Part 142

99. Socr. We must not affirm then, that any one sees rather than not sees, or has any other perception rather than not, since all things are in constant motion.

Theo. Surely not.

Socr. Yet perception is science, as Theætetus and I said.

Theo. That is the case.

Socr. On being asked, therefore, what science is, we answered, that it is not at all science rather than not science.

Theo. You appear to have done so.

Socr. A fine correction of our answer it would be, if we endeavour to prove that all things are in motion, in order that our former answer may appear correct. But this, as it seems, is the result, if all things are in motion, every answer on whatever subject it may be given, will be equally correct, whether we say that a thing is so or is not so, or, if you will, becomes so, that we may not fix them by a definite expression.

Theo. You say rightly.

Socr. Except, Theodorus, that I said “so and not so.” But we ought not to use this word “so,” for in this way it will no longer be in motion; nor again must we use the expression “not so,” for neither does this express motion; but they who maintain this doctrine must find out some other term, since at present they have not words suited to their hypothesis, except perhaps, this, “not in any manner.” This would suit them best, as having an indefinite meaning.

Theo. This manner of speaking would indeed be most proper for them.

100. Socr. We have done then with your friend, Theodorus, nor can we by any means concede to him, that any man is the measure of all things, except he is wise: nor can we concede to him that science is perception, at least according to the doctrine that all things are in motion; unless Theætetus here says otherwise.

Theo. You say admirably well, Socrates; for since these things are brought to a conclusion, it is right that I too should have done with answering according to our agreement, now that our discussion about the doctrine of Protagoras has come to end.

Theæ. Not so, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the doctrine of those who say that the universe is at rest, as you just now proposed to do.

Theo. Do you who are so young, Theætetus, teach old men to act unjustly, by violating their compacts. But prepare to give account to Socrates of what remains to be discussed.

Theæ. If he wishes it, though I should be very glad to hear you on the subject I mentioned.

Theo. You are challenging riders to a race in challenging Socrates to a discussion. Ask therefore and you will hear.

Socr. But I think, Theodorus, I shall not comply with the request of Theætetus.

Theo. Why not comply?

101. Socr. Though I am ashamed of examining with too much freedom Melissus and others, who say that the universe is one and immoveable, yet I am less ashamed to do so with respect to them than Parmenides alone. For Parmenides appears to me, that I may use the words of Homer, “both venerable and formidable.” For I was acquainted with him when I was very young and he was very old, and he appeared to me to possess a depth of wisdom altogether extraordinary. I am afraid, therefore, that we should not understand his words, and that we should be much less able to discover the meaning of what he said, and above all, I fear lest with respect to the main subject of our discussion, science, what it is, should be left unconsidered by reason of the digressions that will rush across us, if we listen to them. Besides, the question which we have now raised is of immense extent, and if one should consider it only by the way, it would be treated unworthily, but if as it deserves, the discussion, being extended to too great length, will put out of sight the subject of science. But neither of these things ought to happen; but we ought to endeavour, by the midwife’s art, to deliver Theætetus of his conceptions respecting science.

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Footnote 162:

Iliad, iii. 172.

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Theæ. It is proper to do so, if you think well.

102. Socr. Again, therefore, Theætetus, consider this with respect to what has been said. You answered that perception is science; did you not.

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. If then any one should ask you, with what a man sees things white and black, and with what he hears sounds sharp and flat, you would say, I think, with the eyes and ears.

Theæ. I should.