Appendix C

MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES AT VEREENIGING, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, THURSDAY, THE 29TH OF MAY, 1902, AND THE FOLLOWING DAYS

MAY 29TH, 1902.

The Rev. J.D. Kestell having offered prayer, the Chairman requested Vice-President Burger to address the meeting.

Vice-President Burger said that the documents laid before the Governments by the Commission would now be read to the meeting. Thereupon Mr. D. Van Velden read the following letter:

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.

PRETORIA, 28th May, 1902.

To the Governments of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic:

HONBLE. GENTLEMEN,--

In accordance with instructions received from you, we went to Pretoria in order to negotiate with the British authorities on the question of peace. We have the honour to make the following report:

The meetings lasted from Monday, May 19th, to Wednesday, May 28th, its prolongation having been principally caused by the length of time taken up by the cable correspondence with the British Government.

We first handed in a proposal (annexed under A) in which we attempted to negotiate on the basis of a limited independence with surrender of part of our territory. Lords Kitchener and Milner refused emphatically to negotiate on this basis, and expressed the opinion that to cable this proposal to the British Government would be detrimental to the objects of these negotiations. They told us they had already informed the two Governments that the British Government would only negotiate on the basis of an amended form of the Middelburg proposal. In order finally to formulate this proposal, Lord Milner asked the assistance of some members of the Commission; and this was granted, on the understanding that the assistance of these members of the Commission should be given without prejudice to themselves.

As the result of the deliberations of this sub-committee, Lord Milner produced a draft proposal, in which we insisted that a fresh clause (No. 11) should be inserted; and this was done. This draft proposal (annexed under B) was then cabled to the British Government, revised by them, and then communicated to us in its final shape (annexed under B). We were informed by the British Government that no further revision of this proposal would be allowed, but that it must now be either accepted or rejected in its entirety by the delegates of the two Republics; and that this acceptance or rejection must take place within a stipulated time. We then told Lord Kitchener that he should know our final decision by the evening of the next Saturday at latest.

During our formal negotiations certain informal conversations took place in reference to the British subjects (in Cape Colony and Natal) who have been fighting on our side. As a result of these informal conversations a communication from the British Government was imparted to us (annexed under B).

We have the honour to remain, etc.,

LOUIS BOTHA. J.H. DE LA REY. C.R. DE WET. J.B.M. HERTZOG. J.D. SMUTS.

Vice-President Burger said that the delegates must proceed to discuss this document, and that they would then be asked to decide--firstly, whether the struggle should be continued; secondly, whether the proposal of the British Government should be accepted; and, thirdly, whether they were prepared to surrender unconditionally.

It was decided that minutes of the meeting should be kept, and the delegates then proceeded to discuss the different articles of the British Government's proposal. The whole of the morning and a part of the afternoon sitting were devoted to questions dealing with the meaning of the several clauses, the members of the Commission answering to the best of their ability.

After these questions had been disposed of, Mr. De Clercq rose to speak. He said that he had already given his own opinion, but that now it was for the whole meeting to decide whether they would give up the war, and, if they resolved to do so, whether they would accept the proposal unconditionally. As to the proposal, it could not be denied that it did not give all that they themselves desired, but that could not have been expected. Should they now return to their commandos and be asked by their burghers what they had effected, they would have to reply, "Nothing." How would they be able to meet their burghers with such an answer as that? It would therefore be better to get terms from the British Government; and by doing so they would also gratify the British nation. As for himself, he was for accepting the proposal, unless it could be proved to him that unconditional surrender would be a still better course to take.

General Nieuwouwdt then proposed that the meeting should, without further delay, proceed to vote whether the war should be terminated, and whether the terms offered to them should be accepted.

General Froneman seconded this proposal.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) felt that this was too important a matter to be treated with such haste. A decision about such a document as the one now lying before the meeting could not be come to in a moment. The delegates would hardly agree with the last speaker in his opinion that they should at once proceed to vote whether the war should or should not be continued. Time was required before coming to such a decision. Moreover it had to be proved whether it were possible to continue the war. There were some districts where it certainly could no longer be carried on. Was it possible for one part of the nation to continue fighting without the other? Then there was the question whether their resources and the troops which they still had were sufficient to justify them in prolonging the struggle. If they were insufficient the war must be discontinued and terms must be accepted. It would not be an easy thing to do; one could not, with a light heart, give up the independence of their country; but half a loaf was better than no bread, and even such a sacrifice as this might be necessary if the nation was to be saved.

Commandant Jacobsz (Harrismith) was at one with the last speaker in holding that they must not be in too great a hurry to vote on the proposal.

Mr. P.R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) felt that the proposal of the British Government would so tightly bind them that they would never again be free. They were knee-haltered now, but under certain circumstances they might even be hobbled.

He considered that the meeting should ask the Governments to stop the war.

General Du Toit (Wolmaransstad) said that the times through which they were passing were very critical; every one ought to say exactly what he thought, and no one ought to be condemned for doing so. A delegate who should say that the war could not be continued must not be considered disloyal to his country because he did so. As regarded the three questions before the meeting, according to the opinion of his burghers the war ought to be continued. The views of his burghers when he left the commandos had been clearly expressed. "Let us retain our independence, or go on fighting," they had said. But why were they of this mind? Because they were unaware how matters stood in other districts. The eyes of the delegates, however, while directed towards God, were also able to observe the condition of the eastern parts of their country. If the burghers in those parts could not hold out, it would be impossible for the other commandos to do so. It could not be denied that some of the commandos were no longer able to continue fighting. That being the case, even if there were a majority in favour of prolonging the struggle, that majority would have to yield to the wishes of the minority, and for this reason: if the war were to be continued in conformity with the wishes of the majority, and if the minority were to be compelled to surrender (and nobody would be surprised at this), then the majority would find themselves too weak to go on fighting. Thus there were clear reasons why the war must be ended. Moreover, its continuation would involve not only the national but also the moral death of the Republics. But it was still to be proved that a continuation of the war was even possible; for himself he feared that it was not so, and if fight he must he could only fight without hope and without heart. If he were now to go back to his burghers, and they were to ask him why he persisted in the war, and he was compelled to reply that he was doing so on the strength of opinions expressed in newspapers, and on the encouragement given to the cause of the Republics in their pages, he would be told that he was building on sand. Again, he feared that if the war were to be continued, detached parties would be formed which would try to obtain terms from the English for themselves. And should the commandos in time become so weak as to be forced to surrender unconditionally, what then would be the fate of the officers? Would they not lose everything, and be banished into the bargain? Let no one think, however, that he was trying merely to do what was best for himself. No. There was now a chance for negotiating; should the meeting let slip that chance, unconditional surrender would most certainly result, and that would be disastrous to all. He hoped that he would not be misunderstood; if the meeting decided to go on with the war, he, for one, would not lay down his arms. No, he would actively prosecute the war, and operate in conjunction with the other generals. But what would be the use of it: he sided with those who held that the struggle could no longer be carried on.

Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) wished to reply to those who demanded reasons for the continuation of the war. One reason, he said, was to be found in the fact that England would not allow them to have any communication with the deputation in Europe; that meant that something advantageous to us was being held back. Another was the consideration of what their descendants in time to come would say. "How is it," they would ask, "that we are not now free men? There were a large number of burghers in the veldt to continue the war--what has become of our independence?" And what answer shall we be able to make?--we whose courage failed us before such tremendous odds, and who laid down our arms when victory was still possible? The speaker would only be satisfied if the meeting were unanimous for stopping the war, not otherwise. He thought of the families. How would the delegates face their families on their return, after the sacrifice of independence? He considered that the commandos should leave those districts where resistance was no longer possible and go to others. If to discontinue the war meant to surrender independence, then the war must not be discontinued.

Vice-President Burger said that he had not heard from the last speaker any reasons whatsoever for continuing the war.

Commandant Rheeder then remarked that if they wanted to surrender their country they should have done so earlier, when the burghers were not entirely destitute. But now nothing was left to them. As to the narrowness of the field of operations, there was still room enough to fight.

Commandant P.L. Uijs (Pretoria) referred to the frequent allusion which had been made to their European deputation. That deputation was now in Holland, and must know if anything was going on there to the advantage of the Republics. If there were any hopeful signs there, their comrades would certainly have informed them. They had not done so, and therefore the meeting should dismiss this subject from its thoughts.

The meeting then adjourned until 7.15 p.m.

Upon reassembling, Commandant Cronje (Winburg) said that he would not detain the meeting for long; he only wished to say a very few words. It had been rightly said that they were passing through a momentous period of their history. To his mind the present was the critical epoch in the existence of the African nation, whose destinies they had now to decide. Delegates were asking what hopes they could now entertain. But what grounds for hope were there when the war began? In his opinion there were none. It was only that men believed then that Right was Might, and put their trust in God. And God had helped them. When the enemy had entered their country everything was dark. There had been a day on which more than four thousand men had surrendered. Then, even as now, they had been without hope. Then, even as now, those who wanted to continue the war had been told that they were mad. That had been some two years ago, and yet the war was still going on. Then, even as now, there had been no food, and yet they had managed to live. The delegates represented a free people; let them not take a step of which they would afterwards repent. As regarded intervention, he had often said that one could not rely on it. But they could rely on God. When he returned to his burghers, and was questioned as to his reason for the course of action which he had advocated, he hoped to be able to answer, "Belief in God." There had always been times when there was no food, and yet they had always managed to live. A deputation had been officially sent to Europe, and was now there to represent their interests. Had the meeting lost its confidence in that deputation? Did it not realize that if the case of the Republic was hopeless in Europe the deputation would send word to that effect? It had been said that by continuing the war they would be exterminating the nation. He did not believe this. The way to exterminate the nation was to accept the British proposal. To go on with the war was their only policy, and it was a very good policy. The deputation had claimed that their advice should be taken before any negotiations were attempted. What right, then, had the delegates to give up the war on the basis of the proposal now before them? To do so was to give the death blow to their national existence; later on they would have cause to rue it. Moreover, the proposal did not safeguard the interests of their brethren in Cape Colony. Again, landed property belonging to burghers had already been sold, and in all probability these burghers would never see any of the proceeds. The sum (L3,000,000) which the proposal offered to compensate for all damages, was not sufficient to cover damage already done. For these and other reasons the proposal could not be accepted. No other course was open to them except to reject the proposal and to continue hostilities.

General Froneman (Ladybrand) agreed with the last speaker. He loved his country, and could not think of surrendering it. The reasons which had induced them to begin the war were still in force. He had been through the whole campaign, and saw stronger reasons now than ever before for the continuing of the war. His districts, like those of others, were exhausted, and yet his burghers remained in the veldt. He had been present at the surrender of the four thousand; he had seen General Cronje give up his sword. Those had been dark days, but the struggle still went on; they could still keep on their legs. It had been God's will that this war should take place. Prayers had been offered that it might be averted, but God had ruled it otherwise. Therefore they must carry the war through, and never think of surrender. They were Republicans. What would it be to have to give up that name for ever? He had consulted his burghers and their women-folk; he had asked them, "What conditions of peace will you accept?" They had answered, "No peace at all, if it means any loss of independence." And so, before he could vote for peace, he would have again to take the opinion of his burghers.

Veldtcornet B.H. Breijtenbach (Utrecht) urged that a definite yes or no must be given to the question, Is the war to continue? The general condition of the country had been laid before the meeting, and it had been clearly shown that its condition made the carrying on of the war impossible. One could not escape from that fact. Why then should they argue any longer? What reason had they for wishing to prolong this struggle? They surely would not do so blindfold. Unless good reasons could be alleged for continuing it, the war would have to be stopped. As those good reasons were not forthcoming, he would vote with those who were for peace. To continue the war would be a crime. Some of the last few speakers had stated that there had been no sufficient reasons for commencing the war. That might be true. They might have been over-confident then. Be that as it might, they certainly had lost so much ground since then that they must now give up the struggle. This was his irrevocable opinion. It had been clearly shown that fourteen commandos were unable to continue in the veldt. This made peace a necessity, for what was to be gained by continuing a struggle without a proper army. The war might last a few months longer, but it must end then--and end in disaster.

Commandant W.J. Viljoen (Witwatersrand) said that some speakers were for and others against the continuation of hostilities. The first were guided by faith alone; the second had brought forward definite grounds for their opinion. A year ago both parties had been inspired by faith, but what had been the result? He would be glad enough to be convinced, but those who wished to continue the war must show grounds for such a line of action.

General De la Rey would only say a few words. He had received definite instructions before he went to his burghers neither to encourage nor discourage them, whatever they might say at their meetings. He had strictly observed these instructions, and had never attempted to influence them. There were present among the delegates nine men (one being from Cape Colony) who represented his burghers, and who would testify as to their state of mind and temper; he need not therefore say anything. The delegates could bear witness how full of courage the men were. Nevertheless, the war could not be continued. Say or do what they would at that meeting, the war must cease. Some had talked about faith. But what was faith? True faith consisted in saying, "Lord, Thy will, not mine, be done." They must bow before the will of God. The delegates, he continued, must choose one of the three courses which were open to them. It would be a great calamity if they were to decide to surrender unconditionally. Had it been necessary to do so it should have been done while they still possessed something. Should they then continue the war? But the question as to what would become of the people under those circumstances must be faced--to continue fighting would be the ruin of the nation. The delegates might go away determined to fight, but the burghers would lay down their arms, and the state of affairs which would thus ensue would not redound to their honour. But the British Government offered guarantees; it would help the nation so that the nation might help itself. If any one were to say now, "Continue fighting," he and his generals might have the heart to do so if they kept their minds fixed on their recent exploits. For himself, however, he would refuse absolutely to accede to that request. And what real advantage had accrued from his successes in the veldt? What had followed on them? All his cattle had been taken away, some three hundred of his men had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Some of the delegates set their hopes on the European deputation, but what did that deputation say a year ago? It said that all depended on their continuing to fight. They had continued to fight. What more, then, was there left for them to do? Some gentlemen present had definite mandates from their burghers, who very likely had no knowledge of the actual state of affairs when they gave those mandates. He himself had not known at that time in what a plight the country was. He challenged each and all of the delegates to show their burghers the proposal of the British Government, and then to see if those burghers were not in favour of unconditional surrender. But if the meeting insisted on the continuation of hostilities, the nation would be driven into hands-upping; thus the war would end in dishonour and disgrace.

Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) was glad that General De la Rey had spoken out so boldly; it was every one's duty to do so. He himself also was against the continuance of the war.

Although it had been said that the war had been begun in faith, it ought not to be forgotten that it had also been begun with hope of intervention, as was shown by the sending of the deputation to Europe--that deputation which, as they had often heard, had done so much good work. Another proof that there had then been hope of intervention was that the burghers had ordered the delegates to keep them in communication with the deputation. And that they had not relied exclusively on faith at the beginning of the war was shown by the fact that they had founded great hopes on what their brethren in Cape Colony might accomplish. These hopes had now been dissipated by General Smuts, who had just said that there was no chance of a general insurrection.

Again, could the war be continued when their commandos were so much weakened, and when food was so scarce? It was nonsense to say that food had been scarce a year ago; there had been a sufficiency then, and at the present time there was not. One could ride from Vereeniging to Piet Retief without seeing more than two or three herds of cattle. Moreover, the women and children were in a most pitiable condition. One delegate had spoken against any scheme which would be as it were a trampling on the blood which had already been spilt--he shared that delegate's sentiments; but he considered that to shed yet more blood in a cause which was to all appearance hopeless would be still more reprehensible. He should prefer not to enter into the religious aspect of the question. It was difficult to fathom the purposes of God; perhaps it might be the Divine will that they should lose their independence. All that they could do was to follow the course which seemed to be good and right. Were they, then, to surrender unconditionally? He would say no. It would be giving the enemy opportunities for doing things from which they might otherwise desist. Moreover, by voting for such a policy the leaders would incur the displeasure of the nation. In choosing what course they would pursue the delegates should let nothing else sway them save the good of the nation. They must not be carried away by their feelings; they must listen only to the voice of reason.

Commandant H.S. Grobler (Bethal) felt that, under the circumstances, the war could not be continued. It had already reduced them to such straits that they would soon have to fly to the utmost borders of their territories, leaving the enemy unopposed in the very heart of the country. At the beginning of the war they had not relied on faith alone; there had also been guns, war material and provisions. But now none of these things were left to them. It was terrible to him to think that they must sacrifice the independence of their country. He was a true son of his country, and could not consent to the surrender of her independence unless that were the only way of saving the women and children from starvation. But it was not only the women and children who were on the verge of starvation; the burghers still left in the laagers were in the same predicament. What, moreover, was to happen to the prisoners of war, if the struggle were to be continued? And to the families in the camps? The delegates must not forget those families. If the people generally were dying a national, the families were dying a moral, death. It was a sad thought that there were among their women in the camps, many who were thus losing their moral vitality. It was a thought which should make them determined to conclude the war.

Commandant Van Niekerk (Ficksburg) said that his commandos had commissioned him to hold out for independence. The proposal of the British Government could not be accepted. They must take no hasty step. If they persevered in the war, the enemy would grant them better terms. All they had to do was to act like brave men.

General J.G. Celliers (Lichtenburg) had already told the meeting what mandate he had received from his burghers. But he was there to do the best he could for the nation as a whole. The condition of the country was very critical. The fact that his own commandos were faring well was not a sufficient reason for continuing the war. He must take all circumstances into consideration. He had said that he was in favour of an arrangement by which peace should be made without the sacrifice of independence. Such an arrangement they had attempted to bring about. They had elected a Commission, which had done all in its power to give effect to their wishes in this matter. And the result was the proposal of the British Government now lying before them. That was what the Commission had obtained for them. Which of them could say that he could have obtained better terms for the people than those contained in that proposal? Or that, if the war were to be continued, the people would gain any advantage which that proposal did not give them? It had been said that the deputation in Europe had encouraged the burghers in their prolonged struggle. The last message they had received from the deputation had been: "Go on till every remedy has been tried." Could that be called encouragement? It had also been said that the nation must have faith. He admitted the necessity--but it must not be the sort of faith which chose what it would believe, and what it would disbelieve. They must be prepared to believe that it might be the will of God that they should yield to the enemy. As he had more insight into the state of affairs than his burghers, and therefore was better qualified to form a judgment, he did not feel himself bound by their mandate. Had the burghers known what he now knew, they would have given him a very different commission. He felt that it was a serious thing to continue sacrificing the lives of his fellow-countrymen. Moreover, however dear independence might be, it was useless to attempt impossibilities. Their one aim should be to safeguard the interests of the nation. His vote would be with those who were for accepting the proposal of the British Government.

Commander-in-Chief de Wet was the next to address the meeting. His speech was as follows:--

"As I feel it to be my duty to speak out all my mind before this meeting, I shall go back to the very beginning of the war. And recalling my feelings at that period, I can say that I had less hope then for intervention than I have now. I do not mean to say that I am sanguine about it even now; but I know to-day, what I did not know then, that great sympathy is felt for us by other nations. Even in England this sympathy is to be found, as is shown by the largely-attended 'Pro-Boer' meetings which have been held in that country. And that the feeling in our favour is widespread is evident from the reports which we received by word of mouth from the messenger to whom the deputation entrusted its recent letter, for we cannot believe that the deputation would have employed an unreliable person. And what did that messenger say? Among other things, he said that our cause was winning new adherents every day. It may be asked, however, why the deputation did not send a report of its own? I reply that it had its hand upon the pulse of the Governments, and that the information it was thus gaining was of such a character that it could not be entrusted to any messenger whatsoever. Perhaps the deputation was unable in any way to communicate what it knew to us--it would never do to noise abroad the secrets of European policy. The silence of the delegates ought not, then, to discourage us; on the contrary, we should regard it as a hopeful sign.

"If there is any one man who feels deeply for the critical condition of our country, I am that man. And critical our condition certainly is; so that I am not surprised that some of us are asking, 'What hope have we now in continuing the struggle?' But I would ask another question: 'What hope had we at the beginning of the war?' Our faith in God--we had nothing else to rely on! At the very outset of the war I knew that we, with our forty-five thousand troops, were engaged in a contest against a nation that had no less than seven hundred and fifty thousand men under arms, and who could easily send against us a third of that number. And to counterbalance the terrible odds against us, we had nothing, as I knew, but our faith. At that time there were some who expected that effectual help would come from Cape Colony. I was never deluded by this hope. I knew of course that there were men there who would fight with us against England; I knew how much those men sympathized with our cause; but I also knew that the circumstances of that country would make it impossible for the colonists to help us more than they have, as a matter of fact, done. No! God was our one Hope when the war began. And if, when the war is over, victory lies with us, it will not be the first time that faith in God has enabled the weaker nation to overthrow the stronger.

"Those of you who urge that the war should be discontinued, ask us, who are for carrying it on, what tangible reason we have for our hope. But what tangible reason for hope was there at the beginning of the war? Are our affairs darker now? Quite the contrary--miracles have been worked in our favour during the last twenty-two months. General Botha wrote to me some time ago, saying that the scarcity of ammunition was causing him much anxiety. And he had good cause for that anxiety--ammunition was exhausted. When a burgher came to me at that time with an empty bandolier, it absolutely terrified me. But now, to use an expression of General Joubert's, my pleasure is tempered with shame when I think of the plentiful store of ammunition which we possess. I am not angry with those of my compatriots who ask for reasons--I give my reasons--nor have I given a thousandth part of them.

"The enemy has already made us some concessions. There was a time when Lord Salisbury said that the English Government would be satisfied with nothing short of unconditional surrender. He does not say so to-day. England is negotiating with us--that is to say, she shows signs of yielding to our demands. If we continue the war, England will negotiate again; she will offer still more favourable terms; she will not even stick at independence.

"Do you want more of my reasons? Look back once more upon our past history, and you shall find them. Recall the time when the Transvaal was at war with England. At that time we did not know the English so well as we now know them; we had only thirteen cartridges for each man; and there were the so-called 'Loyalists'--a chicken-hearted crew--to hamper us. Faith was our only support then--and you all know how that war resulted.

"I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I think also that we might meet the emergency in this way--a part of the men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the women, and then they could take the women with them to the English in the towns. This would be a hard expedient, but it may be the only one possible.

"America has been referred to by some of the speakers, who have compared our circumstances with those of the United States, when they made war upon England. The comparison is, in one respect at least, an apt one, for we also have large territories to which we can always retreat.

"As to Europe--we know little of the condition of things there. Our information about Europe comes only from newspapers, and 'Jingo' newspapers at that. If there is not a great deal going on in Europe which England wants to hide from us, why is she so careful not to let us see European journals? If there were anything in them unfavourable to our cause, England would flood our country with them in her own interests. We must also note that England will not permit our deputation to return to us.

"Taking all these facts into consideration, and remembering that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself, may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued. We must fight on, no matter how long, until our independence is absolutely secure."

General Beijers (Waterberg) said that he had to give an answer to the question whether he ought to follow his reason or his conscience; he could only reply that conscience had the first claim upon him. If he were to perish whilst following the guidance of reason, he would feel that he had been unfaithful; whereas, were he to die whilst obeying the dictates of conscience, he would not fear death. Martyrs of old had died for their faith; but he feared that the martyr spirit was now only to be met with in books! Those martyrs had died, and with their death it had seemed that all was lost; but the truth, for which they had given up their lives, had lived!

But how is it now with us? We think our cause a righteous one, but are we willing to die for it? Some spoke of our existence as a nation--but whether that were to be preserved or lost, did not lie with us--it was in the hands of God--He would take care of it. Right must conquer in the end. They must take care to be on the side of right, should it even cost them their lives. He agreed with those who said that, even if the present deliberations were to come to nothing, they would have another chance, later on, of negotiating. This had been proved by what had already happened. General de Wet had shown them how Lord Salisbury had gone back upon his first demands; he (General Beijers) could tell them that on one occasion Lord Roberts had declined even to speak to General Botha--and yet the English were negotiating with them now. He was quite open to conviction, but at present he could not see that the war ought to be stopped. Nevertheless he was not blind to the critical state of their affairs. But their case was not yet hopeless; their anxiety about food, their lack of horses--these were not insurmountable difficulties. They might even find some means by which to save their womenfolk.

No. These difficulties were not insuperable; but there was one difficulty which was insuperable--the present spirit of the nation. When a spirit, be it what it might, inspired or ruled a man, then that man would submit to no other sway. The spirit that now ruled the burghers was a spirit that was driving them over to the enemy. Against that spirit it was impossible to contend. General De la Rey had said that, if the proposal now before the meeting were to be shown to the burghers, they would at once accept it--that was the sort of spirit that was in them, and one must take it into consideration, for he was convinced that it presented an insurmountable obstacle to the continuation of the war.

The meeting was then closed with prayer.

FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.

After the preliminary prayer had been offered, Vice-President Burger said that before beginning the business of the day, it was his sad duty to inform the meeting that the President of the Orange Free State had been obliged to resign, on account of serious illness. President Steyn had been compelled, in order to obtain medical assistance, to put himself in the hands of the enemy. He had further to communicate that Commander-in-Chief de Wet had been appointed Vice-President of the Orange Free State. He wished to express his deep sympathy with the representatives in the severe loss which they had sustained. President Steyn, he said, had been a rock and pillar to their great cause.

Vice-President de Wet having thanked the Vice-President of the South African Republic for his kind and sympathetic words, Mr. J. Naude (the representative of Pretoria, and of General Kemp's flying columns) put some questions with regard to the colonists who had been fighting on the Boer side. These questions were answered by General Smuts. Mr. Naude then asked if the delegates were expected to come to any decision about independence.

General Botha replied that the Governments had informed Lords Kitchener and Milner that they were not in a condition to decide that question--that it was a matter for the nation to settle. The delegates had then gone to their burghers, and now had returned, and were present.

Mr. Naude said that it must therefore have been known at Klerksdorp that the delegates had to decide upon the question of independence. If that were so, he found himself in a difficulty. Either the delegates had been misled, or they were the victims of a mistake, for they had never been told that they had been elected as plenipotentiaries. Notwithstanding all that the lawyers might say, he considered himself as having a certain definite mission. He had obtained the votes of his burghers on the understanding that he would take up a certain position. He had asked them whether independence was to be given up, and they had answered in the negative. He could not therefore vote for the acceptance of the proposal now before the meeting, for that proposal demanded the surrender of independence. His burghers had also insisted on being allowed to keep their arms, and on the use of their language in schools and Courts of Justice, both of which conditions were refused by the British proposal. Since, therefore, he could not agree to the proposal, he was for continuing the war. Some asked what were the chances of success? He remembered the state of feeling among the burghers at Warmebad--that was a dark time indeed. The Commandant-General had paid those burghers a visit, and had told them that they had nothing to lose, but everything to win, by continuing the struggle. That had been enough for them. They had not had much prospect then; they could not see whither their road was leading. But they had found out afterwards. It had been a dark time too when Pretoria was taken, but most of the burghers had remained steadfast. And after the darkness the light had come back. Again a dark cloud was over them--it would pass away, and the light would reappear.

General De la Rey explained that he had not intended to mislead anybody at the gatherings of the burghers. Every document which the Government had handed over to him had been laid before those gatherings. Mr. Naude had asked whether the delegates at that meeting had to decide about independence. Most certainly they had. And to do so was a duty devolving upon Mr. Naude as much as on any other delegate present. They would have to decide, not for their own districts alone, but for the whole country.

Mr. Naude said that he had no wish to free himself from his responsibility, but he could not forget that he had come there with a definite mission.

Judge Hertzog wished again to explain the rights of the question from a legal point of view. One must ask: If the nation were here, what would it wish to be done? And one must act in conformity with what one thinks its answer would be. The Judge then proceeded to speak on the matter in general. What, he asked, were the arguments in favour of continuing the war? In the first place, England was growing weaker just as their own nation was. Any one could see that with their own eyes. It was true as regarded the financial side of the question. No doubt England could still collect millions of pounds, if she wished, but the time would come when she would have trouble with her tax-payers. Already the British Government found it difficult to pay the interest on the sum borrowed for war expenses, as was proved by the fact that a corn tax had been levied in England. That tax would not have been levied unless things had been in a serious condition. In the second place, he would ask how it was they had not been allowed to meet their deputation? It would only have taken the deputation fourteen days to perform the journey; by now it would have been among them. But permission had been refused them. And why? It was said that to grant a permission would have been a military irregularity. But the present meeting was also a military irregularity. There must be something more behind that refusal. But what were the arguments against going on with the war? He would enumerate them--the situation in which they found themselves was critical; the country as a whole was exhausted. Nearly all the horses had died or had been captured. The strongest argument of all, however, was that some of their own people had turned against them, and were fighting in the ranks of the enemy. Then the condition of the women caused great anxiety; a fear had been expressed that a moral decay might set in among the families in the camps. That consideration had great weight with him. No one with any heart could remain indifferent to it. If there was one thing which more than anything else made him respect Commandant-General Botha, it was that the Commandant-General had the heart to feel, and the courage to express, the importance of that consideration. The present war was one of the saddest that had ever been waged. He doubted if there had ever been a war in which a nation had suffered as they had. But all those sufferings, horrible though they were, did not influence his decision. Did he but see the chance of finally securing freedom for the nation, he would put all such considerations on one side, and go on fighting till death. No; it was not the horror of the situation which influenced him; there was something that weighed upon his heart yet more heavily--it was the holding of that meeting at Vereeniging. He reproached no one. Every one had acted with the best intentions. Nevertheless that meeting was a fatal error; it would give them their death blow. For what had it produced--a statement from the lips of the Commandant-General himself that the condition of the country was hopeless. If there were yet any burghers whose courage was not gone, would they not be utterly disheartened when they heard what their leaders had said at that meeting? That was the saddest thought of all. He could understand that those burghers who had already lost heart should be leaving the commandos, but now those who had never yet been disheartened would become so. But notwithstanding all this, it was difficult to feel certain which was the right course to pursue--to give up the war or to continue it. He could only suggest that those who were now in doubt on the matter should support the line of action which, before their doubt began, had appeared to them to be best.

Mr. L.J. Meijer (a member of the Government of the South African Republic) then gave some account of the devastation of that part of the country which lay to the north of the Eastern Railway, and on the further side of the Sabi River. (This report coincided with those already given by the delegates.) He went on to say that as they were all in the dark, and could not see the road they were travelling along, they must take reason and conscience for their guide. They had already lost much: let them not lose everything. And what could they hope to gain by continuing the struggle? To do so might be to throw away their last chance of peace. What would their progeny say of them if they were to persist in the struggle and thus lose everything they had possessed? They would say, "Our forefathers were brave, but they had no brains." Whereas, if they were to stop the war, their progeny would say, "Our forefathers did not fight for their own glory." He pointed out that however little the British proposal contained of what they desired, it nevertheless promised them representative government. In the past he had been against the war; he had wished that the five years' franchise should be granted. Although the people had opposed this measure he had always supported it. And why? Because he had feared that were that measure not conceded African blood would stain the ground. Must they still continue to shed blood? After the capture of Bloemfontein there had been a secret meeting of the council of war at Pretoria. His Government had then been willing to surrender, but the Free State had refused. The two Governments had therefore decided to go on with the war. A year later, in the month of June, there had been another meeting. A letter had been sent to the Free State. The two Governments had met at Waterval, and had once more decided to continue the struggle. Later on, again, the Government of the South African Republic wrote another letter to the Free State; but there had been no opportunity of meeting until the present occasion, which saw them assembled together at Vereeniging. Were they again going to decide to continue their resistance? It was a matter for serious consideration. There was but little seed-corn left. This must, if they had to go on fighting, be preserved from the enemy at all costs; were it to be destroyed, the African nation must cease to exist. But they could not continue the war. It was the Boers now who were teaching the English how to fight against us; Boers now were with the enemy's forces, showing them how to march by night, and pointing out to them all the foot passes.

Commandant Van Niekerk (Kroonstad) pointed out that the Colonists had already rendered them valuable aid, and could still do so. Were they now to abandon these Colonists, and--thinking only about saving themselves--leave them to fight on alone? It would be sad indeed if the burghers were compelled to lay down their arms.

Commandant-General L. Botha said that in regard to the holding of a national meeting, he had already chosen delegates with power to act. He spoke of the state of affairs at the beginning of the war--the two Republics had then at least sixty thousand men under arms. In reference to the Cape Colony, he said that it had never been expected that that country would allow its railways to be used for the transport of troops. The Commandant-General then proceeded as follows:--

"I used to entertain hopes that the European Powers would interfere on our behalf. All that they have done, however, has been to look on while England was introducing all sorts of new methods of warfare, methods, too, which are contrary to all international law.

"When the war began we had plenty of provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot without the local food supply running out. Our families, too, were then well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English protection. This question of our womenfolk is one of our greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to give up liberty for their sakes?

"As to the deputation, we must remember that it was accredited to all the Powers of Europe. And yet it has only been able to hand in its credentials to the Netherlands Government. Does not this prove that no other Government is willing to receive it? If you need further proof, I refer you to the letter in which the deputation--they were still allowed to write to us then--said: 'There is no chance for us in Europe.' The deputation wanted to be allowed to return home, but our Government advised them to remain in Europe, because their arrival in South Africa would be a death blow to the hopes of many. That is why the deputation is still in Europe. Later on they said that, although they knew that there was no chance of intervention, yet they felt that they ought to persist in their efforts, because of the sacrifices which we had already made. It is possible that a war may arise in Europe from which we shall gain something, but what right have we to expect such a contingency? Moreover, great nations take but little interest in the fate of small ones--indeed, it is to the advantage of the former that the small nations should be wiped out of existence.

"I cannot refrain from alluding to the faithlessness of some of our burghers, who are to be found in the ranks of the enemy. But this is not the only sign of the way in which affairs are trending--I look back on the past. I remember that we have been fighting a full year since we last heard of our deputation. What have we gained since June, 1901? Nothing. On the contrary, we have been going backwards so fast that, if this weakening process goes on much longer, we shall soon find ourselves unable any more to call ourselves a fighting nation. What have we not undergone in the course of this year which is just over! In the concentration camps alone, twenty thousand women and children have died. When I was in Pretoria I received reports from our information office, and otherwise, of our losses. I found that there were thirty-one thousand six hundred prisoners of war, of whom six hundred had died, and that three thousand eight hundred of our burghers had been killed in the war. Is not a loss such as this, in so short a time as two and a half years, a serious matter? Think, too, of the sufferings which those twenty thousand women who died in the camps must have endured!

"I am not deaf to the claims of the colonists who have been fighting for us. I have said that if we surrender our independence, we must provide for them. Should we serve their interests by continuing the war? No, indeed! The best thing for them would be that we should bring it to a close. But if we are absolutely determined to go on fighting, let us at least say to them, 'We advise you to desist.'

"What I am saying now is in substance what I said at Warmbad at a time when there were two thousand men of that district in the Veldt. How many are there now? Four hundred and eighty! On that occasion I also said that we must continue the war until we were driven by sheer starvation to make peace. Well, in some divisions starvation has already come. The delegates themselves have had to confess that our strength up till now has lain in the fact that we have been able to continue the struggle in every district. In this way we have divided the enemy's forces. But if we are compelled to abandon some of our districts, and to concentrate on certain points, then the English also will concentrate, and attack us with an irresistible force.

"It has been suggested that we ought to march into Cape Colony. I know, however, what that would mean--Commander-in-Chief de Wet marched into the colonies. He had a large force, and the season of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed. How, then, shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that they can only go op-een-stap.

"What, then, are we to do? Some will reply, 'Go on with the war,' Yes, but for how long? For ten or twelve years? But would that be possible? If in two years we have been reduced from sixty thousand fighting men to half that number, where will our army be after another ten years of war? It is clear enough to me that if we go on any longer, we shall be compelled to surrender. Would it not be better to come to some agreement with the enemy, while we have the opportunity? We have all received the gift of reason; let us use it on the present occasion.

"As far as I and my own burghers are concerned, to continue the struggle is still possible. But we must not only think of ourselves. We must almost think of others. There are, for instance, the widows and orphans. If we accept the terms now offered to us, they will remain under our care. But if we go on with the war until we are forced to surrender, who will then take care of them? Or if we were all killed, what could we do for them? We should not even be able to send a deputation to Europe, to ask for money to help us to rebuild our farms, and to feed our burghers.

"There are three questions now before us--three alternatives between which we have to choose--the continuing of the war, unconditional surrender, and the acceptance of the British proposal. With regard to the first, I fail to see what satisfactory result can come to us from persisting in this unequal contest, which must result in the end in our extermination. As to the choice between the other two, in many ways unconditional surrender would be the better. But, for the sake of the nation, we may not choose it. Although to reject it may involve us in many hardships, yet we must think of nothing else but the interests of the nation. Our only course, then, is to accept the proposal of the English Government. Its terms may not be very advantageous to us, but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position."

After a short adjournment the delegates again assembled at about 2 p.m.

General C.H. Muller (Boksburg) said that his burghers had sent him to defend their menaced independence. One part of them had authorized him to act as his judgment should dictate; another part had ordered him to hold out for independence and to try to get into communication with the European deputation. He had long ago told his burghers that they must trust in God if they wished to continue the war, for they could not do so by relying only on their guns and rifles. He did not like to think of what they would say if he were to go back to them and tell them that he had not been in communication with the deputation, and that the proposal of the English Government had been accepted. He could not bring himself to surrender. Nevertheless, having in view what the Commandant-General and others had said, he felt that he must do so, for it was impossible for him to prosecute the war single-handed. But could not the delegates continue to stand by one another, and make a covenant with the Lord? The district which he represented was one of the poorest in the whole country, and the L3,000,000 offered by the enemy did not include any provision for those who, like his burghers, could do nothing to help themselves. He would again suggest that the delegates should make a vow unto the Lord. For himself, he could not vote for the acceptance of the British proposal.

General J.H. Smuts then spoke as follows:--

"Up till now I have taken no part in this discussion, but my opinions are not unknown to my Government; we have arrived at a dark period both in the history of our war, and in the course of our national development. To me it is all the darker because I am one of those who, as members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the war with England. A man, however, may not draw back from the consequences of his deeds. We must therefore keep back all private feeling, and decide solely with a view to the lasting interests of our nation. This is an important occasion for us--it is perhaps the last time that we shall meet as a free people with a free government. Let us then rise to the height of this occasion; let us arrive at a decision for which our posterity shall bless, and not curse us.

"The great danger for this meeting is that of deciding the questions before it on purely military grounds. Nearly all the delegates here are officers who in the past have never quailed before the overwhelming forces of the enemy, and who therefore are never likely to do so in the future. They do not know what fear is, and they are ready to shed the last drop of their blood in the defence of their country.

"Now if we look at the matter from their point of view, that is to say, if we look at it merely as a military question, I am bound to admit that we shall come to the conclusion that the war can be continued. We are still an unconquered power; we have still about eighteen thousand men in the field--veterans, with whom one can accomplish almost anything. From a purely military standpoint, our cause is not yet lost. But it is as a nation, and not as an army, that we are met here, and it is therefore for the nation principally that we must consult. No one sits here to represent this or that commando. One and all, we represent the African nation, and not only those members of it which are now in the field, but also those who rest beneath the soil, and those yet unborn, who shall succeed us.

"No! We do not only represent our burghers on commando, the troops over which we are placed in command; we represent also the thousands who have passed away, after making the last sacrifice for their country; the prisoners scattered all the world over; the women and children dying by the thousand in the prison camps of the enemy; we represent the blood and the tears of the whole African nation. From the prisons, the camps, the graves, the veldt, and from the womb of the future, that nation cries out to us to make a wise decision now, to take no step which might lead to the downfall or even to the extermination of their race, and thus make all their sacrifices of no avail. Our struggle, up to the present, has not been an aimless one. We have not been fighting in mere desperation. We began this strife, and we have continued it, because we wanted to maintain our independence and were prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we must not sacrifice the African nation itself upon the altar of independence. So soon as we are convinced that our chance of maintaining our autonomous position as Republics is, humanly speaking, at an end, it becomes our clear duty to desist from our efforts. We must not run the risk of sacrificing our nation and its future to a mere idea which can no longer be realized.

"And ought we not to be convinced that independence is now irretrievably lost? We have been fighting without cessation for nearly three years. It is no exaggeration to say that during that period we have been employing all the strength and all the means which we possess, in the furtherance of our cause. We have sacrificed thousands of lives; we have lost all our earthly goods; our dear country is become one continuous desert; more than twenty thousand of our women and children have perished in the camps of the enemy. And has this brought us independence? Just the reverse; it is receding further and further from us every day. The longer we fight, the greater will be the distance between us and the aim for which we are fighting.

"The manner in which the enemy has been conducting, and still continues to conduct, this war, has reduced our country to such a state of exhaustion, that it will soon be a physical impossibility for us to fight any longer. Our only hope lies in the chance of help from outside. A year ago I, in the name of my Government, communicated the condition of our nation to His Honour States-President Kruger, in Europe. He wrote in reply that we must rely on the state of affairs in Cape Colony--and the sympathy of European nations--and that we must continue the war until all other means were exhausted."

The speaker here enlarged upon the political developments which had taken place in the United States and in the principal European countries during the preceding two years, and then continued:--

"So far as we are concerned, the sum total of the foreign situation is that we obtain a great deal of sympathy, for which we are naturally most grateful. More than this we do not obtain, nor shall obtain for many a long year. Europe will go on expressing sympathy with us until the last Boer hero has died on the field and the last Boer woman has gone down to her grave--until, in fact, the whole Boer nation has been sacrificed on the altar of history and of humanity.

"I have already, on a former occasion, told you what I think about the situation in Cape Colony. We have made great mistakes there; perhaps even now Cape Colony is not ripe for the sort of policy which we have been pursuing with regard to it. At all events, we cannot entertain any hopes of a general rising of the Colonists. We cannot, however, give too much honour to those three thousand heroes in the Colony who have sacrificed all in our behalf, even though they have not succeeded in securing our independence for us.

"Thus we have given President Kruger's advice a fair trial. For twelve months we have been testing the value of the methods which he urged upon us. And, as a result of it all, we have become convinced that those methods are of no avail--that if we wish to remain independent we must depend upon ourselves alone. But the facts which the various delegates have brought before our notice show that we cannot thus depend upon ourselves; that, unless we obtain outside help, the struggle must come to an end. We have, then, no hope of success. Our country is already devastated and in ruins; let us stop before our people are ruined also.

"And now the enemy approaches with a proposal, which, however unacceptable it may be to us in other respects, includes the promise of amnesty for our Colonial brethren who have been fighting side by side with us. I fear that the day will come when we shall no longer be able to save these so-called rebels, and then it will be a just ground for reproach that we sacrificed their interests in a cause that was already hopeless. Moreover, if we refused the proposal which the British Government now makes to us, I am afraid that we shall considerably weaken our position in the eyes of the world, and thus lose much of the sympathy which to-day it evinces in our favour.

"Brethren, we have vowed to stand fast to the bitter end; but let us be men, and acknowledge that that end has now come, and that it is more bitter than ever we thought it could be. For death itself would be sweet compared with the step which we must now take. But let us bow before the will of God.

"The future is dark indeed, but we will not give up courage, and hope, and trust in God. No one shall ever convince me that this unparalleled sacrifice which the African nation has laid upon the altar of freedom will be in vain. It has been a war for freedom--not only for the freedom of the Boers, but for the freedom of all the nations of South Africa. Its results we leave in God's hands. Perhaps it is His will to lead our nation through defeat, through abasement, yes, and even through the valley of the shadow of death, to the glory of a nobler future, to the light of a brighter day."

Commandant A.J. Bester (Bloemfontein) said that at the meeting at which he had been elected his burghers had told him that they were resolved not to become the subjects of England. The arguments now urged against the continuation of the war were not new--they had been used in former times of depression. History gave many instances in which their nation had been delivered out of the most critical positions. One could not help believing that Right would conquer. How was it to be explained that two hundred and forty thousand troops had failed to exterminate two small Republics? Then there had been miraculous escapes; surely the thoughts of these ought to encourage them. They must all be of one mind. His own decision was to stand or to fall for his freedom.

Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) asked whether the proposal could not be accepted under protest.

General J.C. Smuts answered that the meeting could empower the Governments to accept the proposal, and to add that they did so with such and such provisos.

Commandant A.J. Bester (Bloemfontein) thought that there had been enough said, and recommended that the discussion be closed.

Commandant F.E. Mentz (Heilbron) also thought that it was not necessary to argue any more. He believed that the war could not be continued. In Heilbron, Bloemfontein, and part of Bethlehem there were not five head of cattle left. The helpless condition of the women and children also demanded consideration. The state of the country was becoming so desperate that they were now obliged to break away from the kraals. He himself had been compelled to this not long ago, and had lost forty men in one day. He would have to leave his district, but could not bring it to his heart to leave the women behind. It was quite clear to him that the war must be stopped, for some parts of the Transvaal were absolutely unable to go on fighting. Moreover, were the war to continue, commando after commando would go over to the enemy.

General Kemp (Krugersdorp) took a more encouraging view of affairs. He would stand or fall with the independence. His mandate was to that effect. His conscience also would not justify him in taking any other course. He thought that the proposal of the English Government was vague, that there was not sufficient provision for the Boer losses in it, and that it treated the Dutch language as a foreign tongue. Circumstances had often been dark, and the darkness would pass away this time as it had done before. Remembering the commission which had been given to him by the burghers, he could not do otherwise than vote for a continuation of the war.

Vice-President Burger: "I have already given my opinion. I am sorry that the meeting seems to be divided. It is necessary for the welfare of our nation that we should be of one mind. Are we to continue the war? From what I have seen and heard, it is clear to me that we cannot do so. I repeat that there is no possibility of it, neither does any real hope exist that by doing so we should benefit the nation. It is idle to compare our condition in the struggle in 1877-1881 with that in which we now find ourselves; I speak from experience.

"It is true that the victory was then ours; that it was so is due to the help which we received from outside. The Orange Free State remained neutral, but assistance came from President Brand in South Africa and from Gladstone in England: thus it was not by our own sword that we were enabled to win.

"It will be asked why, if we have kept up the struggle for two years and a half, can we not still continue to do so?

"Because, in the meantime, we have become weaker and weaker, and if we persist the end must be fatal. What grounds have we for expecting that we may yet be victorious? Each man we lose renders us weaker; every hundred men we lose means a similar gain to the enemy. England's numerical strength does not diminish; on the contrary, there are even more troops in the country at this moment than when Lord Roberts had the command. England also has used our own men against us, and has not been ashamed of arming the Kaffirs; the enemy are learning from our own men in what way they should fight--he must be blind indeed who cannot see these facts.

"I do not think we can appropriately call this altogether a 'war of faith.' Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God, but there were also two or three other things to rely upon. We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the possibility of defeat.

"The question still remains, What are we to do? I have no great opinion of the document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace it is not on account of any advantages that this proposal offers me: it is the weight of my own responsibility which drives me to it.

"If I think that by holding out I should dig the nation's grave, nothing must induce me to continue the struggle.

"Therefore I consider it my duty, as leader of our nation, to do my utmost that not one man more shall be killed, that not one woman more shall die.

"The sacrifice must be made; is not this also a trial of our faith? What shall we gain by going on? Nothing! It is obvious that further surrenders will take place--here of a few, there of many--and our weakness will increase.

"We shall also be obliged to abandon large areas of the country. Will this make us stronger? Rather, will it not enable the enemy to concentrate still more? And the abandoned tracts--to whom will they belong? To the enemy!

"In all probability this is our last meeting. I do not believe that we shall be given another chance to negotiate: we shall be deemed too insignificant. If we reject this proposal, what prospects have we in the future? If we accept it, we can, like a child, increase in size and strength, but with its rejection goes our last opportunity.

"Fell a tree and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it. What has the nation done to deserve extinction?

"Those who wish to continue the war are influenced chiefly by hope; but on what is this hope founded? On our arms? No. On intervention? By no means. On what then? No one can say.

"I am sorry that the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are at variance on this point, and I regret that it is the Transvaal which has to declare itself unable to proceed further; but the enemy have concentrated all their forces in this State, and we can hold out no longer."

Mr. L. Jacobsz: "I have hitherto not spoken, because I am a non-combatant. I have also suffered much, although less than others. I have listened to what has been said, but my opinion is not changed by the views I have heard expressed.

"I repeat now what I said at Klerksdorp, namely that the struggle cannot continue. I have noted the condition of the country, which is such that the commandos can no longer be supported. I would point out the condition of the women and children, of whom many are dying, and all are exposed to great dangers. If there was a chance of succeeding in the end, then we might hold out, but there is no such chance; there is no possibility of intervention, and the silence of the deputation is ominous.

"I sympathize with the heroes present at this meeting; we must have a foundation for our faith, and we cannot altogether compare our people with the people of Israel. Israel had promises made to them; we have none. I would further point out that, in the interests of the nation, it will not do to surrender unconditionally: the terms before us may be deceptive, but they are the best obtainable.

"With regard to the difficulty of those delegates who consider that they are bound to act as they have been commissioned, I am of the same opinion as Judge Hertzog and General Smuts."

Commandant J.J. Alberts (Standerton) spoke more or less in the same strain. He was of opinion that the war should be finished by ceding territory, but, failing this, that it should be ended on any terms obtainable.

Vice-President de Wet expressed his opinion that, considering the short time at their disposal, they should proceed, if possible, to make some proposal.

General D.A. Brand said that he would have spoken if he had not thought that enough had been said; he considered it desirable to close the discussion, and was willing to make a proposal.

Veldtcornet D.J.E. Opperman (Pretoria South) considered that the difficulties of continuing the war, and of accepting the proposal, were equal. Some of his burghers would fight no longer. What troubled him most was the condition of the women; it went to his heart to see these families perish. He was of opinion that, for the sake of the women and children who were suffering so intensely, the proposal should be accepted under protest.

Veldtcornet J. Van Steedden, seconded by Veldtcornet B.J. Roos, moved that the discussion be now closed.

The meeting was adjourned after prayer.

SATURDAY, MAY 31ST, 1902.

The meeting was opened with prayer.

General Nieuwouwdt, seconded by General Brand, made the following proposal:--

"This meeting of special deputies from the two Republics, after considering the proposal of His Majesty's Government for the re-establishment of peace, and taking into consideration (a) the demands of the burghers in the veldt and the commissions which they had given to their representatives; (b) that they do not consider themselves justified in concluding peace on the basis laid down by His Majesty's Government before having been placed in communication with the delegates of the Republic now in Europe, decides that it cannot accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and orders the Governments of the two Republics to communicate this decision to His Majesty's Government through its representatives."

Mr. P.R. Viljoen, seconded by General H.A. Alberts, made a proposal, amended afterwards by General Smuts and Judge Hertzog, which appears later on under the proposal of H.P.J. Pretorius and C. Botha.

A third proposal by General E. Botha and General J.G. Celliers was laid upon the table, but subsequently withdrawn.

Mr. F.W. Reitz considered it to be his duty not only to the nation but also to himself as a citizen, to say that, in case the proposal of the British Government should be accepted, it would be necessary for the meeting to make provisions as to whose signatures should be attached to the necessary documents. He himself would not sign any document by which the independence would be given up.

Remarks were made by several members on the first proposal, and Mr. P.R. Viljoen asked that no division should arise.

Vice-President de Wet then said that, as the time was limited, and all could not speak, he would propose that a Commission should be nominated in order to draw up a third proposal in which various opinions of the members should be set down; and that, whilst the Commission was occupied in this way, the Orange Free State delegates on their part and those of the South African Republic on their part, should meet in order that an understanding might be come to between them. They must endeavour to come to a decision, for it would be of the greatest possible advantage to them.

Commandant-General Botha thought that this hint should be taken. They had suffered and fought together: let them not part in anger.

The above-mentioned Commission was then decided upon, and Judge Hertzog and General Smuts were elected.

Then the Orange Free State delegates went to the tent of Vice-President de Wet, whilst those of the South African Republic remained in the tent in which the meeting was held.

After a time of heated dispute--for every man was preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement, and Judge Hertzog read the following proposal:--

"We, the national representatives of both the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, at the meeting held at Vereeniging, from the 15th of May till the 31st of May, 1902, have with grief considered the proposal made by His Majesty's Government in connexion with the conclusion of the existing hostilities, and their communication that this proposal had to be accepted, or rejected, unaltered. We are sorry that His Majesty's Government has absolutely declined to negotiate with the Governments of the Republics on the basis of their independence, or to allow our Governments to enter into communication with our deputations. Our people, however, have always been under the impression that not only on the grounds of justice, but also taking into consideration the great material and personal sacrifices made for their independence, that it had a well-founded claim for that independence.

"We have seriously considered the future of our country, and have specially observed the following facts:--

"Firstly, that the military policy pursued by the British military authorities has led to the general devastation of the territory of both Republics by the burning down of farms and towns, by the destruction of all means of subsistence, and by the exhausting of all resources required for the maintenance of our families, the subsistence of our armies, and the continuation of the war.

"Secondly, that the placing of our families in the concentration camps has brought on an unheard-of condition of suffering and sickness, so that in a comparatively short time about twenty thousand of our beloved ones have died there, and that the horrid probability has arisen that, by continuing the war, our whole nation may die out in this way.

"Thirdly, that the Kaffir tribe, within and without the frontiers of the territory of the two Republics, are mostly armed and are taking part in the war against us, and through the committing of murders and all sorts of cruelties have caused an unbearable condition of affairs in many districts of both Republics. An instance of this happened not long ago in the district of Vrijheid, where fifty-six burghers on one occasion were murdered and mutilated in a fearful manner.

"Fourthly, that by the proclamations of the enemy the burghers still fighting are threatened with the loss of all their movable and landed property--and thus with utter ruin--which proclamations have already been enforced.

"Fifthly, that it has already, through the circumstances of the war, become quite impossible for us to keep the many thousand prisoners of war taken by our forces, and that we have thus been unable to inflict much damage on the British forces (whereas the burghers who are taken prisoners by the British armies are sent out of the country), and that, after war has raged for nearly three years, there only remains an insignificant part of the fighting forces with which we began.

"Sixthly, that this fighting remainder, which is only a small minority of our whole nation, has to fight against an overpowering force of the enemy, and besides is reduced to a condition of starvation, and is destitute of all necessaries, and that notwithstanding our utmost efforts, and the sacrifice of everything that is dear and precious to us, we cannot foresee an eventual victory.

"We are therefore of opinion that there is no justifiable ground for expecting that by continuing the war the nation will retain its independence, and that, under these circumstances, the nation is not justified in continuing the war, because this can only lead to social and material ruin, not for us alone, but also for our posterity. Compelled by the above-named circumstances and motives, we commission both Governments to accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to sign it in the name of the people of both Republics.

"We, the representative delegates, express our confidence that the present circumstances will, by accepting the proposal of His Majesty's Government, be speedily ameliorated in such a way that our nation will be placed in a position to enjoy the privileges to which they think they have a just claim, on the ground not only of their past sacrifices, but also of those made in this war.

"We have with great satisfaction taken note of the decision of His Majesty's Government to grant a large measure of amnesty to the British subjects who have taken up arms on our behalf, and to whom we are united by bonds of love and honour; and express our wish that it may please His Majesty to still further extend this amnesty."

Mr. P.R. Viljoen then withdrew his proposal.

Commandant H.P.J. Pretorius, seconded by General C. Botha, presented the proposal, as read by the Commission.

General Nieuwouwdt also withdrew his proposal, but it was at once taken over by General C.C.J. Badenhorst, seconded by Commandant A.J. Bester, of Bloemfontein.

The meeting then adjourned till the afternoon.

* * * * *

In the afternoon at 2.05 it again met.

Proceeding to the voting, the proposal of H.P.J. Pretorius, seconded by General C. Botha, was accepted, by fifty-four votes against six. Then Vice-President Burger spoke a few words suitable to the occasion as follows:--"We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do it in the official capacities which we have formerly occupied. Let us not draw our hands back from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide us, and to show us how we shall be enabled to keep our nation together. We must be ready to forgive and forget, whenever we meet our brethren. That part of our nation which has proved unfaithful we must not reject."

Later, Vice-President Burger spoke a few words of farewell to the Commandant-General, to the Members of the Executive Councils, and to the delegates.

In the afternoon, as it turned out for the last time, Commandant Jacobsz, seconded by General Muller, made the following proposal, which was unanimously accepted by the meeting:--

"This meeting of Delegates, having in view the necessity of collecting means to provide for the wants of the suffering women and children, widows and orphans, and other destitute persons, who have through this war come to a condition of want, and also having in view the desirability of nominating a Committee, whose duty it shall be to arrange the necessary steps in this matter, and to finally decide on the management and distribution of the donations received, decides:--

"To nominate the Hon. Messrs. M.J. Steyn, S.W. Burger, L. Botha, C.R. de Wet, J.H. De la Rey, A.P. Kriel, and J.D. Kestell, as the Committee, to carry out all arrangements for the above-mentioned purposes, that may seem desirable and expedient to them, and also to appoint new Members, Sub-Committees and working Committees; and the said Committee is empowered to draw up regulations, and to amend them from time to time as shall seem to them expedient.

"This meeting further decides to send abroad from the above-mentioned Committee, Messrs. C.R. de Wet, L. Botha, and J.H. De la Rey, in order that they may help in collecting the above-mentioned donations."

Then this--the last meeting of the two Republics--was closed with prayer.

Index

Aard, Commandant Frans van-- Election as Commandant of Kroonstad, 115 Killed in engagement between Kroonstad and Lindley, 157

Abraham's Kraal--Bombardment by British, Boer Flight, 52

Achterlaaiers, 3

Active Service--Calling up of Orange Free State Burghers, 4 Commando Law as to Equipment, Provisions, etc., 3 Notification to Orange Free State Burghers to hold themselves in readiness, 3

Alberts, Capt.--Tribute to, 243

Albrecht, Major--Command of Boer Reinforcements at Koedoesberg, 28

Ammunition--Amount possessed by Boers in 1902, 408 Capture of Ammunition by the Boers, 173 Dewetsdorp, 178 Doornspruit, Capture of Train near, 132 Roodewal--Amount captured, 103 Digging up, 191, 193 Disposal of, 104, 106 Tweefontein, 282 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Ammunition hidden in Cave, 298

Amnesty--General Amnesty for Boer Sympathisers in Cape Colony and Natal, proposed, 322

Annexation of the South African Republic--Battles fought after the alleged Annexation, 229 Peace Negotiations at Pretoria, References to the Annexation, 367

Armistice to admit of attendance of Officers at the Vereeniging Meeting (May, 1902), 315 Misunderstanding on the part of the British Columns, 317

Arms, Surrender of, see titles Banishment and Surrender

Assistant-Commander-in-Chief Gen. de Wet obtaining Post from Government, 95

Assistant-Commander-in-Chief of the Orange Free State-- Prinsloo, Mr. Marthinus, Illegal Election of, 126 Steenekamp, Commandant, Nomination of, 144

Badenhorst, Siege of, by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 77, 78 Abandonment of Siege, 79

Badenhorst, Veldtcornet, 94 Vice-Commander-in-Chief in Districts of Boshof, etc., Appointment, 159

Baggage Animals of British Troops--Exhaustion of, 148 Use of, 279

Baker's, Col., Column--Commander-in-Chief de Wet lying in wait with a view to Reprisals, 271

Banishment Proclamation of Aug. 7, 1901 (Lord Kitchener's Proclamation), 247-250 Battles fought subsequent to, 252 Burghers, Effect on, 252 Kitchener's, Lord, Letter to Commander-in-Chief de Wet enclosing copy of Proclamation, 247 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Reply, 248 Officers, Effect on, 250 President and Commander-in-Chief of Transvaal and Orange Free State--Replies, 250, 251, 257, 258 Steyn's, President, Letter to Lord Kitchener, 251-259 Terms of, 247-251

Bank Notes of the South African Republic--Peace Terms, Arrangements for honouring Notes, 380 Prisoners of War, Opportunity of sending in Notes for Payment, 386

Barbed Wire Fences, see Wire Fences

Barton, Gen., Attack on at Frederiksstad by Commander-in-Chief de Wet and Gen. Liebenberg, 164-167

Beijers, Gen.--Continuance of the War, Spirit of the Nation an obstacle--Speech at Vereeniging Conference, 410 Waterberg District, Situation in--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 339

Bergh, Capt.--Attacks on Boer Forces with bands of Kaffirs, 271

Bester, Commandant A.J.--Continuance of the War, Argument in favour of at the Vereeniging Conference, 421

Bester Station, Skirmish at, 10

Bethlehem--Commandants of Boer Forces, Appointments, 227, 228 Defence of--British Reinforcements, Arrival of, 121, 122 Dispositions of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 120, 121 Voetgangers on Wolhuterskop, Bravery of, 121, 122 Engagement near, 194, 195 Fall of, 122

Bethlehem Commando--Fidelity of Burghers, 94, note

Bezuidenhoutspas--Occupation by Vrede Commando, 7, 8

Biddulphsberg Engagement--English wounded burnt by veldt fire, 84

"Big Constable"--Transvaalers mistaking President Steyn for Police Agent, 86, 87

Birkenstock, Mr.--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 399 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 343

Blauwbank, Fight at, 30 British Camp abandoned--Booty taken by Boers, 33, 34 British Convoy, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Attack on, 32, 33

Blijdschap--Arrival of Laager of Women, 268 De Lange sentenced to death for High Treason at, 268, note Massing of Commandos at, 268

Blikkiescost, 4

Blockhouse System--"Blockhead" System, alleged, 260 Boer Success in breaking through Blockhouses, 260, 261 Bothaville, Boers breaking through Blockhouse Line, 299 British loss of faith in Blockhouses, 291, 292 Cost of erection and maintenance, 262 Description of, 262 Districts surrounded by the British, 261 Failure of, alleged, 261 Lindley-Kroonstad Line, Boers breaking through, 287 Palmietfontein, Boers breaking through Line near, 289, 290 Prolongation of the War by, alleged, 263, 264 Small number of Captures effected, 260, 261 Springhaansnek--Commander-in-Chief de Wet breaking through the Line of Blockhouses on the march to the South, 173 Thaba'Nchu and Sanna's Post, Forts between--Capture by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 201, 202 Trenches dug by British near Blockhouse Lines, etc., 288, 294, 295

Bloemfontein--Capture by British, 55 Defence of--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Arrangements, 54 Water Works--Occupation by General Broadwood, 61

"Boer Biscuits," 3

Boer Forces-- Burghers who had returned home after fall of Bloemfontein, Re-call to the front, 71 Commandos left with Commander-in-Chief de Wet after fall of Bloemfontein, note 57 Confusion among Burghers at Holspruits, 294, 295 Discipline, see that title Disposition of Forces after fall of Bethlehem, 124 Harrismith Commando, Refusal to part with Waggons--Return home, 161, 163 Medical Certificates, Abuse of, note 59 Mobility, see that title Numbers at Outset of War, 408, 414, 415, 491 Numbers at the Termination of the War, 322, 338, 339, 347, 348, 359, 360, 361, 362 Orange Free State Commandos-- Commander-in-Chief, Election of, 6, 7 Harrismith, Concentration at, 4, 6-7 Heilbron Commando, see that title Number of Burghers ready to fight after fall of Pretoria, 94 Panic after Paardeberg, 48, 49, 51, 52, note 57 Permission given to Burghers by Commander-in-Chief de Wet to return home, 56, note 57--Gen. Joubert's Protest, 57 Reduction in numbers due to Paardeberg Surrender, etc., 89, 90 Roberts', Lord, Surrender Proclamation--Effect on Numbers rejoining Commandos, 60 Non-observance of Terms, Burghers returning to Commandos, 80 Separation of Free Staters and Transvaalers after fall of Kroonstad, Reasons for, 89, 90

Boesmanskop Skirmish, 80

Boshof, Vrow--Gift of Clothes to Burghers who had swum the Orange River, 221, 222

Bosman, Landdrost--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 404, 405, 406 Situation in South Africa on 15th May, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 361, 362

Botha--Capture at Honingkopjes, Subsequent Escape and Death, 110

Botha, Commandant-General-- Continuance of the War, Arguments against--Terms of Surrender, etc., 414, 415 Estcourt Skirmishes--Capture of Armoured Train, etc., 19 Fortitude after Fall of Pretoria, 93 Independence of the South African Republic and Orange Free State--Vereeniging Conference Delegates' power to decide as to Independence, 411 Junction with Commander-in-Chief de Wet at Rhenosterriviersbrug, 88, 89 Middelburg Peace Proposals, see that title Mission to Europe on behalf of Relief Fund Committee, 428 Peace Negotiations--Member of Commission of National Representatives at the Pretoria Conference, 320, 365-396 Situation in South Africa on 15th May, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 337, 338, 354-358

Botha, General Philip-- Dewetsdorp Defences, Occupation of, 175, 176 Engagement with General Knox's Forces, 194, 195 Kroonstad War Council, Presence at, 58 Reinforcements sent to Commander-in-Chief de Wet before Paardeberg, Command of, 36, 37 Stinkfontein--Failure to recapture Position, 45 Storming of, 40 Tabaksberg, Engagement at, 83

Botha, Mr. Jan--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Tribute to, 150, 151

Bothaville--Boers breaking through Blockhouse Line, 299 Surprise Attack by the British on Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Forces--Boer Panic, 168-170 Losses of the Boers, 170-171

Bout Span, 5

Boys--Presence with Commandos, 287, 289, 290 Children killed and wounded, 289, 290, 295, 296

Brabant's, General, Successes, 50

Brabant's Horse--Attack on Commandant Kritzinger and Captain Scheepers, 185, 186 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Opinion of, 75, 76

Brand, President--Assistance rendered to South African Republic in War of 1877-1881, 422, 423

Brandfort, Boer Forces at--Hotels closed by Commander-in-Chief, 60

Brandwachten, 22

Breijtenbach, Veldtcornet B.H.--Continuance of the War, Impossibility of Carrying on the Struggle, 403, 404

British Forces--Artillery, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Tribute to, 25 March from Bethlehem to Reitz, under guidance of Free Staater, 263, 264 Sixty Thousand Men, Cordon of, 291, 292, 293, 294

Broadwood, General--Occupation of Thaba'Nchu, 65, 66 Retreat towards Thaba'Nchu before General Olivier, 62

Broodspioen, 207, 208

Bruwer, Commandant--Appointment to Command of Bethlehem District, 227, 228

Buller, Sir Redvers--Drakensberg Frontier, Crossing of, 93 Landing at Cape Town, 21 Relief of Ladysmith, 50 Strength of Positions operated against by Sir Redvers Buller, 21

Bulwana Hill--Boers surprised by British, 21

Burger, Vice-President--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 398, 421, 422, 424, 425 Meeting with Orange Free State Government, Letter to President Steyn, 301, 302 Situation in South Africa on 15th May, 1902--Address at the Vereeniging Conference, 336, 337, 351-354 Steyn, President, Resignation of--Announcement at Vereeniging Conference, 411

Cape Colony-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Attempted Inroad--March towards Cape Colony-- Blockhouses--Commander-in-Chief de Wet breaking through the Line at Springhaansnek, 173, 187, 188, 189 Dewetsdorp-- Defences, British neglecting to hold, 175, 176 Storming of, 175-179 Forces under Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 172 "Good Hope" Farm, Engagement near, 181 Knox's, Gen., Arrival with British Reinforcements, 181 Gun and Amount of Ammunition taken, 173 Karmel, March towards, 181, 182 Knox's, Gen., Pursuit of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190 Orange and Caledon Rivers in flood--Commander-in-Chief de Wet "cornered," 182, 183 Prinsloo's, Commandant Michal, Commando--Appearance in the nick of time, 187, 188 Retreat across Orange River, 184, 185 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Expedition into-- Capture of Farm held by British Troops, 207, 208 Courage and Endurance of Burghers, 212 Diminution in number of Boer Forces, 206, 207 Engagements with British Troops, 206, 207, 212 Escape of Boer Forces in the darkness, 216, 219, 220 Fodder, Lack of, 206, 207 Knox's, Gen., Movements, 201, 202, 203 Miraculous Nature of Boer Achievements, 223, 224 Moddervlei, Passage of--Boer Loss of Ammunition and Flour Waggons, 208, 209, 210, 212 Officers serving with Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 195, 196 Position of Boer Forces after crossing Orange River, 205, 206 Retreat across Orange River, Difficulties of, etc., 217-224 Strategy employed to mislead Gen. Knox, 202, 203, 204 General Rising of Burghers, Impossibility of--Reports of Delegates at the Vereeniging Conference, 340, 341, 342, 355, 360, 361, 405, 406 Position of affairs at the beginning of 1901--Colonial Burghers' Sympathy with Boer Cause, 195, 196 Sheep-farming, success of in North-Western Districts, 211 Small Commandos sent to Cape Colony, Policy of, 234

Cape Mounted Rifles, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's opinion of, 77, 78

Cartwright, Mr., Editor of South African News--Punishment for publication of "not to take prisoners" Anecdote concerning Lord Kitchener, 184, 185

Casualties, see Losses in Killed and Wounded, etc., on either side

Cattle--Blockhouse Line between Lindley and Kroonstad, Boer Cattle breaking through, 288 Capture of Boer Cattle on "Majuba Day," 296, 297 Destruction by the British, 192, 232 Supply available on May 15, 1902--Report of Vereeniging Delegates, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 351, 352

Causes of the War--British Government Interference with the inner policy of the South African Republic, 252, 253 Declaration of War by the South African Republics as the Cause--President Steyn's Contradiction, 251, 252 Extermination of the Republics already determined on by England, alleged, 254, 255 Franchise Law--British Government Demands, 252, 253, 254 Goldfields the main object, alleged, 350, 351 Jameson Raid as a Cause, alleged, 251, 252, 253 Memorials to H.M. Government concerning alleged Grievances--President Steyn's efforts to keep the Peace, 252, 253, 254 Orange Free State joining issues with the Transvaal, 254, 255 Steyn's, President, Letter to Lord Kitchener, 250-259 Troops landed by the British Government prior to outbreak of War, 253, 254 Ultimatum of Boers, Lord Salisbury's Assertion, 53, 54

Ceylon--Boer Prisoners taken with Gen. Prinsloo sent to Ceylon, 156

Chamberlain, Mr. J.--Boer Ultimatum--Telegrams to Sir A. Milner, 329 Jameson Raid--Defence of Mr. Rhodes, President Steyn on, 251, 252

Cilliers, Gen. J.G.--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 404, 405 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Address at the Vereeniging Conference, 353, 354

Cilliers, Sarah--Death at Frederiksstad Engagement, 166, 167

Clothing--De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Clothes hidden in Cave, 298 Difficulty of obtaining, 233 Hides for tanning, Destruction by the British, 233 Stripping British Prisoners to obtain, 233

Colenso--British losses at, 23

Colesberg--Strength of Boer Positions, 26

Colonial Burghers--British subjects fighting on Boer Side, Boer Hopes of Assistance unfulfilled, 405, 406, 408, 420 British Government Intentions with regard to Rebels, 394, 395 Proposal for General Amnesty, 413, 414 Safeguarding in Peace Negotiations, 398, 402, 403, 411, 414, 415, 416, 421, 427

Commandeering--Provisions of Commando Law, 3

Commander-in-Chief of Orange Free State-- De Wet, Gen.--Appointment of, 49 Secret Election of, 118 Prinsloo, Election of, 6, 7

Commando Law--Provisions as to Commandeering, 3

Commandos--Division of into small parties, 225 Advantages of, 227 List of Districts and Commandants, 225-227 Skirmishes, Splendid Record, 267 Small Commandos sent into Cape Colony--De Wet's Policy, 234 (For particular Commandos see their names)

Commissariat--Comparison of Boer and British Commissariat Arrangements, 4, 5, 6, 7

Compensation for Boer Losses, see Repatriation

Concentration Camps--Number of Deaths in, etc., 416, 419, 426 Women--Flight of to avoid being sent to Camps, 193, 279 Maintenance of Boer Women and Children by the British Government--President Steyn on, 257, 258 Treatment of, 232, 257, 258

Conduct of the War by British--Exhaustion of the Republics, 419

Continuance of the War in 1902, Vereeniging Conference-- Burghers, Attitude of, 404, 405, 410, 411 Effect on Vereeniging Meeting, 413, 414 Comparison of Situation with that of 1877-1881, Futility of, 421, 422 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Speech, 407 Kruger's, President, Advice, 420 Possibility, Question of--Situation in South African Republic, Reliance on Government, etc., 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354-358, 359, 360-362, 363, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 408, 410, 412, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 426 Reasons for, 400, 401

Correspondence relating to the War, Preservation of, 247

Court Martial on Commandant Vilonel, Composition of, note 85

Cowboys, Capture by Boers--Blauwbank Capture, 33, 34

Cronje, Commandant--Continuance of the War, Reliance on God, etc., 402 European Intervention, Boer Deputation to Foreign Courts, 402, 403

Cronje, Gen. A.P.--Modder Spruit, Command at, 11 Sanna's Post, Share in Engagement, 64 Vechtgeneraal of Orange Free State, Nomination as, 11

Cronje, Gen. Piet--De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Scheme for breaking Lord Methuen's Railway Communications--Refusal to permit Execution of, 23 Ladysmith, Occupation of Positions South and Southwest of, 19 Magersfontein--Command at, 23, 24 Refusal to profit by Commander-in-Chief De Wet's Advice, 25 Message in reply to Commander-in-Chief De Wet's warning before Paardeberg, 31 Retreat towards Paardeberg, 36, 37 Surrender at Paardeberg (see Paardeberg)

Cronje, Vechtgeneraal Andreas--Command of Boers' Reinforcements from Bloemfontein, 45

Cropper, F.C., Death of, near Lindley, 269

Dakasburg Engagement, 200

Dalgety, Colonel--Command at Badenhorst, 77

Davel, Commandant--Command of President Steyn's Bodyguard, 191

Days of Thanksgiving and Humiliation, Appointment of, 243

De Clercq, Mr.--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, 399 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 344, 348

De la Rey, General--Colesberg Command, 24 Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 403, 404 Fortitude after Fall of Pretoria, 93 Independence of the South African Republic--Powers of Vereeniging Delegates to decide on Question, 411, 412 Kraaipan, Capture of Armoured Train, 8 Kroonstad War Council, Presence at, 58 Magersfontein Laager, Command at, 23 Mission to Europe on behalf of Relief Fund Committee, 428 Peace Negotiations--Member of Commission of National Representatives at the Pretoria Conference, 320, 365-396 Permission given to Burghers to return home, 56 Reitfontein, Work at, 52 Roberts', Lord, Attempt to cross the Orange River--Success in preventing, 26 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 358 Steyn's, President, and General de Wet's visit to, 300

De Lange--Sentence of Death for High Treason at Blijdschap, 268 note

De Wet, General Piet--Advice to Commander-in-Chief De Wet after Siege of Badenhorst, 81 Discontinuance of Struggle proposed--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Reception of Proposal, 130 Lindley Garrison, Capture of, 92 Sanna's Post Engagement, Share in, 64 Swartbooiskop, Guarding after Fight at Nicholson's Nek, 17

De Wet, Jacobus, Capture of, 296, 297

De Wet, Johannes--Death near Smithfield, 181

De Wet, Veldtcornet--Wounded during Retreat from Dewetsdorp, 181

Debtors, Protection of, against Creditors for Six Months after the War--Peace Negotiations at Pretoria (May, 1902), 387

Declaration of War by South African Republic (see Ultimatum)

Deputation to European Powers to ask for Intervention (1900)--Departure from Delagoa Bay, 53, 54 Encouragement to continue Struggle, 407 England's Refusal to permit Return of Deputation, 409, 412, 413 European Governments unwilling to receive, 415, 416 Failure of, 355, 356 Object of, 54 Silence of, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407

Delagoa Bay Harbour, Forbidden to Boers by Portuguese Government, 53, note 54

Destitution caused by the War, 321, 322 Appointment of Committee to Collect and Administer Relief Funds, 428

Devastation by the British--War against Boer Property, 192 Crops destroyed, Corn burnt, etc., note 83 Farm-burning and Waggons (see those titles) Male Attire, Burning of, 221, 222

Dewetsdorp, Occupation by British, 71 Storming by Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Forces, 174-179

Diederiks of Boshof, Commandant, 24

Discipline of Boer Forces--Imperfect Discipline, 7, 8, 9, 57 Failure to remove Cattle along Railway Line, 111 Roodewal, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Difficulties in carrying away Booty, 103, 104 Sanna's Post, irritating Results at, 67 Stricter Discipline, Results of, 61 Taljaart's and Prinsloo's, Veldtcornets, Burghers "preferred to go their own way," 286 Waggon Difficulty, 120, 121 Harrismith Burghers' Refusal to part with their Waggons at Spitskopje, 161-163

Doornberg, War Council at--Decision as to Presidential Election, 197

Doornspruit--Line near crossed by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, Capture of Train, Ammunition, etc., 132

Drakensberg Range-- Boundary between Boer and British Territory in 1899, 7, 8 Passes, Occupation by Orange Free State Commandos, 7, 8

Drive Tactics of British-- Bethlehem-Lindley to Frankfort-Vrede Line--Cordon of Sixty Thousand Men, 290-296 Boer Forces caught between Cordon of Troops and Vaal River, 135, 136 Harrismith, Heilbron and Bethlehem District, 285, 286

Du Toit, General--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 400, 401

Dundee, Line near, cut by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 9, 10

Elandsfontein Engagement--Commandant Michal Prinsloo's Exploit, 119, 120

Elandskop--British Attack in Hope of Capturing Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 290, 291

Elandslaagte Engagement, 114

Els, Veldtcornet Marthinus, wounded outside Ladysmith, 20

Epithets applied by the British to the Boer Forces, 227, 228

European Journals kept from Republics by England, 409

Eustin, Lieut. Banie, wounded and captured by British, 204, 205

Extermination of the South African Republics--British Determination to exterminate the Republics prior to the Outbreak of War, alleged, 254, 255

Fanny's Home Farm--Recapture of Guns by British, 285

Farm-burning, etc., by the British--Heilbron, Bethlehem and Harrismith District, 285 Roberts', Lord, Proclamations, ordering, 192 Shelter, Lack of--Women living in Narrow Sheds, 290, 291 Wholesale Destruction of Farms by the British, 232

Fauresmith and Jacobsdal Burghers--Failure to rejoin Commandos, 60 Return Home without Permission after Poplar Grove, 56

Ferreira, Mr. T.S., Commander-in-Chief, at Kimberley--Death due to Gun Accident, 49

Firing of the Veldt by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 141, 142

Fissher, Abraham--Member of Boer Deputation to Europe (1900), 53, 54

Food Supply--Failure of Food Supply, Reason for Acceptance of British Peace Terms, 233, 321, 401, 402, 405, 406, 410, 416, 417, 421, 422, 427, 428 Kemp's, Gen., Plan of Commandeering Food Supplies from the Kaffirs, 345 Situation in the various Districts on May 15, 1902--Reports of the Delegates to the Vereeniging Conference, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 355, 361, 362

Forces--Comparison between numbers, etc., engaged on either Side in the War, 339 (See also titles Boer and British Forces)

Fourie, General Piet--Bethlehem Engagement, 281 Blauwbank, Exploits at, 33, 34, 35 Cape Colony Expedition, Part in, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 210, 212, 213, 221, 222 Commandos escaped from behind the Roodebergen, Command of, 238, 239 Despatch of, to the South-Eastern Districts, 225 Engagement with British Troops from Bloemfontein (1900), 80 Prinsloo's Surrender, Escape from, 128 Springhaansnek, Leader in Attack on Blockhouse Line, 187, 188, 189 Vice-Commander-in-Chief in Bloemfontein District, Appointment, 157

Franchise--British Government Demands on the South African Republic prior to Outbreak of War, 252, 253, 254

Frankfort, British Success at (1900), 82 Ross', Commandant, Engagement with Colonel Rimington's Troops, 267

Fraser, Gordon--One of two faithful Burghers of Philippolis District, 94

Frederiksstad Station--Attack by Commander-in-Chief de Wet and General Liebenberg on General Barton, Causes of Failure, etc., 165-168

French, General-- Koedoesberg, Fight for, 27 Magersfontein--Boer Lines broken through, 36, 37

Froneman, General-- Continuance of the War at all Costs advocated, 402, 403 Escape from Paardeberg, 41 Frederiksstad, Attack on General Barton--Failure to hold advanced Position, 165, 166, 167 Koedoesberg, Share in Fighting at, 27, 28 Kroonstad War Council, Presence at, 58 Prinsloo's Surrender--Escape from, 128 Railway Line wrecked near America Siding, 115, 116 Reddersburg, March on, 72, 73 Rhenosterriviersbrug Engagement, 99, 101, 104, 105 Sanna's Post Engagement, Share in, 62 Smithfield Expedition, Results of, 79 Train captured by, near Jagersfontein Road Station, 203, 204 Ventersburg, Failure to hold Position, 85

Gatacre, General--Capture of Stormberg, 50

Gatsrand--Death of Danie Theron, 153, 154

Germany--Attitude towards the War, Reasons for Non-intervention, 358, 359

Gladstone-- Assistance rendered to South African Republic in War of 1877-1881, 422, 423 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, tribute to, 85

Goldfields--Surrender of, to the British proposed, 350, 351, 352, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364

Gouveneurskop--General de Villiers' Exploits at, 83

Government of Orange Free State-- Accompanying Commander-in-Chief de Wet in Departure from Roodebergen, 124, 129 Bethlehem, Transference to, 117 Cape Colony, Expedition into, Decision to accompany, 197 Capture of Members of the Government by the British at Reitz--Escape of President Steyn, 244 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Operations after Prinsloo's Surrender--Government accompanying Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 124, 129 Executive Raad, Constitution of, 198 Heilbron, Transference to, 86 Kroonstad, Transference to, 58 Third Transference, Reasons for, 92 Volksraad--Impossibility of assembling a legally constituted Volksraad, 198, 199

Government of South African Republic-- Capture of Members by the British at Reitz, 244 Appointments to Vacancies, 244 Treachery on the part of Burgher Steenekamp, 244 Steyn's, President, Visit to Machadodorp, 144 Termination of the War (see that title)

Governments of the Orange Free State and South African Republic-- Peace Deliberations, Meeting at Klerksdorp, 303, 305 Peace Negotiations at Pretoria, Boer Proposals for Retention of Self-Government under British supervision, 366, 371, 372

Grain Waggons, captured by British near Vredefort, 133

"Granary" of Orange Free State lost to Boers, 84

Grant by the British Government for Repatriation Purposes, Re-stocking Farms, etc., 394

Great Britain, King of--Thanks of Boer Generals for Efforts to promote Peace--Resolution at the Vereeniging Conference, 346

Grobler, Commandant H.S.--Continuance of the War, Impossibility of carrying on the Struggle, 406

Grobler, Mr. E.R.--Colesberg Command, 22

Groenkop, Description of, 278

"Guerillas"-- Designation of Boer Forces by the British as "Guerillas," Objections to the term, 228, 229 Meaning of the term, 229

Guns-- Boer Captures-- Blauwbank, 33 Colenso and Stormberg, 22 Dakasburg Engagement-- Capture of a Maxim-Nordenfeldt, 200 Dewetsdorp, 178 Nicholson's Nek, 16 Sanna's Post, 67, 69 Tweefontein, 282 Boer Losses, 208, 209 Bothaville, Number lost at, 170, 171 Fanny's Home Farm, Recapture of Guns by the British, 285 Frederiksstad, Retreat after--Loss of one gun, 167 Springhaansnek, Gun Abandoned, 189, 190 Ventersdorp, Loss of Krupp Gun near, 141

"Hands-uppers," British use of, 18

Harbour, Boer Lack of, note 53

Harrismith-- Engagement with British Troops near, 272-274 Boer Casualties, 274 Failure of Boer Charge, 273 Orange Free State Troops, Concentration at, 4, 6

Harrismith Burghers-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Visit to, 260 Surrender following Prinsloo's Surrender, 128 Waggon, Refusal to part with--Return home, 161-163

Hasebroek, Commandant--Cape Colony Expedition--Holding the Enemy in Check, 212, 215, 219, 220 Engagement with Colonel White near Thaba'Nchu, 189, 190

Hattingh, General--Command at Harrismith and Vrede Commandos, 161 Commander-in-Chief in the Drakensberg Appointment, 117

Hattingh, Veldtcornet Johannes--Leader in Springhaansnek Attack on Blockhouse Lines, 187

Heenop, David--Swimming the Orange River, 220

Heilbron--District to which Commander-in-Chief de Wet belonged, 4 Government of Orange Free State transferred to, 86 Mentz, Commandant F.E., Engagement with Colonel Byng's Column, 267

Heilbron Commando--Commandant Mr. L. Steenekamp, 4 Vice-Commandant, Election of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 7 Visits to, by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 230, 243

Heliographic Communication, Use by Boers, 286 note, 289

Hertzog, Judge--Continuance of the War, Arguments for and against--Vereeniging Conference, 412 Despatch of, to the South-Western Districts, 225 Mission to bring back Commandos which had escaped from Prinsloo's Surrender, 137 Peace Negotiations--Member of Commission of National Representatives at the Pretoria Conference, 320, 365-396 Rejection of British Terms--Proposal, 425, 426 Report on Attitude of Burghers in North-Western Parts of Cape Colony, 195 Vice-Commander-in-Chief, Appointment in Districts of Fauresmith, etc., 158

Hides for Tanning--Destruction by the British, 233

Hijs, Commandant, P.L.--Impossibility of European Intervention, 401, 402

Holspruits--Boers breaking through British Lines, 293, 294

Honing Kopjes--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's first Engagement with Lord Kitchener, 108-110

Honingspruit Station, Failure of Commandant Olivier's Attack, 115, 116

Horses--Bothaville, Capture of Horses by Boers, 299 Condition of Boer Horses, 338, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 355 Dependence of the Boers on their Horses, 172 Fodder, Scarcity of, 341, 355 Skin Disease among, 271, 272 Wild Horses of the Veldt, Use of, by the Boers, 292, 293

Humiliation Days, Appointment of, 243

Independence of the Republics-- Afrikander Feeling as to, 58 British Government Attitude towards, 337 Correspondence between Presidents Kruger and Steyn and Lord Salisbury, 330-332 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Meetings to ascertain the feeling of the Burghers as to Surrender of Independence, 313 "Irretrievably Lost," 419 Maintenance of--Burghers' Mandate to Vereeniging Delegates, 333, 337, 338, 347, 348, 362, 363, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 411, 412, 417, 421, 422, 423, 424 Peace Negotiations--Conference at Pretoria between Commission of the National Representatives and Lords Kitchener and Milner (May 19-28, 1902), 366, 370, 371 Refusal of the British Government to consider Terms based on Retention of Independence, 53, 54, 309, 310, 397 Steyn, President, Views of, 306 Surrender of--Conditions offered by the British in exchange, 346, 347, 358 Vereeniging Conference, opinions of Burghers' Delegates, 333, 336, 346, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 362, 363, 364

Intervention of Foreign Powers on behalf of the Republics-- Attitude of England towards, 356, 362, 363 Boer Deputation to European Powers (see Deputation) Boer Hopes unfulfilled, 405, 406, 412, 414, 415, 416, 423, 424 Germany, Reasons for Non-intervention, 358, 359 Improbability of Intervention, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 433 Intervention not desired by Boers, 54 Steyn, President, on, 354, 355

Jameson Raid, President Steyn on, 251, 252

Jew at Nicholson's Nek--Burgher declining to do Business, 15

Johannesburg Police, Behaviour at Nicholson's Nek, 15, 16

Jonson, Burgher, Death at Bester Station--First Victim in the Fight for Freedom, 10, 11

Joubert, General-- Junction with Orange Free State Forces at Rietfontein, 13 Kroonstad War Council, Presence at, 58

Kaffirs--Arming by England, 422, 423 Attitude towards the Boers--Reports of Vereeniging Delegates, 337, 338, 339, 340, 343, 345, 346, 355, 361, 362, 363 Boer Women, Treatment of, 151, 152, 153 Capture of Kaffirs by Boers at Dewetsdorp, 178, 179 Release of Prisoners, 181 Treatment of Kaffirs by Boers--Kaffirs captured at Leeuwspruit Bridge, 113 Warfare, Native Methods--Boer Sufferings at the Hands of Zulus and Basutos, 10

Kemp, General--Continuance of the War, Independence of the Republics, etc., 421, 422 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 345, 347, 348

Kitchener, Lord--Armistice agreed on, to admit of Attendance of Boer Officers at the Vereeniging Meeting, 316 Misunderstanding on the Part of the British Columns, 317, 318 Capture of President Steyn and Commander-in-Chief de Wet anticipated--Visit to Wolvehock Station, 290, 291 Escape from Armoured Train, near Leeuwspruit Bridge, 112 Honingkopjes and Roodepoort--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's first Engagement with Lord Kitchener, 108, 109 Independence of Republics as basis for Peace Negotiations, Refusal to consider--Pretoria Conference, 309, 310, 397 Kroonstad, Arrival at, 111 Middelburg Peace Proposals (see that title) Peace Negotiations--Conference at Pretoria with Commission of National Representatives (May 19-28, 1902), 320, 365, 395, 396 Proposals by the Boer Representatives in April, 1902, 305-313 Prisoners, Order given to Gen. Knox "not to take prisoners"--South African News Statement, 184, 185

Klerksdorp--Peace Deliberations, Meeting of Governments of the Republics, 303, 304, 305

Knight, Captain Wyndham-- Surrender at Rhenosterriviersbrug, 105, 106 Tribute to, by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 107

Knox, General--Bethlehem, Engagement near, with Generals Botha and Fourie, and Commandant Prinsloo, 194, 195 Cape Colony--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Operations--Attempted Inroad--Fighting near Smithfield, 181 Expedition into Cape Colony, Dispositions to prevent, 201, 202, 203 Kroonstad taken by, 194, 195 Pursuit of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 185, 186, 187, 189, 190 Thaba'Nchu, Engagement near, with Gen. Fourie, 201, 202

Koedoesberg--Struggle between General French and Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 27, 28, 29

Kotze, Mr. (General Prinsloo's Secretary)--Bearer to Commander-in-Chief de Wet of News of General Prinsloo's Surrender, 135, 136, 137

Kraaipan--Armoured Train captured by Boers, 8, 9

Kritzinger, Commandant--Crossing of Orange River, Seizure of British Outpost, 195, 196

Kritzinger, Commandant, and Captain Scheepers--Engagement with Brabant's Horse, 185, 186

Krom Ellenborg, Sub-district to which Commander-in-Chief de Wet belonged, 4

Kroonstad--British Advance, 86, 87 Abandonment by Boers, 87, 88 Capture by General Knox, 194, 195 Government of Orange Free State transferred to, 58 Government of Orange Free State transferred to Heilbron, 86, 87 Kitchener's Lord, Arrival--Strength of British Forces, etc., 111

Kroonstad Commando, Share in Battle of Modderspruit, 10, 11

Kruger, President--Despatch of Mission to Europe to represent Condition of the Country to President Kruger, proposed, 236, 237, 238 Peace, Joint Letter to Lord Salisbury stating Conditions on which the Republics were willing to make Peace, 330, 331, 332 Poplar Grove, Visit to Boer Troops at, 50 War Council at Kroonstad, Presence, at, 58

Krugersdorp-Potchefstroom Railway--Crossed by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 149

Ladysmith-- British Retreat on Ladysmith, 9, 10 Bulwana Hill--Boers surprised by British, 21 Engagement of 3rd Nov., 1899, 29, 30 Relief, 50

Landsheer, Doctor de--Death at Bothaville, English Newspaper Report, 170, 171

Language Question-- Equal Rights for English and Dutch Languages in Schools--Boer Peace Proposals to Lord Kitchener (April, 1902), 308, 309 Terms of the Peace Protocol, 380, 393, 394 Objections to, 412, 421, 422

Leeuwspruit Railway Bridge--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Scheme for breaking British Lines of Communication, 112 Froneman's, General, Failure to carry out Instructions, 113 Kitchener's Lord, Escape, 112

Leeuwspruit Scheme, Failure of, 112 Methuen's, Lord, Railway Communications--General Cronje's Refusal to permit Execution of Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Scheme for Cutting, 23 Orange Free State Railway--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Work on, 153, 154 Scheepers, Captain, Work of, 154 Wolvehoek, Wrecking the Railway, 163

Liebenberg, General-- Frederiksstad--Failure of Attack on General Barton, 164, 165, 166, 167 Mooi River, Junction with Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 140, 141 Retreat from Rustenburg, 142, 143

Liebenbergsvlei-- British Retreat, 284 Guns, Recapture by British at Fanny's Home Farm, 285

Lindley-- British Garrison Captured by General Piet de Wet, 92 Destruction by the British, Alleged, 271, 272 Engagement near, 268 Postponement of Second Boer Attack--Escape of the British during the Night, 270 Halt of Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Forces, 271, 272

Lindley-Kroonstad Line of Blockhouses--Boers breaking through the Line, 287

Lines of Communication--Boer Attempts to cut British Lines, 172, 246 America Siding Railway Line Wrecked by General Froneman, 115, 116 De Wet, Commander-in-Chief, Schemes of, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 Frederiksstad Station--Wrecking of Railway Bridge and Line, 140, 141 "Little Majuba"--Name given to Swartbooiskop after Nicholson's Nek, 13

Loans by the British Government for restocking Farms, etc., 394

Long Tom damaged by Dynamite, 21

Looting by British, 6, 7

Losses in Killed, Wounded, etc., on either side during the War, 201, 202, 247, 265, 266, 415, 416, 417, 422, 423 Blijdschap, 269 Bothaville, 170, 171 Cape Colony Expedition, 206, 207, 208, 209 Colenso, 22 Dakasburg Engagement, 200 Dewetsdorp, 177, 178 Engagement between Commandant Hasebroek and Colonel White, 189 Frederiksstad Engagement, 166, 167 Heilbron, 26 Koffiefontein, 35, 36 Ladysmith, Engagement of 3rd Nov., 1899, 20 Leeuwspruit Bridge, 112, 113 Lindley, 267, 269 Magersfontein, 23 Modder Spruit, 11 Nicholson's Nek, 16 Paardeberg, 50 Prinsloo's Surrender, 127 Reitz, 265 Rhenosterriviersbrug, 105 Roodewal, Extent of British Losses, 102 Sanna's Post, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 Stinkfontein, 40, 46 Stormberg, 23 Tijgerfontein, 138, 139 Tweefontein, 181 Vanvurenskloof, 139, 140 Verkijkersdorp, 239, 240 Vredefort Engagement, 134, 135

Loyalty to British Government--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Final Advice to the Boers, 324

Lubbe, Commandant--Return from Paardenberg's Drift, 36, 37 Wounded and Captured near Thaba'Nchu, 82

Lyddite Shells, Effect of-- Bethlehem Incident, 121, 122 Magersfontein Laager, 24

Maagbommen, 5

Macdonald, General Sir Hector-- Command of Reinforcements against Bethlehem, 121, 122

Machadodorp--President Steyn's Visit to the Government of the South African Republic, 144

Magalies Mountains, Passage of, by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 145, 146, 147

Magersfontein Engagement-- British Losses, 23

Magersfontein Laager-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Command, 23, 24 Duties and Annoyances of Command, 64 Shelling by British, 24 Women, Presence of--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Failure to induce Government to Prohibit, 25

Mailbags captured at Roodewal, Contents used by Boers, 102

"Majuba Day"--Capture of Commandant van Merwe and men, 296, 297

Malan, Lieut.--Expedition into Cape Colony, 206, 207

Martial Law--Proclamation by Governments of the Republics, 7, 8

Massey, Major--Command at Dewetsdorp, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Tribute, 175, 176

Matthijsen, Corporal Adriaan and the crossing of the Magalies Mountains, 146, 147

Mauser Rifle in Portrait of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, History of, 151, 152

Mears, Commandant--Loss of Guns at Fanny's Home Farm, 285

Medical Certificates, Abuse of by Burghers, note 59

Meijer, Commandant J.--Tribute to, 271, 272

Mentz, Commandant J.E.-- Continuance of the War, Impossibility of, 421, 422 Situation in South Africa on 15th May, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 351, 352

Merve, Commandant-General van, wounded at Sanna's Post, 68, 69

Merve, Commandant van der-- Appointment to Command of Winburg Burghers, 64 Capture of, on "Majuba Day," 296, 297

Meyer, Mr. J.L.--Continuance of the War, Arguments against, Vereeniging Conference, 413, 414

Meyer, Veldtcornet--Loss of Position at Stinkfontein, 42

Middelburg Peace Proposals-- Annulled by the Terms of Peace arranged at the Pretoria Conference (May, 1902), 392 Communications between the Boer Leaders with reference to the proposed Conference, 230 Difference between the Basis of Negotiations proposed by the Boer Representatives in May, 1902, and the Middelburg Proposals, 367, 372, 373 Receipts issued by Boer Officers, Proviso as to Payment, 384, 385

Milner, Lord-- Boer Ultimatum--Mr. Chamberlain's Telegrams, 329 Independence of Republics as Basis for Peace Negotiations, Refusal to consider--Pretoria Conference, 365-396, 397 Peace Negotiations--Conference at Pretoria with Commission of National Representatives (May 18-29, 1902), 320, 365-396

Mobility--British Incapacity to keep pace with Boers, 140, 141 (see also Waggons)

Modder River--British entrenched at, 24

Modder Spruit, Battle of, 9, 10, 11 Boer and British Losses, 11, 12

Modderrivierpoort (see Poplar Grove)

Muller, Capt.--Exploit at Roodewal, 101

Muller, General C.H.--Continuance of the War--Vereeniging Delegates' Refusal to accept British Surrender Proposal, 417

Myringen, Burgher, killed at Rhenosterriviersbrug, 105, 106

Naauwpoort--Prinsloo's Surrender, 85

Natal--British Subjects fighting for the Boers (see Colonial Burghers)

Natal Operations-- Absence of Commander-in-Chief de Wet after 9th Dec., 1899, 21 Bester Station Skirmish, 10, 11 Colenso, Magersfontein, and Stormberg Engagements--British Losses, 23 Drakensberg Passes, Occupation by Orange Free State Commandos, 7, 8 Estcourt Skirmishes--General Louis Botha's Exploits, 19 Failure of Boers to cut off English at Dundee and Elandslaagte, 9, 10 Kraaipan, Capture of Armoured Train by General De la Rey, 8, 9 Ladysmith (see that title) Modder Spruit, Battle of, 9, 10, 11 Natal Frontier, Commander-in-Chief C. de Wet's Reconnaissance, 7, 8 Nicholson's Neck (see that title)

National Representatives (see Peace Negotiations)

National Scouts--Arming men who had taken the Oath of Neutrality, 159 Bergh's, Captain, Attacks on Boers with bands of Kaffirs, 271, 272 Night Attacks by the British instigated by, 263, 264 Services to the British, 184, 185, 223, 224

Naude, Mr. J.--Independence of the South African Republic and Orange Free State, Vereeniging Delegates' power to decide as to Position of British Subjects fighting on Boer side, etc., 411

Neikerk, Altie van--Capture at Honingkopjes, 186

Neikerk, Captain--Appointment as Commandant of President Steyn's Bodyguard, 245

Nel, Commandant-- Farm stormed by English--Escape of Commander-in-Chief C. de Wet, 152, 153, 154 Modder Spruit--West Wing of Boer Forces commanded by Nel, 10, 11 Nicholson's Nek--Failure to hold Swartbooiskop, 13, 14 Resignation, 115, 116

Nerwe, Van de--Drowned in crossing Orange River, 217

Netherlands-- Peace--Correspondence with the British Government, 301, 302 Boer Response to the Invitation implied in the forwarding of the Correspondence, etc., 305, 306, 370, 371 Queen of--Thanks of Boer Generals for efforts to promote Peace--Resolution at the Vereeniging Conference, 345, 346

Newspapers--Circulation of European Papers prohibited in Republics by England, 409

Nicholson's Nek-- Ambulance for British wounded--Sir G. White's Delay in sending, 17 Booty taken by Boers, 16 Swartbooiskop-- Nel's, Commandant, Failure to hold, 13, 14 Storming by Steenekamp and Commander-in-Chief C. de Wet, 14, 15 White Flag Incident, 15 Transvaal Burghers, Work of, 17

Nieuwouwdt, General--Peace, Rejection of British Terms, Proposal, 424, 425

Night Attacks by the British--Success of, Losses caused to the Boers, 263, 264

Norvalspont--Commander-in-Chief C. de Wet's Schemes for Operations in rear of British, 81, 82

Oath of Neutrality, Breaking--Re-arming of Burghers who had taken the Oath, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Scheme, 156-160 British Military Authorities' Breach of Terms of Lord Roberts' Proclamation justifying Scheme, 159, 160

Olivier, Commandant-- Bethlehem District, Appointment to Command, 227, 228 Honingspruit Station, Failure of Attack on, 115, 116 Prinsloo's, General, Position as Private Burgher, Dissatisfaction with, 118

Oliviershoekpas--Occupation by Bethlehem Commando, 7, 8

Orange Free State-- Annexation of--Battles fought after the alleged Annexation, 228, 229 De Wet, Commander-in-Chief, Return of, 144, 150, 151 Government (see Government of Orange Free State) Number of Burghers in Arms after Fall of Pretoria, 94 Outbreak of War--Orange Free State joining issues with the South African Republic, 254, 255 President--Powers granted to President in Matters Concerning War, 9, 10 Situation of Boer and British Forces in 1901, President Steyn on, 255, 256

Ortel, Mr. Charles--Owner of Abraham's Kraal, 51

Outbreak of the War, 7, 8

Paardeberg--General Cronje's Forces surrounded by the British, Bombardment of Laager, etc., 39 Boer Reinforcements, Arrival of, 45 Cronje's, Gen., Determination not to abandon Laager, 41 Efforts to release General Cronje--Storming of Stinkfontein, etc., 40-46 Abandonment of Position by Boers, 44 Botha's, General, Attempt to recapture Position abandoned on 25th February, 45 British Efforts to recapture Position, 42, 43, 44 Way of Escape opened to General Cronje, 41, 43 Sketch of Boer and British Positions, 38 Surrender of General Cronje, 47 Effect on Boer Forces, 48, 49, 51 Theunisson, Mr., Capture by British, 6, 7

Paardenberg's Drift, British Advance on, 30 Camp of "Water-draggers" surprised by British, 32, 33

Palmietfontein--Boers breaking through Blockhouse Line, 289, 290

Panic among Boer Forces-- Burghers returning to Farms after Fall of Pretoria, 93 Holspruits, 294, 295

Peace Negotiations--Boer Overtures, etc.-- Armistice agreed on, to admit of attendance of Officers at the Vereeniging Meeting, 315 Misunderstanding on the part of the British Columns, 317, 318 Concessions in addition to the Terms already offered in the Negotiations of April, 1902, 366 Conference at Pretoria between the Commission of National Representatives and Lords Kitchener and Milner (19-28 May, 1902), 320, 365 Draft Document drawn up to place Negotiations in position to amend the Middelburg Proposals, 376, 377 Prolongation of Meetings due to Cable Correspondence with Great Britain, 397 Report of Commission discussed at Vereeniging Meeting, 397 Governments of the Republics, Meeting at Klerksdorp, 303, 304, 305 Burger's, Vice-President, Letter to President Steyn, 301, 302 Independence (see that subheading) Middelburg Peace Proposals (see that title) National Representatives-- Commission sent to the Pretoria Conference (May, 1902)-- Decision to appoint Commission, 364 Names of Members, 412 Election of Representatives for the Commandos, 313, 314 Meeting at Vereeniging (15th May) to consider the Situation, 352, 353, 358, 359, 362, 363 Peace Terms Proposed, 362, 363, 364 Netherlands' Communication with the British Government, 301, 302 Boer Response to the Invitation implied in the forwarding of the Correspondence, etc., 305, 306, 370, 371 Letter sent to Commandos, 336, 345, 346, 347 Presidents of the Republics--Correspondence with Lord Salisbury, and Lord Salisbury's Reply (5th March, 1900), 50, 53, 54, 330-332, 409 Proposals to Lord Kitchener (April, 1902), 299 Correspondence between Lord Kitchener and the Secretary of State--Independence Difficulty, 401, 402 Signing of Peace at Pretoria, 323, 324 Steyn's, President, Views, 258, 259 Terms of Peace sanctioned by the British Government and accepted by the Boers (May, 1902)-- Acceptance of British Terms, 320, 427, 428 Acceptance under Protest proposed, 421 Dissatisfaction among men of the Commandos, 324 Failure of Food Supply as reason for acceptance, 321 Unconditional Surrender v. Acceptance, 399, 401, 404, 405, 417, 423, 424 Better Terms, Possibility of obtaining, 406, 409, 410, 423, 424 Decision as to Acceptance or Rejection essential, 425, 426 Middelburg Proposal Annulled by the Terms of the Peace Protocol of May, 1902, 392 Milner's, Lord, Telegrams, 392 Rejection of Terms proposed, 424, 425 Signatures to Acceptance, Question of, 425, 426 Sub-committee appointed to aid in formulating Peace Proposals, 378, 398 Text of Draft Proposal and of Draft Proposal with Amendments sanctioned by the British Government, 379, 393 Time allowed for discussion of Terms, 394, 395 "Ultimatum," Description of British Terms, 321

Penzhorn, Mr., Relatives of--Kindness to Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 145

Petrusberg--Capture of by British, 51 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Visit, 232

Plans, Sketch Plans of Engagements, 97, 276

Plessis, Veldtcornet du--Death due to White Flag Treachery at Reddersburg, 76

Poplar Grove-- Concentration of Boer Troops at, 50 Kruger's, President, Visit to Boer Troops, 50 Panic among Boers--Commander-in-Chief de Wet unable to prevent flight, 51

Potchefstroom, Portrait of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, History of Mauser Rifle, which appears in the photograph, 151, 152

Potgieter, Commandant (of Wolmaranstadt)--Escape from Paardeberg, 41

Potgieter, Mr. Hendrik--Appointment as Public Prosecutor of Orange Free State, 198

Preeij, Vice-Commandant Ignatius du, killed near Bethlehem, 194, 195

Presidency of Orange Free State-- Expiration of President Steyn's term of office--Difficulties in the way of an Election, Action of the Doornberg War Council, 197, 198 Resignation of President Steyn, 411 Rhodes, Mr., proposed as Candidate, 198

Pretoria-- Capture by British, 92 Panic ensuing among Transvaalers, 93 Peace Negotiations--Conference between Commission of National Representatives and Lords Kitchener and Milner (May 19-28, 1902), 320, 365

Pretorius, Willem-- Storming of British Schanze on Orange River, 204, 205 Tribute to, 271, 272 Veldtcornet, Nomination as, 205, 206

Prinsloo, Commandant Michal-- Bethlehem Engagement, 194, 195 Elandsfontein Exploit, 119, 120 Liebenbergsvlei Engagement, 284 Springhaansnek, Covering Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Passage of Blockhouse Lines at, 187, 188 Train captured and burned by, 152, 153 Vice-Commander-in-Chief of Bethlehem and Ficksburg Sub-districts, Appointment, 227, 228

Prinsloo, Mr. Marthinus-- Assistant Commander-in-Chief, Irregular Election as, 126 Commandant of Winburg District, 6, 7 Commander-in-Chief of Orange Free State, Election, 6, 7 Natal Campaign, Preliminary Arrangements, 7, 8 Resignation of Post as Commander-in-Chief in the Drakensberg, 117 Surrender at Naauwpoort, 85 Letter to Commander-in-Chief de Wet announcing Surrender and Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Reply, 136, 137 News brought to Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 135, 136, 137, 138 Suspicious Circumstances of Surrender, 127

Prinsloo's, Veldtcornet, Burghers, Capture of, 286

Prisoners--Boer Prisoners-- Bank Notes of the South African Republic, Opportunity of sending in for Payment, 386, 387 Ceylon--Prisoners taken with General Prinsloo sent to Ceylon, 156 Merwe, Commandant, and men--Capture on "Majuba Day," 296, 297 Number taken by the British, Frederiksstad, 40, 46, 170, 171, 264, 265 Total Number (35,000) in the Hands of the British in 1901, 256, 257 Taljaart's and Prinsloo's Veldtcornets, Burghers, Capture of, 286 British Prisoners-- Boer Inability to keep their Prisoners, 227, 228, 426, 427 Clothing taken by the Boers, 233 Numbers taken, 16, 23, 66, 67, 69, 70, 76, 102, 105, 106, 112, 113, 163, 178, 179, 185, 186, 194, 195, 202, 203, 205, 206, 207, 222, 223, 267, 281 Release on Fall of Pretoria due to Transvaalers' negligence, 92 Treatment by Boers-- Personal Property of Prisoners, etc., Disposition of, 101, note Prisoners taken in Cape Colony Expedition, Treatment of, 210 Kaffir Prisoners taken by Boers-- Dewetsdorp, 178, 179 Release of Prisoners, 181 Leeuwspruit Bridge, 113

"Pro-Boers"-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Tribute to, 218 Meetings in England, 407

Public Prosecutor of Orange Free State--Appointment of Mr. Hendrick Potgieter, 198

Railways--Wrecking the Lines, Cutting British Lines of Communication, 172, 242 America Siding, Line near, wrecked by General Froneman, 115, 116 De Aar and Hopetown, Line blown up, 208, 209, 211 Frederiksstad Station, Bridge and Line wrecked, 115, 116 Leeuwspruit, Failure of Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Attempt, 112, 113 Orange Free State Line, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Work on, 153, 154, 155 Scheepers, Captain, Work of, 153, 154 Schemes of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153 Wolvehock, 163

Rebels--Colonial Burghers Fighting on Boer Side (see Colonial Burghers) Roberts', Lord, Description of Burghers continuing to fight after annexation of the Republics as "Rebels," 227, 228

Receipts issued by Boer Officers for the Purchase of Cattle, Grain, etc.--Peace Negotiations, Boer Representatives' Request for a Guarantee of Payment, 382 Amount likely to be required, 386, 387 Middelburg Proposal, 384, 385 Orange Free State, Position with reference to Receipts, 383, 384, 385, 386 Terms of Peace Agreement, 380

Reddersburg--Boer Messenger fired on by British, 74 British Commanding Officer's Reply to Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Advice to Surrender, 74 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Dispositions, 71-74 Mostertshoek, British Failure to reinforce Detachment at, 75 White Flag Treachery, 75, 76

Reich, Dr.--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Meeting with at Senekal, 231

Reitz--Engagement near, 263-266 Surrender of Arms by Commandos after Declaration of Peace, 323, 324

Reitz, Secretary of State--Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902, Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 350, 351

Relief Funds for Destitution caused by the War--Appointment of Committee to Collect and Administer, 428

Repatriation of Boers--Compensation for Losses sustained during the War--District Commissions, Institution of, 393, 394 Grant of L3,000,000 by the British Government, 393, 394 Inadequacy of Proposals, 402, 403, 421 Loans by the British Government, 394, 395

Rheeder, Commandant--Continuance of the War, Terms of Surrender, etc., 401

Rhenoster River, Fighting on, 89, 90 Hurried Retreat of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 90

Rhenosterriviersbrug--General Froneman's Success, 104, 105, 106

Rhodes, Mr. C.-- Jameson Raid--Mr. Chamberlain's Defence of Mr. Rhodes, 251, 252 Presidency of Orange Free State--Mr. Rhodes proposed as a Candidate, 198

Rietfontein, Battle of (see Modder Spruit)

Roberts, Lord-- Advance of, into the Orange Free State, 26 Bloemfontein, Appearance before, 54 Dispositions after Capture of Kroonstad (May 18, 1900), 88, 89 Inaction after Paardeberg, 50 Thaba'Nchu, Operations near (1900), 82 Proclamations-- Burning of Buildings within radius of Ten Miles from Railway wrecked by Boers, 192 Oath of Neutrality, Proclamation as to Charge against Lord Roberts of violating Terms of Proclamation, 80, 159 Effect in preventing Burghers from rejoining Commandos, 60 Roodewal Disaster due to negligence of Lord Roberts, 105, 106 Sanna's Post, Failure to reinforce Troops at, 70 note Ventersburg, Attack on, 85

Roch, General--Natal Campaign, General Roch's Command in Opening Movement of Boer Forces, 9, 10

Roodebergen--De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Departure from, 124, 129 Occupation by Boer Forces--Commander-in-Chief De Wet's Opposition to Scheme, 124 Passes of, 123

Roodepoort--Commander-in-Chief De Wet's first Engagement with Lord Kitchener, 108, 109

Roodewal Station, Action at, 98-101 Booty burnt by Boers, 104, 105 Sketch Plan, 97

Roux, Assistant Commander-in-Chief--Prinsloo's Surrender, weak and childish Conduct of General Roux, 126, 127

Roux, Deacon Paul, Appointment as Vechtgeneraal, 85

Russian Reception of Escaped Burghers, 110 note

Rustenburg--General Liebenberg's Retreat, 142, 143

Salisbury, Marquess of--Peace Negotiations, Boer Proposals of March 5, 1900--Reply to, 50, 53, 54, 409 Peace--Correspondence with Presidents Kruger and Steyn, 330-332

Sanna's Post, Action at-- Broadwood's, General, Troops, Arrival of, 65, 66 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Preparations, 62, 64 Koornspruit, Position occupied by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 64, 65, 66 Women and Children from Thaba'Nchu, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Care for, 66, 67

Scheepers, Captain, and Commandant Kritzinger-- Brabant's Horse, Engagement with, 185, 186 Despatch Rider chosen by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, to carry Message to General Cronje before Paardeberg, 31, 32 Orange River, Crossing of--Seizure of British Outpost, 195, 196 Railway Lines, Wrecking of, 152, 153, 154 Scouting Services, 124, 131 Zandnek Engagement, 139, 140

Scouting-- Boer and British Methods--Services rendered to the British by Boer Deserters, etc., 18, 121, 122 Importance of, 165, 166 National Scouts, Services of (see National Scouts)

Secrecy as to Future Movements--Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Determination to keep his Plans secret, 61, 199

Self-Government, Retention of under British Supervision--Peace Negotiations, Boer Representatives' Proposals at the Pretoria Conference (May 19, 1902), 366, 371, 372

Sheep--Huge Tail of African Sheep, 211

Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--De Wet's Commander-in-Chief, Address at the Vereeniging Conference, 358-362

Situation of the Boer and British Forces in 1901, President Steyn on, 255, 256

Sketch Plans of Engagements, 38, 97, 276

Smith, Veldtcornet Hans, of Rouxville, Desertion after Roodewal, 106, 107

Smuts, General-- Continuance of the War, Arguments for and against--Vereeniging Conference, 418 Peace Negotiations--Member of Commission of National Representatives at the Pretoria Conference, 320, 365-396 Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902--Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 340-342

Sobriety of Boers, 60

South African News--Publication of, Order not to take Prisoners, Anecdote of Lord Kitchener, 184, 185

South African Republic-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Journey with General De la Rey, Incidents during, 238, 239, 242 Extermination of, by the British determined on prior to the Outbreak of War, alleged, 254, 255 Government of (see Government of South African Republic) Situation of, in 1902--Impossibility of continuing the War, 421, 422 Situation of Boer and British Forces in 1901--President Steyn on, 255, 256

Speller, Veldtcornet, of Wepener--Capture by British at Stinkfontein, 44

Springhaansnek--Blockhouse Line broken through by the Boers, 173, 187, 188

Spruit, Commandant--Capture by British at Stinkfontein, 42, 43; Subsequent Escape, 43

States-Procureur of Orange Free State--Capture of Mr. Jacob de Villiers at Bothaville, 170, 171, 198

Steenekamp, Burgher--Betrayal of Members of the South African Government to the British, 244

Steenekamp, Commandant-- Assistant-Commander-in-Chief, Nomination as, 144 Heilbron District, Commandant of, 4, 6, 7 Illness of, 7, 8, 9, 10 Vredefort Road Station, Attack on, 98, 105, 106

Steyn, President-- Accompanying Commander-in-Chief de Wet in his departure from Roodebergen, 129 Bethlehem Engagement, Presence at, 117 Bloemfontein, Departure from, 57 Bodyguard-- Davel, Commandant, Command of, 191 Niekerk, Captain--Appointment as Commandant, 245 Botha, General Philip, Visit to, 86, 87 Burgher's Vice-President, Request for Meeting with Orange Free State Government, 301, 302 Cape Colony Expedition, Decision to accompany, 197 Capture of Members of Governments of the South African Republics by the British at Reitz--President Steyn's Escape, 244 Causes of the War--Letter to Lord Kitchener, 250-259 Commander-in-Chief of Orange Free State, Refusal to allow Election--Consent to Election of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 118 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Schemes for operating in the Rear of the British, Opposition to, 82 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Tribute to, 212 Eyes, Weakness of--Visit to Dr. van Rennenkamp, 300 Government of the South African Republic, Meetings with-- Machadodorp Visit, 144 Vrede Meeting, 231 Illness of, 319 Independence of the Republic, Refusal to surrender, 306 Intervention of Foreign Powers, Attitude as to, 54 Kroonstad War Council presided over by President Steyn, 58 Peace--Correspondence between Presidents Kruger and Steyn and Lord Salisbury, 330-332 Resignation owing to Illness, 411 Ventersdorp--Meeting with Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 168, 169 Western Parts of the State, Visit to, 298-302

Steyn, Willie, Capture at Honing Kopjes--Subsequent Escape, 110 note

Stinkfontein, Stormed and Abandoned by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 40

Stormberg-- British Losses at, 22, 23 Capture by General Gatacre, 50

Stormjagers, 5

Strauss, David--Prisoner taken by the British in contravention of Lord Roberts' Proclamation, 80

Stripping British Prisoners in order to obtain Clothing, 233

Supervision of the British Government--Peace Negotiations, Boer Representatives' offer to accept Supervision as a Compromise on the Independence Question, 366, 371, 372, 373

Surrender-- Banishment Proclamation (see that title) Oath of Neutrality, Lord Roberts' Proclamation (see Oath of Neutrality) Peace Negotiations at Pretoria in May, 1902--Draft Agreement, 376

Surrender of Arms after Declaration of Peace, 323, 324

Swartbooiskop-- Nel's Commandant, Failure to hold, 13, 14 Storming by Commandant Steenekamp and Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 14, 15

Swaziland--Cession to the British, Proposals of the Vereeniging Conference, 350, 351, 360, 361, 363, 364

Sympathy felt for Boer Cause in England--Indirect Intervention, etc., 407, 410, 420

Tabaksberg Engagement, 83

Taljaart's, Veltcornet, Burghers, Capture of, 286

Telegraph Wires--cutting wires between Wolvehock and Viljoensdrift, 299

Telegraphic Communication between Orange Free State and Transvaal, 92

Termination of the War-- Attitude of the Burghers, 237, 238 Boer Women, Opinion of, 361, 362 Conference between Transvaal and Orange Free State Governments-- Decision to continue Fighting, 242, 243 Klerksdorp Meeting, 303, 304, 305 De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Forebodings, 58 Letter from Commandants in the Field to Secretary of the Orange Free State-- Conference with Transvaal Government, 242 Discussion of, by President Steyn and Generals De la Rey and De Wet, 234 Steyn's President, Answer, Extracts from, 236-239 Terms of, 234-237 Mission to President Kruger on behalf of South African Republic proposed, 236, 237, 238 Vereeniging Conference--Views of the Representatives, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 354-358, 359, 360-362, 363

Territory, Session of--Peace Negotiations-- Pretoria Conference, Boer Representatives' Offer, 366, 375 Vereeniging Conference Proposals (15th May, 1902), 350, 351, 352, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364

Thaba'Nchu-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Retreat on after Badenhorst, 81 Occupation by General Broadwood, 65, 66

Thanksgiving Days, Appointment of, 243

Theron, Danie-- Death at Gatsrand, 153, 154 Paardeberg--Passing Enemy's Lines to carry Message from Commander-in-Chief de Wet to General Cronje, 46 Scouting Party, Appointment as Chief by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 54 Scouting Services, 88, 89, 124, 131 Train Captured by, 132

Theron, Jan--Appointment to succeed Commandant Danie Theron, 153, 154

Theunissen, Commandant of Winburg, 45 Capture by British at Stinkfontein, 46 Election as Commandant of Winburg, 6, 7

Thring, Veldtcornet--War Experiences, Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Tribute, etc., 87, 88, 89

Tijgerfontein Engagement, 138, 139

Tintwaspas--Occupation by Kroonstad Commando, 7, 8

Tonder, Mr. Gideon van--Killed by Lyddite Shell at Magersfontein, 25

Trains-- Blowing up with Dynamite, 230, 246 Devices to throw the British off the Scent, 246 Mechanical Devices, 246 Boer Captures of, 132, 152, 153, 203, 204

Transvaalers-- Negligence in leaving Prisoners at Pretoria, 92 Nicholson's Nek, Work at, 17

Truter, Commandant--Abandonment of Krupp gun and Ammunition, 182

Tweefontein--Attack on British Position, 275-283 Sketch Plan, 276

Uijs, Commandant--Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902, Report to the Vereeniging Conference, 349, 350

"Uitschudden"--Institution of, in order to obtain Clothing, 233

Ultimatum by the South African Republic-- Cause of the War alleged-- Salisbury's, Lord, Assertion, 53, 54, 409 Salisbury's, Lord, Demand, 53, 54, 409 Steyn's, President, Contradiction, 251, 252 Chamberlain's, Mr. J., Telegrams to Sir A. Milner, 329 Text of the "Ultimatum," 325-328

Unconditional Surrender--Discussion at Vereeniging Meeting of May 29, 1902, 398, 399, 401, 405, 406, 423, 424

Vaal River--Crossing of President Steyn's Party, 300

Valsch River Bridge, Destruction by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 88, 89

Van Dam, Under Captain--Command of Johannesburg Police at Nicholson's Nek, 16

Van Niekerk, Commandant--Continuance of the War, Argument in favour of, 414, 415

Van Reenen's Pass-- Occupation by Harrismith and Winburg Commandos, 7, 8 War Council at--Commander-in-Chief de Wet attending in place of Commandant Steenekamp, 8, 9

Vanvurenskloof, Boer Retreat from, 139, 140

Vechtgeneraal of the Orange Free State-- Abolition of Post, 95 Creation of Post, 9, 10 De Wet, Commander-in-Chief, Appointment of, 22 Roux, General Paul, appointed by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 85 Ventersburg--Boer Lines broken through, 85

Ventersdorp-- Fighting near, 140, 141, 142 Meeting between President Steyn and Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 168, 169

Vereeniging-- Meeting of General Representatives to discuss the Situation (May 15, 1902), 333-364 Authority given to Delegates to voice the wishes of their Constituencies, 333, 337, 338, 400, 402, 403, 404, 405, 407, 411, 412, 417, 421, 422, 423, 424 Thanks of the meeting to the King of England and Queen of the Netherlands for efforts to promote Peace, 345, 346 Unity among Delegates essential, 337, 338, 349, 350, 351, 357 Meeting of Special National Representatives to discuss British Peace Terms (May 29, 1902), 397 Armistice agreed on to admit of Attendance of Officers, 315 Misunderstanding on the part of the British Columns, 317, 318 Divisions among Delegates, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426 Meeting a Fatal Error, 413, 414 Questions to be decided, 398, 411, 417 (For details of subjects discussed see Independence, Peace Negotiations, etc.)

Verkijkersdorp--Capture of Women's Laager near, by the British, and Rescue by Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Commando, 238-241 British Casualties, 239, 240

Vice-Commanders-in-Chief, Orange Free State-- Badenhorst, Veldtcornet, C.C., Appointment for Districts of Boshof, etc., 159 De Wet, Gen., Appointment of, 49 Fourie, Gen., Appointment for Districts of Bloemfontein, etc., 157 Hertzog, Gen., Appointment for Districts of Fauresmith, etc., 158

Vice-President of Orange Free State-- Appointment of Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 411 Creation of Temporary Post, 198

Viljoen, Mr. P.R.--Situation in South Africa on May 15, 1902, Report of the Vereeniging Conference, 346, 347

Villiers, General de--Death due to Wound received at Biddulphsberg, 84 Natal Expedition, Commanding as Vechtgeneraal, 8, 9 Prinsloo's Surrender, Escape from, 128 Work in South-Eastern Districts of the Orange Free State, 83

Villiers, Mr. Jacob de, States-Procureur of Orange Free State, Capture of at Bothaville, 170, 171, 198

Vilonel, Commandant-- Resignation--Enforced Resignation due to Insubordination, 64 Surrender to British--Recapture by Captain Pretorius and Trial for Desertion, 84 Removal from Bethlehem to Fouriesburg, 121, 122 Waggons, Persistence in use of, 62

Visser, Commandant--Death of at Jagersfontein Engagement, Faithfulness and Valour of Commandant Visser, 158

Vleeschkorporaal, Duties of, 4, 5

Vrede-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Meeting with Louis Botha, 231 Meeting between President Steyn and the Transvaal Government, 231

Vrede Commando, Surrender following Prinsloo's Surrender, 128

Vredefort-- Capture of British Outpost, 232 Engagements near, 133, 134, 135 Retreat of the Boers to the Vaal River, 164, 165 Surrender of Arms by Commando after Declaration of Peace, 323, 324

Vredefort-weg Station--Commandant Steenekamp's Success at, 98, 105, 106

Vrijheid--Kaffir Atrocities, Murder and Mutilation of Burghers, 426, 427

Waggons-- Boer Reluctance to abandon use of, 62, 120, 121, 129, 131, 135, 136 Harrismith Burghers' Refusal to part with their Waggons at Spitskopje, 161-163 De Wet, Commander-in-Chief, Use of Little Waggon, 293, 294, 398 Destruction by British, 120, 121, 191 No Waggons with Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Commando, 279 Vilonel's, Commandant, Persistence in using Waggons, 62 Waggon Camps, Regulation prohibiting, 58

War Commission--Orders to commence Natal Campaign, 4

War Councils, 19 Decisions of Council of March 28, 1900, 61 Doornberg, Council at--Decision as to Presidential Election, 197 Kroonstad Council--Officers present, Decisions, etc., 58 note, 59

War of 1877-1881--Futility of Comparison with War of 1899-1902, 421, 422

Warfare, Boer Methods of-- Checking an Enemy's Advance--Boer Tactics, 213 Rapidity of Action, Importance of, 75

Wauchope, General--Death at Magersfontein, 23

Weilbach, Commandant--Desertion of Post at Bloemfontein, 54

Wessels, General J.B.-- Kroonstad War Council, Presence at, 58 Sanna's Post Engagement, Share in, 64

Wessels, Mr. C.J.-- Commander-in-Chief of Free Staters at Magersfontein and Kimberley, 23 Member of Boer Deputation to Europe (1900), 53, 54

Wessels, Veldtcornet-- Capture of, at Frederiksstad, 166, 167 Dewetsdorp Exploits, 176, 177, 178

White, Colonel--Engagement with Commandant Hasebroek near Thaba'Nchu, 189, 190

White Flag Treachery at Reddersburg, 75, 76

Wire Fencing-- Bothaville Boers cutting the Wire, 299 Erection of, by the British, 262 Lindley-Kroonstad Line of Blockhouses--Escape of Boers, 287 Palmietfontein, Boers breaking through Line, 289, 290

Witkopjes Rheboksfontein Engagement, 135, 136

Witwatersrand, Cession to the British--Proposals of the Vereeniging Conference, 350, 351, 360, 361, 363, 364

Wolfaard Brothers--Wounded by Lyddite Shell at Magersfontein, 25

Wolmarans, Daniel--Member of Boer Deputation to Europe (1900), 53, 54

Wolvehock--Railway blown up by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 163

Women and Children-- De Wet's, Commander-in-Chief, Care for, after Sanna's Post, 66, 67 Difficulties of providing for--Deliberations of the Vereeniging Conference, 333, 339, 342, 343, 344, 345, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 356, 405, 406, 410, 412, 413, 415, 416, 417, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427 Flight of Boer Women to escape Capture by the British, 279 Kaffir Treatment of Boer Women, 151, 152, 153 Magersfontein Laager, Presence in, 25 Sufferings in Concentration Camps, etc., 198, 290, 291, 421, 422 Treatment by the British, 232, 239, 240, 241, 257, 258 Verkijkersdorp Laager, Capture of by British, and rescue by Commander-in-Chief de Wet's Commando, 238-241

Wonderkop--General de Villiers' Exploits, 83

Wounded, Boer Treatment of-- Doornspruit, Care of Wounded after, 133, 134 Nicholson's Nek--Care for Wounded by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 17

Yeomanry, Imperial--Gallantry at Tweefontein, 281

Yule, General--Ladysmith Retreat conducted by, 9, 10

Zandnek--Captain Scheepers' Engagement near, 139, 140

Zwavelkrans Farm--British Convoy Captured by Commander-in-Chief de Wet, 96, 98