Part 144

Socr. Is it the same with similarity and dissimilarity, identity and difference?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? with the beautiful and the ugly, good and evil?

Theæ. It appears to me that the soul especially considers the essence of these in reference to each other, comparing within itself things past and present with the future.

Socr. Stay: will it not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft in like manner?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. But their essence, both what they are, and their opposition to each other, and the nature of this opposition, the soul itself, examining them repeatedly and comparing them with each other, endeavours to determine for us.

Theæ. Certainly.

Socr. Are not, then, both men and beasts by nature able to perceive as soon as they are born those things that pass by means of the bodily organs to the soul, but comparisons of these with reference to their essence and use they arrive at with difficulty, and after a long time, by means of much labour and study, if ever they do arrive at it?

Theæ. Most assuredly.

Socr. For is it possible to apprehend the truth of that of which we cannot apprehend the existence?

Theæ. Impossible.

107. Socr. But can any one possess a scientific knowledge of a thing, of which he cannot apprehend the truth?

Theæ. How can he, Socrates?

Socr. There is, therefore, no science in sensations, but in reasoning on them; for in this way, as it seems, it is possible to touch upon essence and truth, but in that way impossible.

Theæ. It appears so.

Socr. Can you, therefore, call that and this the same, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theæ. It would not be right to do so.

Socr. What name, then, do you give to that, to sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, being hot, and being cold?

Theæ. Perceiving; for what other name can be given?

Socr. Do you, therefore, call the whole of this perception?

Theæ. Necessarily so.

Socr. To which, as we said, it does not appertain to touch upon truth, for it does not ever touch upon essence.

Theæ. Certainly not.

Socr. Nor, therefore, upon science?

Theæ. No.

Socr. Perception, therefore, and science, Theætetus, can never be the same?

Theæ. It appears not, Socrates.