CHAPTER XIII. The Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century[73]

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

=The Return to Realism.= If the history of mankind had terminated with the nineteenth century, the last tendency of thought to be recorded would have been the return to Realism. The abbreviated account which follows of the philosophy of the nineteenth century will explain and illustrate this tendency. Before we set this forth, however, it may be well to define again the nature of Realism. What is Realism? In general it is the belief that reality or realities exist quite independent of anybody’s knowing them. Moreover, Realism has the distinction of being one of the four great types of metaphysical thought. These types are Realism, Mysticism, Critical-rationalism, and Idealism. In other words, Realism is an attitude of mind possible to a whole civilization. This is what is meant by a great philosophical type. The Idealism of the period which we have just studied is such a type. Although Germany had been the leading representative of Idealism, the spread of philosophical and literary Idealism had been world-wide. All nations had shared in it. But when the great events and the romancing spirit of that period had passed, the reaction to Realism was likewise felt the world over. It is the period of this reaction that we are briefly to consider.

=The Character of the Realism of the Nineteenth Century.= We have already discussed the nature of the Realism of ancient civilization as it appeared in Plato’s theory of Ideas; and we also have reviewed the variation of Plato’s doctrine in mediæval times. Both ancient and mediæval societies give expression through Plato to Realistic conceptions――ancient society to an æsthetic Realism, mediæval to an ecclesiastical Realism. Now in the modern period we find a still different kind. The Realism of the nineteenth century has been that of natural science. The question of the nineteenth century has been, What degree of importance has the scientific conception of phenomena in our total conception of life? German Idealism had taken up the natural science of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and had made it a part of a world conceived as cosmic Reason. But in the nineteenth century the conception of the cosmic Reason and that of nature part company. The two conceptions begin to stand in antithesis. Nature is conceived as a reality existing in sublime independence. Democritus wins his victory over Spinoza. There are two reasons for this: (1) The ideas of science are expressed with a clearness and distinctness that is in marked contrast with the ideas of German romanticism. Natural science is formulated mathematically and demonstrated in experience, and natural science moreover does not require the labor of interpretation. (2) Natural science proves its usefulness, thereby responding to the imperative needs of the economic changes of the nineteenth century.

In this modern period the attention of man has been riveted upon his environment. If at any time the man of the nineteenth century has seemed to be interested in man, the interest has really been in man’s relation to his environment. The nineteenth century has championed the necessary laws and mechanical structure of the outer world against man himself. The universe has been enthroned; man has become its serf. Human effort has become slave to its own progress. Work has been apotheosized――work in the outer world, work with the hands. Inventions in material things have multiplied. The nineteenth century has been the period of steam, of electricity, of machinery, of factories, of the enormous increase in the number and size of cities, of the minute division of labor. Social and economic rather than metaphysical problems have commanded attention. Not another and ideal world, but this present world, is the one in which the modern man has lived. The sciences have been specialized and man has become practical. Hegel would have said of our time that the cosmic Reason had been so engaged in concrete and external realities, that it had had no time to turn within and scrutinize itself. If one wishes to turn back the leaves of history for centuries similar to the nineteenth in their spirit, one will find them in the third and second centuries B. C. and the fourteenth and fifteenth of the present era. Nevertheless, there is this to be said about modern Realism in comparison with the Realism of preceding periods――the preceding Realism had been critical, negative in its practical results, and usually an opposition to tradition or a reaction from it; modern Realism has been distinguished by its positive practical results, its ambition for supremacy, and its shaping of the whole direction of the life of man. It has assumed control of religion, art, and social morality, to the end of the well-being of the whole.

=Modern Philosophy and German Idealism.= The nineteenth century has been remarkable in the extent of its historical, literary, and scientific productions. It has been poor in its philosophical ideas, when we compare it with the preceding romantic movement of the German Idealists. To be sure, there has been much philosophical literature with a great variety of doctrine, but the many personally impressive structures have on the whole been only the re-shaping of former thought. It has sometimes seemed as if some of the philosophic doctrines of this time were about to take original shape; but none have ever reached it, with the possible exception of the doctrine of historical evolution.

The explanation of the uncreative character of modern thought is found in its relation to the Idealism which preceded it. The German Idealists had conquered the world of the spirit, but in spite of all their efforts the realm of empirical facts remained stubborn to all their romancing. Even Hegel, the greatest among them, had not succeeded in completely penetrating history by his dialectic law. Already in the eighteenth century a Realistic movement had been stirring in England and France, and had made notable achievements. So the Idealists turned to the study of the facts of life――partly in order to subordinate them to their Idealism, partly because a great interest had appeared in the study of the records of the past. The origin and history of religions, of law, of languages, of art, of institutions formed topics of study within the Romantic circle. A remarkable list of books was published by the Romanticists on these subjects between the date of the battle of Waterloo (1815) and that of the death of Hegel (1831). After Hegel died no adequate successors in speculative power came to take the place of the old Idealistic leaders, but the interest in empirical science was borne on by many men of genius. The study of empirical phenomena was extended to all branches; biology and geology, which were late in being studied historically, began to occupy the centre of the stage. In spite of the fact that the nearness of modern philosophical theories blinds us to their true perspective, yet even now we can see that in comparison with the German Idealism the philosophical doctrines of the nineteenth century are partial in their survey of the field. The whole problem of life was before the eyes of the Idealists; the modern world about 1831 shifted its attention to a critical scrutiny of only one part of that problem. The philosophical problem to the Idealists was the problem of the cosmos; the philosophical problem to the nineteenth century was concerned only with a reëxamination of the environment of man.

=The Philosophical Problems of the Nineteenth Century.= In summarizing what we have above said, we have before us a situation something as follows. Idealism had run its course as a social attitude of mind, and about 1831 the leaders of Idealism had died with no one to fill their places. But within Idealism between 1815 and 1831 there had arisen a great empirical interest in the origins of history, law, philology, etc. Side by side with this empirical interest there had come certain economic conditions that had called forth and rewarded genius in natural science.

Thus we find even before the fourth decade of the nineteenth century two strong tendencies: (1) a new conception of the meaning of history as an evolution from origins; and (2) a remarkable interest in the natural sciences. The two tendencies modified each other. The historical view of the world exercised a powerful influence upon natural science; natural science had to be reckoned with in the writing of history. History and natural science were drawn together, but without producing a new philosophical conception that would include them both.

From the interaction of these two powerful tendencies the great variety of philosophical interests were grouped around two general problems. These were (1) The problem of the functioning of the soul; (2) The problem of the conception of history.

=1. The Problem of the Functioning of the Soul.= With the decline of metaphysics and the reaction from speculation, psychology began to loosen from its anchorage in philosophy. Psychology, which had been a study of mind, now became the study of the relation of mind and body. The tendency was strong to make psychology an empirical science, and by the use of the methods of science to become a part of physiology and biology. Philosophy has been a nest in which all the sciences have been brooded. Psychology has been the last to attempt to leave the nest, and to-day in some of our large universities it is coördinated in the curriculum with the natural sciences. Deprived of a basis in philosophy, psychology turned to natural science for support. Concerning the relation of the soul to the body many solutions have been offered.

Following the Sensationalist, Cabanis, who died in 1808, some of the French Ideologists, so-called, concluded that the soul is everywhere determined by physical influences, such as age, sex, temperament, climate, etc.; some said that the mind is a result of brain activity; some developed the conception of phrenology, according to which the shape of the skull determines the faculties of the mind. The French Ideologists differed widely in their interpretations, but on the whole the basis of the movement was materialism. The hypothesis of phrenology aroused great interest in England, but John Stuart Mill led the movement back to Hume’s associational psychology. He conceived the psychical and the physical states as two separate realms, and he concluded that psychology as the study of the laws of mental states cannot reduce mental states to physical. So Sir William Hamilton, under the influence of Kant, championed the life of inner experience.

Of course the materialistic challenge of the soul aroused great heat in theological circles. The personality of God and the nature of the soul became burning questions, and led to the dissolution of the Hegelian school into “the right wing” and “the left wing.” Hegel had always maintained his standing in orthodox circles as the Prussian “State philosopher.” Those followers who composed the “right wing” tried to interpret his doctrine in accordance with the traditional theological conception of the soul; the “left wing” interpreted Hegel as a pantheist, in whose doctrine the soul could not be considered as a substance with immortality. Feuerbach followed this by inverting Hegelianism into a nominalistic materialism, and conceived the soul as nature “in its otherness.” In 1854, at a convention of naturalists in Germany, the materialistic conception of the soul was found to be widely spread among the German physicians and naturalists. But the contradiction between the inferences of science and “the needs of the heart” became a subject of controversy, and in 1860, under the leadership of Kuno Fischer, the “return to Kant” was begun, which lasted throughout the nineteenth century.

There are two names that stand out most prominently in relation to this controversy over the nature of the soul: they are those of Lotze (1817–1881) and Fechner (1801–1887). They are names that were conjured with by the generation of American scholars before the present. Lotze regarded the mechanical necessity of nature as the form in which the impulsive mental life of man realizes its purposes. Every soul therefore has a life that consists essentially in purposeful relations with other souls. And this is possible only if the lives of men are under an all-embracing Providence. Fechner chose another way to escape from the materialistic tendency. He regarded the soul and body as separate and qualitatively different, although exactly corresponding, manifestations of one unknown reality. There is a parallelism between the mental and the physical, in which the mental phenomena are known only to the individual perceiving them. As sensations are the surface waves of a total individual consciousness, so the consciousnesses of human beings are the surface waves of a universal consciousness. The mechanical activity of nature corresponds to the consciousness of God. We can investigate this correspondence by studying the correspondence between our own mental states and physical states. This is the modern well-known psychological method of psycho-physics. We can measure psychical quantities by formulating mathematical laws of their occurrence.

Our present psychology has seen a development from all these earlier explanations; but this is a matter of contemporary writing and not of history.

=2. The Problem of the Conception of History.= The contrast in the Kantian teaching between nature and mind became an antagonism in the nineteenth century. When psychology was no longer a purely mental science, social life in its historical development at first withstood the vigorous march of the natural science of the nineteenth century. But the inroads of science in psychology were duplicated in the field of sociology, and thus the problem of society was only the problem of the soul on a larger scale.

The first form that this problem took arose from the opposition in France between the traditional conception of society and that of the philosophy of the Revolution. The nineteenth century French philosophy has, however, a religious coloring that differentiates it from that of the Revolution. Auguste Comte (1798–1857) stands as the chief representative of this scientific reduction of society. He pushed the doctrines of Hume and Condillac to their extreme in his positivist system of social science. He maintained that human knowledge had as its objects phenomena in their reciprocal relations, but that there is nothing absolute at the basis of these phenomena. The only absolute principle is, All is relative. There is a hierarchy of sciences in which sociology is highest. Sociology includes all the preceding sciences, and yet it is the original fact. The first social phenomenon is the family. The stages of the development of society are (1) theological, (2) metaphysical, and (3) positivistic or scientific. All mental life in detail, and human history as a whole, are subject to these stages of growth. In the positivistic stage mankind will be the object of religious veneration, and the lives of great men will be justified because they have raised the lives of common men. The democracy to which Comte looks is one ruled by great minds, and is not a socialism. In contrast to Comte’s theory is that of Buckle, who would study history by discovering the mechanical laws governing society.

While human history was thus being invaded by natural science and had to defend its autonomy against the naturalistic principle of science, natural science on the other hand was in the nineteenth century invaded by the historical principle of evolution. Natural science becomes a history. We have seen that in the Romantic circle there was great interest in the origin and development of law, philology, art, etc. In the beginning and middle of the nineteenth century this interest spread to an investigation of the origin of animal life. This investigation has been the most notable in this century, because (1) it included in its scope the source and means of progress of the human race; and because (2) it advanced a new conception of development. Development now becomes evolution. Up to the nineteenth century the world was looked upon as a graded series of types, but no type was supposed to evolve into another. (See vol. i, pp. 180, 193; vol. ii, p. 306.) The theory of historical evolution of the nineteenth century is notable because it advanced the conception, based upon empirical investigation, that types are changed into others. This theory, among those of the century, comes the nearest to an original philosophical doctrine. The book that became the centre of scientific interest for many years was Darwin’s Origin of Species, published in 1859. The name most prominently linked with that of Darwin is that of Herbert Spencer, who attempted to make universal the principle of development and to formulate its law.

The modern theory of the historical evolution of animal life has reinforced the mechanical principle of nature, which had its origin in the minds of the philosophers of the Renaissance. It has antagonized the theological doctrine of creation; it has related the animal and man by filling in the supposably impassable gulf between them; it has advanced the doctrine of chemical synthesis against the hylozoistic notion of a vital principle; it has pushed forward with great assurance its theories of transformation and equivalence of forces, and of the action of electricity as a substitute for thought-activity; it has shown a wonderful parsimony in giving a value to all the facts of history which had hitherto been conceived as trivial; and on the other hand it has reduced the conception of mighty cosmic cataclysms to a geological series of gradual gradations. Darwin’s place in this movement of the nineteenth century was this: he tried to show that animal life can be explained without the aid of final causes. In other words, the adaptation of the structure of animals can be accounted for mechanically. The factors involved in the development of organic life upon the earth were, according to Darwin, infinite differentiation, adaptation, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest.

Now at the beginning of the twentieth century there seems to be a reaction from the scientific positivism of the last century. This has taken the form of an extravagant mysticism, although at heart it is an optimism and an idealism.

INDEX

Abbott, E. A., Francis Bacon, 40 n. Absolute Reality, of Hegel, 314, 316, 321, 323–326, 328, 329. See Reality. Absolutism, spirit of, in Germany, from 1648 to 1740, 217–223; in France, 217, 225; destroyed by Frederick the Great and Lessing, 225, 226, 228, 229. Æsthetic Idealism, of Schelling, 302, 304, 307. Agnosticism, of Hume, 188. Alchemists, the, 25. Alembert, Jean le Rond d’, 211. Althusius, Johannes, 47. America, discovery of, 6. Anacreonticists, the, 224. Analysis. See Induction. Analytic judgments, of Kant, 249–252. Antinomies, of Kant, 264, 265. Antithesis, of Fichte, 295; of Hegel, 327. A posteriori, judgments, of Kant, 250–252; material, the perceptions, 257; principle, in ethics, 271, 272. A priori, judgments, of Kant, 250–252; principles, categories, 257, 271, 272. Archæus, the, of Paracelsus, 26, 27. Aristotle, represented by two antagonistic schools in the Renaissance, 11. Art, in Schelling’s philosophy, 308; and in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 359. Association of Ideas, according to Hume, 191–193; by law of contiguity, 192–194; by law of resemblance, 192–196; by law of causation, 192, 193, 196–199. Associational Psychology, Hobbes the father of, 56. Associationalist Psychologists, 141. Astronomers, mathematical, 32–36. Atheistic controversy, of Fichte, 282, 284. Atoms, scientific conception of, examined by Leibnitz, 119, 120, 121. Attributes, according to Spinoza, 95, 96. See Qualities. Auerbach, Berthold, Spinoza, 88 n. Autobiographies, many of them written in the Enlightenment, 137.

Bacon, Francis, 31, 35; life of, 39; position of, in philosophy, 39–42; his New Atlantis, 40–42; the aim of, 42, 43; his method, 43–46; compared with Hobbes, 48; seems to stand apart, 146. Baldwin, J. M., Fragments in Philosophy, 84 n. Ball, W. W. R., History of Mathematics, 36 n., 40 n. Bayle, Pierre, 203. Beauty, in Schelling’s philosophy, 307. Beers, H. A., History of Romanticism in Eighteenth Century, 295 n.; History of Romanticism in Nineteenth Century, 295 n. Berkeley, George, life and writings of, 169–172; the influences upon his thought, 172; the purpose of, 173, 174; general relation of, to Locke and Hume, 174, 175; his points of agreement with Locke, 175, 176; the negative side of his philosophy, 176–179; denies existence of abstract ideas, 177–179; the positive side of his philosophy, 179–183; and Hume, compared, 183, 184. Blackwood Classics, Descartes, 70 n., 73 n. Bodin, Jean, 47. Body, relation of mind and, according to Descartes, 78–80; in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 126. Bohn’s Libraries, Spinoza, 90 n. Brahe, Tycho, 32, 33. Brown, Thomas, 202. Browning, Robert, Paracelsus, 25, 26 n. Bruno, Giordano, 25, 27–30, 32, 33. Buckle, H. T., 362. Buffon, G. L. L. de, 211. Butler, Joseph, his Analogy of Religion, 166. Byron, G. G., Lord, on Berkeley, 182.

Caird, E., Philosophy of Kant, 236 n. Calkins, M. W., Persistent Problems in Philosophy, iv, 66 n., 73 n., 110 n. Cambridge School, the, 61. Campanella, ♦Tommaso, his State of the Sun, 41 n. Cartesian argument, the, 74, 75. Categorical imperative, the, of Kant, 273. Categories, Aristotelian and Kantian, 256, 257; of Hegel, 323, 327. Causation, association of, 192, 193, 196–199. Chubb, Thomas, 165. Church, mediæval, 14; attitude of, toward science, in the period of the Renaissance, 19–21, 62–65; according to Hobbes, 60. Civilization, of the Middle Ages, causes of the decay of, 4–7; modern, is subjective, 15. Classicism, German, 224, 296. Coleridge, S. T., and Spinoza, 85. Collegiants, the, Spinoza’s acquaintance with, 87–89. Collins, Anthony, 165. Columbus, Christopher, discovers America, 6. Comte, Auguste, quoted on the Encyclopædia, 211; his philosophy, 360. Concomitant variations, the name, 38 n. Condillac, E. B. de, 212. Consciousness, ultimate certainty of, according to Descartes, 70–72; implications of, according to Descartes, 72, 73; in Fichte’s philosophy, 286–288, 293; in Schelling’s philosophy, 309; in Hegel’s philosophy, 321, 322, 326, 327; in Herbart’s philosophy, 336, 338; in Fechner’s philosophy, 359. Constantinople, fall of, 6. Constitutionalists and Political Economists, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Contiguity, association of, 192–194. Continuity, law of, 129. Contradictions, the world a world of, according to Hegel, 321, 327, 328, 335; of experience, according to Herbart, 334, 335. Copernicus, Nikolaus, 7, 32–34. Cosmic, unity, of Hegel, 322–326; law, of Hegel, 326–328. Counter-Revolution, the, 17. Criticism, the Enlightenment a period of, 138; Kant’s method of, 239. Cusanus, Nicolas (Nicolas of Cusa), 23–25.

Darwin, Charles Robert, his Origin of Species formulated most fully the Evolution movement, 3, 362. Decentralization of Europe and of philosophy, iv, 12, 13. Deduction, in the Natural Science period, 19, 21, 35; defined, 35 n.; use of, according to Galileo, 37; according to Bacon, 40, 46; according to Descartes, 70, 72, 73; use made of, by the followers of Descartes, 81. Deed-act, of Fichte, 293. Deism, and Hume, 200; of Voltaire, 210. Deists, the English, 141, 164–166; the German, 142. Descartes, René, 31, 35; compared with Hobbes, 48, 49; the mental conflict in, 65, 66; life and philosophical writings of, 66, 67; the two conflicting influences upon the thought of, 67–69; the method of, 69, 70; the great contribution of, an absolute principle, 70; induction, provisional doubt, ultimate certainty of consciousness, according to, 70–72; deduction, implications of consciousness, according to, 70, 72, 73; his proofs of the existence of God, 73–75; the reality of matter, according to, 75–77; his view of the relation of God to the world, 77; of God to matter, 77, 78; of God to minds, 78; of mind and body, 78–80; influence of, 80, 81; relation of the Occasionalists and Spinoza to, 81–84; his influence on Spinoza, 87; his influence on Locke, 145, 146, 152. Determinism, 53. Dewing, A. S., Introduction to Modern Philosophy, iv, 8 n., 332 n. Diderot, Denis, 211. Differential calculus, discovered by Leibnitz, 112, 114, 119. Discoveries. See Inventions. Dogmatism, defined, 187. Doubt, provisional, of Descartes, 70–72. Dualism, Cartesian, of mind and matter, assumed in the Enlightenment, 135; of Berkeley, 179; formed the background of Kant’s thought, 232. Dualists, 174 n. Duty, according to Fichte, 289–295.

Eclecticism, revived by Renaissance scholars, 11. Edwards, Jonathan, 171. Ego, the, of Kant, 260, 263, 264; of Fichte, 288–295, 313; of Schelling, 304, 309; of Hegel, 313, 314. Empiricism, begun by Locke, 61; defined, 61 n.; in the Enlightenment, 137; of Berkeley, 174; of Hume, 189; of the nineteenth century, 355–357, 361, 362. Encyclopædists, the, of the Enlightenment, 142, 211, 212. England, in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31; the Natural Science movement in, 46; the Renaissance in, after Hobbes, 61; the Enlightenment in, 140, 145–147; comparison of the French Enlightenment with the Enlightenment in, 204, 205; influence of, in France, in the Enlightenment, 206, 207. Enlightenment, the, the second period of modern philosophy, 2, 3; general treatment of, 132–143; begins when the “new man” tries to understand his own nature, 132; the practical presupposition of, 134; the metaphysical presupposition of, 135; the problems of, 135–140; the period of empirical psychology, autobiographies, and Methodism, 137; a period of criticism, 138; a period of remarkable changes in the political map of Europe, 139; a comparison of, in England, France, and Germany, 140, 204, 205; the many groups of philosophers in, 140–143; birthplaces of influential thinkers of (map), 144; in Great Britain, 145–147; in France, 203–216; the situation in, in France, 203–206; the English influence in, in France, 206, 207; the two periods of, in France, 207, 208; the intellectual (Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopædists), 208–212; the social (Rousseau), 213–216; in Germany, 216–229; the introductory period (absolutism), 217–223; sources of, 218–223; the literary, in Germany, summary of, 223, 224; the political (Frederick the Great), 224–226; the course of, in Germany, 226–228; Lessing, 228, 229. Epicureanism, revived by Renaissance scholars, 11. Epistemology, of Locke, 155, 156, 158, 160–162; of Kant, 238, 239. See Knowledge. Erdmann, J. E. on the Enlightenment, 133. Eternity, in Spinoza’s philosophy, 105, 106. Ethics of Spinoza, 102–106; of Hume, 200, 201; of Kant, 269–277. Eucken, Rudolf, Problem of Human Life, iv, 8 n., 23 n., 40 n., 47 n., 66 n., 84 n., 107 n., 147 n., 183 n., 203 n., ♦213 n., 236 n., 282 n., 300 n., 315 n., 340 n., 352 n. Evil, in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 130. Evolution, principle of, 3, 361, 362. Experience, contradictions of, according to Herbart, 334, 335. Extension, the essence of matter, according to Descartes, 77, 82; in Spinoza’s philosophy, 93, 95, 96, 102.

Faith philosophy, Herder a writer on, 143. Falckenberg, Richard, History of Modern Philosophy, iv, 26 n., 36 n., 47 n., 55 n., 70 n., 73 n.; quoted, 274, 275. Fechner, G. T., 359. Feuerbach, L. A., 358. Fichte, J. G., and Schelling and Hegel, what they sought, 279, 281, 312; life and writings of, 282–285; the influences upon his teaching, 285, 286; his two kinds of ideas, 286; the moral awakening, according to, 287, 288; the central principle in his philosophy, 288–290; the moral world of, 290–292; God and man, in the philosophy of, 292, 293; what a moral reality involves, according to, 293–295; his relation to Romanticism, 299; and Schelling, a brief comparison of, as philosophers, 303–305. Fischer, Kuno, Descartes and his School, 70 n.; leads the “return to Kant,” 359. FitzGerald, Edward, his translation of the Rubáiyát, 347, 348. Force, fundamental ground of motion, according to Leibnitz, 119, 120; identified with the metaphysical atom by Leibnitz, 121; the word, as used by Leibnitz, squints toward physics and psychology, 122. France, in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31; the Enlightenment in, 140, 203–216; the situation in, in the Enlightenment, 203–206; the English influence in, 206, 207; the two periods of the Enlightenment in, 207, 208; the intellectual Enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesquieu, the Encyclopædists) in, 208–212; the social Enlightenment (Rousseau) in, 213–216; absolutism in, 217. Francke, A. H., 220. Frederick the Great, 223–226. Freedom, Spinoza’s conception of, 104; according to Locke, 154, 155; Kant’s idea of, 270; the postulate of, according to Kant, 276; according to Fichte, 289, 290; and God, Schelling’s philosophy of, 303; transcendental, of Schopenhauer, 349–351.

Galilei, Galileo, 31–33, 35–39. Gama, Vasco da, discovers all-sea route to India, 7. Gassendi, Pierre, was author of the introduction of Greek atomism into modern thought, 120. Geneva, new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12. Geometrical Method and its Opponents, in the Enlightenment, 142. German Idealism, and modern philosophy, 355, 356. German Idealists, places connected with (map), 280; treated, 278–329. German literature, a factor in the Enlightenment, 218, 219, 223. German Philosophy, the third period of modern philosophy, 3; treatment of, 230–329; the three characteristics of, 231, 232; the two periods of, 232, 233. Germany, in the Renaissance, 12, 16, 17, 21, 31; the Enlightenment in, 140, 216–229; the introductory period (absolutism), 217–223; summary of the literary Enlightenment in, 223, 224; the political Enlightenment in (Frederick the Great), 224–226; the course of the Enlightenment in, 226–228; Lessing, 228, 229; the convergence of philosophical influences in, 230, 231. Geulincx, Arnold, 63, 83. Gibbon, Edward, quoted, 138. God, in the philosophy of Cusanus, 25; in Bruno’s philosophy, 28–30; Descartes’ proofs of the existence of, 73–75; relation of, to the world, to matter, and to minds, according to Descartes, 77, 78; in the philosophy of the Occasionalists, 83; in Spinoza’s philosophy, 91–106; in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 126, 127, 130, 131; in the Enlightenment, 135; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 181–183; in Hume’s philosophy, 200; in Voltaire’s philosophy, 210; the idea of, according to Kant, 261, 265–268; the postulate of the existence of, according to Kant, 276, 277; in Fichte’s philosophy, 292, 293; in Schelling’s philosophy, 300; and freedom, Schelling’s philosophy of, 303, 312; of the Mystic, 319; in Hegel’s philosophy, 324; according to Fechner, 359. Goethe, J. W. von, Faust, 25, 26 n., 85 n.; and Spinoza, 84, 85; describes the Enlightenment as an age of self-conceit, 134; prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227; as a Romanticist, 297–299; and Schelling, their philosophy, 306. Gottsched, J. C., 219, 223, 294. Grace, world of. See World of grace. Great Britain, the Enlightenment in, 145–147. See England. Greek, language and literature, study of, before and in the Renaissance, 10–14, 16. Greeks, the, naturalism of, recovered in the Renaissance, 14. Grotius, Hugo, 47. Gunpowder, discovery of, 6.

Hamilton, Sir William, 202, 358. Hardenberg, Friedrich von (Novalis), on Spinoza, 92; quoted, 295. Hartmann, K. R. E. von, 342. Harvey, William, 35. Hegel, G. W. F., German philosophy ends with, 3; and Fichte and Schelling, what they sought, 279, 281, 312; comment of, on Schelling, 299; and the culmination of Idealism, 312–314; why he remains to-day the representative of Kant, 314, 315; life and writings of, 315–318; the fundamental principle of his idealism, 321, 322; the cosmic unity of, 322–326; the cosmic law of, 326–328; his application of his theory, 328, 329; basis of the opposition against, 331, 332; and Schopenhauer, compared, 340, 341; his philosophy, how interpreted by his followers, 358. Heidelberg, University of, 12. Herbart, J. F., as a follower of Kant, 330–332; turns to the thing-in-itself, 332; his programme at the beginning of his teaching, 332, 333; life and writings of, 333, 334; his contradictions of experience, 334; his argument for realism, 334–336; the many reals and nature phenomena, according to, 337, 338; the soul and mental phenomena, according to, 338–340. Herbert of Cherbury, 165. Herder, J. G. von, brought into currency the word “humanity,” 133; prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227; true interpreter of Leibnitz, 228. Hibben, J. G., Philosophy of Enlightenment, 107 n., 119 n., 132 n., 179 n.; quoted on Berkeley, 180. History, conception of, in the nineteenth century, 357, 360–363. Hobbes, Thomas, 31, 35, 36; a political theorist, 47; forerunner of modern materialism, 48, 49; compared with Bacon, 48; compared with Descartes, 48; life and writings of, 49, 50; the influences upon the thought of, 50–52; his mission, to construct a mechanical view of the world, 52; the fundamental principle in the teaching of, 52–54; the method of, 54, 55; kinds of bodies, according to, 55, 56; his application of the mathematical theory to psychology, 56–58; to politics, 58–60; his Leviathan, 60; and Descartes and Locke, 145, 146; began the school of English Moralists, 167, 168. Höffding, Harold, History of Modern Philosophy, iv, 36 n., 40 n., 70 n. Holland, in the Natural Science period, 17, 21, 31. Holy Roman Empire, 217, 225. Humanistic period, general character of, 15–21; long list of representatives of, 22, 23; consideration of representatives of (Cusanus, Paracelsus, Bruno), 23–30. Humanity, the word, brought into currency by Herder, 133. Hume, David, on Spinoza, 88; the change in English intellectual interests shown in, 147; general relation of Berkeley to, 174, 175; a dualist, 174 n.; life and writings of, 183–186; compared with Berkeley, 183, 184; influences upon the thought of, 186, 187; his Skepticism and Phenomenalism, 187–189; the origin of ideas, according to, 189–191; the association of ideas, according to, 191–193; association, by law of contiguity, 192–194; by law of resemblance, 192–196; association of causation, 192, 193, 196–199; mathematics in his philosophy, 194, 195; his conception of substance, 195, 196; his attack on theology, 195, 196; his attack on science, 196–199; the extent and limits of human knowledge, according to, 199, 200; his theory of religion and ethics, 200, 201; the ♦skepticism of, influenced Kant, 235. Huyghens, Christian, 32.

Idea, the world as, and as Will, according to Schopenhauer, 345–347; the misery of the world as, according to Schopenhauer, 348, 349. Idealism, of Berkeley, 174; after Kant, 278, 279; subjective, of Fichte, 290, 304; æsthetic, of Schelling, 302, 304, 307; Transcendental, of Schelling, 309, 310; Hegel and the culmination of, 312–314; and Realism, and Mysticism, contrasted, 318–321; Hegel’s, the fundamental principle of, 321, 322; German, and modern philosophy, 355, 356. Idealists, German, treated, 279–329. Ideas, the proof of their truth, according to Descartes, 72; innate, of Descartes, 73, 156; innate, of Spinoza, 156; innate, denied by Locke, 156, 157, 189; innate, of Leibnitz, 157; source of, according to Locke, 157–159; in the philosophies of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 174, 175; abstract, in Berkeley’s philosophy, 177, 179, 189; source of, according to Berkeley, 181–183; origin of, according to Hume, 187, 189–191; association of, according to Hume, 191–193; association of, by law of contiguity, 192–194; by law of resemblance, 192–196; Kant’s use of the term, 261; the three, according to Kant (God, soul, totality of the universe), 261–268; of Fichte, 286; neo-Platonic, in Schelling’s philosophy, 312. Identity, of indiscernibles, 129; Schelling’s philosophy of, 303, 310, 311. Ideologists, French, 358. Idols, the, of Bacon, 45. Illuminati, the, 227. Immortality of the soul, the postulate of, according to Kant, 276. Impressions, in Hume’s philosophy, 190. Inconsistencies, of the world according to Hegel, 322. Independent Philosophers, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Individual, independence of the, in the Enlightenment, 134. Individualism, movement toward, in the Renaissance, 12, 15; modern, the rise of, 132–134; in the Enlightenment, its expression in England, France, and Germany, 140; in France, in the Enlightenment, 207–209; in Germany, 219, 220, 223, 225–229; of the Romantic movement, 296. Induction, in the Natural Science period, 19, 21, 35; defined, 35 n.; use of, according to Galileo, 37; according to Bacon, 40, 46; according to Descartes, 70–72. Infinity, Spinoza’s idea of, 94, 95, 105, 106. Innate Ideas, of Descartes, 73, 156; of Spinoza, 156; existence of, denied by Locke, 156, 157, 189; of Leibnitz, 157. Intellectual Enlightenment, in France, 207–212. Inventions, of the Middle Ages, 6, 9; in the nineteenth century, 354. Italian nature philosophers, 22. Italy, in the Renaissance, 10, 12, 16, 17, 21, 31.

James, William, Hibbert Journal, 315 n.; Pragmatism, 352 n. Jena, 233, 284, 302, 307. Jewish Cabala, the, 11. Johnson, Samuel, president of King’s College in New York, 171. Judgments indispensable to knowledge, according to Kant (analytic, synthetic, a posteriori, a priori), 248–252.

Kant, Immanuel, his Critique of Pure Reason, marks the transition from the Enlightenment to German Philosophy, 2–4, 232; the influences upon, 233–235; life and writings of, 235–238; the problem of, 238, 239; the method of, 239, 240; the threefold world of (subjective states, things-in-themselves, and phenomena), 240–243; his world of knowledge, 243–245; place of synthesis in knowledge, according to, 245–248; the judgments indispensable to knowledge, according to, 248–252; proof of the validity of human knowledge, according to, 252–260; validity of sense-perception consists in space and time, 253–255; the validity of the understanding, 255–260; the question of the validity of the reason, 260–262; the idea of the soul, 261–264; the idea of the universe, 261, 264, 265; the idea of God, 261, 265–268; summary of the theory of knowledge contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, 268, 269; the ethics of (the problem of the Critique of Practical Reason), 269–271; the moral law and the two questions concerning it, 271–275; the moral postulates, 275–277; idealism after, 278, 279; his influence upon Fichte, 285, 286; why Hegel remains to-day the representative of, 314, 315; followers of (Herbart and Schopenhauer), 330–332. Kepler, Johann, 32–34. Khayyám, Omar, 347, 348. Knowledge, in Hobbes’s philosophy, 57; in Descartes’s philosophy, 77; God the only object of, according to Spinoza, 92; Locke’s theory of, 155, 156, 158, 160–162; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 176; in Hume’s philosophy, 187, 199, 200; in Reid’s philosophy, 202; Kant’s theory of, 238, 239; Kant’s world of, 243–245; the place of synthesis in, according to Kant, 245–248; the judgments indispensable to, according to Kant, 248–252; human, proof of the validity of, according to Kant, 252–262; transcendent and transcendental, of Kant, 262; of the soul, 262–264; of the universe, 264, 265; of God, 265–268; summary of Kant’s theory of, contained in the Critique of Pure Reason, 268, 269; according to Schopenhauer, 345. Knutzen, Martin, teacher of Kant, 234.

Latin, before and in the Renaissance, 10–12. Leibnitz, G. W. von, 31; as the finisher of the Renaissance and the forerunner of the Enlightenment, 107, 108; life and writings of, 108–112; his early classical studies, 112, 113; the new science and his discoveries, 113, 114; influenced by political pressure for religious reconciliation, 114, 115; the method of, 115–118; the immediate problem for (that of reconciling science and religion), 118, 119; the result of his examination of the principles of science, a plurality of metaphysical substances, 119–122; his examination of the scientific conception of motion, 119, 120; his examination of the scientific conception of the atom, 120, 121; his theory of monadology, 121; the double nature of his monads, 122–125; the two forms of his conception of the unity of the substances, 125; the intrinsic (philosophical) unity of his monads, 125–129; the superimposed (theological) unity of his monads, 129–131; his toleration compared with that of Locke, 151; his philosophy, a source of the German Enlightenment, 220–223; his philosophy developed and transformed by Wolff and Thomasius, 221–223; Lessing and Herder as interpreters of, 228; appears, through Lessing, as a motive power in German Enlightenment, 229. Leibnitz-Wolffian philosophy, 221–223, 231; influenced Kant, 233, 234. Lessing, G. E., and Spinoza, connection of, 85; helped save Germany from a political revolution, 226–228; gave the death-blow to pedantic absolutism, 228; German literature begins with, 228; as interpreter of Leibnitz, 228; his philosophy, 229. Life, in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 128. Locke, John, his Essay on the Human Understanding marks the transition from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, 2–4; his general position in the history of philosophy, 145–147; his life and writings, 147–150; the sources of his thought, 150–153; his Puritan ancestry, 150; his training in tolerance, 150, 151; the scientific influence on, 151, 152; the political influence on, 152, 153; the purpose of, 153–155; two sides of his philosophy, 155–158; and scholasticism, 156, 157; his psychology, 157–160; his epistemology, 155, 156, 158, 160–162; his practical philosophy, 162, 163; the influence of, 163, 164; general relation of Berkeley to, 174, 175; Berkeley’s points of agreement with, 175, 176. Logic, in the latter part of the Middle Ages, studied for its own sake, 4; in Hegel’s philosophy, 323, 328. London, new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12; becomes an intellectual centre about the time of the publication of Locke’s Essay, 206. Lotze, R. H., 359. Louis XIV, French King, 203. Louis XV, French King, 204.

Macaulay, T. B., Essay on Bacon, 40 n.; on Bacon, 42. Macchiavelli, Niccolò, 47. Magic, in the Humanistic period, 18, 19, 21, 25. Magnetic needle, discovery of, 6, 7. Malebranche, Nicolas de, 63, 83. Man, his relation to the universe in the Renaissance, 8–18; in the philosophy of Paracelsus, 26; in Hobbes’s philosophy, 55, 58; in Descartes’s philosophy, 79; in Spinoza’s philosophy, 103; in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 126; in Fichte’s philosophy, 292, 293; in Schelling’s philosophy, 300, 309. See New man. Materialism, of Hobbes, 48, 49, 53; defined, 53 n.; of the nineteenth century, 358. Mathematical Astronomers, the, 32–36. Mathematical law, according to Galileo, 37, 38. Mathematics, in the Natural Science period, 19, 21; modern influence of, grew from astronomical beginnings among the Humanists, 35; of Hobbes, 48, 54, 56–60; of Descartes, 48, 68, 69, 74, 76; in Spinoza’s philosophy, 90, 91, 93, 99; differential calculus, discovered by Leibnitz, 112, 114, 119; in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 116, 122, 123; in Hume’s philosophy, 194, 195. Matter, the reality of, according to Descartes, 75–77, 82; relation of God to, according to Descartes, 77, 78; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 177, 178; in Schelling’s philosophy, 305; in Hegel’s philosophy, 324. Mechanism, of the world of Hobbes, 52–54. Mediæval, man, 9, 10; science, 11; institutions, 11; church, 14; world, 15. Mendelssohn, Moses, 221. Metaphysics, Cartesian, assumed in the Enlightenment, 135. Methodism, rise of, 137. Middle Ages, the, causes of the decay of the civilization of, 4–7. Mill, J. S., 38 n., 358. Mind, relation of God to, according to Descartes, 78; relation of body and, according to Descartes, 78–80; in the philosophy of the Occasionalists, 83; in the philosophy of Locke, 156–162; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 176, 180; in Hume’s philosophy, 191; in Reid’s philosophy, 202; of Fichte and Schelling, 304; in Hegel’s philosophy, 324; phenomena of, according to Herbart, 338–340. See Soul. Modern philosophy, comparative short time-length of, iii, iv; difficulty in the study of, 1, 2; periods of, 2–4; and German idealism, 355, 356. Modes, of mind and matter, according to Descartes, 77; of thought and extension, according to Spinoza, 95, 96. Monadology, Leibnitz’s theory of, 121. Monads, of Leibnitz, metaphysical atoms, 112, 114, 119, 121; the double nature of, 122–125; conceived as soul-atoms, 122, 123, 126; representation the general function of, 124; are windowless, and mirror the universe, 125, 127; the principle of unity among, called a pre-established harmony, 125; the intrinsic (philosophical) unity of, 125–129; the superimposed (theological) unity of, 129–131. Montesquieu, C. de S. de, Baron, 208. Moral, awakening, the, according to Fichte, 287, 288; freedom, of Fichte, 289, 290; world, of Fichte, 290–292; reality, a, what it involves, according to Fichte, 293–295. Moral Philosophers, of the Enlightenment, 141. Moralists, English, the, 166–168. Morality, according to Hegel, 326. Morals, Kant’s theory of, 269–277. More, Thomas, his Utopia, 41 n., 47. Morley, John, Diderot, 211 n. Motion, in Galileo’s philosophy, 38; in Hobbes’s philosophy, 53; Leibnitz’s examination of the scientific conception of, 119, 120. Music according to Schopenhauer, 350. Mysticism, self-destructive, 5; of Spinoza, 98–102; and Realism, and Idealism, contrasted, 318–321; of Schopenhauer, 347; of twentieth century, 363. Mystics, Protestant, the, 23. Mythology and Revelation, Schelling’s philosophy of, 303, 311, 312.

Napoleon, quoted, 231. Natura naturans and natura naturata, 29, 30, 97. Natural Religion, the creed of, 165. Natural Science period, the, general facts about, 15–21; discussion of (Galileo, Bacon, Hobbes), 31–61; discussion of the Rationalism of, 62–131. Naturalism, of the Greeks, recovered in the Renaissance, 14; in Hobbes, 53; defined, 53 n. Nature, in the Natural Science period, 18; in the philosophy of Paracelsus, 27; in Bruno’s philosophy, 29, 30; its two aspects, natura naturans and natura naturata, 29, 30; in the philosophy of the Rationalists, 63, 64; continuity of, according to Leibnitz, 123, 126, 128, 129; in the Enlightenment, 135; in the philosophy of Locke, 163; according to Kant, 248, 255, 258, 259; as conceived by the Romanticists, 297; Schelling’s philosophy of, 300, 304–306; phenomena of, and the many reals, according to Herbart, 337, 338; in Schopenhauer, 348; how conceived, in the nineteenth century, 353; according to Fechner, 359. Nature philosophers, Italian, 22. Neo-Platonism, dominated the Humanistic period, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 27–29. New Man, in a New Universe, phrase characterizing first period of modern philosophy, 8–18; the emergence of the, in the Enlightenment, 132–134. Newton, Sir Isaac, 32; his physics, Kant influenced by, 234. Nietzsche, Friedrich, 342, 352 n. Nineteenth century, pessimistic, 341, 342; the character of the realism of, 353–355; the barrenness of the philosophy of, and German idealism, 355, 356; the philosophical problems of, 356–362. Nineteenth Century Philosophy, the fourth period of modern philosophy, 3, 352–363. Nominalism, doctrine of, led to the dissolution of the civilization of the Middle Ages, 6. Noumena of Kant, 242. Novalis. See Hardenberg.

Occasionalists, the, 63, 81; their relation to Descartes, 81–83. Owen, John, Locke influenced by, 150. Oxford University, 12.

Panpsychism, 102. Pantheism, defined, 94; of Spinoza, 94–98. Paracelsus, 23, 25–27. Paris, the centre of scholastic influence in the seventeenth century, 206. Paulsen, Friedrich, cited, 231; on Kant’s synthetic judgments a priori, 251 n. Perceptions, of Berkeley, 181; of Hume, 190. See Sense-perception. Periods of modern philosophy, 2–4. Pessimism, 341, 342, 344, 348–351. Phenomena, the world of, according to Kant, 242–243; realities implied by, according to Herbart, 336; nature, and the many reals, according to Herbart, 337, 338. Phenomenalism, of Hume, 187–189. “Philosopher’s stone, the,” 25. Philosophical Religion, Lessing a writer on, 143. Philosophical Revolutionists, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Philosophy, according to Hegel, 326; modern, barren of ideas, 355; and German Idealism, 355, 356. Phrenology, in the nineteenth century, 358. Physics, in Hobbes’s philosophy, 56; of Descartes, 68. See Science. Pietism, and Leibnitz, 115; a factor in the German Enlightenment, 219, 220, 223, 230; influenced Kant, 233. Pietists, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Plato, 45 n. Platonic Academy, the, of the Renaissance, 10. Platonism, reaction toward, after Hobbes, 61. Plotinus, 28. Pluralism, of Leibnitz, 119–122. Political Economists and Constitutionalists, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Political philosophers, 23. Politics, according to Hobbes, 56, 58–60. Pope, Alexander, on Bacon, 42; Essay on Man, quoted, 133. Popular Philosophers, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Positivism, Bacon the father of, in England, 43; defined, 43 n.; of Hume, 188, 189. Prague, University of, 12. Printing, discovery of, 6. Protestant Mystics, the, 23. Prussia, rise of, 218, 219, 223; and Frederick the Great, 224–226. Psychologists and related philosophers, of the Enlightenment, 142. Psychology, in Hobbes’s philosophy, 56–58; empirical, took the place of metaphysics in the Enlightenment, 137; of Locke, 157–160; of Hume, 189; of Herbart, 338–340; in the nineteenth century, 357. See Associational Psychology, Associational Psychologists. Psycho-physical parallelism, of Spinoza, 102. Ptolemaic system, the, 33. Pyrrho, Skeptic philosopher, 187.

Qualities, primary and secondary, in Locke’s philosophy, 161; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 177, 178. See Attributes.

Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, iv, 40 n., 47 n., 66 n., 84 n., 107 n., 147 n., 169 n., 183 n., 212 n., 236 n., 282 n., 300 n., 315 n., 340 n., 352 n., 360 n. Rationalism, defined, 61 n.; the nature of, 62–65; School of, in Germany, France, and Holland, 80; of Wolff and the Leibnitz-Wolffians, 221–223, 231. Rationalists, the, 31, 63–65. See Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism, contrasted, 318–321; the argument for, according to Herbart, 334–336; multiple, according to Herbart, 337, 338; the return to, in the nineteenth century, 352, 353; of the nineteenth century, the character of, 353–355. Realistic Movement, the, 224. Reality, of Fichte, 287–295; of Realism, Mysticism, and Idealism, 320, 321; implied by phenomena, according to Herbart, 336; irrational, the will as, according to Schopenhauer, 347, 348. See Absolute Reality. Reason, the question of its validity, according to Kant, 260–262; the will exerted from, 272, 273; in Hegel’s philosophy, 314, 323. Reflections in Locke’s philosophy, 158, 159. Reformation, Protestant, the, 7. Reid, Thomas, 201, 202. Religion, according to Hobbes, 60; and science, Leibnitz’s attempt to reconcile, 118, 119; in the Enlightenment, 137; Philosophical, Lessing a writer on, 143; of the Deists, 164, 165; in Hume’s philosophy, 200, 201; according to Hegel, 326. Religious philosophy, of Schelling, 311, 312. Renaissance, the, the first period of modern philosophy, 2–4; general character of, 8–11; significance of, in history, 11–15; the problem of, 14; two periods of, 15–21; discussion of the Humanistic period of, 22–30; birthplaces of the chief philosophers of (map), 30; discussion of the Natural Science period of (Galileo, Bacon, Hobbes), 31–61; in England after Hobbes, 61; discussion of the Rationalism of the Natural Science period of, 62–131. Representation, the general function of Leibnitz’s monads, 124, 126. Resemblance, association by, 192–196. Revelation and Mythology, Schelling’s Philosophy of, 303, 311, 312. Revolution, French, the, 213, 214, 216. Revolutionists, Philosophical, the, of the Enlightenment, 142. Ribot, Théodule, German Psychology of To-day, 332 n. Richter, J. P., forerunner of the literary Romanticists, 279. Robertson, G. C., Hobbes, 47 n., 66 n. Romantic philosophers, the, 299. Romanticism, 224; the period of, 295, 296; its meaning, 296, 297; in philosophy, 299, 300; takes a religious turn at beginning of eighteenth century, 311. Romanticists, the, 284, 285; Goethe as one of, 297–299; the æsthetic humanism of, 308. Rousseau, J. J., the most notable figure of France during the Enlightenment, 142; his philosophy, 213–216; his influence, 216, 230, 234, 235. Royal Society, the, 40. Royce, Josiah, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, iv, 84 n., 169 n., 236 n., 282 n., 299 n., 315 n., 352 n.; The World and the Individual, 352 n.

Salvation, Spinoza’s doctrine of, 102–106. Schelling, F. W. J. von, and Fichte and Hegel, what they sought, 279, 281, 312; the true Romantic spirit appears in, 299; life and writings of, 300–303; his philosophy of Nature, 300, 304–306; his philosophy characterized, 301; his transcendental philosophy, 302, 307–310; his system of identity, 303, 310, 311; and Fichte, a brief comparison of, as philosophers, 303–305; his religious philosophy, 311, 312. Schiller, J. C. F. von, prominent in the Storm and Stress movement, 227; notable example of the influence of Kant upon literature, 233; quoted on Kant, 233; Artists, Letters on Æsthetic Education, 307 n. Schleiermacher, F. E. D., 308, 311. Scholasticism, a self-destructive method, 4; mediæval, Renaissance had to reckon with, 11; representatives of the revival of, 22; after Hobbes, 61; and Locke, 156, 157. Schopenhauer, Arthur, his relation to Kant, 330–332; and his philosophical relations, 340–342; and pessimism, 341, 342, 344, 348, 349–351; life and writings of, 342, 343; the influences upon his thought, 343–345; the world as will and the world as idea, 345–347; the will as irrational reality, 347, 348; the misery of the world as idea, 348, 349; the way of deliverance, 349–351. Schultze, F. A., teacher of Kant, 233. Science, attitude of the Church toward, in the period of the Renaissance, 19–21; modern methods in, began with Galileo, 32, 37–39; in Bacon, 40–46; in Hobbes, 54, 58; and religion, Leibnitz’s attempt to reconcile, 118, 119; Hume’s attack on, 196–199; Hume’s two classes of, 199, 200; in the nineteenth century, 353–357; invaded by evolution, 361. See Natural Science period, Physics. Scientific methods, in the Renaissance, 18, 19. Scientists, of the Natural Science period, 31–39, 62–65. See Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz. Scottish School of Philosophy, the, of the Enlightenment, 141, 201, 202. Self, idea of, in Locke’s philosophy, 159, 160; of Kant, 260; of Fichte, 293; of Schelling, 309, 310. See Ego. Sensationalism, 53. Sensationalists. See Sensualists. Sensations, of Locke, 158, 159; of Kant, 245; of Fichte, 290, 291; of Herbart, 339; of Fechner, 359. Sense-perception, in what its validity consists, according to Kant, 253–255. See Perceptions. Sensualists, the, of the Enlightenment, 141, 212. Sentimentalist, the, of the Enlightenment (Rousseau), 142. Seven Years’ War, 225. Shaftesbury, Lord, and Locke, 148, 152, 153. Shelley, P. B., Love’s Philosophy, 305 n.; Prometheus Unbound quoted, 325. Skepticism, revived by Renaissance scholars, 11; of Hume, 187–189; of Hume, influenced Kant, 235. Skeptics, the, of the Enlightenment, 141. Social Enlightenment, in France, 213–216. Sociology, according to Comte, 360. Solipsism, of Descartes, 72; defined, 183. Soul, according to Descartes, 72, 79; the monad of Leibnitz conceived as, 122, 123, 126; according to Hume, 196; the idea of the, according to Kant, 261–264; the postulate of the immortality of, according to Kant, 276; in Herbart’s philosophy, 338–340; the problem of the functioning of, 357–360. See Mind. Space and time, knowledge possible by means of, according to Kant, 253–255. Spencer, Herbert, Education, 43 n.; and evolution, 362. Spener, P. J., 220, 230. Spinoza, Baruch de, 31, 35; his relation to Descartes, 81–84; the historical place of, 84–86; influence of his Jewish training on, 86; his impulse from the new science, and Descartes’s influence upon, 86, 87; his acquaintance with the Collegiants, 87, 88; life and philosophical writings of, 88–90; the method of, 90, 91; the ♦fundamental principle in his philosophy, 91, 92; three central problems in his teaching, 93; his pantheism, 94–98; the mysticism of, 98–102; his doctrine of salvation, 102–106; summary of his teaching, 106; his conception of the world compared with Leibnitz’s, 127; and Kant, foci of the philosophy of the generation after Kant, 278, 279; his influence upon Fichte, 285. Spirit. See Mind, Soul. Spirituality of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, 281. Staël, Madame de, quoted, 231. State, the, according to Hobbes, 55, 58–60. States, ideal, 41, 47. Stephen, Leslie, Hobbes, 47 n.; History of English Thought, 166 n. Stewart, Dugald, 141, 202. Stirling, J. H., Textbook to Kant, 236 n. Stoicism, revived by Renaissance scholars, 11. Storm and Stress movement, 224, 227, 229, 295, 296. “Strife of methods, the,” 19, 35. “Struggle of traditions, the,” 17, 18. Subjective idealism, of Fichte, 290, 304. Subjective states, the world of, according to Kant, 240–242. Subjectivism, Renaissance marked by the rise of, 14, 15. Substance, in Descartes’s philosophy, 77, 81, 82; in the philosophy of the Occasionalists and Spinoza, 81–84, 91–95, 101; in Leibnitz’s philosophy, 119–122; in Locke’s philosophy, 160–162; according to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, 174, 175; in Berkeley’s philosophy, 176, 178; Hume’s conception of, 195, 196, Sufficient reason, law of, 129. Suicide, according to Schopenhauer, 349. Sympathy, according to Schopenhauer, 350, 351. Synthesis, according, to Kant, 244, 245; the place of, in knowledge, according to Kant, 245–248; of Fichte, 295; of Hegel, 327. See Deduction. Synthetic, judgments of Kant, 249–252.

Taurellus, 11. Tetens, J. N., 221. Theology, Hume’s attack on, 195, 196. Thesis, of Fichte, 295; of Hegel, 327. Things-in-themselves, the world of, according to Kant, 240–242, 336; how treated by Fichte, 290, 291; how treated by Schelling, 300; the philosophy of, 330–351; the chief concern of philosophy, according to Herbart, 332; implied by phenomena, according to Herbart, 336; basis of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, 340; according to Schopenhauer, 345, 346. Thirty Years’ War, 217. Thomasius, Christian, 142, 221. Thought, in Spinoza’s philosophy, 95, 101, 102; in Hegel’s philosophy, 322, 335. Time and space, knowledge possible by means of, according to Kant, 253–255. Tindal, Matthew, 165. Toland, John, 165. Transcendental, method, of Kant, 239, 240; philosophy, of Schelling, 302, 307–310; freedom, of Schopenhauer, 349–351. Trent, Council of, 16, 20. Truth, standard of, in the Middle Ages, self-destructive, 5; criterion of, according to Descartes, 72. Truths, of Leibnitz, 116, 117. Tschirnhausen, E. W. von, 221. Turner, William, History of Philosophy, 73 n.

Ueberweg, Friedrich, History of Philosophy, iv, 209 n. Understanding, in what its validity consists, according to Kant, 255–260. Unity, of Leibnitz, 122; a preëstablished harmony, 125; the intrinsic (philosophical), 125–129; the superimposed (theological), 129–131; cosmic, of Hegel, 322–326. Universal, concrete and abstract, 99, 100. Universe, Man’s relation to, in the Renaissance, 8–18; according to the Ptolemaic system, 33; according to the Copernican system, 34; the idea of the, according to Kant, 261, 264, 265; according to Schelling, 304, 311. See New Man. Universities, in the Renaissance, 12; towns containing (map), 280. Utilitarianism, 43. Utopias, 41, 47. Van der Ende, his influence on Spinoza, 87, 89. Vienna, University of, 12. Voltaire, F. M. A. de, 208–210, 223.

Wagner, Richard, 342. Watson, John, Hedonistic Theories, 47 n. Weber, E. A., History of Philosophy, iv, 70 n., 73 n., 107 n., 332 n., 352 n. Weimar, 233, 307. Wernaer, R. M., Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany, 300 n. Will, the, Kant’s theory of, 269–277; the world as, and as idea, according to Schopenhauer, 345–347; as irrational reality, according to Schopenhauer, 347, 348; suicide and, according to Schopenhauer, 349; the denial of, according to Schopenhauer, 349–351. Windelband, Wilhelm, History of Philosophy, iv, 8 n., 23 n., 30 n., 47 n., 70 n., 119 n., 132 n., 183 n., 230 n., 236 n., 278 n., 282 n.; on Kant’s synthetic judgments a priori, 251 n. Wittenberg, new religious centre in the Renaissance, 12. Wolfenbüttel Fragments, 85. Wolff, Christian, 221, 222, 228. Wolffians, the, 142. World, of grace, 63, 64, 76, 83; relation of God to, according to Descartes, 77; in Spinoza’s philosophy, 97; the, Leibnitz’s conception of, as the best possible, 130; according to Goethe, 298; in terms of consciousness, 321; a world of contradictions, 321; as will and as idea, according to Schopenhauer, 345–347; as idea, the misery of, according to Schopenhauer, 348, 349. See Universe.

Footnotes.

1 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 303–321; Windelband, History of Philosophy, pp. 348–351; Dewing, Introduction to Modern Philosophy, pp. 52–54.

2 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 321–331; Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 352–354.

3 – Read Falckenberg, Hist. of Modern Phil., pp. 27–28; Browning, Paracelsus; Goethe, Faust, lines 1–165.

4 – These two phrases will be found again in the philosophy of Spinoza. Nature is conceived as having two aspects: one is natura naturans, or God as the animating principle of nature; the other is natura naturata, or the world as materialized forms or effects.

5 – Read Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 378–379.

6 – Induction and deduction are methods of reasoning. Induction is the method of beginning with particular cases and inferring from them a general conclusion. Deduction is the opposite method of reasoning.

7 – Read Höffding, Hist. of Phil., vol. i, p. 175; Ball, Hist. of Math., pp. 249 ff.; Falckenberg, Hist. of Mod. Phil., pp. 59 ff.

8 – An example used by Galileo is the law of the velocity of falling bodies in empty space.

9 – The name, “concomitant variations,” was later given by John Stuart Mill.

10 – Read Ball, Hist. of Math., pp. 253 ff.; Höffding, Hist. of Mod. Phil., vol. i, pp. 184–186; Macaulay, Essay on Bacon; Bacon, Essays,――Studies, Truth, Friendship, Simulation, and Dissimulation; Abbott, Francis Bacon; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 336–344; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 24–56.

11 – Bacon wrote his New Atlantis in 1623. The same year Campanella wrote his State of the Sun, and the preceding year Thomas More wrote his Utopia.

12 – Utilitarianism regards adaptation to general happiness as the ideal of society. Positivism, broadly used, is that philosophy which limits the scope of thought to the observation of facts, although the observations are inferior to the facts. The data and methods of positivism are the same as those of natural science, and opposed to the a priori methods of metaphysics.

13 – In this connection read Herbert Spencer, Education.

14 – Bacon chooses the word Idols, because it is the same as the Greek word for false forms (eidola, εἴδολα).

15 – Bacon is here alluding to Plato’s myth of the cave. Read Plato, Republic (Jowett’s trans.), Bk. VII, 514 A–520 E.

16 – Bacon is satirical here and is likening philosophical systems to stage-plays.

17 – But see the contradiction in the theory of Hobbes.

18 – Read Robertson, Hobbes (Blackwood’s Phil. Classics), pp. 204–206; Falckenberg, Hist. Mod. Phil., pp. 71–72; Encyclopædia Britannica, article, “Hobbes”; Leslie Stephen, Hobbes; Watson, Hedonistic Theories, pp. 73–94; Turner, Hist. Phil., pp. 443–446; Windelband, Hist. Phil., p. 389; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 359–360; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 57–69, 80–84.

19 – See also the ideal States of Campanella and Bacon, p. 41.

20 – The theory that the assumption of extended, impenetrable, eternal, and moving bodies explains the universe.

21 – The theory that all knowledge originates in sensations; that all complex mental states (like memory, reason, etc.) are only combinations of elementary sensations.

22 – The theory that between alternative courses of conduct the choice decided upon is fully accounted for by psychological and other pre-conditions.

23 – The theory sometimes meaning materialism, sometimes positivism, but sometimes, as here, meaning that man in all his operations is a product of his environment.

24 – Read Falckenberg, Hist. Mod. Phil., p. 72, for his quotation from Grimm’s criticism of the irreconcilable contradiction of the empirical and the rational in Hobbes.

25 – Empiricism and Rationalism have reference to the source of truth. Empiricism is the theory that truth is to be found in immediate sense experience. The opposite theory is Rationalism, which declares that the reason is an independent source of knowledge, distinct from sensation, and having a higher authority.

26 – Read Robertson, Hobbes (Blackwood Phil. Classics), p. 40; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 117–147; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 351–362; Calkins, Persistent Problems, pp. 459–463.

27 – Read Descartes, Method, Meditations, for the dramatic struggle of his inner life; Falckenberg, Hist. Modern Phil., pp. 86–88; Fischer, Descartes and his School, p. 199; Blackwood Classics, Descartes, pp. 144–149; Windelband, Hist. Phil., pp. 389 ff.; Höffding, Hist. Modern Phil., pp. 219 ff.; Weber, Hist. Phil., pp. 306 ff., for an opposing opinion about the place of Descartes.

28 – Read Falckenberg, Hist. of Modern Phil., pp. 92–94; Blackwood’s Classics, Descartes, pp. 151–153; Weber, Hist. of Phil., p. 310; Calkins, Persistent Problems in Philosophy, pp. 25–30; Turner, Hist. of Phil., pp. 451 f., which presents Descartes’ arguments as reduced to two.

29 – Read Royce, Spirit of Modern Phil., chap. iii; Baldwin, Fragments in Philosophy, pp. 24–42; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 148–166; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 362–380.

30 – See page 279. Read Goethe, Geheimnisse, in this connection.

31 – Read Auerbach, Spinoza, an historical romance.

32 – Read Bohn’s Libraries, Spinoza, vol. ii, pp. 275 ff., for Spinoza’s interesting correspondence with notable men.

33 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 199–214; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 388–405; Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 343–369; Hibben, Phil. of Enlightenment, pp. 161–193.

34 – A good selection of Leibnitz’s works for the student to read is: Discourse on Metaphysics (1690), Letters to Arnauld, Monadology (1714), New System of Nature (1695), Principles of Nature and Grace (1714), Introduction to New Essays (1704), and the Theodicy (1710). See Calkins, Persistent Problems in Phil., p. 74, note.

35 – Read Hibben, Phil. of Enlightenment, ch. vii; Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 420–425.

36 – Read Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 437–440, 447–449, 500–502; Hibben, Phil. of Enlightenment, pp. 3–13, 18–20.

37 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 215–217, 248–262; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 380–388.

38 – See Essay, introductory epistle to the reader.

39 – Read Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought, vol. i, pp. 86–88.

40 – Read Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 86; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 263–277.

41 – Berkeley and Hume were really also dualists, like Locke and all other Enlighteners. The ideas were substituted by them for material substances. As objects of knowledge the ideas were antithetical to the knowing process. Hume tried to overcome this dualism, but he was not successful in his attempt.

42 – Read Hibben, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, chap. iii.

43 – Hibben, Phil. of Enlightenment, p. 64.

44 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 326–342; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 420–422; Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 472–476.

45 – Causal events are to Hume merely alleged matters of fact.

46 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 415–420.

47 – Voltaire’s Letters on the English were written in 1728, published first in London, and appeared in France in 1734. His Elements of the Philosophy of Newton was published in Amsterdam in 1738, but was not allowed to be published in France until 1741.

48 – Read Ueberweg, Hist. of Phil., vol. ii, pp. 124–125.

49 – Read Morley, Diderot, vol. i, ch. v, pp. 113–171.

50 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 347–375.

51 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 423–433.

52 – In a real sense the German Enlightenment has never come to an end. Classicism and the Romantic movement were a continuation of it.

53 – Read Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 529–531.

54 – Read the quotation from Heine in E. Caird, Phil. of Kant, vol. i, p. 63; Stirling, Textbook to Kant, Biographical Sketch; Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, chap. iv; Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 532–534; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 376–405, 420–424; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 435–452.

55 – The word “world” is used for lack of a better. The reader is, however, again reminded that Kant’s problem is one of epistemology and not of metaphysics.

56 – Paulsen says (Immanuel Kant, His Life and Teaching, p. 135) that this formula of synthetic judgments a priori appears only in the introduction to the Critique and in Kant’s later writings, and it would have been no misfortune if Kant had never discovered it. But Windelband (Hist. of Phil., p. 533, n. 2) says, “No one who does not make this clear to himself has any hope of understanding Kant.”

57 – Quoted from Falckenberg, Hist. of Modern Phil., p. 387. This is a paraphrase of some of Schiller’s verses in The Philosophers, a satirical poem of philosophical theories.

58 – Kant’s theory of Beauty, discussed in his Critique of Judgment, through which he tries to reconcile the antagonism of knowledge and morality, is omitted here.

59 – Read Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 568–569.

60 – Read Royce, Spirit of Modern Phil., chap. v; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 486–490; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 486–496, 516–535; Windelband, Hist. of Phil., pp. 579–581.

61 – Read Beers, History of Romanticism in Eighteenth Century, pp. 1–25; Beers, History of Romanticism in Nineteenth Century, pp. 132–139.

62 – Read Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, ch. vi.

63 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 457–464, 490–494; Wernaer, Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany, pp. 132–143; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 535–568.

64 – Read Shelley, Love’s Philosophy.

65 – Read Schiller, Artists; Letters on Æsthetic Education.

66 – F. E. D. Schleiermacher, b. 1768; educated in the Herrnhuten institutions and at the University of Halle; in 1796 preacher at the Berlin Charité; in 1802 court preacher at Stolpe; in 1804 professor extraordinary at Halle; in 1809 preacher at a church in Berlin; in 1810 professor in Berlin University.

67 – Read Royce, Spirit of Modern Phil., chap. vii; James, Hibbert Journal, 1908–09, pp. 63 ff.; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 494–507; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 569–574, 583–592, 614–628.

68 – Read Ribot, German Psychology of To-day, pp. 24–67; Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 536–543; Dewing, Introduction to Modern Philosophy, pp. 230–235.

69 – A discussion of these contradictions can be found in any text-book in metaphysics.

70 – The “principle of contradiction” in logic is the prohibition to commit contradiction.

71 – Read Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 510–518; Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 629–671.

72 – Read Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, FitzGerald’s translation, 4th ed., quatrains xlvii–lxxiii; Goethe, Sorrows of Werther, as an example of pessimism due mainly to environment.

73 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 703–708; Weber, Hist. of Phil., §§ 69, 70; Eucken, Problem of Human Life, pp. 518–523, 524–553, 559–573; Nietzsche, Also Sprach Zarathustra; James, Pragmatism, Lectures I, IV, VII; Royce, Spirit of Mod. Phil., Lecture IX.

74 – Royce, The World and the Individual, vol. i, pp. 60 f.

75 – Read Rand, Modern Classical Philosophers, pp. 672–689.

Transcriber’s Notes.

The following corrections have been made in the text:

Page xiv: Sentence starting: In what does the Validity.... – ‘Persception’ replaced with ‘Perception’ (Validity of Sense-Perception consist?)

Page 8: Sentence starting: The fusion did not result.... – ‘homogenous’ replaced with ‘homogeneous’ (in a homogeneous whole,)

Page 85: Sentence starting: It formed the background.... – ‘Wolffenbüttel’ replaced with ‘Wolfenbüttel’ (Wolfenbüttel Fragments)

Page 114: Sentence starting: He was led to this conclusion.... – ‘Leeuwenhook’ replaced with ‘Leeuwenhoek’ (of Swammerdam and Leeuwenhoek)

Page 174: Sentence starting: Berkeley started out by.... – ‘speculalation’ replaced with ‘speculation’ (against scholastic speculation and abstraction;)

Page 296: Sentence starting: Some of the literary names.... – ‘Wackenrode’ replaced with ‘Wackenroder’ (Tieck, Wackenroder, Novalis,)

Page 336: Sentence starting: Kant reasoned from the relativity.... – ‘thing-it-itself’ replaced with ‘thing-in-itself’ (while the thing-in-itself was)

Index Campanella: – ‘Tommasso’ replaced with ‘Tommaso’ (Campanella, Tommaso)

Index Eucken: – ‘223’ replaced with ‘213’ (213 n.)

Index Hume: – ‘scepticism’ replaced with ‘skepticism’ (the skepticism of, influenced Kant)

Index Spinoza: – ‘fundanental’ replaced with ‘fundamental’ (the fundamental principle in)

Index Unity: – ‘preëstabished’ replaced with ‘preëstablished’ (a preëstablished harmony)