Part 92

“We admitted also that what is done foolishly is done contrariwise to that which is done temperately?”

He assented.

“And that what is done temperately is done by temperance, and what foolishly, by folly?”

He agreed.

“If therefore it is done contrariwise, must it not be done by a contrary?”

“Yes.”

“And the one is done by temperance, and the other by folly?”

“Yes.”

“Contrariwise?”

“Certainly.”

“Through contraries therefore?”

“It appears so.”

“Folly therefore is contrary to temperance?”

“So it appears.”

“Do you remember, however, that we before admitted that folly is contrary to wisdom?”

He allowed it.

“And that one thing only is contrary to one?”

“I grant it.”

58. “Which, then, of these positions must we retract, Protagoras? That which says, that one thing only is contrary to one, or that in which it was asserted, that wisdom is different from temperance, but that each is a part of virtue, and that besides being different, both they and their functions are dissimilar, in the same manner as the parts of the face? Which of these, then, must we retract? for these two positions taken together are not set down in a very musical manner; for they neither accord, nor harmonize with each other. For how can they accord, since it is necessary that one thing only should be contrary to one, but not to more, but wisdom and temperance are found to be contrary to folly, which is one. Is it so, Protagoras,” I asked, “or otherwise?”

He admitted that it was so, though very unwillingly.

“Must not, then, temperance and wisdom be one and the same thing? Before, moreover, justice and holiness were found to be nearly the same. 59. Come, however,” said I, “Protagoras, let us not be disheartened, but examine the rest. Does a man who acts unjustly, appear to you to be prudent, because he acts unjustly?”

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Footnote 99:

As was before observed, it is now necessary for the thread of the argument to use the word prudent instead of temperate, but the reader must bear in mind that in the original the two ideas are expressed by one word.

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“I should be ashamed, Socrates,” he said, “to acknowledge this, though many men do say so.”

“Whether, then, shall I address my argument to them,” I asked, “or to you?”

“If you please,” said he, “discuss this statement first, the statement of the many.”