Part 20

11 The first four chapters of the first of the supplementary books belong to these seven paragraphs.

12 Compare with this paragraph §§ 26 and 27 of the third edition of the essay on the principle of sufficient reason.

13 Cf. Ch. 5 and 6 of the Supplement.

14 Cf. Ch. 9 and 10 of the Supplement.

15 Cf. Ch. 11 of Supplement.

16 I am therefore of opinion that a science of physiognomy cannot, with certainty, go further than to lay down a few quite general rules. For example, the intellectual qualities are to be read in the forehead and the eyes; the moral qualities, the expression of will, in the mouth and lower part of the face. The forehead and the eyes interpret each other; either of them seen alone can only be half understood. Genius is never without a high, broad, finely-arched brow; but such a brow often occurs where there is no genius. A clever-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be so the uglier the face is; and a stupid-looking person may the more certainly be judged to be stupid the more beautiful the face is; for beauty, as the approximation to the type of humanity, carries in and for itself the expression of mental clearness; the opposite is the case with ugliness, and so forth.

17 Cf. Ch. 7 of the Supplement.

18 Cf. Ch. 8 of Supplement.

19 Suarez, Disput. Metaphysicæ, disp. iii. sect. 3, tit. 3.

20 Cf. Ch. 12 of Supplement.

21 The reader must not think here of Kant’s misuse of these Greek terms, which is condemned in the Appendix.

22 Spinoza, who always boasts that he proceeds more geometrico, has actually done so more than he himself was aware. For what he knew with certainty and decision from the immediate, perceptive apprehension of the nature of the world, he seeks to demonstrate logically without reference to this knowledge. He only arrives at the intended and predetermined result by starting from arbitrary concepts framed by himself (substantia causa sui, &c.), and in the demonstrations he allows himself all the freedom of choice for which the nature of the wide concept-spheres afford such convenient opportunity. That his doctrine is true and excellent is therefore in his case, as in that of geometry, quite independent of the demonstrations of it. Cf. ch. 13 of supplementary volume.

23 Cf. Ch. 17 of Supplement.

24 Omnes perturbationes judicio censent fieri et opinione. Cic. Tusc., 4, 6. Ταρασσει τους ανθρωπους ου τα πραγματα, αλλα τα περι των πραγματων δογματα (Perturbant homines non res ipsæ, sed de rebus opiniones). Epictet., c. v.

25 Τουτο γαρ εστι το αιτιον τοις ανθρωποις παντων των κακων, το τας προληψεις τας κοινας μη δυνασθαι εφαρμοξειν ταις επι μερους (Hæc est causa mortalibus omnium malorum, non posse communes notiones aptare singularibus). Epict. dissert., ii., 26.

26 Cf. Ch. 16 of Supplement.

27 Cf. Ch. xviii. of the Supplement.

28 We can thus by no means agree with Bacon if he (De Augm. Scient., L. iv. in fine.) thinks that all mechanical and physical movement of bodies has always been preceded by perception in these bodies; though a glimmering of truth lies at the bottom of this false proposition. This is also the case with Kepler’s opinion, expressed in his essay De Planeta Martis, that the planets must have knowledge in order to keep their elliptical courses so correctly, and to regulate the velocity of their motion so that the triangle of the plane of their course always remains proportional to the time in which they pass through its base.

29 Cf. Ch. xix. of the Supplement.

30 Cf. Ch. xx. of the Supplement, and also in my work, “Ueber den Willen in der Natur,” the chapters on Physiology and Comparative Anatomy, where the subject I have only touched upon here is fully discussed.

31 This is specially treated in the 27th Ch. of the Supplement.

32 This subject is fully worked out in my prize essay on the freedom of the will, in which therefore (pp. 29-44 of the “Grundprobleme der Ethik”) the relation of cause, stimulus, and motive has also been fully explained.

33 Cf. Ch. xxiii. of the Supplement, and also the Ch. on the physiology of plants in my work “Ueber den Willen in der Natur,” and the Ch. on physical astronomy, which is of great importance with regard to the kernel of my metaphysic.

34 Wenzel, De Structura Cerebri Hominis et Brutorum, 1812, ch. iii.; Cuvier, Leçons d’Anat., comp. leçon 9, arts. 4 and 5; Vic. d’Azyr, Hist. de l’Acad. de Sc. de Paris, 1783, pp. 470 and 483.

35 On the 16th of September 1840, at a lecture upon Egyptian Archæology delivered by Mr. Pettigrew at the Literary and Scientific Institute of London, he showed some corns of wheat which Sir G. Wilkinson had found in a grave at Thebes, in which they must have lain for three thousand years. They were found in an hermetically sealed vase. Mr. Pettigrew had sowed twelve grains, and obtained a plant which grew five feet high, and the seeds of which were now quite ripe.—Times, 21st September 1840. In the same way in 1830 Mr. Haulton produced in the Medical Botanical Society of London a bulbous root which was found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy, in which it was probably put in observance of some religious rite, and which must have been at least two thousand years old. He had planted it in a flower-pot, in which it grew up and flourished. This is quoted from the Medical Journal of 1830 in the Journal of the Royal Institute of Great Britain, October 1830, p. 196.—“In the garden of Mr. Grimstone of the Herbarium, Highgate, London, is a pea in full fruit, which has sprung from a pea that Mr. Pettigrew and the officials of the British Museum took out of a vase which had been found in an Egyptian sarcophagus, where it must have lain 2844 years.”—Times, 16th August 1844. Indeed, the living toads found in limestone lead to the conclusion that even animal life is capable of such a suspension for thousands of years, if this is begun in the dormant period and maintained by special circumstances.

36 Cf. Chap. xxii. of the Supplement, and also my work “Ueber den Willen in der Natur,” p. 54 et seq., and pp. 70-79 of the first edition, or p. 46 et seq., and pp. 63-72 of the second, or p. 48 et seq., and pp. 69-77 of the third edition.

37 The Scholastics therefore said very truly: Causa finalis movet non secundum suum esse reale, sed secundum esse cognitum. Cf. Suarez, Disp. Metaph. disp. xxiii., sec. 7 and 8.

38 Cf. “Critique of Pure Reason. Solution of the Cosmological Ideas of the Totality of the Deduction of the Events in the Universe,” pp. 560-586 of the fifth, and p. 532 and following of first edition; and “Critique of Practical Reason,” fourth edition, pp. 169-179; Rosenkranz’ edition, p. 224 and following. Cf. my Essay on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, § 43.