CHAPTER XV. Matter and Mind

MATTER AND MIND

In conclusion it may be worth while saying a few words as to theories of the physical world supplementary to the views that have already been stated above.

Gross matter, as the possibility of sensation, has been divided into five classes, according to their relative grossness, corresponding to the relative grossness of the senses. Some modern investigators have tried to understand the five bhūtas, viz. ākāśa, marut, tejas, ap and kshiti as ether, gaseous heat and light, liquids and solids. But I cannot venture to agree when I reflect that solidity, liquidity and gaseousness represent only an impermanent aspect of matter. The division of matter from the standpoint of the possibility of our sensations, has a firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has therefore a better rational footing than the modern chemical division into elements and compounds, which are being daily threatened by the gradual advance of scientific culture. This carries with it no fixed and consistent rational conception as do the definitions of the ancients, but is a mere makeshift for understanding or representing certain chemical changes of matter and has therefore a merely relative value.

There are five aspects from which gross matter can be viewed. These are (1) sthūla (gross), (2) svarūpa (substantive), (3) sūkshma (subtle), (4) anvaya (conjunction), (5) arthavattva (purpose for use). The sthūla or gross physical characteristics of the bhūtas are described as follows:—

Qualities of Earth—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability, manifestation (vṛtti), difference, support, turbidity, hardness and enjoyability.

Ap—Smoothness, subtlety, clearness, whiteness, softness, heaviness, coolness, conservation, purity, cementation.

Tejas—Going upwards, cooking, burning, light, shining, dissipating, energising.

Vāyu—Transverse motion, purity, throwing, pushing, strength, movability, want of shadow.

Ākāśa—Motion in all directions, non-agglomeration, non-obstruction.

These physical characteristics are distinguished from the aspects by which they appeal to the senses, which are called their svarūpas. Earth is characterised by gandha or smell, ap by rasa or taste, tejas by rūpa, etc. Looked at from this point of view, we see that smell arises by the contact of the nasal organ with the hard particles of matter; so this hardness or solidity which can so generate the sensibility of gandha, is said to be the svarūpa of kshiti. Taste can originate only in connection with liquidity, so this liquidity or sneha is the svarūpa or nature of ap. Light—the quality of visibility—manifests itself in connection with heat, so heat is the svarūpa of fire. The sensibility of touch is generated in connection with the vibration of air on the epidermal surface; so this vibratory nature is the svarūpa of air.

The sensibility to sound proceeds from the nature of obstructionlessness, which belongs to ākāśa, so this obstructionlessness is the svarūpa of ākāśa.

The third aspect is the aspect of tanmātras, which are the causes of the atoms or paramāṇus. Their fourth aspect is their aspect of guṇas or qualities of illumination, action, inertia. Their fifth aspect is that by which they are serviceable to purusha, by causing his pleasurable or painful experiences and finally his liberation.

Speaking of aggregation with regard to the structure of matter, we see that this is of two kinds (1) when the parts are in intimate union and fusion, e.g. any vegetable or animal body, the parts of which can never be considered separately. (2) When there are such mechanical aggregates or collocations of distinct and independent parts yutasiddhāvayava as the trees in a forest.

A dravya or substance is an aggregate of the former type, and is the grouping of generic or specific qualities and is not a separate entity—the abode of generic and specific qualities like the dravya of the Vaiśeshika conception. The aspect of an unification of generic and specific qualities seen in parts united in intimate union and fusion is called the dravya aspect. The aggregation of parts is the structural aspect of which the side of appearance is the unification of generic and specific qualities called the dravya.

The other aggregation of yutasiddhāvayava, i.e. the collocation of the distinct and independent parts, is again of two kinds, (1) in which stress may be laid on the distinction of parts, and (2) that in which stress is laid on their unity rather than on their distinctness. Thus in the expression mango-grove, we see that many mangoes make a grove, but the mangoes are not different from the grove. Here stress is laid on the aspect that mangoes are the same as the grove, which, however, is not the case when we say that here is a grove of mangoes, for the expression “grove of mangoes” clearly brings home to our minds the side of the distinct mango-trees which form a grove.

Of the gross elements, ākāśa seems especially to require a word of explanation. There are according to Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgeśa two kinds of ākāśa—kāraṇa (or primal) and kārya (atomic). The first or original is the undifferentiated formless tamas, for in that stage it has not the quality of manifesting itself in sounds. This kāraṇa later on develops into the atomic ākāśa, which has the property of sound. According to the conception of the purāṇas, this karyākāśa evolves from the ego as the first envelope of vāyu or air. The kāraṇakāśa or non-atomic ākāśa should not be considered as a mere vacuum, but must be conceived as a positive, all-pervasive entity, something like the ether of modern physicists.

From this ākāśa springs the atomic ākāśa or kāryākāśa, which is the cause of the manifestation of sound. All powers of hearing, even though they have their origin in the principle of egoism, reside in the ākāśa placed in the hollow of the ear. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or defect is also noticed in the power of hearing. Further, when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing, the sounds of solids, etc., are to be apprehended, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear requires the capacity of resonance residing in the substratum of the ākāśa of the ear. This sense of hearing, then, operates when it is attracted by the sound originated and located in the mouth of the speaker, which acts as a loadstone. It is this ākāśa which gives penetrability to all bodies; in the absence of this, all bodies would be so compact that it would be difficult to pierce them even with a needle. In the Sāṃkhya-sūtra II. 12, it is said that eternal time and space are of the nature of ākāśa. So this so-called eternal time and space do not differ from the one undifferentiated formless tamas of which we have just spoken. Relative and infinite time arise from the motion of atoms in space—the cause of all change and transformation; and space as relative position cannot be better expressed than in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, as “totality of positions as an order of co-existent points, and as such it is wholly relative to the understanding like order in time, being constructed on the basis of relations of position intuited by our empirical or relative consciousness. But there is this difference between space order and time order:—there is no unit of space as position (dik) though we may conceive time, as the moment (kshaṇa) regarded as the unit of change in the causal series. Spatial position (dik) results only from the different relations in which the all-pervasive ākāśa stands to the various finite objects. On the other hand, space as extension or locus of a finite body, or deśa, has an ultimate unit, being analysable into the infinitesimal extension quality inherent in the guṇas of prakṛti.”

Citta or mind has two degrees: (1) the form of states such as real cognition, including perception, inference, competent evidence, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. (2) In the form in which all those states are suppressed. Between the stage of complete outgoing activity of ordinary experience (vyutthāna) and complete suppression of all states, there are thousands of states of infinite variety, through which a man’s experiences have to pass, from the vyutthāna state to the nirodha. In addition to the five states spoken of above, there is another kind of real knowledge and intuition, called prajñā, which dawns when by concentration the citta is fixed upon any one state and that alone. This prajñā is superior to all other means of knowledge, whether perception, inference or competent evidence of the Vedas, in this, that it is altogether unerring, unrestricted and unlimited in its scope.

Pramāṇa, we have seen, includes perception, inference and competent evidence. Perception originates when the mind or citta, through the senses (ear, skin, eye, taste and nose) is modified by external objects and passes to them, generating a kind of knowledge about them in which their specific characters become more predominant.

Mind is all-pervasive and can come in touch with the external world, by which we have the perception of the thing. Like light, which emits rays and pervades all, though it remains in one place, the citta by its vṛttis comes in contact with the external world, is changed into the form of the object of perception and thus becomes the cause of perception; as the citta has to pass through the senses, it becomes coloured by them, which explains the fact that perception is impossible without the help of the senses. As it has to pass through the senses, it undergoes the limitations of the senses, which it can avoid, if it can directly concentrate itself upon any object without the help of the senses; from this originates the prajñā, through which dawns absolute real knowledge of the thing; unhampered by the limitations of the senses which can act only within a certain area or distance and cannot cognize subtler objects.

We see that in ordinary perception our minds are drawn towards the object, as iron is attracted by magnets. Thus Bhikshu says in explaining Vyāsa-bhāshya IV. 17:—

“The objects of knowledge, though inactive in themselves, may yet draw the everchanging cittas towards them like a magnet and change them in accordance with their own forms, just as a piece of cloth is turned red by coming into contact with red lac.” So it is that the cittas attain the form of anything with which they come in touch and there is then the perception that that thing is known. Perception (pratyaksha) is distinguished from inference, etc., in this, that here the knowledge arrived at is predominantly of the specific and special characters (viśesha) of the thing and not of its generic qualities us in inference, etc.

Inference proceeds from inference, and depends upon the fact that certain common qualities are found in all the members of a class, as distinguished from the members of a different class. Thus the qualities affirmed of a class will be found to exist in all the individual members of that class; this attribution of the generic characters of a class to the individual members that come under it is the essence of inference.

An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another; and the mental modification, which has for its sphere the meaning of such words, is the verbal cognition of the hearer. When the speaker has neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which cannot be believed, the authority of verbal cognition fails. But it does not fail in the original speaker, God or Īśvara, and his dictates the Śāstras with reference either to the object of perception or of inference.

Viparyyaya or unreal cognition is the knowledge of the unreal as in doubt—a knowledge which possesses a form that does not tally with the real nature of the thing either as doubt or as false knowledge. Doubt may be illustrated by taking the case of a man who sees something in dim light and doubts its nature. “Is it a wooden post or a man?” In nature there is either the wooden post or the man, but there is no such fact or entity which corresponds with doubt: “Is it a wooden post or a man?” Knowledge as doubt is not cognition of a fact or entity. The illusion of seeing all things yellow through a defect of the eye (as in jaundice) can only be corrected when the objects are seen in their true colours. In doubt, however, their defective nature is at once manifest. Thus when we cannot be sure whether a certain thing is a post or a man, we know that our knowledge is not definite. So we have not to wait till the illusoriness of the previous knowledge is demonstrated by the advent of right knowledge. The evil nature of viparyyaya is exemplified in avidyā nescience, asmitā, rāga, etc.

Viparyyaya is distinguished from vikalpa—imagination—in this, that though the latter is also unreal knowledge its nature as such is not demonstrated by any knowledge that follows, but is on the contrary admitted on all sides by the common consent of mankind. But it is only the learned who can demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of vikalpa or imagination.

All class notions and concepts are formed by taking note only of the general characters of things and associating them with a symbol called “name.” Things themselves, however, do not exist in the nature of these symbols or names or concepts; it is only an aspect of them that is diagrammatically represented by the intellect in the form of concepts. When concepts are united or separated in our thought and language, they consequently represent only an imaginary plane of knowledge, for the things are not as the concepts represent them. Thus when we say “Caitra’s cow,” it is only an imaginary relation for, strictly speaking, no such thing exists as the cow of Caitra. Caitra has no connection in reality with the cow. When we say purusha is of the nature of consciousness, there is the same illusory relation. Now what is here predicated of what? Purusha is consciousness itself, but in predication there must always be a statement of the relation of one to another. Thus it sometimes breaks a concept into two parts and predicates the one of the other, and sometimes predicates the unity of two concepts which are different. Thus its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought-process conducted through language and involves an element of abstraction and construction which is called vikalpa. This represents the faculty by which our concepts are arranged in an analytical or synthetical proposition. It is said to be śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ, i.e. the knowledge that springs from relating concepts or names, which relating does not actually exist in the objective world as it is represented in propositional forms.

Sleep is that mental state which has for its objective substratum the feeling of emptiness. It is called a state or notion of mind, for it is called back on awakening; when we feel that we have slept well our minds are clear, when we have slept badly our minds are listless, wandering and unsteady. For a person who seeks to attain communion or samādhi, these desires of sleep are to be suppressed, like all other desires. Memory is the retaining in the mind of objects perceived when perception occurs by the union of the cittas with external objects, according to the forms of which the cittas are transformed; it retains these perceptions, as impressions or saṃskāras by means of its inherent tamas. These saṃskāras generate memory, when such events occur as can manifest them by virtue of associations.

Thus memory comes when the percepts already known and acquired are kept in the mind in the form of impressions and are manifested by the udbodhakas or associative manifestors. It differs from perceptions in this that the latter are of the nature of perceiving the unknown and unperceived, whereas the former serves to bring before the mind percepts that have already been acquired. Memory is therefore of percepts already acquired by real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. It manifests itself in dreams as well as in waking states.

The relation between these states of mind and the saṃskāras is this that their frequency and repetition strengthens the saṃskāras and thus ensures the revival of these states.

They are all endowed with sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (pain) and moha (ignorance). These feelings cannot be treated separately from the states themselves, for their manifestations are not different from the manifestation of the states themselves. Knowledge and feeling are but two different aspects of the modifications of cittas derived from prakṛti; hence neither can be thought separately from the other. The fusion of feeling with knowledge is therefore here more fundamental than in the modern tripartite division of mind.

In connection with this we are to consider the senses whose action on the external world is known as “perceiving,” “grahaṇa,” which is distinguished from “pratyaksha,” which means the effect of “perceiving,” viz. perception. Each sense has got its special sphere of work, e.g. sight is of the eye, and this is called their second aspect, viz. svarūpa. Their third aspect is of “asmitā” or ego, which manifests itself through the senses. Their fourth aspect is their characteristic of guṇas, viz. that of manifestation (prakāśa), action (kriyā) and retention (sthiti). Their fifth aspect is that they are set in motion for purusha, his experiences and liberation.

It is indeed difficult to find the relation of manas with the senses and the cittas. In more than one place manas is identified with cittas, and, on the other hand, it is described as a sense organ. There is another aspect in which manas is said to be the king of the cognitive and motor senses. Looked at in this aspect, manas is possibly the directive side of the ego by which it guides the cognitive and conative senses in the external world and is the cause of their harmonious activity for the experience of purusha. As a necessary attribute of this directive character of manas, the power of concentration, which is developed by prāṇāyāma, is said to belong to manas. This is the rajas side of manas.

There is another aspect of manas which is called the anuvyavasāya or reflection, by which the sensations (ālocana) are associated, differentiated, integrated, assimilated into percepts and concepts. This is possibly the sāttvika side of manas.

There is another aspect by which the percepts and concepts are retained (dhāraṇa) in the mind as saṃskāras, to be repeated or revealed again in the mind as actual states. This is the tamas side of manas.

In connection with this we may mention ūha (positive argumentation), apoha (negative argumentation) and tattvajñāna (logical conclusion) which are the modes of different anuvyavasāyas of the manas. Will, etc., are to be included with these (Yoga-varttikā, II. 18). Looked at from the point of view of cittas, these may equally be regarded as the modifications of cittas.

The motives which sustain this process of outgoing activity are false knowledge, and such other emotional elements as egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life. These emotional elements remain in the mind in the germinal state as power alone; or they exist in a fully operative state when a man is under the influence of any one of them; or they alternate with others, such as attachment or aversion; or they may become attenuated by meditation upon opposites. Accordingly they are called respectively prasupta, udāra, vicchinna or tanu. Man’s minds or cittas may follow these outgoing states or experiences, or gradually remove those emotions which are commonly called afflictions, thus narrowing their sphere and proceeding towards final release.

All the psychic states described above, viz. pramāṇa, viparyyaya, etc., are called either afflicted or unafflicted according as they are moved towards outgoing activity or are actuated by the higher motive of emancipation by narrowing the field of experiences gradually to a smaller and smaller sphere and afterwards to suppress them altogether. These two kinds of motives, one of afflictions that lead towards external objects of attachment and aversion or love of life, and the other which leads to striving for kaivalya, are the sole motives which guide all human actions and psychic states.

They influence us whenever suitable opportunities occur, so that by the study of the Vedas, self-criticism or right argumentation, or from the instruction of good men, abhyāsa and vairāgya may be roused by vidyā. Right knowledge and a tendency towards kaivalya may appear in the mind even when a man is immersed in the afflicted states of outgoing activity. So also afflicted states may appear when a man is bent upon or far advanced in those actions which are roused by vidyā or the tendency towards kaivalya.

It seems that the Yoga view of actions, or karma, does not deprive man of his freedom of will. The habit of performing particular types of action only strengthens the corresponding subconscious impressions or saṃskāras of those actual states, and thus makes it more and more difficult to overcome their propensity to generate their corresponding actual states, and thus obstructs the adoption of an unhampered and free course of action. The other limitation to the scope of the activity of his free will is the vāsanā aspect of the saṃskāras by which he naturally feels himself attached by pleasurable ties to certain experiences and by painful ones to others. But these only represent the difficulties and impediments which come to a man, when he has to adopt the Yoga course of life, the contrary of which he might have been practising for a very long period, extending over many life-states.

The free will is not curbed in any way, for it follows directly from the teleological purpose of prakṛti, which moves for the experience and liberation of purusha. So this motive of liberation, which is the basis of all good conduct, can never be subordinated to the other impulse, which goads man towards outgoing experiences. But, on the other hand, this original impulse which attracts man towards these ordinary experiences, as it is due to the false knowledge which identifies prakṛti with purusha, becomes itself subordinate and loses its influence and power, when such events occur, which nullify false knowledge by tending to produce a vision of the true knowledge of the relation of prakṛti with purusha. Thus, for example, if by the grace of God false knowledge (avidyā) is removed, true knowledge at once dawns upon the mind and all the afflictions lose their power.

Free will and responsibility for action cease in those life-states which are intended for suffering from actions only, e.g. life-states of insects, etc.

APPENDIX SPHOṬAVĀDA

Another point to be noted in connection with the main metaphysical theories of Patañjali is the Sphoṭa theory which considers the relation of words with their ideas and the things which they signify. Generally these three are not differentiated one from the other, and we are not accustomed to distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet they are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view when we consider the process of auditory perception of words. Thus if we follow the Bhāshya as explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu we find that by an effect of our organs of speech, the letters are pronounced. This vocal sound is produced in the mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in contact with which it produces the audible sound called dhvani (Yoga-vārttika, III. 17). The special modifications of this dhvani are seen to be generated in the form of letters (varṇa) and the general name for these modifications is nāda. This sound as it exists in the stage of varṇas or letters is also called varṇa. If we apply the word śabda or sound in the most general sense, then we can say that this is the second stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage being that of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. The third stage of śabda is that in which the letters, for example, g, au, and ḥ, of the word “gauḥ” are taken together and the complete word-form “gauḥ” comes before our view. The comprehension of this complete word-form is an attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense of hearing senses the letter-forms of the sound one by one as the particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as they approach the ear one by one in air-waves. But each letter-form sound vanishes as it is generated, for the sense of hearing has no power to hold them together and comprehend the letter-forms as forming a complete word-form. The ideation of this complete word-form in the mind is called sphoṭa. It differs from the letter-form in this that it is a complete, inseparable, and unified whole, devoid of any past, and thus is quite unlike the letter-forms which die the next moment after they originate. According to the system of Patañjali as explained by the commentators, all significance belongs to this sphoṭa-form and never to the letters pronounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and heard in a particular order serve to give rise to such complete ideational word-images which possess some denotation and connotation of meaning and are thus called “sphoṭas,” or that which illuminates. These are essentially different in nature from the sounds in letter-forms generated in the senses of hearing which are momentary and evanescent and can never be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning, and have the sense of hearing as their seat.

The Vaiśeshika view.—Saṅkara Miśra, however, holds that this “sphoṭa” theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the supporters of sphoṭa agree that the sphoṭa stands conventionally for the thing that it signifies; now if that be the case what is the good of admitting sphoṭa at all? It is better to say that the conventionality of names belongs to the letters themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a thing; and it is when you look at the letters from this aspect—their unity with reference to their denotation of one thing—that you call them a pada or name (Upaskāra, II. 2, 21). So according to this view we find that there is no existence of a different entity called “name” or “sphoṭa” which can be distinguished from the letters coming in a definite order within the range of the sense of hearing. The letters pronounced and heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when they denote a particular meaning or object.

Kumārila’s view:—Kumārila, the celebrated scholar of the Mīmāṃsa school, also denies the sphoṭa theory and asserts like the Vaiśeshika that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any special sphoṭa or name. To prove this he first proves that the letter-forms are stable and eternal and suffer no change on account of the differences in their modes of accent and pronunciation. He then goes on to show that the sphoṭa view only serves to increase the complexity without any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to the so-called defect of the letter-denotation theory that the letters cannot together denote a thing since they do not do it individually, applies to the name-denotation of the sphoṭa theory, since there also it is said that though there is no sphoṭa or name corresponding to each letter yet the letters conjointly give rise to a sphoṭa or complete name (Ślokavārttika, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 91–93).

The letters, however, are helped by their potencies (saṃskāras) in denoting the object, or the meaning. The sphoṭa theory has, according to Kumārila and Pārthasārathi, also to admit this saṃskāra of the letters in the manifestation of the name or the śabda-sphoṭa, whereas they only admit it as the operating power of the letters in denoting the object or the thing signified. Saṃskāras according to Kumārila are thus admitted both by the sphoṭa theorists and the Kumārila school of Mīmāṃsa, only with this difference that the latter with its help can directly denote the object of the signified, whereas the former have only to go a step backwards in thinking their saṃskāra to give rise to the name or the śabda-sphoṭa alone (Nyāyaratnākara, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 104).

Kumārila says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity of the sphoṭa theory only because if the sphoṭa view be accepted then it comes to the same thing as saying that words and letters have no validity, so that all actions depending on them also come to lose their validity (Ślokavārttika, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 137).

Prabhākara.—Prabhākara also holds the same view; for according to him also the letters are pronounced in a definite order; though when individually considered they are momentary and evanescent, yet they maintain themselves by their potency in the form of a pāda or name, and thus signify an object. Thus Śāliknātha Miśra says in his Prakaraṇa Pañcikā, p. 89: “It is reasonable to suppose that since the later letters in a word are dependent upon the perception of a preceding one some special change is wrought in the letters themselves which leads to the comprehension of the meaning of a word.... It cannot be proved either by perception or by inference that there is any word apart from the letters; the word has thus for its constituents the letters.”

Śabara.—The views of Kamārila and Prahhākara thus explicated are but elaborate explanations of the view of Śabara who states the whole theory in a single line—pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ.

“The last letter together with the potency generated by the preceding letters is the cause of significance.”

Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa.—After describing the view of those who are antagonistic to the sphoṭa theory it is necessary to mention the Vaiākaraṇa school which is in favour of it; thus we find that in explaining the following passage of Mahābhāshya,

“What is then a word? It is that which being pronounced one can understand specific objects such as those (cows) which have tail, hoofs, horns, etc.”

Kaiyata says: “The grammarians think that denotation belongs to words, as distinct from letters which are pronounced, for if each of the letters should denote the object, there would be no need of pronouncing the succeeding letters....”

The vaiyakaraṇas admit the significant force of names as distinguished from letters. For if the significant force be attributed to letters individually, then the first letter being quite sufficient to signify the object, the utterance of other letters becomes unnecessary; and according to this view if it is held that each letter has the generating power, then also they cannot do it simultaneously, since they are uttered one after another. On the view of manifestation, also, since the letters are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected together in due order; if their existence in memory is sufficient, then we should expect no difference of signification or meaning by the change of order in the utterance of the letters; that is “sara” ought to have the same meaning as “rasa.” So it must be admitted that the power of signification belongs to the sphoṭa as manifested by the nādas as has been described in detail in Vākyapadīya.

As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the object of perception is a constant one so also is the relation between the sphoṭa and the nāda as the manifested and the manifestor (Vākyapadīya 98). Just as the image varies corresponding to the variation of the reflector, as oil, water, etc., so also the reflected or manifested image differs according to the difference of the manifestor (Vāk. 100). Though the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs at one and the same time yet there seems to be a “before and after” according to the “before and after” of the nāda utterances (Vāk. 102). That which is produced through the union and disunion (of nādas or dhvanis) is called sphoṭa, whereas other sound-perceptions arising from sounds are called dhvanis (Vāk. 103). As by the movement of water the image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt the movement of the water and thus seems to move, so also the sphoṭa, though unchanging in itself, yet appears to suffer change in accordance with the change of nāda which manifests it (Vāk. 49). As there are no parts of the letters themselves so the letters also do not exist as parts of the name. There is again no ultimate or real difference between names and propositions (Vāk. 73). It is only in popular usage that they are regarded as different. That which others regard as the most important thing is regarded as false here, for propositions only are here regarded as valid (Vāk. 74). Though the letters which manifest names and propositions are altogether different from them, yet their powers often appear as quite undifferentiated from them (Vāk. 89). Thus when propositions are manifested by the cause of the manifestation of propositions they appear to consist of parts when they first appear before the mind. Thus, though the pada-sphoṭa or the vākya-sphoṭa does not really consist of parts, yet, as the powers of letters cannot often be differentiated from them, they also appear frequently to be made up of parts (Vāk. 91).

The Yoga View.—As to the relation of the letters to the sphoṭa, Vācaspati says, in explaining the Bhāshya, that each of the letters has the potentiality of manifesting endless meanings, but none of them can do so individually; it is only when the letter-form sounds are pronounced in succession by one effort of speech that the individual letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from one another can manifest a complete word called the sphoṭa. Thus owing to the variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from other letter-form sounds any letter-form sound may manifest any meaning or word; for the particular order and the association of letter-form sounds depend upon the particular output of energy required in uttering them. The sphoṭa is thus a particular modification of buddhi, whereas the letter-form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It is well to note here that the theory that the letters themselves have endless potentiality and can manifest any word-sphoṭas, according to their particular combinations and recombinations, is quite in keeping with the main metaphysical doctrine of the Pātañjala theory.

Vākya-sphoṭa.—What is said here of the letter-form sounds and the śabda-sphoṭas also applies to the relation that the śabda-sphoṭas bear to propositions or sentences. A word or name does not stand alone; it always exists as combined with other words in the form of a proposition. Thus the word “tree” whenever it is pronounced carries with it the notion of a verb “asti” or “exists,” and thereby demonstrates its meaning. The single word “tree” without any reference to any other word which can give it a propositional form has no meaning. Knowledge of words always comes in propositional forms; just as different letter-form sounds demonstrate by their mutual collocation a single word or śabda-sphoṭa, so the words also by their mutual combination or collocation demonstrate judgmental or propositional significance or meaning. As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words themselves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them side by side in a particular order that a meaning dawns in the mind. When single words are pronounced they associate other words with themselves and thus appear to signify a meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by association with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve to specialise that meaning (niyamārthe anuvādaḥ). Thus “cooks” means that any subject makes something the object of his cooking. The mention of the subject “Devadatta” and the object “rice” only specialises the subject and the object. Though the analysis of a sentence into the words of which it is constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word into the letter-form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary division of it as into cases, verbs, etc.

Abhihitānvayavada and Anvitābhidhānavāda.—This reminds us of the two very famous theories about the relation of sentences to words, viz. the “Abhihitānvayavāda” and the “Anvitābhidhānavāda.” The former means that words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function abhidhā or denotation; these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter means that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with each other; they only express an action or something connected with action; in “sāmānaya”, “bring the cow”—“gām” does not properly mean “gotva” but “ānayanānvitagotva,” that is, the bovine genus as connected with bringing. We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb and vice versa—(Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Cowell).

The Yoga point of view.—It will be seen that strictly speaking the Yoga view does not agree with any one of these views though it approaches nearer to the Anvitābhidhāna view than to the Abhihitānvaya view. For according to the Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the only true thing; words only serve to manifest this idea but have themselves no meaning. The division of a sentence into the component word-conceptions is only an imaginary analysis—an afterthought.

Confusion the cause of verbal cognition.—According to Patañjali’s view verbal cognition proceeds only from a confusion of the letter-form sounds (which are perceived in the sense of hearing), the śabda-sphoṭa which is manifested in the buddhi, and the object which exists in the external world. These three though altogether distinct from one another yet appear to be unified on account of the saṅketa or sign, so that the letter-form sounds, the śabda-sphoṭa, and the thing, can never be distinguished from one another. Of course knowledge can arise even in those cases where there is no actual external object, simply by virtue of the manifesting power of the letter-form sounds. This saṅketa is again defined as the confusion of words and their meanings through memory, so that it appears that what a word is, so is its denoted object, and what a denoted word is, so is its object. Convention is a manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confusion of words and their meanings. This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and their objects: such unity is imaginary and due to beginningless tradition. This view may well be contrasted with Nyāya, according to which the convention of works as signifying objects is due to the will of God.

INDEX

abhihitānvayavāda, 186

abhiniveśa, 101, 104

abhivyaktikāraṇa, 133

abhyāsa, 100, 101, 126, 128, 129, 130, 138, 143, 149, 162, 177

Absorption, 102

Abstraction, 135, 136, 148, 154, 174

Accessories, 135, 137, 145

Accidental variation, 77

acit, 162

Actual, 73

Actuality, 83

adharma, 85, 86, 88, 102, 106, 162

adhikārin, 123

adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 112

adṛshṭa-janmavedanīya karma, 105, 110, 111

advaita, 14

Advaita-Brahmasiddhi, 14

Afflictions, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123, 124, 128, 143, 173 n., 176, 177, 178

Agent, 4

Aggregation, 168

Agreement, 33

ahaṃkāra, 38, 40, 41, 53, 56, 58, 61, 82, 86, 87, 93

ahaṃkāra-sāttvika, rājasa, tāmasa, 55

ahiṃsā, 136, 138, 139, 144

Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā, 10

akhyāti, 164

aklishṭa, 101

aklishṭavṛtti, 128

aliṇga, 7, 41, 42, 62, 118

anādisaṃyoga, 28

anāśrita, 29 n.

anekabhavika, 107, 112, 113

Anger, 141

anirvācyā, 28

aniyatavipāka, 112

aniyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113

antaḥkaraṇa, 43 n.

anukāreṇa paśyati, 21

anupaśya, 21

anuvrata, 139

anuvyavasāya, 176

anvaya, 166, 167

anvayikāraṇa, 61

anvitābhidhānavāda, 186

anvitābhidhānavāda, Yoga view, near to, 186

anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkāraḥ sahakārībhavati, 55

anyathākhyāti, 164, 173 n.

anyatvakāraṇa, 134

anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo viprayogo vā úpalabhyate, 7

aṅga, 145

aṇu, 43 n., 65

ap, 74, 75, 166, 167

ap atom, 65, 66

apara vairāgya, 127, 128

aparigraha, 141

apavarga, 29

apoha, 101, 176

Appearance, 36

apuṇya karma, 88

Aristotle, 1, 13

artha, 150

arthavattva, 166, 167

arthena svakīyayā grāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani, 33

asamprajñāta, 124, 149

asamprajñāta samādhi, 125

Asceticism, 136, 139, 142, 144

asmitā, 51, 59, 100, 104, 118, 153, 154, 172, 175

asmitā-ego, 51

asmitāmātra, 50, 51, 59, 160

asmitānugata, 125, 153, 154

asmītyetāvanmātrākāratvādasmitā, 153

Assimilation, 101

Association of ideas, 37

asteya, 141, 144

Astral body, 93

aśukla, 140

aśuklākṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111

Atheistic, 90

Atomic change as unit of time, 43

Atoms, 4, 38, 39, 43, 65, 72, 74, 77, 81, 152, 167; continual change, 71

Attachment, 99, 100, 176, 177

Avariciousness, 136, 141

avasthā, 76

avasthāpariṇāma, 71, 73, 82, 156, 165

Aversion, 98, 176, 177

avibhāgaprāptāviva, 17

avidyā, 2, 11, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 128, 131, 159, 172, 173 n., 178; its definition, 11; uprooting of, 115, 116

avidyā of yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164

aviśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 84, 165

aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ, 6

aviveka, 173 n.

avyapadeśyatva, 77

avyavasthitākhilapariṇamo bhavatyeva, 85

ayutasiddhāvayava, 69

ādisamprayoga, 7

ākāra, 85

ākāśa, 14, 43 n., 56, 57, 58, 68, 80, 93, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170

ākāśa, two kinds of, 168

ākāśa atom, 65, 66; Bhikshu and Vācaspati on, 65

ākāśa tanmātra, 66

ālocana, 176

āmalaka, 77, 78, 79

ānanda, 153,154

ānandānugata, 125, 153, 154

āptikāraṇa, 133, 135

āpūra, 93

āpyakāraṇa, 135

āsana, 136, 145

āśaya, 103

āśerate sāṃsārikā purushā asminniti āśayaḥ, 103

āvaraṇa śakti, 84

āyush, 105, 106, 115

Barabara muni, 64

bāhya karma, 102

Beginningless, 28

Behaviour, 6

Bel, 77

Benares, 11 n.

bhakti, 161

bhaktiyoga, 159, 161

bhava, 110

bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītam svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’stīti, 31 n.

Bhāshya, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 61, 62, 67, 71, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 99, 109, 110, 131

bhāvanā, 161

Bhikshu, 6, 9, 12 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 50, 65, 67, 85, 86, 88, 90, 94, 109, 110, 112, 126, 129, 145, 153, 168

bhoga, 29, 105, 106, 115

bhoga-śarīra, 105

Bhoja, 126

Bhojavṛtti, 95

bhrama, 173 n.

bhūta, 60, 69, 166

bhūtādi, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64; accretion from, 65, 66

Biological, 2

Birth, 133, 161

Body, sattvamaya, 160

Bondage, 19

Brahmacaryya, 141

Brahman, 27, 28, 139

Breath, 146, 147

Breath regulation, 135, 136

buddheḥ pratisaṃvedi purushaḥ, 19

buddhi, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 51, 52, 61, 115, 116, 118, 152, 173 n.

Buddhist, 33, 45 n.

Buddhists, their theory of sahopalambhaniyama refuted, 33

Caitra, 173

Caraka, 11

Caste, 139

Categories of existence, 41

Category, 6, 117

Caturdaśī, 139

Causal activity, 4

Causal operation, 4

Causal transformation, 4

Causality, 152

Causation, 132, 133; Sāṃkhya view of, 81

Cause, 79, 81, 85, 133, 134; nine kinds of, 133

Cessation, 19

Change, 43, 44; Buddhist and Yoga idea contrasted, 45 n.; units of, 45, 46

Changeful, 18

Characterised, 37

Characteristic, 37

Chāyā-vyākhyā, 63, 93

Chemical, 2

Chowkhamba, 11 n.

Circumstance, 139

cit, 15, 162

citta, 36, 81, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 125, 132, 147, 154, 161, 175; different forms of, 92, 93; different states of, 170; its nature, 94

cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati purushasya svāminaḥ, 22

cittaprasāda, 127

Clairaudience, 144

Class-characteristics, 4 n.

Cleanliness, 136, 143, 144

Coco-nut, 77

Co-existence, 34

Cognitive states, 48

Coherent, 7, 37

Collocation, 37

Commentary, 4

Compassion, 137

Complacency, 137

Compounds, 3, 166

Conceived, 3

Conceiver, 3

Concentration, 17, 94, 95, 96, 123, 126, 128, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153, 155, 163, 170

Concept, 150, 162, 173

Conceptual, 23, 25

Concomitant causes, 85

Condensation, 10

Conscious-like, 19

Consciousness, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 45, 92, 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 173

Consciousness contentless, 50

Conscious states, 17

Conservation, 132, 133

Contact, 27, 29 n.

Contemplation, 97

Contentment, 136, 139, 144

Continence, 136, 139, 141, 144

Contrary, 141

Co-operation, 5

Cosmic evolution, 47

Cosmic matter, 74

Country, 139

Creation, 114, 115, 160, 161

Critique of Judgment, 14

Critique of Practical Reason, 14

Critique of Pure Reason, 14

Davies, 25

Decision, 53

Demerit, 86, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103

Denotation, 7 n.

deśa, 85, 170

Descartes, 13

Desire, 141

Determinate, 7

Determined, 3, 37

Determiner, 3

Devotion, 139, 142, 145, 161

dhāraṇā, 101, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 145, 147, 148, 176

dharma, 42, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 106, 162

dharmamegha-samādhi, 117

dharmapariṇāma, 69, 71, 74, 80, 81, 156, 165

dharmin, 71, 73, 74, 76

dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā propañcyate, 37, 71

dharmī, 42

dhātu, 11

dhṛtikāraṇa, 135

dhyāna, 117, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 148

Difference, 33

Differentiated, 7, 37, 62

Differentiation, 53, 66, 101

dik, 170

Discrimination, 8, 116, 120, 164

Distractions, 126, 148

Doubt, 172

drashṭā dṛśiṃātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ, 16

dravya, 4 n., 29 n., 168

Droṇa, 140 n.

dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā, 16, 51

dṛk, 17

dṛkśakti, 20

dṛshṭajanma karmāśaya, 105

dṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 105, 110, 112

duḥkha, 175

dvesha, 104

Earth, 167

Effect, 81, 82, 85, 132

Efficient cause, 82

Ego, 3, 4, 27, 28, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 99, 152, 153, 175; a modification of buddhi, 53; evolution in three lines from, 54; three kinds of, 55

Egohood, 50, 124

Ego-universal, 50

ekabhavika, 105, 110, 111, 112

ekabhavikatva, 109

ekāgra, 95, 96, 123, 126

ekātmatā, 17

ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā, 51

ekendriya, 128

Elements, 3, 166

Emancipation, 164

Energy, 3, 5, 8, 132

Enjoyment, 28, 29

Equilibrium, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 43, 87

Error, 173 n.

Eternal, 8, 91

Eternity, two kinds of, 118

Ethics, 92

European, 10

Evolutes, 11

Evolution, 7, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 62, 65, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84, 87, 89, 114; as change, 43; as change of qualities and as derivation of categories, 69; definite law of, 82; its limitations by time and space, 79; measured by units of spatial motion, 44; of manas, 55; of the senses, 54; of categories, difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga view, 58–62; of similars, 10

Evolutionary process, 77, 85, 91

Exhalation, 146

Existence as capacity of effecting, 8

Expiratory, 136

Extension, 34

Externality, 34

External reality, 34; Buddhist objection to, 32; has more than a momentary existence, 36; its ground, 36; not due to imagination, 35; not identical with our ideas, 35

External world, 31; refutation of Buddhist objections, 33

Faith, 102

Fichte, 50

Fisherman, 139

Force, 82

Freedom, 123, 125, 127; of will, 177

Friendliness, 137

Future, 31, 32, 46, 72

Gaṇḍa, 15

gandha, 38, 152, 167

gandha-tanmātra, 58, 64

Gauḍapāda, 24

Generalisation, 154

Generic, 168

ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa, 14

Gītā, 12

Gītābhāshya, 4 n.

Goal, 115, 121, 124, 127, 129

God, 2, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 115, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149, 161, 163, 164, 172, 178, 187

Gold, 134

grahaṇa, 101, 153, 175

grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ, 53

grahītṛ, 153

grāhya, 54, 153

Gross elements, derivation of, 65 et seq.

Grossness, 34

guṇā eva prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti, 10

guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam vyavaseyātmakatvaṃca, 53

guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati, yattu drshṭipathaṃ prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakaṃ, 12, 37

guṇas, 3, 4 n., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 26, 37, 38, 39, 42, 53, 76, 78, 81, 82, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 131, 155, 167, 170

guṇas, three classes, 5; as causal effect, 6; evolution of the cognitive and conative senses and tanmātras, 38; identity of qualities and substances, 5; relative preponderance of, 7; special affinity of each class, 6; special behaviour of each class of, 6; their atomic qualities consistent with their all-pervasiveness, 43 n.; their common purpose, 7; their co-operation, 38; their mode of combination, 6; their mode of mutual operation, 5; their mode of evolution, 7; their nature as feelings, 68; their twofold nature, 53; their threefold course of development, 38; their want of purpose in the state of equilibrium, 7; two classes of their evolution, aviśesha and viśesha, 40

Hariharāraṇya, 96

Heaven, 86 n.

hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ sāvayavamparatantraṃ vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ, 42

Hibiscus, 15 n.

hiṃsā, 140, 141

History of Hindu Chemistry, 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.

Horn of a hare, 8

Hume, 37

Idealistic Buddhists, 31

Ignorance, 141, 145

Illumination, 5

Illusion, 173 n.; of Yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164

Illusive, 28

Imagination, 34

Immanent purpose, 90

Independence, 95, 128, 134

Indeterminate, 8

India, 14

Indra, 86 n.

Inertia, 3, 5, 8, 37, 167

Inference, 1, 2, 81, 96, 154, 156, 162, 163, 170, 171

Infra-atomic, 3

Infra-atoms, 4

Inhalation, 146

Injury, 139

Inorganic, 74

Inspiratory, 136

Intellection, 6

Intelligence, 2, 48

Intelligence-stuff, 3, 8, 49

Iron, 6

Īśvara, 14, 79, 87, 88, 90, 103, 126, 144, 145, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 172; removal of barriers, 87

Īśvarakṛshṇa, 7 n.

Īśvarapraṇidhāna, 142, 145, 161

Īśvarasyāpi dharmādhisṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro, 87

janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat pravṛtteśca purushabahutvam siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca, 26

japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ, 15

jāti, 105, 106, 115

Jealousy, 143

jīva, 14

jīvanmukta, 117

jīvanmukti, 120

jñāna, 150

jñānayoga, 130, 142, 143, 159

Judgmental, 23

kaivalya, 22, 23, 27, 31, 95, 96, 116, 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142, 143, 177

kalpa, 160

Kant, 14, 37

Kapila, 25

karma, 86, 98, 117, 159, 160, 177; its classification and divergence of views, 109–113

karma-sannyāsin, 103

karmāśaya, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 160

karmayoga, 159

karuṇā, 137, 138, 139

Kaumudī, 64

kāla, 85

kāma, 104

kāraṇa, 168

kāraṇacitta, 93

kārikā, 7 n., 11, 24, 26, 42, 64, 165

Kārya, 168

kārya vimukti, 120

kāryya citta, 92

kāryyakarī śakti, 84

Kāśmīra, 79

kevalapurushākārā saṃvit, 153

kevalī, 117, 118

kirātā, 101

kleśa, 99, 100, 104, 114

klishṭa, 128

klishṭavṛtti, 100

Knowable, 5, 27, 32, 38

Knower, 27, 50

Knowledge, different kinds of, differentiated, 163

Known, 27

kriyā, 37, 175

kriyāyoga, 129, 130, 142, 143, 161

krodha, 104

kṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111

kṛshṇa karma, 103, 111

kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt, 26

kshaṇa, 43, 44, 45, 46 n., 146, 170

kshaṇabhaṅguram, 12 n.

kshaṇapracayāśraya, 46 n.

kshaṇapratiyogi, 46 n.

kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ. sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi buddhinirmāṇah, 44

kshipta, 95, 122

kshiti, 74, 75, 166

kshiti atom, 66

kuntī, 14, 15 n.

kuśala, 121

kuśalī, 121

kūṭastha nitya, 118

lakshaṇa, 76, 82

lakshaṇa-pariṇāma, 71, 72, 73, 74, 156, 165

Latent, 46, 73, 81, 96, 108

laukikamāyeva, 12 n.

liberation, 7, 25, 167, 175, 177

Light, 167

Limitation theory, 14, 15

liṅga, 7, 41, 42, 51, 62, 118

liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani, 50

lobha, 104

Locke, 37

Lokācāryya, 11, 55, 58

Lotus, 9

madhumatī, 125

madhupratīka, 125

Magnet, 6, 89, 171

mahat, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61, 82; its potential existence in prakṛti, 9

Mahābhārata, 15 n., 80, 140

mahāpralaya, 118

mahāvrata, 139

maitrī, 137, 138, 139

manas, 40, 51, 55, 60, 81, 100, 118, 133, 175, 176

Manifested, 72

mantra, 161

Many, 27, 28

Maṇiprabhā, 65

marut, 75, 166

Mass, 3

Material cause, 61, 81

Matter, 2, 3, 166

mānasa karma, 102

mātrā, 146

māyā, 2, 11, 12, 14, 27, 28

māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ, 11

māyeva, 12 n.

Mechanical, 2

Meditation, 102, 135, 136, 145, 148, 149, 161, 176

Memory, 53, 98

Mental, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 37, 48

Mental states, analysis of, 48

Merit, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 103

Metaphysics, 30

Method of agreement, 33, 35; of difference, 33

Mind, 2, 3, 18, 19, 81; its seven qualities, 156

Mind-modification, 20, 22; -transformations, 18

moha, 104, 175

Mokshadharmādhyāya, 140

Moment, 44, 45

Momentary, 12, 35

Moral, 2

Moral ideal, 26

Movement, 48

muditā, 137, 139

mūḍha, 95, 122

Nahusha, 86

Naiyāyika, 58

Name, 150, 173; and thing, 173

Nandī, 85

na tu kshaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu kshaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate, 45 n.

Naturalism and agnosticism, 2 n.

Natural selection, 76

Nāgeśa, 61, 63, 66, 86, 87, 94, 107, 109, 117, 168

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, 90, 126

nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīm, 12

nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ na cāsti sato vināśāḥ, 31

Nectar, 85

Nescience, 14, 15, 97, 99; its different forms, 172 n.

nidrā, 101

Nihilists, 2

niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo vivekāt, 15

niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam, 8

niḥsattāsattaṃ, 12

nirasmitā, 153

nirmāṇa citta, 160, 161

nirānanda, 153

nirodha, 19, 96, 118, 149, 155, 156, 170

nirodhaja saṃskāra, 97

nirodha samādhi, 139

niruddha, 95, 123

nirvicāra, 149, 153, 154

nirvīja, 122, 125

nirvīja samādhi, 154

nirvitarka, 150, 151, 153, 154

niścaya, 50

niyama, 136, 139, 142, 143, 148

niyata vipāka, 112

niyatavipākadṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113

Nīlakaṇṭha, 80, 88, 89

Non-being, 2

Non-covetousness, 139, 144

Non-discrimination, 15

Non-distinction, 173 n.

Non-existence, 8, 12

Non-injury, 139, 140, 144; its classification, 141

Non-stealing, 139

Noumenon, 8, 14

Observance, 135, 136

oṃkāra, 161

Omniscience, 95

oshadhi, 161

Pain, 98, 121, 122, 126, 137, 142

Palm, 77

Pantheism, 13

Pañcaśikha, 17, 52, 103 n.

parama mahat, 68

paramāṇu in Sāṃkhya and Yoga, 43 n., 66, 67, 165, 167

para vairāgya, 120, 127, 128

parikarma, 129, 130, 135, 137

pariṇāma, 98

pariṇāmaduḥkhatā, 98

pariṇāmakramaniyama, 62, 82

pariṇāmi, 19

pariṇāminityatā, 119

Past, 31, 32, 46, 72

Patañjali, 1, 2, 5 n., 16, 26, 30, 35, 51, 119

Patent, 81

pāda, 54

Pāñcāla, 79

pāṇi, 54

pāpa karma, 100

pāpakarmāśaya, 105

Pātañjala, 1, 12, 90, 115

pāyu, 54, 58

Perceived, 3

Perceiver, 3

Percept, 19

Perception, 3, 53, 96, 154, 162, 170, 171, 175

Permanent, 21

Phenomena, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 95

Phenomenal, 29, 84, 125, 155

Philosopher, 2

Philosophical, 2

Physical, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 166

Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus, 63 n.

Plant: its possession of life and senses, 80

Plato, 13

Pleasure, 98

Plurality, 26–29, 30

Poison, 85

Posture, 135, 136, 145

Potency, 19, 82, 96, 98, 101, 106, 116, 124, 125, 154, 155; destroying other potencies, 117

Potential, 9, 32, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85

Potentiality, 5, 83, 84

Potentials, 3

Power, 82

pradhāna, 118

prajñā, 102, 116, 117, 120, 122, 125, 126, 128, 136, 151, 154, 170, 171; its seven stages, 119–120

prajñāsaṃskāra, 101

prajñāloka, 149

prakāśa, 37, 175

prakṛti, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41, 42, 54, 59, 62, 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 114, 115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 125, 143, 152, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 173 n., 175, 177, 178; as undifferentiated cosmic matter, 12; as equilibrium of dharma and dharmī, 42; avidyā and vāsanā lie merged in it, 114; different views of, 10, 11; different from avidyā, 12; evolution of the second category of asmitā, 51; its difference from māyā, 12; its difference from purusha, 20; its first evolutionary product, mahat, 50, 51; its goal, 116; its identity with guṇa reals, 9; its relation with guṇas, 6; its similarity with purusha, 20; Lokācāryya’s view of, 11; nature in the state of equilibrium, 8; refilling from, 86; roused by God, 87; Venkaṭa’s view of, 10

prakṛtilīna, 127

prakṛtivikṛti, 7 n.

prakṛtiṛityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā jñānavirodhitvāt māyā vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt, 11

prakṛtyāpūra, 106

pralaya, 114

pramāṇa, 101, 170, 176

praṇava, 161

prāṇāyāma, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 175

prasupta, 176

pratipaksha bhāvanā, 141

pratisambandhī, 46 n.

pratiyogī, 46 n.

pratyāhāra, 136, 137, 147, 148

pratyaksha, 171, 175

pratyaya, 119, 134

pratyayakāraṇa, 133

pratyayaṃ bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi tadātmaka iva pratibhāti, 17

pratyayānupaśya, 17, 18

Pravacana-bhāshya, 64

prāmāṇyaniścaya, 134 n.

Pre-established harmony, 2

Present, 31, 32, 46, 72

Presentative ideation, 101

Presentative power, 33

Pride, 143

Primal, 3

Primal cause, 3, 6

pṛthivī, 57

Psychological, 2

Psychology, 81

Psychosis, 3, 16

puṇya, 100

puṇya karma, 88, 100

puṇya karmāśaya, 105

Purāṇa, 64

Purification, 138

Purificatory, 129, 130, 136

Purity, 139

purusha, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 28, 29, 42, 48, 53, 61, 76, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 104, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125, 131, 133, 143, 154, 159, 162, 164, 173, 173 n., 175, 177, 178; arguments in favour of its separate existence, 24; contrast with vedantic Brahman, 26; different from the mental states, 17; fulfilment of its objects, 7, 8; its connection with prakṛti real, 28; its final separation from prakṛti, 118; its permanence, 21; its plurality, 26–30; its reflection in the mind, 18; its relation with concepts and ideas, 49; its similarity with sattva, 49; meaning determined from the sūtras, 16, 17; nature of its reflection in buddhi, 21, 22

purushārtha, 89

purushārthatā, 120, 164; its relation with avidyā, 115

pūrvadeśa, 43 n.

rajas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 62, 95, 96, 116, 175

Rarefaction, 10

rasa, 38, 152

rasa-tanmātra, 58, 64

Ray, P. C., 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.

Rādhā, 14, 15 n.

rāga, 97, 99, 104, 172

Rājamārtaṇda, 65

rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt, 15

rājasa, 38

Rāmānuja, 64, 162

Realisation, 137

Reality, 2, 4, 30, 118, 154

Reals, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 28

Reason, 50

Reasoning, 53

Rebirth, 93, 107

Reflection, 18, 28

Reflection theory, 14, 15

Release, 28, 29, 123, 128

Religious, 2

Reperception, 18

Restraint, 135, 136

Retention, 101

Right knowledge, 53

rūpa, 38, 65, 152, 167

rūpa tanmātra, 57, 64

Ṛgveda, 11

ṛshi, 144

ṛtambharā, 154

sadṛśapariṇāmā, 10

sahakāri, 55

sahopalambhaniyama, 33

sahopalambhaniyamaś ca vedyatvañca hetū sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau, 34

sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nilataddhiyoḥ, 32

Salvation, 145, 159, 162

samādhi, 81, 96, 102, 118, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140, 142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161, 162; classification of, 153, 154

samādhipariṇāma, 155

samāna tantra, 67

samprajñāta, 96, 124, 125, 126, 137, 144, 149, 153, 155, 156

samprajñāta samādhi, 138, 145, 150, 154

sampratyaya, 134 n.

saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishṭhānāt purusho’sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteśca, 24

saṃsāra, 115, 121

saṃskāra, 19, 81, 96, 98, 101, 108, 109, 125, 174, 176, 177

saṃskārāḥ vṛttibhiḥ kriyante saṃskāraiśca vṛttayaḥ evaṃ vṛttisaṃskāracakram aniśamāvarttate, 97

saṃskāraśesha, 125

saṃskāryyakāraṇa, 135

saṃsṛshṭā vivicyante, 62

saṃvega, 129

saṃyama, 149, 157

saṃyoga, 27, 29 n.

sannyāsāśrama, 103

santosha, 143

saṅketa, 187

Sarasvatī Rāmānanda, 126

sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ, 77

satkāraṇavāda, 81

satkāryyavāda, 81

sattva, 3, 4, 5, 6, 22, 24, 37, 38, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 96, 116, 143, 144, 153, 160, 161

sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ, 16, 22

sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśesho bhogaḥ parārthatvāt svārthasamyamāt purushajñā, nam, 16

savicāra, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154; prajñā, 151

savitarka, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154

sā ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid, 51

sāmānya guṇa, 29 n.

Sāṃkhya, 4, 7 n., 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29 n., 30, 58, 62, 67, 89, 90, 94, 140, 164, 165; Jaina influence on, 94 n.

Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 55, 56 n., 67

Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, 24, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 85

Sāṃkhya philosophy, 4 n.

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya, 4 n.

Sāṃkhya-sūtra, 11, 15, 169

Sāṃkhya-Yoga, 4, 26, 27, 50 n., 57

Sāṃkhyists, 12

sānanda, 153

sāttvika, 38, 56

sāttvikaahaṃkāra, 63

Science of Ethics, 50

Seal, Dr. B. N., 7, 37, 63 n., 66–169

Seeming reflection, 22, 23

Seer, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 47, 51

Self, 8, 18, 21, 26, 49, 51, 54

Self-consciousness, 52, 54

Self-control, 24

Self-intelligent, 3

Self-subsistent, 36

Sensation, 166

Sense, 141

Sense faculties, 56

Sense organs, 56

Senses, 3, 40, 41, 47, 54, 60, 86, 87, 100, 102, 135, 147, 167, 171; divergent views about their evolution, 57

Separation, 29 n.

Sex restraint, 144

Shashṭitantraśāstra, 10, 12

siddha, 144

Siddhānta-candrikā, 65, 95

Siddhāntaleśa, 14

Sign, 7, 41

Simultaneous revelation, 33

Sins, 103

Sleep, 174

smṛti, 19, 64, 101, 102, 108, 126, 128, 136

Social, 2

Soul, 13, 14, 24, 25

Sound, 169

Space, 79, 146, 152; as relative position, 169

Space order, 170

sparśa, 38, 65

sparśâtanmātra, 57, 64

Specialised, 7, 8

Specific, 168

sphoṭavāda, 178–187; Kumāril’s view, 181; Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa, 182; Prabhākara, 182; Śabara’s view, 182; Vaiśeshika view, 180; Vākya-sphoṭa, 185; Yoga view, 184

Spinoza, 13

Spirits, 7, 13

Spiritual principle, 24, 28

sthiti, 37, 175

sthitikāraṇa, 133

sthūla, 166

sthūlavishayaka, 154

Strength, 102

Studies, 136, 139

Subconscious, 81

Sub-latent, 46, 73

Substance, 4 n., 29 n., 40, 47, 73, 74, 76, 81, 168; its nature, 37

Substantive entities, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 82, 84

Substratum, 36, 37, 49

Succession, 44, 45

summum bonum, 121

Susheṇa, 135

sutucchaka, 12

sūkshma, 61, 67, 166, 167

sūkshmavishayaka, 154

sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ, 6

Sūtra, 15, 17, 22, 26, 31, 62, 64, 108, 137, 147

Sūtrārthabodhinī, 65, 90

svarūpa, 166, 167, 175

svādhyāya, 136, 142, 161

Svetāśvatara, 11

Sympathy, 137, 138

śabda, 38, 65, 150

śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ, 174

śabda-tanmātra, 57, 64

śabdādīnām mūrttisamānajātīyānām, 66 n.

śakti, 17, 82, 83

śaktimān, 82, 83

Śaṅkara, 4 n., 135, 162

śānta, 73

Sānti-parva, 80, 88, 89

śāstra, 172

śauca, 143, 144

śīla, 6

śraddhā, 102, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 138, 158

śruti, 57

śukla, 102, 111, 140, 175

śukla karma, 103, 140

śukla karmāśaya, 111

śuklakṛshṇa, 102, 111

Śūnyavādi Buddhists, 2

svalpasaṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ, 103 n.

svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ, 16

tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā, 16

tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ, 16

taijasa, 56

tamas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 94, 95, 117, 169, 176

tanmātra, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 124, 151, 167

tanmātras, evolution of grosser elements from, 65; their difference from paramānus, 68; their evolution, et seq., 64; their relation to ahaṃkāra, 40, 41

tanmātrāvayava, 66

tanmātrāṇāmapi parasparavyārvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca yogimātragamyam, 68

tanu, 176

tapaḥ, 136

tapas, 161

tasmāt svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurushasādhāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante, 36

Taste, 167

tatradṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya, 109

tattva, 40, 94

tattvajñāna, 101, 176

Tattva-kaumudī, 25, 56 n., 103 n.

Tattva-nirūpaṇa, 66

Tattvatraya, 11 n., 55, 58, 64, 66

Tattvavaiśāradī, 3 n., 5 n., 9 n., 33 n., 46, 53, 56 n., 64, 75, 78, 79, 93, 135, 154

tattvāntara, 68

tattvāntara-pariṇāma, 40, 41, 69

tāmasa, 38, 56

tāmasa ahaṃkāra, 60, 62

te vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ ... sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ Sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ, 38

tejas, 65, 75, 166, 167

tejas atom, 66

Teleological, 86, 121

Teleology, 24, 76, 77, 89

Temptation, 141

Theft, 136, 141

Theists, 90

Theories, 2

Thing, 150

Thing-in-itself, 2, 37

Thought, 2

Time, 79, 139, 152, 169; as discrete moments, 44; as unit of change, 43; element of imagination in, 44; unit of, 46; order, 170

Tinduka, 77

Trance, 135, 136, 143; Trance-cognition, 95

Transcendent, 18

Transformations, 20, 24

trasareṇu, 66

triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi vyaktaṃ tathā pradhānaṃ, tadviparītastathā pumān, 42

Truth, 141

Truthfulness, 139, 140, 144

Tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ, 6

udāra, 176

udbodhaka, 174

udghāta, 146, 147

udita, 73

Ultimate state, 7

Unafflicted, 176

Understanding, 19

Undetermined, 8

Undifferentiated, 12, 162

Unindividuated, 12

Universe, 1, 13; a product of guṇa combinations, 37

Unknowable, 2, 37

Unmanifested, 4, 8, 72

Unmediated, 8

Unpredicable, 73

Unreal, 28

Unspecialised, 7

Unwisdom, 142

Upanishads, 11

upastha, 54, 58

upādāna, 61

upādāna kāraṇa, 61, 133

upekshā, 137, 139

utpādyakāraṇa, 135

uttaradeśa, 43 n.

ūha, 101, 176

vaikārika, 56

vairāgya, 100, 101, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 143, 149, 162, 177

Vaiśeshika, 43 n., 71, 168

Vaiśeshika atoms, 70

vaishṇava, 10

Vanity, 143

vaśīkāra, 128

vastupatitaḥ, 44

vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ, 35 n.

Vācaspati, 3, 5 n., 8, 12, 32, 33, 35, 44, 46 n., 51, 55, 62, 65, 66, 67, 75, 78, 87, 89, 93, 109, 110, 112, 118, 126, 129, 144, 153, 154

vāk, 54

Vākyapadīya, 183

vāsanā, 99, 106, 108, 114, 116, 177; contrasted with karmāśaya, 107

Vāyu, 167

Vāyu atom, 65

Vedas, 154, 160, 162, 170, 177

Vedānta, 11, 14, 24, 27, 28, 29, 162

Vedāntism, 14

Vedāntists, 12, 26, 66, 81

Vedic, 103

Vehicles of actions, 103

Venkaṭa, 10

Veracity, 136, 140

Verbal cognition, cause of, 186; view of Nyāya, 187

vibhu, 43 n.

vibhu parimāṇa, 29 n.

vibhūti, 158

Vibhūtipāda, 22

vicāra, 153

vicārānugata, 125, 153

vicchinna, 176

Vice, 86, 87

videha, 127

vidyā, 177

vidyāviparītam jñānāntaraṃ avidyā, 11, 97

Vijñanāmṛta-bhāshya, 88, 90

Vijñāna Bhikshu, 4, 15

vikalpa, 101, 150, 173, 174

vikārakāraṇa, 133

vikāryyakāraṇa, 135

vikṛti, 7 n., 165

vikshipta, 95, 123

vikshiptacitta, 96, 130

vipāka, 105, 107

viparyyaya, 101, 172, 173, 176

viprayoga, 7

Virtue, 86

Vishṇu Purāṇa, 66

viśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 59, 81, 84, 165, 171

viśeshapariṇāma, 60

viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāniguṇaparvāṇi, 59

visokā, 125

vitarka, 153

vitarkānugata, 125, 154

viyoga, 29 n.

viyogakāraṇa, 134, 135

vīryya, 102, 126, 128, 135, 136

Vomit, 141

Vṛtti, 56, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 122, 171

vyaṇgya, 57

vyaṅjaka, 57

vyatireka, 128

vyavasāyātmakatva, 3

vyavaseyātmakatva, 3

Vyāsa, 5, 7, 8, 8 n., 22, 53, 121, 133, 135

Vyāsa-bhāshya, 3 n., 5 n., 7 n., 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36, 37, 43 n., 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66 n., 68 n., 70, 71 n., 79, 84, 85, 94, 99, 101, 117, 119, 121, 133, 171

vyoman, 75

vyutthāna, 155, 156, 170

vyutthāna citta, 95

Ward, 2 n.

Wicked, 102

World-phenomena, 16

World-process, 91

yadyaliṅgāvasthā śabdādyupabhogaṃ vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā purushārtham nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyāvasthā syāt, 8

Yama, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148

Yatamāna, 127

yathā rathādi yantradibhiḥ, 25

yathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt śalyanishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat purushasya svāminaḥ svam bhavati bhogasādhanatvāt, 22

ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti udaramapi na gṛhyeta, 36

Yoga, 14, 29, 48, 62, 89, 96, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 144, 147, 155, 162, 177; its points of difference with Sāṃkhya, 163–165

Yoga metaphysics, 1

Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought, 165

Yoga system, 2

Yoga theory, 5

yogāṅga, 122, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 144, 145, 149

Yoga-sūtra, 5 n., 11, 17, 35 n., 43 n., 45, 47, 108, 117, 142, 153

Yoga-vārttika, 4 n., 6 n., 9, 10, 12 n., 22, 29 n., 43 n., 45 n., 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 87, 110, 126, 127, 129, 134 n., 143, 154, 176

Yogins, 79, 87, 95, 97, 98, 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 136, 139, 143, 147, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160; nine kinds of, 129

yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ, 82

Yudhishṭhira, 140

yutasiddhāvayaba, 168

-----

Footnote 1:

See Ward’s Naturalism and Agnosticism.

Footnote 2:

Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on the Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 47.

Footnote 3:

Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya, I. 120.

Footnote 4:

It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the guṇas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that guṇa in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable that as the Sāṃkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it was realised that there was no ultimate distinction between substance and qualities. In consequence of such a view the guṇas which were originally regarded as qualities began to be regarded as substantive entities and no contradiction was felt. Bhikshu in many places describes the guṇas as substantive entities (dravya) and their division into three classes as being due to the presence of three kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean that within the same class there were many other differences which have not been taken into account (Yoga-vārttika, II. 18). But it cannot be said that the view that the guṇas are substantive entities and that there is no difference between qualities and substances is regarded as a genuine Sāṃkhya view even as early as Śaṅkara. See Ghābhāshya, XIV. 5.

Footnote 5:

See Vyāsa-bhāshya on Patañjali’s Yoga-sūtras, II. 18, and Vācaspati’s Tattvavaiśāradī on it.

Footnote 6:

See Bhikshu’s Yoga-vārttika, II. 18.

Footnote 7:

History of Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66.

Footnote 8:

The usual Sāṃkhya terms as found in Iśvarakṛshṇa’s Kārikā, having the same denotation as aviśesha and viśesha, are prakṛtivikṛti and vikṛti.

Footnote 9:

Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

Footnote 10:

Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

Footnote 11:

Tattvavaiśāradī, II. 19.

Footnote 12:

Tattvatraya, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.

Footnote 13:

Bhikshu in his Yoga-vārttika explains “māyeva” as “laukikamāyeva kshaṇabhaṇguram” evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience.

Footnote 14:

Siddhāntalleśa (Jīveśvara nirūpaiṇa).

Footnote 15:

Princess Kuntī of the Mahābhārata had a son born to her by means of a charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal she floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife of a carpenter (Rādhā). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karṇa and he thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his royal lineage was disclosed to him later in life.

Footnote 16:

Kārikā 17.

Footnote 17:

Gauḍapāda’s commentary on Kārikā 17.

Footnote 18:

Purusha is a substance (dravya) because it has independent existence (anāśrita) and has a measure (vibhu parimāṇa) of its own. So it always possesses the common characteristics (sāmānya guṇa) of substances, contact (saṃyoga), separation (viyoga) and number (saṃkhyā). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or impure on account of the possession of the above common characteristics of all substances. Yoga-vārttika, II. 17.

Footnote 19:

Thus the Bhāshya says: bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti.

Footnote 20:

Tattvavaiśāradī, IV. 14.

Footnote 21:

Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ. Yoga-sūtra, IV. 15.

Footnote 22:

“Tattvāntara-pariṇāma” means the evolution of a wholly new category of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new category of existence since all these qualities are the direct manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.

Footnote 23:

Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (vibhu) how can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (Yoga-vārttika, III. 52) in reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce mind antaḥkaraṇa and ākāśa) which are all-pervading, while the others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus. Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth, water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter should mean guṇas. Moreover, Yoga-sūtra, I. 40, and Vyāsa-bhāshya, I. 45, speak of paramāṇu and aṇu in the sense of earth-atoms, etc. Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms (paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides, prior (pūrvadeśa) and posterior (uttaradeśa).

Footnote 24:

Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the ultimate unit of time (kshaṇa). The whole world is nothing else but a series of kshaṇas. This view differs from the Buddhist view that everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other thing but the kshaṇas (na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate. Yoga-vārttika, III. 52).

Footnote 25:

There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word “kshaṇapratiyogi” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the growth associated with a particular kshaṇa or moment (kshaṇapracayāśraya). The word pratiyogī is interpreted by Vācaspati as related (pratisambandhī). Bhikshu, however, gives a quite different meaning. He interprets kshaṇa as “interval” and pratiyogī as “opposite of” (virodhī). So “kshaṇapratiyogī” means with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession. There is according to his interpretation no interval between the cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.

Footnote 26:

Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here intended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.

Footnote 27:

Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhya-kārikā, 25.

Footnote 28:

Tattvavaiśāradī, III. 41.

Footnote 29:

This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus in Dr. P. C. Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II.

Footnote 30:

Yoga-vārttika, I. 45.

Footnote 31:

I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the guṇas (except the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms. See Yoga-vārttika, III. 52.

Footnote 32:

Cf. Vyāsa-bhāshya—“sabdādīnāṃ mūrttisamānajátīyānāṃ,” IV. 14.

Footnote 33:

Vyāsa-bhāshya, II. 19.

Footnote 34:

Vyāsa-bhāshya, III. 13.

Footnote 35:

Ibid.

Footnote 36:

Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from Heaven and was turned into a snake.

Footnote 37:

Tattravaiśāradī, IV, 3.

Footnote 38:

I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions of the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the conservative side of mind as the repository of all experiences, memory, etc.

Footnote 39:

If this is a Sāṃkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina influence.

Footnote 40:

Compare Pañcaśikha, svalpasaṇkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ, Tattvakaumudī, 2.

Footnote 41:

Pratyaya is explained in Yoga-vārttika, II. 28, as sampratyaya or prāmāṇyaniścaya.

Footnote 42:

Yudhishṭhira led falsely Droṇa to believe that the latter’s son was dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the same name as that of his son that had died.

Footnote 43:

This book has, however, not yet been published.

Footnote 44:

Dr. Ray’s Hindu Chemistry, Vol. II, p. 81.

Footnote 45:

Avidyā manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions (kleśa) of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy) and abhiniveśa (self-love); (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3) as error of sense. All these manifestations of avidyā are also the different forms of viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake). This bhrama in Yoga is the thinking of something as that which it is not (anyathākhyāti). Thus we think the miserable worldly existence as pleasurable and attribute the characteristics of prakṛti to purusha and vice versa. All afflictions are due to this confusion and misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis in all their transmigrations from one life to another. Sāṃkhya, however, differs from Yoga and thinks that all error (avidyā or bhrama) is due only to non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus non-distinction (aviveka) between prakṛti and purusha is the cause of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and aviveka are thus synonymous with Sāṃkhya.

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. ● Enclosed italics font in underscores.