Part 184

“Whether, by Jupiter,” said I, “if evil were to be destroyed, would there no longer be any hunger or thirst, or any thing else of the kind? or would there be hunger, if men and other animals existed, yet not so as to be hurtful? and thirst, and other desires, yet not be evil, since evil is destroyed? or is the question ridiculous, what would then be the case or not be the case? for who knows? This, however, we know, that at present it is possible to be harmed by being hungry, and it is also possible to be benefited; is it not so?”

“Certainly.”

“Therefore it is possible that one who thirsts, or is affected by any other similar desire, may sometimes be affected by it beneficially, and sometimes harmfully, and sometimes neither?”

“Assuredly.”

“If, therefore, evil were destroyed, must things that are not evil be destroyed together with the evil?”

“Not at all.”

“There will be, then, such desires as are neither good nor evil, even if evils were destroyed?”

“It appears so.”

40. “Is it, then, possible, that one who desires and is fond of any thing, should not love that which he desires and is fond of?”

“It does not appear so to me.”

“When evils, then, are destroyed, there will remain, as it seems, certain friendly things?”

“Yes.”

“Not so; at least if evil were the cause of any thing being friendly, for, when that is destroyed, one thing could not be friendly to another: for when the cause is destroyed, it is surely impossible that that of which it was the cause should any longer exist?”

“You say rightly.”

“Did we not admit that the friendly loved something, and on account of something, and did we not then think that, on account of evil, that which is neither good nor evil loved the good?”

“True.”

“But now, as it seems, there appears to be some other cause of loving and being loved?”

“So it seems.”

“Whether, then, in reality, as we just now said, is desire the cause of friendship, and is that which desires friendly to that which it desires, and at the time when it desires, but is what we before said was friendly mere trifling, like a poem heedlessly composed?”

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Footnote 175:

I have adopted Ast’s suggestion of μάτην for μακρόν. Stallbaum would retain both, and read μακρὸν μάτην.

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“It seems so,” said he.

“However,” I said, “that which desires desires that which it stands in need of; does it not?”

“Yes.”

“And is that which stands in need friendly to that of which it stands in need?”

“It seems so to me.”