Part 142

The question being taken on the motion, for withdrawing the privilege from the members, it passed in the negative; yeas 21, nays 35.

TUESDAY, December 20.

Post Office Bill.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill for establishing the Post Office and Post Roads within the United States.

Mr. WADSWORTH moved an amendment, to withdraw the privilege of franking from the members of both Houses of Congress.

In support of this motion, it was said, that the grand security which the people of the United States have in their Representatives is, that those Representatives are subject to the same regulations as their constituents. In the article of postage, this was not the case. Congress, in this case, assume to themselves a privilege, which they refuse to the people; they took money from their constituents, and paid none themselves. The people viewed this privilege with a jealous eye, and could not be pleased to see it enjoyed by Congress, whilst neither the members of the State Assemblies, nor even the Governors were indulged in it. Congress enjoys only chartered rights; and all rights not expressly mentioned in the charter, are of course excluded. The constitution is their charter; the Convention, who framed it, had, no doubt, well considered the whole subject of privileges and accurately defined all such as they wished the Legislative body should enjoy distinct from their constituents. In the enumeration of those privileges, there is not a syllable tending to exonerate them from their share of the common burden of postage; they have no constitutional claim to such an immunity, and if they assumed it they would increase the burden on their constituents. The post office, if unable to maintain itself, must derive its support from other sources of revenue. Already the members of both Houses send and receive, during their session, as many letters through the General Post Office as all the other inhabitants of Philadelphia; those letters, if paid at the usual rates, would amount to half the postage of the United States. The number and bulk of the franked letters and packets excluded the newspapers from the mail, and thus prevented the circulation of intelligence; if the evil increased (and there was no probability of its being diminished, except by the utter abolition of the privilege) it would eventually prove the ruin of the post office. The example of Britain showed to what an enormous height the abuse of such a privilege may be carried; and though similar abuses may not as yet have taken place here, yet it could hardly be doubted that many unnecessary letters were daily sent by the post, which never would have been written if subject to postage; those letters are not only unproductive, but an actual expense to the post office, as the postmaster receives a certain percentage on these, as well as upon other letters. The privilege of franking is moreover unequal in its operation; while some members use it only for the purpose of transmitting political information to their constituents, others, absent perhaps during the whole session, use it for very different purposes: to men in trade it was a considerable advantage, amounting probably, in some instances, to a hundred dollars a year. It would be better to take away the privilege entirely, and reduce the general rates of postage one-half, or to allow the members, at the close of each session, to make a charge for all letters on public business, from their constituents, or to make them an allowance in gross to defray the expense of postage; better, even, if necessary, to make an addition to the compensation which the members receive for their services, if the present one be found incompetent to their honorable support.

On the other hand, it was observed, that the privilege of franking was not assumed by the members for their own private accommodation, but for the benefit of their constituents, to transmit to them every necessary information respecting the operations of the General Government, and to receive from them such information as they might have to communicate. Petitions are frequently enclosed to members; and if these were to be subject to the payment of postage, the privilege of petitioning the House, would be in a great measure destroyed. The diminution of revenue which the post office might in some instances suffer from the privilege of franking, ought not to be deemed a sufficient reason for abolishing that privilege; since it is allowed, that the object contemplated in the establishment was the general convenience, and an easy and speedy mode of disseminating public and private intelligence. Revenue was but a secondary consideration. Although the citizens who live at the seat of Government, and have daily opportunities of learning from the newspapers what public measures are going forward, may not be materially affected by the abrogation of the privilege, yet the case would be widely different with those who live at a distance, especially when fiscal operations were on foot; those who are informed, will make a prey of those who are ignorant, and destructive speculation will enrich the few, at the expense of the many. In a government of opinion (which is the Government of America) much greater reliance is to be placed on the confidence of the people than upon any other circumstance: that confidence can only be the result of the fullest information; but if the privilege of franking were taken away, the avenues of information would be, in a great measure, closed, for the members could not undertake, at their own private expense, to transmit intelligence to every part of the Union; yet the citizens have a right to expect information, not only of the acts of Government, but also the principles upon which they were grounded. The abuses of the privilege, that have prevailed in England, do not prevail here; and its abolition would give general dissatisfaction, particularly in the more distant parts of the Union, where information would be subject to a very high tax, if circulated through the post office, at the ordinary rates of postage. Of those bundles of letters received and dispatched by members of Congress, many (though far from being unnecessary, as had been said) would perhaps never be written, if they were not to pass free of postage; and thus that free communication of sentiment between the Representative and constituent, which is so essential in a Government like this, would be in a great measure cut off; and the post office would gain little or nothing by it, as those packets of newspapers, bills, reports, &c., would either be sent by private hand, or not sent at all; even here an inequality would prevail, as the people who live near the seat of Government, and all along the main road, could, from the greater frequency of opportunities, receive such packets with more ease and regularity, whilst those in more remote situations could seldom or never receive them, unless by the mail. The expense arising from the percentage to the postmaster on the free letters, is but trifling, as in such cases he receives no more for a packet of two ounces than for a single letter; and as to the idea of allowing the members to make a charge for their letters, this would be no better than receiving with one hand and paying away with the other. If, however, it were found absolutely necessary to take precautions against the abuses that were apprehended, this might be done by limiting the number or weight of letters that should go free by any one post, without entirely preventing the interchange of sentiments between the Representative and his constituents.

The committee then rose, without taking the question on the amendment.

THURSDAY, December 22.

Election of President, &c.

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act relative to the election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and declaring the officer who shall act as President, in case of vacancies in the offices both of President and Vice President."

The bill was read by the Clerk. The first section being again read by the Chairman,

Mr. TUCKER moved to amend this clause by striking out these words, "except in cases in which an extraordinary election of President and Vice President shall take place, as hereinafter specified." This motion was agreed to.

Mr. SEDGWICK made some general observations on the great objects of the bill, and adverting to the term proposed for the choice of Electors of President and Vice President, observed that he had his doubts whether it would not be best to give a longer time. He enlarged on the disagreeable consequences which would probably ensue, in case there should not be a choice by the Electors; as the matter must then be determined by the House, voting according to the constitution, by States. He descanted on the pernicious consequences which might result from the collision of parties, and the working of passions in the breasts of men whose ardor would probably be excited to the greatest degree on such an occasion; every reasonable measure should be adopted to prevent the evils which he deprecated; he therefore moved that the words "thirty days" should be struck out, in order to give the people a longer time to give in their votes for Electors.

Mr. WHITE objected to the motion. He conceived it was calculated to produce the very mischiefs the gentleman appeared to deprecate. If it had been possible, he could have wished that the Electors should meet and give in their votes on the very day of their being chosen; he wished as much as the gentleman to adopt measures to prevent the evils he mentioned; but did not think the motion would conduce to that object; he thought the time should rather be contracted than extended.

Mr. DAYTON also objected to the motion; he thought fourteen days would be a more proper time; it was the design of the constitution, though it is not expressed, that the President should not know the characters to whom he is indebted for his election.

Mr. SEDGWICK observed, that the objections would be very proper was it certainly known that the Electors would always agree in a choice; but this he conceived, it was hardly possible should always be the case; and what will then take place? The election devolves on this House, and the Electors will then be known, and liable to all that intrigue and cabal which has prevailed in other countries. He left it to the consideration of the committee to determine on the immense importance of providing in season against the evils of a contested election, in the case now before them.

Mr. BALDWIN objected to the motion; but said if it was struck out, he should then move to insert a clause which should assign different periods according to the circumstances of the several States, so that the Electors should meet as nearly as possible at the same time in all the States.

Mr. NILES objected to the motion; and the question being put it was negatived.

The clause which makes it the duty of the Executive of the several States to cause the names of the Electors to be certified, was objected to.

Mr. NILES observed that no person could be called upon to discharge any duty on behalf of the United States, who had not accepted of an appointment under their authority. He thought that this was opening the door too wide, and involves a blending of the respective powers and duties of each, which is not warranted by the constitution; and he observed that he should be sorry that the Government of the United States should attempt to exercise a power which they are not competent to carry into execution. He moved that the clause should be struck out.

Mr. SEDGWICK observed that if Congress were not authorized to call on the Executives of the several States, he could not conceive what description of persons they were empowered to call upon.

Mr. NILES said he considered this section as degrading to the Executive of the several States; and inquired, what is to be done in case those Executives should refuse to comply with the requisition?

Mr. CLARK said, it appeared to him that the committee was creating difficulties where none before existed. He observed that the choosing these Electors was a privilege conferred on the people, and that this was merely pointing out the mode of exercising this privilege; he thought the clause stood very well and would create no uneasiness whatever.

Mr. HILLHOUSE said, he considered the provision improper. It imposed a duty on the Supreme Executives of the several States, which they might or might not execute; and thus the necessary certificates may not be made. He seconded the motion to strike out the clause, and proposed a substitute making it the duty of the Electors to procure for themselves the necessary certificates.

Mr. LIVERMORE spoke in favor of the clause; he did not consider it either as an undue assumption of power, or degrading to the Executives of the respective States.

Mr. BARNWELL said, a small addition to the clause would in his opinion obviate every difficulty; the words he proposed to insert were--"or such person as the Executive may appoint."

Mr. STURGES moved to strike out "Executive," and insert "the Legislature."