Part 10

In August of the year following his accession he paid his first visit as Emperor to England. It was a very different thing, one may imagine, from the earliest recorded visit of a German Emperor to the English Court. That was in 1416, when the Emperor Sigismund (1411-1437) arrived there and was received by Henry V. Henry postponed the opening of Parliament specially on his account, made him a Knight of the Garter, and signed with him at Canterbury an offensive and defensive alliance against France. How poor the German Empire and the German Emperor were at that epoch may be judged from the fact that on his way home Sigismund had to pawn the costly gifts he had received in England.

On the present occasion a grand naval review of over a hundred warships, with crews totalling 25,000 men, was held in honour of the Emperor at Osborne. This was followed, a few days afterwards, by a parade of the troops at Aldershot under the command of General Sir Evelyn Wood. On this occasion, after expressing his admiration for the British troops, the Emperor concluded: "At Malplaquet and Waterloo, Prussian and British blood flowed in the prosecution of a common enterprise." In a little speech after the review the Emperor spoke of the English navy as "the finest in the world." The impression made by the Emperor on Sir Evelyn has been recorded by that general. "The Emperor is extremely wide-awake," he writes to a friend, "with a decided, straightforward manner. He is a good rider. His quick and very intelligent spirit seizes every detail at a glance, and he possesses a wonderful memory." The Emperor was now nominated an honorary Admiral of the British navy and as a return compliment made Queen Victoria honorary "Chef" of his own First Dragoon Guards. At the naval review a journalist asked an English naval officer what would happen if the Emperor, in command of a German fleet, should meet a British fleet in time of war between England and Germany?--"Would the British fleet have to salute the Emperor?" "Certainly," replied the naval officer; "it would fire 100 guns at him."

Next year the Emperor was again in England, this time to be present at the Cowes regatta, which he took part in regularly during the four succeeding years, noting, doubtless, all that might prove useful for the development of the Kiel yachting "week," the success of which he had then, as always since, particularly at heart. He was received by Queen Victoria with the simple and homely words, "Welcome, William!"

A State visit to the City of London followed, when he was accompanied by the Empress, and was entertained to a luncheon given by the City Fathers in the Guildhall. The entertainment, which took place on July 10, 1891, was remarkable for a speech delivered by the Emperor in English, in which, besides declaring his intention of maintaining the "historical friendship" between England and Germany, he proclaimed that his great object "above all" was the preservation of peace, "since peace alone can inspire that confidence which is requisite for a healthy development of science, art, and commerce." On the same occasion he expressed his feeling of "being at home" in England--"this delightful country"--and spoke of the "same blood which flows alike in the veins of Germans and English." Shortly afterwards he attended a review of volunteers at Wimbledon, and, as he said, was "agreeably astonished at the spectacle of so many citizen-soldiers in a country that had no conscription."

The Emperor returned from England to receive the visit of his chief Triplice ally, the Emperor Franz Joseph, and to discuss with him doubtless the European situation. Bismarck has been pictured as sitting at the European chessboard pondering the moves necessary tor Germany to win the game of which the great prize was the hegemony of Europe. The chief opposing Pieces, whose aid or neutrality was desirable, were for long France, Russia, Austria, and Italy; but in 1883, with the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, Austria and Italy needed less to be considered, and the only two really important opposing pieces left were France and Russia. Still, Germany, through her allies of the Triplice, might be dragged into war, and consequently the doings of Austria and Italy, both in relation to one another and to France and Russia were, as they now are, of great importance to her.

At the time of the accession, the chessboard of our metaphor was mainly occupied with Franco-German relations and with Russian designs on Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea. The danger to Germany of war with France, which had arisen out of the Boulanger and Schnaebele incidents, had died down, but not altogether ceased. Hohenlohe tells us how at this time, in conversation with the Emperor, the latter ventured the forecast: "Boulanger is sure to succeed. I prophesy that as Kaiser Ernest he will pay a visit to Berlin." He was wrong, we know, as so many prophets are.

Russian designs on Turkey had had to reckon with the opposition of England and Austria. As regards these designs, Bismarck says:

"Germany's policy should be one of reserve. Germany would act very foolishly if in Oriental questions, without having special interests, she took a side before the other Powers, who were more nearly interested: she would therefore do well to refrain from making her move as long as possible, and thus, besides, gain the benefit of longer peace."

The Chancellor, however, admitted that against the advantages of a policy of reserve had to be set the disadvantage of Germany's position in the centre of Europe with its frontiers exposed to the attacks of a coalition. "From this situation," said the Chancellor, "it results that Germany is perhaps the only Great Power in Europe which is not tempted to attain its ends by victorious war."

"Our interest," he goes on,

"is to maintain peace, whereas our continental neighbours without exception have wishes, either secret or officially admitted, which can only be fulfilled through war. Consequently, German policy must be to prevent war or confine it as much as possible: to keep in the background while the European game of cards is going on: and not by loss of patience or concession at the cost of the country, or vanity, or provocation from friends, allow ourselves to be driven from the waiting attitude: otherwise--plectuntur Achivi!--third parties will rejoice."

That was the Bismarckian policy twenty-five years ago, and though new economic conditions have had great influence in modifying it since, particularly as it regards the East, it is practically Germany's policy now.

In his first speech from the throne to the Reichstag the Emperor thus referred to the Triple Alliance:

"Our Alliance with Austria-Hungary is publicly known. I hold to the same with German fidelity, not merely because it has been concluded, but because I see in this defensive union a foundation for the balance of power in Europe and a legacy of German history, the importance of which is recognized by the whole of the German people, while it accords with European international law as undeniably in force up to 1866. Similar historical relations and similar national exigences of the time bind us to Italy. Both Germany and Italy desire to prolong the blessings of peace that they may pursue in tranquillity the consolidation of their newly acquired unity, the betterment of their national institutions, and the increase of their prosperity."

In a speech a few months later he declared that the Alliance had no other purpose than to strengthen the peaceful relations of Germany to other foreign Powers. His next public reference to it was in May, 1900, when Kaiser Franz Joseph visited Berlin on the occasion of the coming of age of the German Crown Prince. "Truly," exclaimed the Emperor, in a vein of some exaggeration,

"this Alliance is not alone an agreement in the eyes of the monarchs, but the longer it has existed, the deeper has it taken root in the convictions of the peoples, and the moment that the hearts of the peoples beat in unison nothing can tear them asunder. Common interests, common feelings, joy and sorrow shared together, unite our three nations for now twenty years, and although often enough misunderstandings and sarcasm and criticisms have been poured out on them, the three peoples have succeeded in maintaining peace hitherto, and are regarded by the whole world as its champions."

The history of the Triplice may be shortly related here as, along with his navy, it is regarded by the Emperor as the chief factor in the preservation of the world's peace, and is, in fact, as has been said, the foundation of his foreign policy. It arose from Bismarck's desire to be independent of Russia and from his dread of a European coalition--for example, that of France, Austria, and Russia--against the German Empire. "We had," Bismarck writes,

"carried on successful war against two of the European Great Powers (Austria and France), and it became advisable to withdraw at least one of them from the temptation to revenge which lay in the prospect an alliance with others offered. It could not be France, as any one who knew the history and temperament of the two peoples could see, nor England owing to her dislike of permanent alliances, nor Italy as her support alone was insufficient against an anti-German coalition; so that the choice lay between Austria-Hungary and Russia."

For many reasons Bismarck would have preferred the Russian alliance, among others the traditional dynastic friendship between the two countries and the fact that no natural political or religious causes of conflict existed between them; while a union with Austria was less reliable, owing to the changeable nature of her public opinion, the heterogeneousness of her Magyar, Slav, and Catholic populations, and the loss of influence by the German element with the governing body. On the other hand, however, an alliance with Austria would be nothing new, internationally, as such a connection theoretically arose from the former connection of Germany and Austria in the Holy Roman Empire. While weighing the matter, a threatening letter from Czar Alexander II to William I, in which he called on Germany to support his Balkan policy, and said that if he refused peace could not last between their two countries, decided Bismarck in favour of Austria. The chief opponent of the new Alliance was William I, who was moved by personal chivalric feelings towards his nephew, Czar Alexander; but, disregarding this, because confident of eventually persuading his imperial master, Bismarck went to Gastein and there settled with the Austrian Minister, Count Andrassy, the principles of the Alliance. Italy came into the Alliance in 1883 as the immediate result of France obtaining a protectorate in Tunis, in return, partly, for her acquiescence in the English acquisition of Cyprus. The protectorate aroused general indignation and fear in Italy, and though it meant a large expenditure on naval and military armament, on May 20, 1882, she joined the Dual Alliance for five years, and thus turned it into the Triplice.

The Triple Alliance rests on three treaties: one between Germany and Austria-Hungary, one between Germany and Italy, and one between Austria-Hungary and Italy. While by the first Germany and Austria-Hungary bind themselves to combine in case of an attack on either by Russia, whether as original foe or as ally, and to observe "at least" benevolent neutrality in case of attack from any other quarter, by the second Germany and Italy bind themselves to mutual support in case of an attack on either by France. The third, between Austria-Hungary and Italy, binds the signatories to benevolent neutrality in case Austria-Hungary is attacked by Russia, or Italy by France.

That there are weak points in the Triple Alliance is obvious. If Austria-Hungary were a purely homogeneous country like France or Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, even without Italy, could face with confidence an attack from either or both their powerful neighbours. But Austria-Hungary is not homogeneous. A large proportion of her population is anti-German, or at least non-German, and Italy is always subject to be tempted by an opportunity of obtaining some of Austria-Hungary's Adriatic possessions. Moreover, a large party is even now to be found in Austria-Hungary which desires revenge for the humiliation of her defeat by Germany in 1866.

The relations of Germany to Russia have always been rather those of friendship between the monarchs of the two countries than of friendship between the two peoples; and it is easy to understand that the fear of revolution, Socialism, or "government of the people, by the people, for the people," to use Lincoln's celebrated phrase, at all times forms a strong and active bond of sympathy between the monarchs. In the case of Russia there is also always to be considered the obstinate, or as the Emperor would call it knightly, spirit in which his grandfather, King William I, regarded his obligation to maintain friendship with the Czar, and which for a long time made him hostile to the idea of alliance with Austria instead of alliance with Russia. The feeling, it is highly probable, is strong, if not equally strong, in the mind of the Emperor to-day, if only out of respect for the memory of his ancestor. There is not, to use a popular expression, much love lost between the two peoples, not only because of racial differences between Teuton and Slav, but because of the differences in religion and in degree of civilization. There are not a few Germans who assert that Germany's next war will be with Russia, and that from the dominions of the Czar will be obtained the fresh territory Germany needs for her constantly expanding population.

The Czar returned the Emperor's accession visit in Berlin in October, 1889, and it was on this occasion that the first sign of trouble between the Emperor and the old Chancellor showed itself. When the Emperor first proposed to make his round of visits of accession to foreign sovereigns, Bismarck agreed except as regarded Russia and England, objecting that visits to these countries would have an alternatively bad effect in each. The Emperor, however, as has been noted, went to Russia. During the return visit in Berlin, Bismarck had an interview with the Czar which resulted in the final adjustment of Russo-German relations, but at its close the Czar said, "Yes, I believe you and have confidence in you, but are you sure you will remain in office?" Bismarck looked surprised, and said, "Certainly, Majesty; I am quite certain I shall remain in office all my life"--an odd thing, one may remark, for a man to say, who must have been familiar with the saying, "Put not your trust in princes."

When the Czar was going away, both the Emperor and Bismarck accompanied him to the station, and on their return the Emperor gave the old Chancellor a seat in his carriage. The talk concerned the visit just over, and the Emperor again announced his intention of spending some time in Russia the following year. Bismarck now advised against the project on the ground that it would arouse hostility in Austria, and because "it was not suitable considering the Czar's disposition towards the Emperor."

"What disposition? What do you mean? How do you know?" questioned the Emperor quickly.

"From confidential letters I am in the habit of receiving from St. Petersburg, in addition to official reports," replied the Chancellor.

The Emperor expressed a wish to see the letters, but Bismarck gave an evasive answer. The result was a temporary coolness between Emperor and Chancellor.

From a memorandum of Prince Hohenlohe's we get a glimpse of one of the political currents and anti-currents just now running high. Prince Hohenlohe writes under date, June 27, 1888, when the Emperor was hardly a fortnight on the throne:--