CHAPTER II.. Of the Nature of Things Indifferent.

OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.

Sect. 1. To say nothing here of the homonymy of the word indifferent, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of them. Indifferens, saith Calepin, is that quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum. Aquinas(1170) calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est, saith a later writer.(1171)

But Dr Forbesse(1172) liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of God; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of God, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.(1173) The one he calleth bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which God in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

Sect. 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by God. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

Ans. 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that actus individuatur a circumstantus et adjecto modo, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circumstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that actus quo ad speciem is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I go to hear God’s word upon the Lord’s day, let this action of mine be considered quo ad individuum, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman’s action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, etiam quo ad individuum.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, in se? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other than this, quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione specici?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by in se, understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, in se, per se, or sua natura, they mean only things indifferent quo ad speciem. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense, for so we should take his words, quamvis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum.

Sect. 3. But to let his manner of speaking pass, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or quo ad speciem, and likewise respectu adjecti modi, whereas a woman’s action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, respectu modi, for, in se, or, quo ad speciem, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.

Ans. What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions quo ad speciem? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered quo ad individuum.

That whereby the Doctor either was deceived, or would deceive, appeareth to be this: That he taketh everything which agreeth to an individual thing to agree to it quo ad individuum, as if to speak of Peter quatenus est homo, and to speak of him quatenus est individuum signatum, or res singularis sub specie hominis, were all one thing. Even so, to say of my individual action of hearing the word, that it is necessary because of the commandment of God (and in that respect remunerable), is not to speak of it quo ad individuum, but as the specifical nature of that action of hearing the word (which God hath commanded) is found in it; for if we speak of this individual action, quo ad individuum, we cannot consider it otherwise than respectu adjecti modi, because, in moral actions, modus adjectus is principium individuationis, and nothing else doth individualise a moral action.

Sect. 4. Thus shall my position stand good, namely, that those individual actions which the Doctor calleth necessary, because their species is commanded of God, and those individual actions which he calleth indifferent, because their species is not commanded, both being considered quo ad individuum, the former hath no other remunerable good in them than the latter, and the whole remunerable good which is in either of them standeth only in objecto modo; which being so, it is all one when we speak of any individual moral action quo ad individuum, whether we say that it is good, or that it is remunerable and laudable, both are one. For, as is well said by Aquinas,(1177) Necessarium est omnem actum hominis, ut bonum vel malum, culpabilis vel laudabilis rationem habere. And again: Nihil enim est aliud laudari vel culpari, quam imputari alicui malitiam vel bonitatem sui actus; wherefore that distinction of a twofold goodness, causans and concomitans, which the Doctor hath given us, hath no use in this question, because every action is laudable and remunerable which is morally good, whether it be necessary or not. Now moral goodness, saith Scalliger,(1178) est perfectio actus cum recta ratione. Human moral actions are called good or evil, in ordine ad rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, saith Aquinas,(1179) thereupon inferring that illis mores dicuntur boni, qui rationi congruunt; mali autem, qui à ratione discordant. Dr Forbesse doth therefore pervert the question whilst he saith,(1180) in hac cum fratribus quaestione, hoc bonum est quod necessarium. Nay, those actions we call morally good which are agreeable to right reason, whether they be necessary or not. Since, then, those actions are laudable and remunerable which are morally good, and those are morally good which are agreeable to right reason, it followeth, that forasmuch as those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, are agreeable to right reason, they are, therefore, not only morally good, but also laudable and remunerable, and so not indifferent. Yea, those actions which he calleth necessary, being considered quo ad individuum, are no otherwise laudable and remunerable than those which he calleth indifferent, being considered in like manner quo ad individuum, as hath been showed.

Sect. 5. And besides all this, we have somewhat more to say of the Doctor’s speculation about the nature of things indifferent.

For, 1. The Doctor maketh that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary, and yet he maketh both these to be morally good. Now albeit in natural things one good is opponed to another good, as that which is hot to that which is cold, yet bonum bona non contrariatur in moralibus.(1181) The reason of the difference is, because bonitas physica, or relativa est congruentia naturae quaedem, saith Scalliger;(1182) and because two natures may be contrary one to another, therefore the good which is congruous to the one may be contrary to the good which is congruous to the other; but bonum virtutis, saith Aquinas(1183) non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum, scilicet rationem; so that it is impossible for one moral good to be opponed to another.

2. Since divines take a thing indifferent to be medium inter bonum et malum morale; and since (as the very notation of the word showeth) it is such a means as cometh not nearer to the one extreme than to the other, but is alike distant from both, how comes it that the Doctor so far departeth both from the tenet of divines and from the notation of the word, as to call some such actions indifferent as have a moral remunerable goodness, and yet not evil in them? or where learned he such a dialect as giveth to some good things the name of the things indifferent?

3. Why doth he also waver from himself; for he citeth(1184) out of the Helvetic Confessor Jerome’s definition of a thing indifferent, and approveth it. Indifferens, saith he, illud est quod nec bonum nec malum est, ut sive feceris sive non feceris, nec justitiam habeas nec injustitiam. Behold the goodness which is excluded from the nature of a thing indifferent is not only necessity but righteousness also, yet hath the Doctor excluded only the good of necessity from things indifferent, making the other good of righteousness to stand with them; for things which are done in faith, and done for the right end (such as he acknowledgeth these things to be which he calleth indifferent), have righteousness in them, as all men know.