Part 134

Theo. What?

Socr. In other respects I thought what he said was very acceptable, that what appears to each person, really exists, but I wondered at the beginning of his essay, that he did not say at the commencement of his book on Truth that a pig or a cynocephalus or some other more monstrous creature that possesses perception, is the measure of all things, in order that he might begin by speaking grandly and very contemptuously to us, shewing that we indeed admire him as if he were a god, for his wisdom, whereas with respect to understanding, he is no better than a tadpole, let alone any other man. What are we to say, Theodorus? 49. For if that opinion which is formed from perception will be true to each person, and no one will be able to decide better on the way in which another is affected, nor one more competent to examine the opinion of another, whether it is true or false, but, as we have often said, each person by himself alone will form opinions for himself, and all these are right and true, why in the world, my friend, should Protagoras be so wise as to be thought justly worthy to teach others for high pay, while we are more ignorant and must have recourse to him, though each person is to himself the measure of his own wisdom? How can we avoid saying that Protagoras speaks thus out of joke? As to myself and my art of midwifery, I say nothing of the ridicule we should be exposed to, and I think, so would the whole study of reasoning; for will it not be great and signal vanity to examine and endeavour to confute the fancies and opinions of others, each person’s being true, if the Truth of Protagoras is true, and he has not uttered his oracles in sport from the sanctuary of his book?

50. Theo. Socrates, he is my friend, as you just now said; I cannot, therefore, allow Protagoras to be confuted by my concessions, nor yet can I oppose you contrary to my own opinion. Again, therefore, take Theætetus; for he certainly appears to have listened to you just now very attentively.

Socr. If you went to Lacedæmon, Theodorus, to the wrestling grounds, and were to see others naked, some of them mean, should you hesitate to strip yourself and shew your own form in turn?

Theo. Why do you think I should not, at least if they would permit me and be persuaded by me? as I think I shall now persuade you to allow me to be a spectator, and not drag me to the gymnasium, now that my limbs are stiff, but for you to wrestle with one who is younger and more supple.

51. Socr. But if this is agreeable to you, Theodorus, it is not disagreeable to me, as the vulgar saying goes. I must have recourse again, therefore, to the wise Theætetus. Tell me, then, Theætetus, first of all as to what we just now discussed, do you not wonder with me, that you have so suddenly discovered yourself to be not inferior in wisdom to any man or god? or do you think that the measure of Protagoras has less to do with gods than men?

Theæ. Not I, by Jupiter: and I very much wonder at your question. For when we discussed in what manner they said, that what appears to each person is true to him to whom it appears, it seemed to me to be well said, but now the very contrary has speedily occurred to me.

Socr. For you are young, my dear boy, and quickly give ear to and are persuaded by plausible speeches. For to these things Protagoras or some one on his behalf would say: “Noble boys and old men, you here sit and converse together, dragging gods into the question, of whom, whether they exist or not, I do not think proper either to speak or write, and what the multitude hear and admit, this you assert, as if it were strange if every man did not excel any beast whatever in wisdom, but you do not adduce any proof, or conclusive argument, but have recourse to likelihood, which if Theodorus or any other geometrician were to employ in geometry, he would be deemed unworthy of notice.” 52. Do you, therefore, and Theodorus, consider, whether on such matters you will admit of arguments deduced from probability and likelihood.

Theæ. But, Socrates, neither would you nor we say that this is right.

Socr. We must therefore consider it in another way, as it appears, according to what you and Theodorus says.

Theæ. In another way, certainly.

Socr. Let us, then, consider it thus, whether science and perception are the same or different: for to this surely our whole discourse tends, and for the sake of this we have mooted these many absurd points; have we not?

Theæ. Assuredly.

Socr. Shall we allow then that whatever we perceive by sight or hearing, this we at the same time know? for instance, before we have learnt the language of barbarians, whether shall we deny that we hear them when they speak, or that we both hear and know what they say? And again, when unacquainted with letters, on looking at them, whether shall we insist that we do not see, or know them, though we do see them?

53. Theæ. Whichever of them, Socrates, we see and hear, we shall say that we know, for that of the latter we see and know the form and colour, and of the former, that we both hear and know the sharpness and flatness of the sounds; but that what grammarians and interpreters teach about them, we neither perceive by sight or hearing, nor know.

Socr. Admirable, Theætetus, and it is not worth while to dispute with you about these things, in order that you may make a greater proficiency. But observe also this other difficulty that stands in our way, and consider how we can repel it.

Theæ. What is that?

Socr. This: if any one should ask, whether it is possible for a person who still possesses and retains the memory of a thing which he once knew, at the very time when he remembers it, not to know the very thing that he remembers. But I am becoming prolix, as it seems, through a wish to ask whether a person who has learnt any thing and remembers it, does not know it.

Theæ. How should he not, Socrates? for, otherwise, what you say would be a prodigy.

Socr. Am I then trifling? Consider. 54. Do you not then say that to see is to perceive, and that sight is perception?

Theæ. I do.

Socr. Has not he, then, who sees any thing, obtained a scientific knowledge of that which he sees, according to our late argument?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. What then? do you not say that memory is something?

Theæ. Yes.

Socr. Whether of nothing or something?

Theæ. Of something, surely.

Socr. Is it not, then, of the things which he learns and perceives, of some such things as these?