Part 112

Socr. It is necessary, then, that he who means to deceive another, but not be deceived himself, should be able to distinguish with accuracy the similarity and dissimilarity of things.

Phæ. It is indeed necessary.

Socr. Will he be able, then, if ignorant of the truth of each particular thing, to discern the smaller or greater similarity of the thing of which he is ignorant, in other things?

Phæ. Impossible.

Socr. It is clear, therefore, that in the case of those who have formed opinions contrary to the truth and are deceived, this error has found its way in by means of certain resemblances.

99. Phæ. It doubtlessly does happen so.

Socr. Is it possible, then, that one, who is ignorant of what is the nature of each particular thing, should have sufficient art to bring over any one by degrees by leading him through means of resemblances, from each several truth to its opposite, or himself to escape from being so led?

Phæ. Never.

Socr. He therefore, my friend, who does not know the truth, but hunts after opinions, will, as it appears, produce but a ridiculous and inartistic art of speaking.

Phæ. It seems so.

Socr. Are you willing, then, in the speech of Lysias, which you have with you, and in those which I delivered, to look for instances of what I assert is inartistic and artistic?

Phæ. I should like it of all things; for now we are speaking in a bald sort of way, for want of sufficient examples.

100. Socr. And, indeed, by some lucky chance, as it seems, two speeches have been made which furnish examples, of how one who is acquainted with the truth, while he is jesting in his arguments, can lead his hearers astray. And for my part, Phædrus, I attribute that to the deities of the spot. Perhaps, also, the interpreters of the Muses, the songsters over head, have inspired us with this gift; for I at least have no part in any art of speaking.

Phæ. Be it as you say, only make your meaning clear.

Socr. Come then, read out to me the beginning of Lysias’s speech.

100. Phæ. “You are well acquainted with the state of my affairs, and I think you have heard that it would be for our advantage if this took place. And I claim, not for this reason to fail in my request, because I do not happen to be one of your lovers: for they repent”—

Socr. Stop. We are to say, then, in what he errs, and acts inartistically: are we not?

Phæ. Yes.

Socr. Now is it not plain to every one, that in some things of this kind we are agreed, on others at variance?

Phæ. I think I understand what you mean; but explain yourself still more clearly.

Socr. When any one pronounces the word iron or silver, do we not all understand the same thing?

Phæ. Assuredly.

Socr. But what when any one pronounces the word just, or good? are we not carried different ways, and do we not differ both with one another and with ourselves?

Phæ. Certainly.

Socr. In some things, therefore, we agree, in others not.

Phæ. Just so.

Socr. In which class of things, then, are we more easily deceived? and in which of the two has rhetoric greater power?

Phæ. Clearly in that in which we are easily led astray.