Part 13

Answer. This is an objection founded on an undefinable something aside from divine precept; yet as some terms in it have been much used in polemic divinity by men of eminent talents and piety, whose praise is in the churches, I think it neither proper nor modest to dissent from so high authority without offering some reasons. I shall, therefore, make a few general observations on what is called the moral law, the eternal rule of right and wrong, or the nature of things; all of which phrases, I believe, have been occasionally used by eminent writers as conveying the same ideas.

I cannot agree with such as suppose that a moral law or nature of things exists independently of the will of God and is the common law of God and man. It appears to me as inconsistent to suppose a law to exist without a lawgiver as to suppose a world to exist without a creator. If God is the only eternal and independent Being in the universe, and if all things are the work of his power and goodness, then the supposition that an eternal law exists independently of him appears to me to be absurd, as on this supposition there exists a law without a lawgiver and an effect without a cause. If God is not the author of all things, then there must be more than one eternal cause of things.

To suppose that the reason and fitness of things independently of the will of God, either in his works, his providence, or word, can be a rule of man's duty appears to me as inconsistent as to suppose that men might institute divine worship from such fitness of things independently of the existence of God; for the will of God to man seems as necessary to lay a foundation of moral obligation and to direct man's obedience as the existence of God is necessary to lay a foundation of religious worship. Should it be asked whether the laws of God are not founded on the eternal nature and fitness of things, I would answer that such a supposition appears to me no more reasonable than to suppose that his power is founded on the eternal capacity of things; for the capacity of things has just as much reality and eternity in it to found the omnipotence of God upon, as the reason and nature of things have to found his infinite wisdom or justice upon.

I therefore dissent from all standard of moral obligation which are supposed to exist aside from, and independently of, the divine will; and fully agree with the Assembly's Shorter Catechism, in the answer to this question: "What is the duty which God requires of man? Answer: The duty which God requires of man is obedience to his revealed will." Should it, however, be said that things do exist aside from the divine will, that it does not depend on the divine will, but on the nature of things, that two and two make four, or that a thing cannot be in motion and at rest at the same time, it is by no means admitted that this order or constitution of things exists independently of God; but it is believed to be as much the effect of his power and goodness as anything else. And if God is not the author of all the laws both in the natural and moral world, it may reasonably be inquired, who is?

If God is the moral governor of the world, then all his laws over men, as moral beings, must be moral laws; and to make a distinction between the laws designed to regulate the moral conduct of men, and to call some of them moral and others by different names, seems to me not necessary, while I find no such distinction in the Scriptures. Because some of God's laws were intended to be temporary, under certain circumstances, they were no less of a moral nature on that account; neither was it any less criminal to violate them.

As created things are in some respects constantly changing, and as the relations of things are often varied, so a law may be relatively right at one time and relatively wrong at another. But as man is frail and short-sighted, and is incapable of seeing the end from the beginning, he is totally unable of himself to judge what is and what is not right, all things considered; hence the necessity of a revelation from God to direct his steps.

That there is a fitness of things and a standard of moral right and wrong cannot be denied; but, instead of being founded in a supposed nature of things independent of God, it originates in the very nature and perfections of God himself, and can never be known by man any farther than the nature and perfections of God are known. A standard of right and wrong independent of God, whether by the name of moral law or nature of things, is what never has been and never can be intelligibly defined. It is like a form without dimensions, like a foundation resting on nothing. It is, therefore, in my opinion, as extravagant to talk of an eternal nature of things, without reference to the laws of God, as it would be to talk of an eternal wisdom or an eternal omnipotence, independent of the existence of God.

But if the statement of the objector is meant only to imply a rule of right and wrong emanating from the nature and perfections of God, and coincident with his laws, then, admitting the propriety of the terms moral law, nature of things, etc., the objection, if it proves anything, may prove quite too much for its advocates; for under certain circumstances it has been consistent with this rule of moral right and wrong utterly to exterminate nations, to destroy men, women, and children, and show them no mercy.

Besides, the whole force of the objection rests on the supposition that no laws which have existed, and which were not contrary to the moral law, can be abrogated under the Christian dispensation or be inconsistent with the precepts of the gospel. It hence follows that whatever has been morally right and lawful for men to do must forever remain right and lawful to be done. This is a necessary result from the premises; but no Christian can consistently subscribe to this. The premises must, therefore, be unsound and the objection of no force.

If literal sacrifices, slavery, and many other practices which are totally abolished under the Christian dispensation were not contrary to the moral law under the Old Testament economy, why may not the same be true of war? Why may not the gospel forbid war as consistently as it can forbid slavery?

Objection fourth. The nature of religion and morality under the ancient dispensation was the same as under the new. Love to God and man was the substance of the law and the prophets; and though truth under the former was inculcated more by types and ceremonies, yet the essence of religion was the same under that as under the present dispensation; and as war was not inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion then, it cannot be inconsistent with the nature and precepts of religion now, under like circumstances.

Answer. It is readily admitted that the essence of religion is the same under the present as under the former dispensation, both requiring at all times and in all actions holy exercises of heart in cordial obedience to divine command; yet the laws for external conduct under the two dispensations differ widely, and the practice of war involves much of the external conduct of men. It was never right for men to indulge unholy feelings in the act of war, but the external act was required as a means of executing the divine vengeance; the gospel does not command, but seems plainly to forbid, the external act of war.

But to suppose that saints under the gospel can ever be placed in circumstances like those of the ancient church is to suppose that they may be put under the same typical economy which has vanished away, given place to the substance, and ceased to be binding even on the natural Israelites. To be in like circumstances they must also be made the executors of God's wrath, to inflict vengeance, by his particular command, on idolatrous and rebellious nations. The Israelites had the same high authority to exterminate the Canaanites and subdue the idolatrous nations about Palestine that the holy angels had to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah.

It is perfectly plain that if God should positively command Christians to take the weapons of war and not only repel invasion but actually exterminate nations, it would be their duty to obey, and a refusal would be open rebellion against God. The Old Testament saints received such commands, but Christians have no such authority, which makes a material difference in circumstances.

Some general observations relative to the different dispensations of the church of God may illustrate this topic more fully.

The Old Testament economy has sometimes, perhaps without reason, been divided into the Adamic, Patriarchal, and Mosaic dispensations of the church; but as the latter was more full and complete, and as the distinction between the Mosaic and Christian dispensations is common, I shall confine my remarks chiefly to that distinction, though I consider the great distinction to be between the Old and New Testament economies.

The Old Testament economy, in general, was typical of the New. Under the former dispensation literal and temporal things typified spiritual and everlasting things under the latter. The nation of Israel, chosen and separated from all other nations, typified the true Israel of God, who are chosen out of every nation and sanctified and set apart as a holy nation and peculiar people, to offer up spiritual sacrifices to God. The land of Canaan was a type of the heavenly Canaan. Jerusalem was a type of the New Jerusalem from above. Mount Zion and the royal throne of Israel, which were in Jerusalem, typified the heavenly Zion and the throne of the true David who now reigns in glory. The sacrifices were types of spiritual offerings. The Israelites had enemies within and foes without, literal weapons of war and literal warfare, typical of spiritual foes, spiritual armor, and spiritual warfare. Their kings were seated on the throne of the Lord (see 1 Chron. xxix. 23). At the command of God they judged and made war and conquered their enemies and thus typified the Son of God who is now on the throne of his Father David, and who in righteousness judges and makes war and rides forth conquering and to conquer. The ancient promises and threatenings were mostly temporal, but typical of spiritual and everlasting promises and threatenings. Doubtless the gospel was preached by types and figures under the Old Testament economy, and the saints of old looked upon those temporal things merely as shadows representing a more enduring substance. When they looked upon Canaan, the land of promise, they viewed it as a type of the heavenly Canaan, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on earth seeking a better country. When they looked on the bleeding lamb they beheld, by the eye of faith, the Lamb of God who taketh away the sins of the world.

Thus we may see that almost the whole of the Old Testament economy was typical and temporary, and not intended to be perfect and everlasting. But under the gospel dispensation we have a new covenant and better promises which are intended to be perfect and everlasting. It is therefore more proper for those who live under this new and perfect dispensation to look at the substance than at the shadow for a rule of duty. Errors are often and easily propagated by reasoning from analogy and introducing it as proof of sentiments instead of illustration. This is frequently done in relation to the Old Testament economy and common political government. It is not uncommon to hear ministers, in their political sermons, reason and infer just as if there were a perfect parallel between the Jewish theocracy and political governments, when at the head of one was the Lord of hosts and at the head of the others are but men; when one was the church of the living God, and the others are but human institutions. They not unfrequently speak of God's driving out the heathen before his American Israel and planting them in a goodly land, as though there were a perfect parallel between the Americans driving the Indians from their native soil and taking possession of it themselves, without divine commission, and the Israelites going at the express command of God and taking possession of Canaan. Thus they endeavor to keep up a parallel between God's ancient church and civil governments. The economy of God's ancient covenant people was by no means a political institution in the popular sense, but it was a dispensation of the church of God, and in its rites, ceremonies, and government was typical of the kingdom of Messiah under his mediatorial reign, and differed widely in its nature, origin, and design from mere political governments; therefore all reasoning drawn from a supposed analogy between them is specious and false. The Israelites had no authority to enact laws or to alter God's laws one iota; their duty was implicitly to obey them.

But if Christians take their authority for going to war from the practice of the Old Testament saints, their example will prove too much; it will not only allow war, but offensive war in its most dreadful forms.

Objection fifth. Abraham went to war, not like the Israelites at the command of God, yet he met with the divine approbation when he returned from the slaughter of the kings; he, therefore, must have acted on a universal law still in force; and as Christians are called the children of Abraham they ought, of course, to imitate his example in such things as God approved.

Answer. Abraham, like the Israelites, was under a typical dispensation and practiced rites and ceremonies which were a shadow of good things to come. That he acted without divine command, in the war referred to, is more than we are warranted to say. He was a prophet and the friend of God and probably was acquainted with the divine will on this subject.

Christians are not called the children of Abraham because they imitate his example in war, but because they exercise like precious faith with him. If Christians are warranted to imitate the example of Abraham in all things which were tolerated by God, then they may sacrifice cattle, practice polygamy, and buy and hold slaves. But if they object to his example as a rule of duty in these instances, why not object to his example as a rule of duty in the case of war?

But to say that he acted from some universal law still in force is taking for granted the question in dispute, and cannot be admitted without evidence.

The war waged by Abraham against the kings was, I apprehend, offensive rather than defensive; for Lot, his brother's son, whom he rescued, did not then belong to his family or kingdom, but was separated from him and was also a patriarch, a father of nations, and a prince or head over his own house or kingdom.

It appears very evident that offensive as well as defensive war was tolerated under the patriarchal economy, as may be seen from the words of the inspired Jacob when blessing his sons (Gen. xlviii. 22). That, as well as the Mosaic dispensation, was typical, and doubtless war was allowed under both for the same reasons.

But there can be no doubt that whoever attempts to justify war by the example of Abraham may equally justify the slavery of our fellow-men; and whoever depends on his example for authority for engaging in war, to be consistent, must advocate and defend the doctrine of slavery.

Objection sixth. It appears to be a universal law of God that "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." If one man, or one nation, attacks another and sheds his blood, his own must be shed in return. Hence this precept not only authorizes taking away the life of a murderer, but authorizes nations to repel by war nations that wage war against them.

Answer. Whether this was a precept given to man as a rule of duty or not is very questionable, though it has generally been so construed, at least since the dark ages of the church; and it is still more questionable whether it is a universal and perpetual law.