Part 47

Gorg. Certainly.

Socr. Which kind of persuasion, then, does rhetoric produce in courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting what is just and unjust? is it that from which belief springs without knowledge, or that from which knowledge arises?

Gorg. It is evident, Socrates, that it is that from which belief springs.

Socr. Rhetoric then, as it seems, Gorgias, is the artificer of a persuasion which produces belief, and not of that which teaches respecting the just and unjust.

Gorg. It is so.

Socr. A rhetorician, therefore, does not profess to teach courts of justice and other public assemblies, respecting things just and unjust, but only to produce belief. For surely he could not teach so great a multitude in a short time things of such great importance.

Gorg. Certainly not.

23. Socr. Come then, let us see now what we ought to say of rhetoric. For I, indeed, am not yet able to understand what I should say. When an assembly is held in a city, for the choice of physicians, or shipwrights, or any other kind of artificer, is it not the case that the rhetorician will refrain from giving his advice? for it is evident that, in each election, the most skilful artist ought to be chosen. Nor will he be consulted when the question is respecting the building of walls, or the construction of ports or docks, but architects only. Nor, again, when a deliberation occurs respecting the choice of generals, or the marshalling an army against enemies, or the occupation of posts,—but on such occasions those who are skilled in military affairs will give advice, and not rhetoricians. What do you say, Gorgias, on such points? For since you say that you are a rhetorician, and are able to make others rhetoricians, it is proper to enquire of you what are the things about which your art is concerned. And consider that I am labouring for your benefit. For, perhaps, some one who is now within the house may wish to become your disciple; for I perceive some, nay several, who probably are ashamed to question you. 24. In being questioned, therefore, by me, consider yourself to be questioned by them, What would be the consequence to us, Gorgias, if we should put ourselves under your instructions? On what subjects shall we be able to give advice to the city? Whether about the just only and the unjust; or on those subjects of which Socrates just now made mention? Endeavour to answer them.

Gorg. I will endeavour, Socrates, to develope clearly the whole power of rhetoric: for you have admirably led the way. You doubtless know that these docks and walls of the Athenians, and the structure of the ports, were made partly on the advice of Themistocles, and partly on that of Pericles, but not of artificers.

Socr. This is told of Themistocles, Gorgias: and I myself heard Pericles when he gave us his advice respecting the middle wall.

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Footnote 62:

The wall which connected the southern extremities of the long walls and the Phaleric wall.

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Gorg. And when there is an election of any such persons as you mentioned, Socrates, you see that the rhetoricians are the persons who give advice, and whose opinion prevails in such matters.

25. Socr. It is because I wonder at this, Gorgias, that I have been for some time asking you, what is the power of rhetoric. For when I consider it in this manner, it appears to me almost divine in its magnitude.

Gorg. If you knew all, Socrates, that it comprehends under itself almost all powers! And I will give you a strong proof of this. For I have often, ere now, gone with my brother and other physicians to various sick persons, who would neither drink their medicine, nor suffer themselves to be cut or cauterized by the physician, and when the physician was unable to persuade them, I have done so by no other art than rhetoric. I say too, that if a rhetorician and a physician should go to any city you please, and it were necessary to contend by argument in a general assembly, or any other convention, which should be chosen, a rhetorician or a physician, the physician would be held in no account, but he that has the power of speaking would be chosen, if he pleased. 26. And if he should contend with any other artist whatever, the rhetorician would persuade that he himself should be chosen in preference to any one else. For there is no subject on which a rhetorician will not speak to the multitude more persuasively than any other artist whatever. Such, then, and so great is the power of this art. It is right however, Socrates, to use rhetoric in the same way as any other exercise employed in contests: for it is not right to use other exercises against all men alike; nor, because any one has learnt pugilism, and the pancratium, and to fight with arms, so as to be superior both to friends and enemies, is it therefore proper to strike, or pierce, or slay one’s friends. 27. Nor, by Jupiter, if some one who, by having frequented the palæstra, has made his body robust, and become a pugilist, should afterwards strike his father or mother, or any other of his relatives or friends, would it on that account be proper to hate, and expel from cities, the training masters and those who teach how to fight with arms. For they instructed their pupils in these exercises, in order that they might make a proper use of them against enemies, and those that do wrong, for self-defence, and not for attack; but they contrariwise, use their strength and skill improperly. The teachers, therefore, are not wicked, nor is their art either to be blamed, or for this reason wicked, but they, I think, who do not use it properly. 28. The same may be said of rhetoric. For a rhetorician is able to speak against all men, and on every subject; so that he can best persuade the multitude, in a word, on whatever subject he pleases: but he ought not any the more on this account to detract from the reputation of physicians, because he is able to do it, nor of other artificers; but he should use rhetoric justly, as well as other exercises. In my opinion, however, if any one having become a rhetorician abuses this power and art, it is not proper to hate the teacher and expel him from cities, for he imparted the knowledge of it for just purposes, but the other makes a contrary use of it. It is just, therefore, to hate, banish, and slay him who does not make a right use of it, but not the teacher.

29. Socr. I think, Gorgias, that you as well as I, have been present at many discussions, and that you have observed this in them, that it is not easy for men, on whatever subject they undertake to converse, having propounded their ideas to each other, both learning themselves and teaching one another, then to put an end to the conference; but if they have a controversy about any thing, and one says that the other does not speak correctly or clearly, they are indignant, and each thinks that the other is speaking out of envy, from a love of contention, and not seeking what was proposed in the discussion: and some, at length, depart in a most disgraceful manner, having reviled each other, and spoken and heard such things that even the bystanders are vexed at themselves for having deigned to listen to such men. 30. But why do I say this? Because you now appear to me to say what does not follow from, or accord with, what you first said respecting rhetoric. I am afraid, therefore, to proceed with my refutation, lest you should suppose that I do not speak with zeal for the subject, that it may be made clear, but out of opposition to you. If, then, you are of that class of men to which I belong, I should gladly question you: but if not, I would forbear to do so. But to what class of men do I belong? To those who are willingly refuted, if they say any thing that is not true, and who willingly refute if any one says any thing that is not true; and who are not less pleased to be refuted than to refute. For I consider the former to be the greater good, inasmuch as it is a greater good one’s-self to be delivered from the greatest evil than to deliver another. For I think no evil so great to man as false opinion on the subjects we are now discussing. If, then, you say that you are such a man, let us continue our discussion; [31.] but if you think we ought to desist, let us give it up, and put an end to the argument.

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Footnote 63:

Ficinus, I think, correctly translates τελευτῶντες, tandem.

Footnote 64:

Literally “being reviled.”

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Gorg. But indeed, Socrates, I profess myself to be such a man as you describe. Perhaps, however, it is right to attend to the wishes of the company who are present. For, some time since, before you came, I explained many things to the present company: and now, perhaps, we shall protract it too far if we continue the discussion. We must, therefore, respect their wishes lest we detain any of them, who have something else to do.

Chær. You yourselves, Gorgias and Socrates, hear the noise these men make, from their anxiety to hear, if you say any thing. For my part, may I never have so much business, as to be obliged to leave such a discussion and so conducted, from having any thing else more important to do.

32. Cal. By the gods, Chærephon, and I too, though I have been present at many conferences, know not whether I have ever been so delighted as now; so that you will gratify me much, should you even be willing to continue the discussion throughout the whole day.

Socr. There is no obstacle on my side, Callicles, if only Gorgias is willing.