Part 40

§ 51-57.

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Polus imagines that even a child could confute such a position as this; and in order to do so mentions instances of men whom all have accounted happy, though they were unjust, especially that of Archelaus, king of Macedonia. But Socrates denies that any one who acts unjustly can be happy; and further than this, he contends that a person who acts unjustly, and does not suffer punishment, is more miserable than one who meets with punishment for his injustice. To prove this he argues that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it, and if more base it must also be worse; Polus admits the premise, but denies the conclusion. Socrates, therefore, endeavours to make his opponent admit this also by the following arguments. Beautiful things are esteemed beautiful, either on account of their usefulness, or the pleasure they occasion, or both; and in like manner base things are deemed base on account of the pain or evil they occasion, or both; so that when of two things one is more beautiful than the other, it is so because it excels in pleasure or utility, or both; and when of two things one is more base, it must be because it exceeds in pain or evil. But Polus has already admitted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; it must therefore be so because it exceeds in pain or evil, or both. But to commit injustice does not exceed the suffering it, in pain; it remains, therefore, that it must exceed it in evil: consequently it must be worse, for whatever exceeds another thing in evil must necessarily be worse.

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Footnote 52:

§ 58-69.

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Having established his point thus far he now goes on to prove that it is the greatest of evils for one who has committed injustice not to be punished. To suffer punishment and to be justly chastised, are one and the same thing. But all just things are beautiful. Moreover wherever there is an agent there must also be a patient; and the patient suffers what the agent does; so that if the agent punishes justly the patient also suffers justly. But it has been just admitted that all just things are beautiful; and it was proved before that all beautiful things are good, either because they are pleasant or useful; whence it follows that he who is punished suffers that which is good, and is benefited in being freed from the greatest evil, which is depravity in the soul. From all this it is evident that rhetoric can be of no use whatever: for it is generally employed for the purpose of excusing injustice, and screening men from the punishment they deserve, which on the contrary they ought rather to court than to shun.

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Footnote 53:

§ 70-80

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Polus having been thus completely silenced, Callicles takes up the argument and begins by asking whether Socrates is really in earnest. Finding that he is so, he blames Polus for having granted that it is more base to commit injustice than to suffer it; for that there is a difference between nature and law, which Socrates perceiving, confounded that which is more base by nature with that which is so by law, and so made that which is more base by law appear to be more so by nature: whereas by nature it is more base to suffer injustice than to commit it. For the weak and the many make laws with a view to their own advantage, but nature herself avows that it is just that the better should have more than the worse, and the more powerful than the weaker. Callicles then proceeds to inveigh against philosophy and philosophers, and when he has done, Socrates, after having indulged in a vein of pleasant irony at his expense, returns to the subject, and asks what he means by the superior, the better, and the stronger, whether they are the same or different. Callicles says they are the same. Socrates objects, that if that is the case the many being stronger are also the better, and so, inasmuch as they make the laws, law and nature are not contrary to each other. Callicles therefore is compelled to change his ground, and next says that by the better and superior he means the more wise: and at last he says that they are those who are skilled and courageous in administering the affairs of a city. He adds that it is just that the governors should have more than the governed. Socrates, hereupon, asks whether they ought not to govern themselves also and be temperate, which elicits from Callicles the shameless avowal that a man should have as large desires as he can, and indulge them without restraint.

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Footnote 54:

§ 81-103.

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Socrates having in vain endeavoured to persuade Callicles to change his opinion by two similitudes of a perforated cask, and a full and an empty one, to which he compares the soul, proceeds to combat his assertion that a happy life consists in having and indulging as large desires as possible. If happiness consists in being hungry and eating, thirsty and drinking, it must follow that to be scabby and itch and scratch one’s self is to live happily. Callicles is forced to admit that this is to live pleasantly, and then if pleasantly, happily; and at length is driven to assert that the pleasant and the good are the same. In order to confute this opinion, Socrates leads him to maintain that science and courage differ from each other and from the good; and then by a series of most subtle questions, too minute to be abbreviated, forces him to this absurd conclusion, that if the pleasant and the good are the same, a bad man, inasmuch as he oftentimes receives more pleasure than a good man, must be accounted better than a good one.

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Footnote 55:

§ 104-117.

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Callicles to evade this absurdity is compelled to admit that some pleasures are better than others. From this concession Socrates shews that the end of all human actions is the good and not the pleasant; for that so far is it from being the case that we do any thing merely for the sake of pleasure, that we pursue pleasure itself for the sake of the good.

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Footnote 56:

§ 118-119.

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Having established this point, Socrates brings back the discussion to the original subject, and proposes to enquire whether it is better to live in such a manner as Callicles advises, namely to devote one’s self to public business and to study rhetoric, or in such a manner as philosophy persuades. He recurs therefore to his own former arguments, in which he stated that as there are certain skills, not arts, employed for the gratification of the body, so there are other corresponding ones made use of to please the soul, such as flute-playing, harp-playing, dithyrambic and even tragic poetry; now take from these last melody, rhythm and measure, and what else remains but words, that is to say a kind of flattery addressed to the multitude? And is not popular rhetoric similar? Callicles answers that there is a difference to be observed in this respect, for that some do, as Socrates has observed, speak only in order to please, but that others look to the interest of the citizens. “That is enough,” says Socrates. At all events one part of rhetoric is flattery, and when has an instance of that which is honourable, which strives to speak what is best, whether it be pleasant or unpleasant to the hearers, ever been seen? Callicles instances Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades and Pericles, but Socrates will by no means admit that any of these really endeavoured to make the people better. But before this, Callicles, being hard pressed in argument, breaks off the discussion, and Socrates, at the request of Gorgias, carries it on by himself, and shews at length and with great force and perspicuity the advantages of a virtuous and well regulated life; and in conclusion he describes the future judgment when each man will give account of himself in another world, and be rewarded or punished according as he has lived a good or a bad life.