Part 49

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. By the same reason, then, does it not follow, that he who has learnt just things is just?

Gorg. Assuredly.

Socr. And he who is just surely performs just actions.

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. Is it not, therefore, necessary that the just man should wish to do just actions?

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Footnote 65:

Οὐκοῦν ἀνάγκη [τὸν ῥητορικὸν δίκαιον εἶναι] τὸν [δὲ] δίκαιον βούλεσθαι δίκαια πράττειν. I concur with Ast and others in thinking that the words inserted in brackets have been interpolated, and have therefore omitted them in the translation. Their insertion would break the chain of the argument.

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Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. The just man, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly.

Gorg. Necessarily.

Socr. And it follows from the argument that the rhetorician should be just?

Gorg. Yes.

Socr. A rhetorician, therefore, will never wish to act unjustly?

Gorg. It appears not.

36. Socr. Do you remember that you said a little before that we ought not to accuse the trainers of youth, nor expel them from cities, if a pugilist does not make a good use of the pugilistic art, and acts unjustly? And so, likewise, if a rhetorician make an unjust use of rhetoric, that we should not accuse the teacher, nor expel him from the city, but the person who acts unjustly, and does not make a proper use of rhetoric? Were these things said, or not?

Gorg. They were said.

Socr. But now this very same rhetorician appears incapable of ever acting unjustly. Is it not so?

Gorg. It appears so.

Socr. And it was said, Gorgias, at the commencement of our discussion, that rhetoric is conversant with words, not those respecting the even and the odd, but those respecting the just and the unjust. Was it not so?

37. Gorg. It was.

Socr. When, therefore, you spoke thus, I supposed that rhetoric could never be an unjust thing, since it always discourses concerning justice. But when you said shortly afterwards that a rhetorician might use rhetoric unjustly, then, wondering, and thinking that the two statements did not accord, I made that remark, that if you should think it a gain to be confuted, as I do, it was worth while to continue the discussion, but if not, to give it up. Afterwards, however, when we were investigating the matter, you see yourself that it is again allowed to be impossible for a rhetorician to make an unjust use of rhetoric, and to be willing to act unjustly. How the case really stands, by the dog, Gorgias, requires no little discussion to examine it thoroughly.

38. Pol. What then, Socrates? Have you really such an opinion of rhetoric as you now say? or do you not think that Gorgias was ashamed not to acknowledge that the rhetorician knows what is just, beautiful, and good, and that, if any one should come to him ignorant of these things, he himself would teach them? Then perhaps from this admission some inconsistency in his arguments followed; the very thing which you love, yourself leading the way to such questions. For who do you think will deny that he knows what is just, and can teach it to others? To lead the discussion to such matters is a piece of great rusticity.

Socr. Most excellent Polus! we get ourselves friends and sons, for this express purpose, that when we, through being advanced in years, fall into error, you that are younger, being with us, may correct our life both in deeds and words. If, then, Gorgias and I have fallen into any error in our arguments, do you who are present correct us: you ought to do so. And I wish that if any of the things that have been granted appear to you to have been improperly granted, you would retract whatever you please, only I beg you beware of one thing.

Pol. What is that?

39. Socr. That you would restrain that prolixity of speech which at first you attempted to employ.