Part 15

-----

Footnote 26:

A Pythagorean of Crotona.

-----

“Nothing very clearly, Socrates.”

“I however speak only from hearsay; what then I have heard I have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about to travel there, to enquire and speculate about the journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before sunset?”

“Why then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one’s-self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others say that it was not right to do this; but I never heard any thing clear upon the subject from any one.”

15. “Then you should consider it attentively,” said Socrates, “for perhaps you may hear: probably however, it will appear wonderful to you, if this alone of all other things is an universal truth, and it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at sometimes and to some persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men for whom it is better to die—this probably will appear wonderful to you—may not without impiety do this good to themselves, but must await another benefactor.”

-----

Footnote 27:

Namely, “that it is better to die than live.”

-----

16. Then Cebes, gently smiling, said, speaking in his own dialect, “Jove be witness.”

-----

Footnote 28:

Ἴττω Bœotian for ἴστω.

-----

“And indeed,” said Socrates, “it would appear to be unreasonable, yet still perhaps it has some reason on its side. The maxim indeed given on this subject in the mystical doctrines, that we men are in a kind of prison, and that we ought not to free ourselves from it and escape, appears to me difficult to be understood, and not easy to penetrate. This however appears to me, Cebes, to be well said, that the gods take care of us, and that we men are one of their possessions. Does it not seem so to you?”

-----

Footnote 29:

Of Pythagoras.

-----

“It does,” replied Cebes.

“Therefore,” said he, “if one of your slaves were to kill himself, without your having intimated that you wished him to die, should you not be angry with him, and should you not punish him if you could?”

“Certainly,” he replied.

“Perhaps then in this point of view, it is not unreasonable to assert, that a man ought not to kill himself before the deity lays him under a necessity of doing so, such as that now laid on me.”

17. “This, indeed,” said Cebes, “appears to be probable. But what you said just now, Socrates, that philosophers should be very willing to die, appears to be an absurdity, if what we said just now is agreeable to reason, that it is God who takes care of us, and that we are his property. For that the wisest men should not be grieved at leaving that service in which they govern them who are the best of all masters, namely the gods, is not consistent with reason. For surely he cannot think that he will take better care of himself when he has become free: but a foolish man might perhaps think thus, that he should fly from his master, and would not reflect that he ought not to fly from a good one, but should cling to him as much as possible, therefore he would fly against all reason: but a man of sense would desire to be constantly with one better than himself. Thus, Socrates, the contrary of what you just now said is likely to be the case; for it becomes the wise to be grieved at dying, but the foolish to rejoice.”

18. Socrates, on hearing this, appeared to me to be pleased with the pertinacity of Cebes, and looking towards us, said, “Cebes, you see, always searches out arguments, and is not at all willing to admit at once any thing one has said.”