasion, the Indians, not content with rejecting our offers of peace, proceeded even so far as to insult us, by telling us we have lands within the British posts, and asking us why we did not go and take possession of them? Will it be said that we are unable to do it? Is this language to be used within the United States? No! We are able, abundantly able to do it, whenever we please; and if we would but retrench our expenses in some instances, which might well admit of a reduction, our ability would still increase; our finances are not quite so insufficient as some gentlemen seem to imagine, nor so easily deranged. We are still able to prove that the boasted efficiency of the General Government is something more than an empty name--we can yet raise both men and money sufficient to defend the nation from either injury or insult.

It is now too late to inquire whether the war was originally undertaken on the principles of justice or not. We are actually involved in it, and cannot recede, without exposing numbers of innocent persons to be butchered by the enemy; for, though we should determine to discontinue the war, can it he said that the savages will also agree to a cessation of hostilities? It is well known that they are averse to peace; and even the warmest advocate of pacific measures must therefore allow that the war is a war of necessity, and must be supported. We cannot, without impeachment both to our justice and our humanity, abandon our fellow-citizens on the frontier to the rage of their savage enemies. And although the excise may be somewhat unpopular, although money may still be wanted; what is the excise? what is money, when put in competition with the lives of our friends and brethren?

A sufficient force must be raised for their defence; and the only question now to be considered is, what that force shall be? Experience has proved, that the force employed in the last campaign was inadequate. It is true the establishment was not complete; but who will venture to assert that, if it had been complete, it would have been sufficient for the intended purpose? Are gentlemen who assert this so well acquainted with the circumstances of the enemy, as to be able to give an accurate statement of the amount of their forces on the frontier? There are stronger opinions in favor of an augmentation of the army than can be adduced against it--opinions given by men of judgment and experience, who have themselves been on the spot, and are well acquainted with the situation of affairs in that quarter. These gentlemen, who must be allowed to be competent judges, are decidedly of opinion that the present establishment, though completed to the last man, will not furnish an adequate force to carry on the war with effect; and that it will be a hopeless attempt to open another campaign, with less than about five thousand regular troops, the number contemplated in the bill.

Nor ought that number to be deemed extravagant, under an idea that we have only a contemptible handful of banditti to contend with. Their numbers were, last year, from authentic documents, stated at about twelve hundred warriors, from twenty-three different tribes: such was the opposition then contemplated; but it is impossible to ascertain what accessions of strength they have since received, or even what force they had engaged in the late unfortunate action, as the very men who were in the engagement do not pretend to form any just or accurate estimate of the number of their assailants; but there is good reason to suppose that they had previously entered into an association with various tribes, that have not as yet come within our knowledge. The bows and arrows used against our troops on that occasion, afford a convincing proof that they had foes to encounter from distant nations, as yet unacquainted with the use of fire-arms. Nor does the account of the bows and arrows depend, for its authenticity, on newspaper evidence alone; gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, who were personally engaged in the action, have declared that they had themselves noticed the arrows flying.

When we consider the warlike disposition of the Indians in general, and the alacrity with which the victors are ever sure to be joined by numerous allies, we have every reason to expect a much more formidable opposition in the next campaign. It is well known that the savages place all their glory in deeds of war; and that, among them, a young man cannot make his appearance in company till he has signalized his valor by some martial achievement. When, to this powerful incentive, a new stimulus is added by the trophies obtained in the late action, it is presumable that numbers will crowd to their standard; and it strongly behooves us to prepare in time for a much more vigorous effort than any we have yet made against them.

The objections drawn from the increased expense, must entirely vanish from before the eyes of any man who looks forward to the consequences of one more unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster would eventually involve the nation in much greater expense than that which is now made the ground of opposition. Better, therefore, at once to make a vigorous and effectual exertion to bring the matter to a final issue, than to continue gradually draining the Treasury, by dragging on the war, and renewing hostilities from year to year.

If we wish to bring the war to a speedy and a happy conclusion, and to secure a permanent peace to the inhabitants on the frontier, we must employ such troops and adopt such measures as appear best calculated to ensure success. If we delay our determination until the force of the enemy be ascertained, we can make no provision at all; for the nature and circumstances of the case preclude us from the very possibility of obtaining a knowledge of their strength and numbers. And are we, meanwhile, to remain inactive and irresolute, and make no efforts to repel their intended attacks? No! Whatever their numbers may be, prudence calls aloud for provision of some kind. And if experience is to have any weight with us, the example of the French and of the British points out the true mode of securing our frontier, and rendering it invulnerable to an Indian foe. Let us occupy posts in the vicinity of the enemy, let them be properly garrisoned and well provided, and the business is done.

These will afford an opportunity of trading with the friendly tribes, and will prevent all intercourse between the whites and the Indians, except under proper regulations. Should hostilities be meditated by any tribes who are not in amity with us, early intelligence of their movements can be obtained; their marauding parties may either be beaten off on their approach, or intercepted on their return; opportunities may be taken of separately attacking the hostile tribes; their old men, their squaws, their children, will be exposed a great part of the year, whilst the others are out hunting. In short, if fear, hope, interest, can be supposed to have any influence on the Indians, this mode of defence must be allowed to be preferable to any other, as giving the fullest scope to the operation of all those motives.

A different mode has long been pursued in Virginia, and adopted by the inhabitants of Kentucky, but its success has not been such as to offer any inducement to the General Government to follow the same plan. Rangers have there been employed for a number of years to scour the frontiers; and those rangers, too, were expert woodsmen, perfectly inured to the Indian mode of warfare; yet, notwithstanding their utmost vigilance, these savages still found means to commit all the murders and depredations already enumerated. It is true, however, that a frontier militia man, trained up in the woods, may be, in many respects, preferable to a regular soldier, who has not the same knowledge of the country, and of the mode of fighting; but with equal experience, (and proper men possessed of that experience, may be enlisted on the establishment,) regular troops will be found infinitely superior to any militia upon earth.

Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, cannot but know that a very trifling disaster, or a slight cause of discontent, is sufficient to make them disband, and forget all subordination, so far as even to neglect the means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, are much more to be depended on, especially when the object of attack is distant, and great fatigue is to be undergone. The militia, in whatever mode they may be called out, will hardly furnish men of the proper description; if large pay be offered, the temptation will equally prevail upon those who are unfit for the service as it will upon good, effective men; besides, some of the States have no militia laws; and, even in those States which have such laws, they are gone into disuse; no dependence can therefore be placed on militia under any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a general militia law now before the House: but if it ever passes, it certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the purpose of providing for the immediate defence of the frontier. Regular troops must be raised, or nothing effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense we refuse the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render ourselves responsible for the consequences of this parsimonious policy, which may be attended with the ruin and destruction of our fellow-citizens in the Western country.

The Cornplanter's speech was again mentioned and called for; but, as it had been confidentially communicated by the President, an objection was made to having it read, without clearing the galleries. Whereupon,

An honorable member rose, and mentioned his having read it in one of the public newspapers in the State of New Jersey.