Part 9

Socr. We must not, then, my excellent friend, so much regard what the multitude will say of us, but what he will say who understands the just and unjust; the one, even truth itself. So that at first you did not set out with a right principle, when you laid it down that we ought to regard the opinion of the multitude with respect to things just and honourable and good, and their contraries. However, some one may say, are not the multitude able to put us to death?

Cri. This, too, is clear, Socrates; any one might say so.

Socr. You say truly. But, my admirable friend, this principle which we have just discussed appears to me to be the same as it was before. And consider this moreover, whether it still holds good with us or not, that we are not to be anxious about living, but about living well.

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Footnote 10:

That is to say, the principle which we had laid down in former discussions, that no regard is to be had to popular opinion, is still found to hold good.

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Cri. It does hold good.

Socr. And does this hold good or not, that to live well and honourably and justly, are the same thing?

Cri. It does.

9. Socr. From what has been admitted, then, this consideration arises, whether it is just or not, that I should endeavour to leave this place without the permission of the Athenians. And should it appear to be just, we will make the attempt; but if not, we will give it up; but as to the considerations which you mention, of an outlay of money, reputation, and the education of children, beware, Crito, lest such considerations as these in reality belong to these multitudes, who rashly put one to death, and would restore one to life, if they could do so, without any reason at all. But we, since reason so requires, must consider nothing else than what we just now mentioned, whether we shall act justly in paying money and contracting obligations to those who will lead me hence, as well they who lead me as we who are led hence, or whether in truth we shall not act unjustly in doing all these things. And if we should appear in so doing to be acting unjustly, observe that we must not consider whether from remaining here and continuing quiet we must needs die, or suffer any thing else, rather than whether we shall be acting unjustly.

Cri. You appear to me to speak wisely, Socrates; but see what we are to do.

Socr. Let us consider the matter together, my friend; and if you have any thing to object to what I say make good your objection, and I will yield to you; but if not, cease, my excellent friend, to urge upon me the same thing so often, that I ought to depart hence, against the will of the Athenians. For I highly esteem your endeavours to persuade me thus to act, so long as it is not against my will. Consider, then, the beginning of our enquiry, whether it is stated to your entire satisfaction, and endeavour to answer the question put to you exactly as you think right.

Cri. I will endeavour to do so.

10. Socr. Say we, then, that we should on no account deliberately commit injustice, or may we commit injustice under certain circumstances, under others not? Or is it on no account either good or honourable to commit injustice, as we have often agreed on former occasions, and as we just now said? Or have all those our former admissions been dissipated in these few days; and have we, Crito, old men as we are, been for a long time seriously conversing with each other, without knowing that we in no respect differ from children? Or does the case, beyond all question, stand as we then determined? whether the multitude allow it or not, and whether we must suffer a more severe or a milder punishment than this, still is injustice on every account both evil and disgraceful to him who commits it? Do we admit this, or not?

Cri. We do admit it.

Socr. On no account, therefore, ought we to act unjustly.

Cri. Surely not.

Socr. Neither ought one who is injured to return the injury, as the multitude think, since it is on no account right to act unjustly.

Cri. It appears not.

Socr. What then? Is it right to do evil, Crito, or not?

Cri. Surely it is not right, Socrates.

Socr. But what? To do evil in return when one has been evil-entreated, is that right or not?

Cri. By no means.

Socr. For to do evil to men, differs in no respect from committing injustice.

Cri. You say truly.

Socr. It is not right, therefore, to return an injury, or to do evil to any man, however one may have suffered from him. But take care Crito, that in allowing these things, you do not allow them contrary to your opinion. For I know that to some few only these things both do appear and will appear to be true. They then to whom these things appear true, and they to whom they do not, have no sentiment in common, and must needs despise each other, while they look to each other’s opinions. Consider well then, whether you coincide and think with me; and whether we can begin our deliberations from this point, that it is never right either to do an injury, or to return an injury, or when one has been evil-entreated to revenge one’s-self by doing evil in return; or, do you dissent from and not coincide in this principle? For so it appears to me both long since and now; but if you in any respect think otherwise, say so and inform me. But if you persist in your former opinions, hear what follows.

Cri. I do persist in them and think with you. Speak on then.