“That should not hinder you, son of Democrates: since thus far, I think, both your father and mother permit you and do not wait till you are old enough: for when they wish any thing to be read to or written for them, they appoint you, I think, first of all in the house to this office; do they not?”
“Certainly,” said he.
“Are you allowed then, in this case, to write whichever letter you please first, and which second, and are you allowed to read in like manner? And when you take the lyre, I think, neither your father nor your mother hinder you from tightening and loosening any string you please, and from twanging and striking them with the quill; do they hinder you?”
“By no means.”
“What then can be the cause, Lysis, that in these cases they do not hinder you, but do hinder you in those that we just now mentioned?”
“Because, I think,” said he, “I know the one, but not the other.”
15. “Be it so,” said I, “my excellent youth; your father, then, is not waiting for your being old enough to entrust every thing to you, but on the very day that he shall think you are wiser than he is, he will entrust to you both himself and his property?”
“I think he will,” said he.
“Be it so,” said I, “what then? Will not your neighbour follow the same rule as your father respecting you? Do you think he will entrust you with the management of his household when he thinks you are wiser than himself with respect to household-management, or will he preside over it himself?”
“I think he will entrust it to me.”
“But what? do you think the Athenians will entrust their affairs to you, when they perceive that you are wise enough?”
“I do.”
“By Jupiter,” said I, “what then as to the great king? Would he suffer his eldest son, who will succeed to the government of Asia, when his meat is being cooked, to throw into the sauce whatever he pleases, rather than us, if we should go to him and shew that we are more skilled in the preparation of dishes than his son?”
“Us, clearly,” he replied.
16. “And he would not allow him to throw any thing in, however trifling, but us he would allow, even if we wished to throw in salt by the handful.”
“How not?”
“But what if his son should be diseased in his eyes, would he allow him to touch his own eyes, not considering him a physician, or would he hinder him?”
“He would hinder him.”
“But if he supposed we were good physicians, even if we wished to open his eyes and sprinkle them with ashes, I think he would not hinder us, considering we judged rightly.”
“You say true.”
“Would he not entrust every thing else to us rather than to himself or his son, with respect to which we appeared to him to be wiser than either of them?”
“Necessarily so, Socrates,” he replied.
“This, then, is the case,” said I, “my dear Lysis, all persons, both Greeks and barbarians, men and women, will entrust us with those things with respect to which we are found to be wise, and we shall do in them whatever we please, nor will any one purposely hinder us, but we shall both be free ourselves in these matters, and governors over others, and these things will be our own, for we shall derive benefit from them. 17. But those things about which we have no knowledge no one will suffer us to do as we think proper, but all men will hinder us as much as they are able, not only strangers, but even our own father and mother, and any one else who is more nearly related to us than them, and in these matters we ourselves shall be subject to others, and they will be strange to us, for we shall derive no benefit from them. Do you admit that this is the case?”
“I do.”
“Shall we, then, be friends to any one, and will any one love us in those things in which we are of no use?”
“No, surely,” said he.
“Now, then, neither does your father love you, nor does any one else love another person, in so far as he is useless?”
“It appears not,” he said.
The Works of Plato (vol. 1 of 6) · The Wunder Library — complete classics, free to read, with narration.