Part 145

Under all circumstances, I think his estate should be indemnified. If the committee do not like the whole of the resolution, let there be a division, as proposed by one of the gentlemen from South Carolina; though I should think we might safely vote for the whole of the resolution, and let the bill make any other provisions which it may be thought necessary.

Mr. LEE, Mr. BARNWELL, Mr. WAYNE, and Mr. BOURNE, R. I., spoke in favor of agreeing to the resolutions, and Mr. MACON and Mr. STURGES against the motion. Mr. SUMTER closed the debate in sundry remarks on extracts from letters wrote by General Greene during the late war, inserted in Gordon's History of the American Revolution, which extracts contain unfavorable reflections on the militia of South Carolina, and the patriotism of the inhabitants of that State. These reflections, Mr. SUMTER said, were gross calumnies on, and misrepresentations of the character of that people, which he said were invalidated by facts that at that time took place, and by the general tenor of the conduct of South Carolina throughout the whole course of the war.

MONDAY, January 23.

Petition of Catharine Greene.

The order of the day being called for, on the report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, several members objected to taking up this subject, being of a private nature, while matters of the greatest public importance demand the immediate attention of Congress. The question being taken, the motion for going into Committee of the Whole was carried, 21 to 16; and Mr. LIVERMORE took the chair.

After considerable debate, the question was put for agreeing to the first resolution, in the following words:

Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, That the estate of the late Major General Greene ought to be indemnified for the engagements entered into by that General, with certain persons in the State of South Carolina, for the purpose of obtaining supplies for the Army of the United States, under his command, in the year 1783.

Which was negatived, 28 to 25.

The committee then rose, and the Chairman reported that the Committee of the whole House had had under consideration a report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. MACON then moved that the Committee of the Whole should be discharged from any further proceedings on the subject; which motion was agreed to.

Mr. BOURNE then laid on the table a resolution for referring the Secretary's Report, together with Mrs. Greene's petition, and the vouchers accompanying it, to a select committee, with instruction to inquire into the facts which rendered it necessary for General Greene to become security to Banks & Co., and the nature, circumstances, and amount of the original debt, and the obligation entered into by General Greene for payment thereof; with an account of the moneys or collateral security received by the obligees, or by General Greene in his lifetime, or his representatives since his death, in part thereof; and the eventual loss which his estate will sustain in consequence of the said securities; and after examining all the circumstances and such further evidence as may be offered relative to the transaction, to report their opinion thereon to the House.

THURSDAY, January 26.

An engrossed bill to ascertain and regulate the claims to half-pay and to invalid pensions was read the third time and passed.

Protection of the Frontiers.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the Protection of the Frontiers of the United States.

A motion being made to strike out the second section of the bill, which contemplates the raising of three additional regiments of infantry and a squadron of light dragoons, amounting in all to three thousand and forty men, exclusive of commissioned officers--

It was urged in favor of the motion, that the Indian war, in which the United States are at present involved, was, in its origin, as unjustly undertaken as it has since been unwisely and unsuccessfully conducted; that depredations had been committed by the whites as well as by the Indians; and the whites were most probably the aggressors, as they frequently made encroachments on the Indian lands, whereas the Indians showed no inclination to obtain possession of our territory, or even to make temporary invasions, until urged to it by a sense of their wrongs. A proof of this unencroaching disposition on their part plainly appeared in their conduct, after the victory they lately obtained over our troops; for, when flushed with success, they might have swept the country before them, and penetrated as far as Pittsburg, they contented themselves with the advantage they had gained over their invaders, and did not attempt to invade our territories in return, although there was nowhere at hand a sufficient force to check their career.

The mode of treating the Indians in general was reprobated as unwise and impolitic. The Indians are with difficulty to be reduced by the sword, but may easily be gained by justice and moderation; and, although their cruelties are alleged as reasons for a different conduct, and the sufferings of the white people pathetically deplored, these narratives, it was said, are at best but ex parte evidence--we hear nothing of the sufferings of the Indians--but if Cornplanter's speech were read, it would set the matter in a very different point of view, and furnish a complete answer to all the charges of their accusers.

Peace, it was said, may be obtained from the Indian tribes at a much less expense than would be necessary for the support of the war. To persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad purpose indeed; for, supposing our arms crowned with victory, what are the advantages we may expect to reap from our success? We can only gain possession of their lands--a possession that must long continue unproductive of the smallest benefit, as we already possess land sufficient--more, in fact, than we will be able to cultivate for a century to come.

Instead of being ambitious to extend our boundaries, it would answer a much better national purpose to check the roving disposition of the frontier settlers, and prevent them from too suddenly extending themselves to the Western waters. If kept closer together, and more nearly connected with the old settlements, they would be more useful to the community at large, and would not so frequently involve us in unnecessary and expensive wars with the Indians; but if permitted to rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation embroiled in perpetual warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest upon.

If the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper boundaries, there they might, for years to come, cultivate the soil in peace, neither invaded nor invading. As the country progresses in population, and our limits are found too narrow, it will then be soon enough to contemplate a gradual extension of our frontier; but, in the mean time, it is an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry war beyond our present line of forts. It is only exposing our arms to disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession of the posts within our territory.

As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts, we can never hope to succeed against the Indians; nor ought we to trace our late misfortune to any other source than her still holding them in her possession. Were they in our hands, the Indians could not carry on their operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for it is from those forts that they obtain their supplies of arms and ammunition, with which they can be at all times plentifully furnished, as long as things continue on their present footing.

Until those posts are in our possession, it will be in vain to send our armies into the wilderness. A body of five thousand men, sent out against the Indians, under the present circumstances, would be as effectually defeated as the smaller ones have already been. In those wilds, our troops have no friend at hand to furnish them with supplies, or to give them intelligence of the approach and operations of the enemy; whereas, the Indians, receiving both aid and information from their friendly neighbors, can preconcert their plans, and choose, according to their own convenience, the place and the hour of attack, as they did before.

It was here observed, by an honorable gentleman on the other side of the question, that we ought undoubtedly to get possession of those posts; and that we might have long since obtained it, if we had only laid a seasonable embargo on all the British shipping in our ports; though he doubted whether it would at present be worth while to take such a step, as the English have lost so great a portion of our carrying trade, in consequence of the additional tonnage laid on their vessels.

In favor of the motion, it was further urged, that, supposing even the war to have been originally undertaken with justice on our side--supposing, also, that the national honor and interest called for a continuance of hostilities--yet, as it was by no means either necessary or prudent to invade the Indian territory, as this had been attempted in two successive campaigns, and the event had, in both instances, been such as to afford no very flattering prospect from a third expedition of the same kind, it was thought much more advisable to content ourselves with defending the frontier; and this might be done without making so great an augmentation in the military establishment.

The only use of regular troops on the frontier is to garrison the forts, and to have a standing force in the neighborhood to form a station, to which the militia may resort either for protection or supplies; but as to active service, the frontier militia and rangers were pronounced to be by far preferable to the regular troops, as being more expert woodsmen, and better habituated to the Indian mode of fighting. To defend the forts, a small number of regulars would be sufficient. The present establishment of two regiments would, if completed, be amply adequate to the purpose, and, when assisted by such forces as might at all times be collected on the frontier, would be able to repel every inroad of the enemy.

Experience has proved that the sudden and desultory attacks of the frontier militia and rangers are ever attended with better success than the methodical operations of a regular force. The former are better calculated for expedition and surprise, making unexpected sallies, scouring the country in small bodies, harassing the Indians, and intercepting their straggling parties, by whom their motions are unobserved; whereas, when a body of regulars take the field, encumbered with baggage and heavy artillery, the unavoidable slowness of their movements affords the enemy an opportunity of watching all their operations, collecting their whole force, and skulking in the woods around them till they can seize the favorable moment to strike a sudden blow, which they generally do with success, but which they could never attempt if exposed every hour to the unforeseen attacks of our woodsmen, who would keep their attention constantly engaged in all quarters, and thus prevent them from uniting in large bodies.

It was further observed by some gentlemen, who even admitted the propriety of invading the Indian territory, that, to effect this with success, it was by no means necessary to make such an increase in the military establishment as that contemplated in the bill. The miscarriage of the former expeditions could not (they said) be alleged as a sufficient reason; for it is well known that the former establishment was far from being complete. The regulars intended for the service of the last campaign were to have been above two thousand two hundred; the President was, besides, empowered to raise two thousand five hundred levies, in addition to the regulars; and these would, together, have constituted an army of about four thousand seven hundred men. Had such a body been employed, we might reasonably have expected much better success against the Indians, whose numbers were so far inferior; the whole force of the Wabash tribes not amounting to above eleven or twelve hundred warriors, who never could keep the field for any length of time, but must be soon obliged to disperse, without venturing an attack upon an army of such superior strength.