Part 119

Socr. Before a man knows the truth of each subject on which he speaks or writes, and is able to define the whole of a thing, and when he has defined it again knows how to divide it into species until he comes to the indivisible; and in like manner, having distinguished the nature of the soul, and having found out what kind of speech is adapted to the nature of each, he so disposes and adorns his speech, applying to a soul of varied powers speeches that are various and all-harmonious, and simple ones to a simple soul, before this is done, he will not be able to manage speech with art, as far as it might be done, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our former argument has proved.

Phæ. This is exactly how it appeared.

142. Socr. But what as to its being honourable or disgraceful to speak and write speeches, and under what circumstances it may be called a reproach or not, has not what we have said a little before sufficed to prove?

Phæ. What was that?

Socr. That if either Lysias, or any one else, has ever written, or shall hereafter write, privately or publicly, writing a state document in proposing a law, and thinks that there is in it great stability and clearness, this is a reproach to the writer, whether any one says so or not. For to be utterly ignorant of what is just and unjust, evil and good, cannot be otherwise than truly disgraceful, though the whole mass of mankind should unite in its praise.

143. Phæ. Certainly not.

Socr. But he who thinks that in a written discourse, on whatever subject, there must necessarily be much that is sportive, and that no discourse, in prose or verse, deserving of much study, has ever been written or spoken, as those declamations used to be spoken without discrimination and instructive method, for the sake of persuasion, but that in truth the best of them were for the purpose of reminding those who already know, but that only in discourses taught and spoken for the sake of instruction, and really written in the soul about things just, and beautiful, and good, there is found what is clear and perfect and worthy of study; and that such discourses ought to be called as it were their author’s legitimate offspring; first of all that which is in himself, if it is there by his own invention, then any children or brothers of the former that have at the same time worthily sprung up in the souls of others; whoever thinks thus and dismisses all others, that man, Phædrus, appears to be such a one as you and I should pray that we might become.

144. Phæ. I, for my part, entirely wish and pray for what you mention.

Socr. Be we then content with having thus far amused ourselves with the subject of speeches; and do you go and tell Lysias that we, having descended to the fountain of the nymphs, have heard words which charged us to tell Lysias and any one else who composes speeches, and Homer and any one else who is in the habit of composing poetry, epic or lyric, and thirdly, Solon and whosoever commits political discourses to writing under the name of laws, if they composed their works knowing how the truth stands, and able to defend them when brought to account for what they have written, and being themselves capable by speaking to shew that their writings are poor, then they ought not to be named from these works, but from those to which they have seriously applied themselves.

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Footnote 133:

Ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ, without music or with.

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145. Phæ. What name, then, do you assign them?

Socr. To call them wise, Phædrus, appears to me to be a great matter, and proper for God alone; but lovers of wisdom, or some such name, would suit them better, and be in better taste.

Phæ. And it would be nothing out of the way.

Socr. Him, therefore, who has nothing more valuable than what he has written, by turning it upwards and downwards for a long time, patching and clipping it bit by bit, may you not justly designate a poet, or a compiler of speeches, or a writer of laws?

Phæ. How not?

Socr. Tell this, then, to your friend.

Phæ. But you? what will you do? For we must not pass over your friend.

Socr. Whom do you mean?

146. Phæ. The beautiful Isocrates. What news will you take him, Socrates? what shall we say he is?

Socr. Isocrates is still young, Phædrus; but what I prophesy of him I am willing to say.

Phæ. What?

Socr. He appears to me to have better natural endowments than to be compared with the speeches of Lysias, and moreover to be endued with a nobler disposition, so that it would not be at all wonderful if, as he advances in age, he should in this very pursuit of speech-making, to which he is now applying himself, surpass all who have ever attempted speeches, as if they were boys, and besides, if he should not be content with this, that a more divine impulse may lead him to greater things; for, my friend, there is a natural love of wisdom in the mind of the man. This message, then, I will take from the gods of this spot to Isocrates my favourite, and do you take the other to Lysias as yours.

147. Phæ. This shall be done. But let us depart, since the heat has become less oppressive.

Socr. Ought we not to go after we have prayed to these gods?

Phæ. How not?